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Abstract			 This	thesis	aims	to	examine	the	connection	between	aesthetic	and	ethical	valuations.		Nietzsche	and	Freud	both	claim	that	values	are	symptoms	of	underlying	psychical	constitutions.		I	elicit	an	original	understanding	of	aesthetic	and	ethical	valuations	through	a	synthesis	of	their	works.			Beginning	with	drive	theory,	I	argue	that	the	death-drive	is	an	entropic	principle	guiding	all	psychical	life.		Another	original	contribution	is	my	conceptualization	of	Eros	as	reducible	to	the	death-drive	as	the	means	by	which	the	death-drive	manifests	itself	as	a	homeodynamic	process	in	open	systems.		I	argue,	fundamentally,	that	the	way	our	drives	are	expressed	in	the	world	entail	vicissitudes	that	are	more	or	less	incorporative	of	stimuli	and	content	as	a	means	of	mastery.		There	is	a	bifurcation	of	drive	expression	concerning	incorporation,	which	I	articulate	as	being	egodystonically	oriented,	as	in	the	case	of	defense	mechanisms;	or	egosyntonically	oriented,	as	in	the	case	of	sublimation.		Sublimation	is	the	only	indirect	vicissitude	that	can	be	regarded	as	egosyntonic	because	it	involves	neither	repression	nor	disavowal.		Unlike	other	vicissitudes,	then,	sublimation	is	the	vicissitude	by	which	Nietzsche’s	emphasis	on	incorporation	is	realized.			Following	my	analysis	of	the	various	vicissitudes,	I	demonstrate	that	there	is	accordingly	a	bifurcation	of	valuations.		While	most	ethical	theories	involve	repudiations	of	self-interest	(our	primary	drives	or	inclinations),	Nietzsche	wants	us	to	return	to	an	incorporation	of	self-interest	and	an	infusion	of	it	into	our	relations.		His	arguments	against	the	ethical	theories	of	Kant	and	Schopenhauer	echo	precisely	his	arguments	against	their	aesthetic	theories	regarding	disinterestedness.		I	thus	discuss	the	ethical	as	a	corollary	of	the	aesthetic.		I	conclude	describing	what	it	means	for	aesthetic	and	ethical	valuations	to	emerge	from	egosyntonic	vicissitudes,	and	I	argue	that	the	Übermensch	is	ultimately	an	archetype	of	egosyntonic	relating.	Nietzsche	illustrates	this	with	the	metaphor	of	dancing.	
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I.	 INTRODUCTION	
	This	thesis	aims	to	elucidate	the	persistent,	historical	associations	of	aesthetic	and	ethical	valuations,	where	beauty	and	the	morally	good	are	either	viewed	as	schematic	of	each	other,	or	one	as	having	a	symbolic	or	analogous	relation	to	the	other.		Beauty,	for	Kant,	is	symbolic	of	the	morally	good,	for	example.		And	for	Wittgenstein,	aesthetics,	like	ethics,	“cannot	be	put	into	words,”	noting,	parenthetically,	“Ethics	and	Aesthetics	are	one	and	the	same.”1	I	look	to	show	how	aesthetics	and	ethics	are	a	concern	for	psychology.		Freud	and	Nietzsche	both	regard	aesthetic	and	ethical	valuations	as	symptomatic	of	our	psychical	constitutions,	and	so	I	turn	to	them	to	examine	the	etiology	of	these	valuations.		Regarding	my	method,	I	seek	to	elicit	new	meaning	and	understanding	of	ethics	and	aesthetics	by	synthesizing	ideas	put	forward	by	Nietzsche	and	Freud,	using	each	to	aid,	and	expand	upon,	the	understanding	of	the	other.		Freud	has	an	unrivaled	description	of	drive	theory	and	defense	mechanisms,	although	much	of	his	own	work	agreed	with	what	Nietzsche	(and	Schopenhauer)	also	expressed.		But	Freud	stops	short	of	having	anything	substantial	to	say	about	ethics	or	aesthetics,	arguing	only	that	it	is	our	defenses	that	inform	various	valuations	of	each.		So,	I	turn	to	Nietzsche	to	pick	up	Freud’s	slack	regarding	aesthetics	and	ethics	after	having	demonstrated	the	philosophical	affinities	of	their	work.		This	is	in	part	possible	
																																																								
1 Wittgenstein, TLP 6.421 
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because	they	both	see	aesthetic	and	ethical	values	as	symptomatic	of	psychodynamic	processes,	and	both	use	retroductive	reasoning	to	arrive	at	explanations	for	phenomena.2		Significantly,	they	both	generally	manage	to	reason	thus	without	succumbing	to	the	fallacy	of	myopic	retrospect.3		I	use	Freud	and	Nietzsche	to	add	clarity	to,	and	complement,	each	other’s	ideas,	as	well	as	to	expand	upon	their	work	with	contemporary	research	in	psychology	and	the	sciences.		My	aim	is	to	procure	a	new	understanding	of	aesthetic	and	ethical	valuations.		In	the	end,	via	Nietzsche,	I	hope	to	also	point	towards	a	potential,	positive	ethics	for	the	future	whilst	demonstrating	that	ethics	is	a	matter	of	aesthetics	and	beautification.	Our	psychical	constitutions	are	largely	formed	by	the	vicissitudes	of	our	drives	and	defense	mechanisms.		For	a	sufficient	analysis	of	the	etiology	of	aesthetic	and	ethical	values,	I	therefore	examine	drive	theory.		Freud	ultimately	saw	drive	theory	as	a	provisional	description	of	motivational	states	by	which	psychology	needed	to	progress	because	neurology	of	his	day	could	not	offer	anything	satisfactory	at	the	time	although	he	nonetheless	subscribed	to	what	is	now	referred	
																																																								2	Charles	Sanders	Pierce	introduced	the	term	‘retroductive’	–	which	he	also	called	‘abductive’	–	to	denote	a	subcategory	of	inductive	reasoning.		A	doctor,	for	example,	uses	retroductive	reasoning	in	diagnosing	possible	underlying	causes	for	observable	symptoms.		Psychoanalysis	is	particularly	engaged	in	retroductive	reasoning.			3	Daniel	Dennett	refers	to	this	fallacy	in	his	book,	Darwin’s	Dangerous	Idea,	pg.	180.		It	is	a	kind	of	“false	cause”	fallacy.		I	believe	Douglas	Adams	provides	the	best	anecdotal	illustration	of	it.	In	a	speech	given	at	Cambridge	University	in	1998,	Adams	personifies	a	puddle	of	water,	saying,	“Imagine	a	puddle	waking	up	one	morning	and	thinking,	‘This	is	an	interesting	world	I	find	myself	in	—	an	interesting	hole	I	find	myself	in	—	fits	me	rather	neatly,	doesn't	it?	In	fact	it	fits	me	staggeringly	well,	it	must	have	been	made	to	have	me	in	it!’,”(Digital	Biota	2,	Cambridge	Speech,	September	1998).		He	thus	argued	against	creationism	or	intelligent	design.	
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to	as	non-reductive	physicalism.4		For	this	reason,	I	reference	contemporary	research	in	neuro-psychoanalysis,	such	as	the	works	by	Jason	Wright	and	Jaak	Panksepp,	Lois	Oppenheim,	and	others.		Doing	so	enables	me	to	show	that	Nietzsche	and	Freud’s	theories	can	be	complemented	by,	and	regarded	in	coherence	with,	contemporary	neurological	research	that	also	reinforces	my	arguments	concerning	drive	theory.	To	help	articulate	drive	theory	in	Freud’s	works,	I	also	reference	Jean	Laplanche’s	masterful	work	Life	and	Death	in	Psychoanalysis	in	which	he	recognized	in	the	death	drive	an	entropic	principle	that	was	in	Freud’s	theory	from	the	beginning.		Laplanche	also	pays	sufficient	attention	to	the	notion	of	anaclisis,	pertaining	to	the	derivation	of	drives	from	instincts,	and	thus	locates	drives	among	our	primal	motivational	states.	Psychical	processes	involve	resolving	psychical	conflicts	by	the	means	of	acquiring	homeostases	in	relation	to	environmental	or	internal	stimuli,	which	is	the	domain	of	Eros.		However,	Freud	also	writes	that	Eros	is	in	the	service	of	the	death	drive,	and	I	argue	that	these	homeodynamic	processes	emerge	through	entropic	processes	in	open	systems.		The	purpose	of	this	argument	is,	first,	to	reduce	Eros	to	a	manifestation	of	the	death	drive,	and	secondly	to	add	credence	to	Freud	and	Nietzsche	who	locate	the	motivational	states	of	sentient	life	in	not	only	sentient	life	but	in	the	organic	and	even	inorganic.		Making	this	argument,	I	rely	on	works	by	the	biophysicist	Arto	Annila,	et	al.,	a	meta-analysis	of	entropy	by	Peter	Weiss,	both	of																																																									4	He	is	“non-reductive”	because	he	believed	a	mere	physical	explanation	probably	couldn’t	suffice	for	therapy	or	for	lived	experiences,	but	he	is	a	“physicalist”	because	he	believed	that	there	was	nonetheless	a	physical	explanation	for	phenomena	and	symptoms.	
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whom	speak	of	how	entropic	processes	can	be	responsible	for	the	generation	of	the	appearance	of	order.		And	I	reference	a	paper,	“Dynamic	Homeostasis”	by	Alfred	Emerson,	who	argues	that	social	systems	emerge	fundamentally	through	homeodynamic	processes.			I	show	parallels	between	Freud	and	Nietzsche	by	referencing	Bataille’s	characterization	of	life	and	socio-economic	systems	in	The	Accursed	Share	as	essentially	requiring	an	expenditure	of	energy.		This	is	one	meeting	point	for	both	Freud	and	Nietzsche	because	Nietzsche	also	regards	nature	as	fundamentally	entailing	an	excess	of	energy	that	requires	expenditure.		Furthermore,	I	draw	attention	to	a	neglected	concept	in	Freud’s	thought,	Bemächtigungstrieb,5	arguing	that	this	should	be	regarded	as	related	to	the	will	to	power	for	sentient	beings.		I	do	this	by	arguing	that	the	task	of	the	psyche	is	essentially	to	master	stimuli,	and	I	explain	this	through	references	to	the	efficacy	of	Imagery	Rehearsal	Therapy	for	PTSD,	a	“disorder”	which	Freud	addressed	when	introducing	the	death	drive	explicitly	in	Beyond	the	Pleasure	Principle.		I	reference	research	done	by	Carl	Nappi	and	Melynda	Casement.		I	argue	against	the	exposition	of	the	Will	to	Power	by	Maudemarie	Clark	in	her	book,	Nietzsche	on	Truth	and	Philosophy,	and	in	doing	so	argue	against	conflating	desire	and	propositional	attitudes	with	motivational	states.		I	also	reference	the	book	Nietzsche:	Naturalism	and	Interpretation	by	Christoph	Cox	to	help	clarify	Nietzsche’s	conceptualization	of	the	will	to	power	and	later,	when	discussing	creativity,	regarding	the	notion	of	interpretation.	
																																																								5	I	reference	a	paper	by	Kristin	White,	who	points	out	the	significance	and	neglect	of	this	concept.	
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I	conclude	my	reconceptualization	of	the	death	drive	and	drive	theory	by	affirming	the	death	drive	as	a	metonym	describing	entopic	psychical	trends	from	which	Eros	emerges.		Eros	is	nothing	more	than	a	detour	of	the	death	drive.		Eros	compromises	the	original	“aim”	(zero)	with	one	of	homeostasis.		The	same	homeodynamic	trend	is	also	identified	as	the	will	to	power	by	Nietzsche.		My	second	task	is	to	examine	the	ways	in	which	drives	structure	our	psychical	constitutions.		Our	vicissitudes	of	drives	are	the	“paths”	by	which	our	drives	are	expressed.		They	are	the	detours	of	the	death	drive	located	in	Eros.		Our	vicissitudes	are	the	ways	by	which	we	relate	to	ourselves	and	to	our	world,	conditioning	our	reception	of	every	eliciting	situation	and	further	structuring	and	organizing	our	relations.		For	example,	I	might	relate	to	the	world	by	disavowing	or	seeking	to	destroy	this	or	that	aspect	of	it;	I	might	relate	to	the	world	by	repressing	this	or	that	drive	that	seeks	satisfaction	in	it.		Our	vicissitudes	are	the	means	by	which	we	engage	with	the	world	and	with	our	selves.		Every	defense	mechanism	depends	upon	a	particular	vicissitude,	while	each	defense	can	be	a	particular	means	by	which,	or	in	which,	a	vicissitude	is	undergone.		For	example,	intellectualization	is	a	defense	that	depends	upon	the	vicissitude	of	repression	for	its	enactment.		To	begin	the	discussion	of	vicissitudes,	I	reference	work	done	on	defense	mechanisms	by	George	Valliant,	upon	whose	research	the	psychiatric	Diagnostic	and	Statistics	Manual’s	account	of	defenses	strongly	relied.	Significantly,	I	argue	that	our	vicissitudes	bifurcate	according	to	the	repudiation	or	incorporation	of	stimuli	or	content.		I	articulate	the	bifurcation	using	the	terms	“egodystonic,”	in	the	case	of	repudiation;	or	“egosyntonic,”	in	the	case	of	
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incorporation.		Aside	from	Valliant,	I	rely	mostly	on	the	works	of	Freud	and	the	book	
The	Language	of	Psychoanalysis,	by	Laplanche	and	Pontalis,	to	articulate	and	distinguish	the	various	vicissitudes	and	defenses.		I	demonstrate	that	the	only	vicissitude	that	can	be	regarded	as	egosyntonic	is	sublimation	because	it	involves	neither	repression	nor	disavowal.6		For	this	assertion,	I	reference	the	book	
Sublimation,	by	Hans	Loewald,	as	well	as	works	by	Donald	Winnicott,	Anna	Freud,	and	Silvano	Arieti.		I	also	reference	Ken	Gemes’	paper,	“Freud	and	Nietzsche	on	Sublimation,”	to	elucidate	the	meeting	point	of	Freud	and	Nietzsche’s	notions	of	Sublimation.		Freud	presented	Leonardo	da	Vinci	as	an	exemplar	of	sublimation,	and	I	argue	against	this	because	Leonardo	exemplifies	failures	of	incorporation	(“obsessional-neuroses”	specifically).7		I	thus	also	need	to	argue	that	creativity	is	possible	without	sublimation,	or	that	egodystonic	vicissitudes	can	be	responsible	for	prized	cultural	artifacts.		I	make	this	point	referencing	research	on	creativity	and	defense	mechanisms	done	by	George	Domino	and	Ingegerd	Carlsson.			Bringing	Nietzsche	into	the	discussion	of	creativity	that	began	in	the	chapter	on	Leonardo,	I	examine	the	ways	in	which	the	will	to	power	is	fundamentally	a	creative	force,	and	that	our	interpretations	are	essentially	products	of	that	force	–	of	the	vicissitudes	of	our	drives.		Interpretation	is	thus	an	artistic	product.		I	reference	Alexander	Nehamas’	work	Nietzsche:	Life	as	Literature,	with	which	I	am	in																																																									6	I	do	admit	that	a	direct	expression	of	a	drive	can	be	regarded	as	egosyntonic,	but	a	direct	expression	is	also	involved	in	aggression	or	disavowals	(the	latter	entailing	delusions),	and	therefore	cannot	itself	be	regarded	as	an	egosyntonic	vicissitude.		Sublimation,	on	the	other	hand,	is	always	egosyntonic.	7	Gemes	also	astutely	points	out	Loewald’s	troublesome	concept	of	“Internalization,”	which,	as	articulated	by	Loewald,	can	contradict	Loewald’s	own	account	of	Sublimation.		I	address	this	issue	prior	to	addressing	reaction-formation.	
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agreement	on	two	fronts:	first,	the	aestheticism	of	Nietzsche’s	philosophy;	and	secondly,	his	emphasis	on	incorporation.		In	the	chapters	“The	Will	to	Power	as	Artistry”	and	“Interpretation	as	art,”	and	later	in	the	final	chapter	“Amor	Fati:	an	Imperative	to	Dance,”	I	reference	this	text	to	reinforce	my	assertion	that	interpretations	are	creative	products,	and	some	interpretations	are	better	than	others	owing	to	the	degree	to	which	an	interpretation	can	incorporate	various	stimuli	or	content.		This	is	addressed	in	conjunction	with	the	book	by	Christoph	Cox,	which	I	mentioned	above,	in	which	Cox	argues	that	Nietzsche	is	an	ontological	relativist,	and	according	to	his	philosophy	there	is	no	reality8	outside	of	interpretation	of	that	reality.	Another	focus	of	my	argument,	for	which	I	use	Nietzsche	and	Freud,	demonstrates	that	the	ground	of	aesthetic	and	ethical	valuations	are	irrational	rather	than	rational.		They	are	psychologically	determined.		Sebastian	Gardner’s	book,	Irrationality	and	the	Philosophy	of	Psychoanalysis,	is	also	informative	here.		This	issue	also	concerns	the	frequent	allusion	to	‘disinterest’	made	by	Kant,	and	which	I	believe	is	meant	to	be	indicative	of	judgments	that	are	objective	and	rational,	untainted	by	subjective	inclinations.		I	demonstrate	the	irrational,	interested	component	by	looking	at	aesthetics	and	refer	to	passages	in	Stendhal’s	book,	Love,	which	greatly	influenced	Nietzsche’s	articulation	of	beauty	as	something	deeply	interested.			The	third	section	of	my	thesis	involves	the	symptoms	of	our	psychical	constitutions:	aesthetic	and	ethical	values.		I	contrast	Nietzsche’s	position	with	that																																																									8	This	is	in	contrast	to	the	realist	interpretations	of	Nietzsche	put	forth	by	Clark	and	Leiter.	
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of	Kant	and	Schopenhauer	and	demonstrate	the	bifurcation	mentioned	above.		The	same	bifurcation	is	illustrated	by	Nietzsche	aesthetically,	whereas	he	argues	that	differences	between	the	psychical	constitution	of	the	Übermensch	and	the	slave	spirit	obtain	different	valuations,	such	that	what	is	beautiful	for	the	one	would	not	be	beautiful	for	the	other.		The	strength	of	the	Übermensch	to	incorporate	various	stimuli	is	the	distinguishing	factor,	whereas	the	psychical	weakness	of	the	fettered	spirit	conditions	its	inability	to	incorporate	stimuli	and	therefore	results	in	its	repression	or	disavowal	as	well	as	is	corresponding	valuations.	Our	aesthetic	encounter	involves	what	Nietzsche	refers	to	as	‘instinctive	judgments’,	whereby	we	evolved	to	instinctively	proclaim	something	to	be	agreeable	or	disagreeable	because	of	that	something’s	historical	beneficence	or	detriment	to	us	throughout	our	evolution.	The	immediate	encounter	with	the	world	is	aesthetic,	so	that	our	first	encounters	involve	an	aesthetic	relation	of	pleasure	or	unpleasure	which	then	structure	our	vicissitudes.		Our	vicissitudes	are	our	initial	means	of	repudiation	or	of	mastering	the	eliciting	situations	of	our	aesthetic	experiences.			I	reference	work	on	the	Sublime	by	Keith	Ansell-Pearson	and	the	Dionysian	by	Gregory	Moore.		However,	I	also	look	to	argue	against	the	postmodern	reception	of	Nietzsche	that	privileges	the	sublime.		In	doing	so,	I	argue	that	Nietzsche	privileges	Beauty	over	the	Sublime,	as	the	creation	of	meaning	and	the	giving	of	form	or	style	to	what	is	otherwise	formless	and	incoherent	or	dissonant.		For	this	purpose,	I	reference	Nietzsche,	Aesthetics	and	Modernity	by	Matthew	Rampley,	and	“Postmodernism’s	Use	and	Abuse	of	Nietzsche”	by	Ken	Gemes,	both	of	whom	argue	
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against	the	postmodernist	interpretation	of	Nietzsche.		Gemes’	account	complements	my	own	where	I	argue	that	beauty	is	privileged	precisely	because	it	is	indicative	of	the	homeostatic	trend	in	psychical	life,	the	generation	of	order.		With	Gemes,	I	also	argue	against	modernist	interpretations	that	finds	nostalgia	in	beauty,	which	would	indicate	an	egodystonic	orientation	exemplified	by	fixation	and	fantasy.	The	same	bifurcation	in	aesthetic	valuation	is	seen	ethically,	pertaining	to	interest	and	disinterest,	in	such	a	way	that	the	ethical	merely	echoes	what	was	observed	aesthetically.		Ethics	can	thus	be	regarded	as	schematic	of	aesthetics.		The	same	contrast	is	made	between	Nietzsche	and	Schopenhauer,	and	Nietzsche	and	Kant,	as	was	made	previously	discussing	aesthetics.		I	further	bring	this	topic	into	a	discussion	of	contemporary	philosophy	by	referencing	Carol	Gilligan’s	In	a	Different	
Voice.		I	argue	her	ethics	of	care	is	correct	to	be	based	on	empirical	feeling,	but	I	argue	it	is	dangerously	close	to	Schopenhauer’s	account,	which	promotes	selflessness	and	an	opposition	to	suffering.		I	reference	contemporary	research	in	psychology	done	by	Jonathan	Haidt	to	demonstrate	the	irrational	and	empirical	ground	of	ethics.		But,	unlike	Haidt,	I	argue	that	the	ground	is	aesthetic	rather	than	“intuitive,”9	which	should	have	already	become	apparent	by	this	point.		Interestingly,	research	by	Haidt	also	demonstrates	that	aesthetic	responses	influence	our	ethical	judgments.		Furthermore,	I	reference	Walter	Kaufmann’s	account	of	morality	and	sublimation	in	Nietzsche’s	work	to	
																																																								9	Or	rather,	I	argue	in	line	with	Haidt,	but	argue	that	what	he	refers	to	as	“intuition”	is	actually	an	aesthetic	ground.	
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clarify	that	Nietzsche’s	‘positive’	ethics	would	require	overcoming	or	mastering	what	is	disagreeable	(disgusting)	through	sublimation,	by	beautifying	existence.	The	Übermensch	is	characterized	throughout	the	thesis	as	one	who	is	able	to	incorporate	stimuli	because	it	relates	to	itself	and	the	world	egosyntonically.		I	demonstrate	that	dance	is	Nietzsche’s	metaphor	for	egosyntonic	relating	in	that	it	requires	an	attunement	to	corporeality	–	one’s	bodily	senses,	motivational	states,	and	encounters	with	the	world.		I	reference	Claudia	Crawford’s	paper,	“Nietzsche’s	Dionysian	Arts,”	to	articulate	this	point.		And	to	drive	it	home	I	relate	this	to	the	first	claim	of	my	thesis	by	referencing	the	book	by	Lois	Oppenheim,	A	Curious	Intimacy:	
Art	and	Neuro-Psychoanalysis,	in	which	she	speaks	of	dance.		Oppenheim	argues	that	dance	is	a	special	performative	art	that	is	intimately	involved	with	the	embodied	homeodynamic	processes	of	our	psyche.			My	claim	is	that	all	of	our	means	of	relating	are	aesthetically	grounded,	structured	by	our	vicissitudes,	and	we	characterize	the	action	in	those	relations	as	a	matter	of	ethics,	such	that	ethics	is	nothing	else	but	performance	art.		Sublimation	is	essentially	a	self-interested	activity.		It	is	only	creative	weakness	and	impotence	that	demands	the	sacrifice	of	one’s	interests	or	the	interests	of	others.		In	other	words,	I	show,	using	Nietzsche’s	metaphor	of	dance,	how	a	positive	ethics	for	the	future	is	an	aesthetic	endeavor	that	involves	beautification	by	sublimation.		What	is	beautiful	and	what	is	good	are	valuations	conditioned	by	homeodynamic	trends	of	psychical	life,	all	serving	the	death	drive.		To	live	well	ultimately	requires	sublimating	the	death	drive.		
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II.	 DRIVE	THEORY	
Introducing	the	Concepts	
My	argument	begins	with	how	to	conceptualize	the	death	drive	specifically,	and	then	the	nature	of	drives	generally.		But	some	preliminary	remarks	on	what	a	drive	is	are	necessary.		In	Instincts	and	their	Vicissitudes,	Freud	proposes	a	dualistic	conception	of	drives:	“The	ego,	or	self-preservative,	[drives]	and	the	sexual	[drives].”		However,	he	quickly	adds,	“It	is	a	working	hypothesis,	to	be	retained	only	so	long	as	it	proves	useful.”10		Of	course,	Freud	does	not	retain	this	conceptualization	for	too	long.		In	just	five	years,	he	combines	them	into	one	category	–	Eros	–	but	stubbornly	maintains	a	duality	by	introducing	the	death	drive,	which	is	meant	to	represent	what	is	“beyond	the	pleasure	principle”	when	Freud	became	aware	that	the	psyche	does	not	operate	strictly	according	to	the	procurement	of	pleasure	and	avoidance	of	unpleasure.			Freud	continues,	“I	am	altogether	doubtful	whether	any	decisive	pointers	for	the	differentiation	and	classification	of	the	[drives]	can	be	arrived	at	on	the	basis	of	working	over	the	psychological	material.”11		Thus,	the	classifications	he	gives	are	not	only	provisionary,	but	he’s	not	sure	what	kinds	of	drives,	or	how	many,	belong	in	each	classification.		He	does	write,	however,	that	the	“sexual	[drives]”	are	“numerous”	and	“emanate	from	a	great	variety	of	organic	sources,	act	in	the	first	instance	independently	of	one	another	and	only	achieve	a	more	or	less	complete	
																																																								10	Freud,	Instincts,	pg.	124	11	Freud,	Instincts,	pg.	124	
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synthesis	at	a	later	stage.”12		The	sexual	drives	are,	at	least	originally,	multiple	and	only	synthesize	into	coherent	or	unified	aims	later.		The	first	order	of	business	in	discussing	the	death	drive	is	to	demarcate	the	distinction	between	a	“drive”	(Trieb)	and	an	“instinct”	(Instinkt).		In	his	book	Life,	
Death	and	Psychoanalysis,	Laplanche	first	tackles	the	distinction	etymologically,	pointing	out	that	the	“…	two	terms	in	Freud’s	scientific	discovery	[comprise]	an	
analogy,	a	difference,	and	also	a	derivation	from	one	to	the	other.		This	is	a	derivation	which	is	not	simply	conceptual,	but	which	we	may	…	relate	to	a	real	derivation:	the	derivation	in	man	of	drives	from	instincts.”13		This	refers	to	the	anaclitic	relation	of	a	drive	to	an	instinct,	where	a	drive	is	derived	from	sensual	pleasure	in	the	feeding	function	of	the	instinct	to	feed	between	the	infant	and	the	mother	(or	her	breast	and/or	milk).		He	then	goes	on	to	define	an	instinct	per	Freud’s	usage,	being	a	“performed	behavioral	pattern,	whose	arrangement	is	determined	hereditarily	and	which	is	repeated	according	to	modalities	relatively	adapted	to	a	certain	type	of	object.”14		So,	with	an	instinct,	there	is	an	inherited	behavioral	pattern	and,	significantly,	a	specified	object	or	group	of	objects.15	Following	Freud’s	formulation	in	Instincts	and	their	vicissitudes,	Laplanche	notes	that	there	are	four	aspects	to	a	drive:	its	Impetus	(Drang),	its	aim	(Ziel),	its	object	(Objekt),	and	its	source	(Quelle).16		This	generalization	of	the	aspects	of	a	drive,	Laplanche	recognizes,	“allows	them	to	be	applied	to	both	instincts	and																																																									12	Freud,	Instincts,	pg.	125	13	Laplanche,	Life	and	Death,	pg.	10	14	Laplanche,	Life	and	Death,	pg.	10	15	This	“specific	object”	bears	relation	to	what	Freud	writes	in	the	Project,	claiming	that	a	“specific	action”	is	necessitating	by	the	“exigencies	of	life.”	16	Laplanche,	Life	and	Death,	pg.	10	
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drives.”17		This	is	the	point	of	analogy.		The	difference	and	the	derivation	that	Laplanche	recognizes	between	the	two	terms	is	in	the	fact	that	a	“local	biological	stimulus	finds	its	delegation,	its	‘representation’	in	psychical	life	as	a	drive.”18		A	further	difference	is	presented	when	Laplanche	observes	whether	or	not	the	name	“drive	is	in	fact	properly	applied”	to	the	discussions	of	“ego-drives”	and	“self-preservative	drives.”19		This	will	become	clearer	further	on	in	the	discussion	of	the	evolution	of	drive	theory	within	Freud’s	own	thought.		We	have	arrived	at	a	difference	between	an	inherited,	biological	impetus	with	a	particular	aim,	a	(somewhat)	particular	object,	and	a	somatic	source;	and	the	psychical	manifestation	or	derivation	of	such	with	a	rather	contingent	or	arbitrary	object	as	the	means	towards	an	abstract,	generalized	aim	of	satisfaction.		But	the	source	of	both	is,	for	Freud,	“a	theoretically	knowable	somatic	process,	whose	psychical	translation	would	in	fact	be	the	drive.”20		Laplanche	concludes	his	analysis	of	Freud’s	discussions	of	instincts	and	drives	observing	that	the	“source”	of	a	drive	is	in	fact	the	instinct.		He	writes,	“It	is	the	instinct	in	its	entirety.		The	entire	instinct	with	its	own	‘source,’	‘impetus,’	‘aim,’	and	‘object,’	as	we	have	defined	them;	the	instinct	…	is	in	turn	the	source	of	a	process	which	mimics,	displaces,	and	denatures	it:	the	drive.”21		What	Laplanche	observes	is	that	the	drives,	at	this	point	in	Freud’s	
																																																								17	Laplanche,	Life	and	Death,	pg.	13	18	Laplanche,	Life	and	Death,	pg.	13	19	Laplanche,	Life	and	Death,	pg	13	20	Laplanche,	Life	and	Death,	pg	12	21	Laplanche,	Life	and	Death,	pg	22	
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work,	actually	emerge	from	the	instincts.22		For	this	reason,	it	is	important	to	make	that	distinction	and	read	‘Trieb’	as	‘drive’.				 This	brings	us	to	what	is	referred	to,	in	the	English	translation	edited	by	James	Strachey,	as	the	anaclitic	relation.		Anaclisis	is	translated	from	the	German	word	Anlehnung,	and	is	properly	understood	as	a	‘propping	upon’	or	a	‘leaning	on’.		In	relation	to	sexuality,	Laplanche	writes	that	anaclisis	“implies	that	sexuality	…	emerges	from	nonsexual,	instinctual	activities:	organ	pleasure	from	functional	pleasure,”	as	in	the	case	of	feeding.23		In	other	words,	what	occurs	is	that	organ	pleasure,	such	as	the	stimulation	of	the	lips	in	a	process	of	feeding,	becomes	associated	with	the	instinctual	activity	of	feeding.		The	drive	forms	as	an	impetus	towards	the	pleasure	in	satisfaction	derived	from	the	object	and	from	the	activity	itself.			Laplanche	observes	that	it	is	a	quite	overlooked	aspect	of	psychoanalytic	theory.		We	are	hereditarily	given	various	instincts,	but	we	are	not	born	with	drives,	only	the	potential	for	them;	instead,	drives	develop	according	to	our	relations	with	the	world.		Sexual	objects	are	“derived	…	from	experiences	of	satisfaction,”24	writes	Freud.		“The	first	auto-erotic	sexual	satisfactions	are	experienced	in	connection	with	vital	functions	which	serve	the	purpose	of	self	preservation”	so	that	the	“sexual	[drives]	are	at	the	outset	attached	to	the	satisfaction	of	the	ego-instincts;	only	later	to	they	become	independent	of	these.”25		The	point	at	hand	is	that	the	drive	forms	in																																																									22	An	important	note	is	that	Laplanche	has	only	been	dealing	thus	far	with	Freud’s	corpus	prior	to	the	introduction	of	the	death	drive	in	1920.	23	Laplanche,	Life	and	Death,	pg.	87	24	Freud,	On	Narcissism,	pg.	87	25	Freud,	On	Narcissism,	pg.	87	
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an	anaclitic	relation	to	what	are	referred	to	as	“instinctual	activities,”	and	must	therefore	be	distinguished	although	the	relation	is,	in	the	beginning,	quite	an	intimate	one.		They	acquire	their	independence	through	the	experience	of	sensual	pleasure	–	e.g.,	the	stimulation	of	the	lips	in	feeding	–	and	henceforth	“drives”	should	be	regarded	as	aiming	at	the	same,	or	an	associated,	sensual	pleasure.		The	erotogenic	zones	that	Freud	identifies	are	the	oral,	anal,	and	phallic	sources,	those	which	provide	the	infant	with	sensual	‘pleasures’	and	stimulations	and	are	generally	the	main	somatic	‘sources’	of	drives.		
A	Genealogy	of	Drive-Theory	within	Freud’s	works	
There	is	essentially	nothing	new	put	forward	by	Freud	in	Beyond	in	terms	of	concepts	or	content;	rather,	all	that	has	seemed	new	to	many	scholars,	whether	a	notion	of	aggressivity	or	the	repetition	compulsion,	had	been	addressed	by	Freud	in	previous	works.26		What	is	new	is	Freud’s	articulation	of	drive	theory	and	his	recognition	that	the	phenomena	of	‘pleasure’	and	‘unpleasure’	might	be	more	complicated	than	originally	supposed.	In	The	Project	for	a	Scientific	Psychology,	Freud	introduced	two	“principles,”	which	he	referred	to	as	the	“principle	of	neuronal	inertia”	and	the	“constancy	principle.”		He	writes	in	the	Project,	“This	is	the	principle	of	neuronal	inertia:	that	neurons	tend	to	divest	themselves	of	[quantity].”27		He	goes	on	to	note	differences																																																									26	Freud	had	explicitly	addressed	the	repetition	compulsion	and	the	death	drive	already	a	year	later	in	The	Uncanny,	but	each	is	only	a	different	articulation,	perhaps	a	mild	variation,	of	concepts	previously	proposed.	27	Freud,	Project,	pg.	296.	
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between	external	stimuli,	which	would	entail	a	“flight	from	stimulus,”28	and	internal	stimuli,	which	he	calls	endogenous	stimuli,	from	which	“the	organism	cannot	withdraw	as	it	does	from	external	stimuli,”29	and	where	the	“individual	is	being	subjected	to	conditions	which	may	be	described	as	the	exigencies	of	life.”		An	example	of	such	exigencies	is	hunger,	which	requires	a	specific	action	such	as	taking	in	nourishment.30		Endogenous	stimuli	are	thus	regarded	as	instincts	(or	later,	drives).		This	requires,	however,	that	the	organism	maintain	a	sufficient	quantity	of	energy	so	as	to	be	able	to	execute	the	specific	action.		And	so	Freud	concludes,	“In	consequence,	the	nervous	system	is	obliged	to	abandon	its	original	trend	to	inertia…”	and	instead,	“the	manner	in	which	it	[maintains	a	sufficient	quantity	for	the	specific	action]	shows	that	the	same	trend	persists,	modified	into	an	endeavor	at	least	to	keep	the	[quantity]	as	low	as	possible	…	--	to	keep	it	constant.”31		This	is	also	where	he	divides	the	primary	and	secondary	processes.	Laplanche	also	observes,	“As	early	as	the	Project	for	a	Scientific	Psychology,	the	distinction	between	the	two	principles	that	will	later	appear	in	the	form	of	the	Nirvana	principle	and	the	constancy	principle	is	clearly	posited.”32		The	Nirvana	principle	would	correspond	to	Freud’s	“principle	of	inertia”	in	the	Project,	which	Laplanche	accurately	depicts	thus:	a) free	energy,	tending	towards	discharge	by	the	shortest	paths;																																																									28	Freud,	Project,	pg.	296	29	Freud,	Project,	pg.	297	30	Freud,	Project,	pg.	297	31	Freud,	Project,	pg.	297	32	Laplanche,	Life	and	Death	in	Psychoanalysis,	pg.	116	
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b) the	primary	process;	c) the	pleasure	(or	unpleasure)	principle:	‘Since	we	have	certain	knowledge	of	a	trend	in	psychical	life	towards	avoiding	unpleasure,	we	are	tempted	to	identify	that	trend	with	the	primary	trend	towards	inertia.		In	that	case	
unpleasure	would	coincide	with	a	rise	in	the	level	of	quantity	or	with	a	quantitative	increase	of	pressure…	Pleasure	would	be	the	sensation	of	discharge.’33				In	other	words,	pleasure	is	here	procured	through	discharge.		By	contrast	to	this,	the	constancy	principle	might	be	presented	as:	a) bound	energy,	tending	towards	homeostasis	or	stability	by	maintaining	quantity	at	a	minimum;	b) the	secondary	process;	c) the	avoidance	of	unpleasure.		In	other	words,	pleasure	is	here	procured	through	avoidance	and	the	maintenance	of	a	constant	level	(quantity)	of	energy	capable	of	‘dealing	with’	external	and	internal	stimuli.34		Laplanche	writes,	‘This	tendency	to	a	complete	discharge,	to	inertia,	to	a	zero	level	will	be	constantly	asserted	throughout	Freudian	theory;	first	…	under	the	name	of	the	principle	of	neuronal	inertia;	soon	thereafter	under	the	term	of	‘pleasure	principle’;	finally	as	the	Nirvana	principle	or	the	principle	of	the	death	drive.”35		In	
Beyond,	Laplanche	observes,	“The	term	‘pleasure	principle’	…	with	its	modification	as	the	reality	principle,”	becomes	“situated	on	the	side	of	constancy.		It	is	‘its	most	radical	form’	or	it’s	‘beyond’	which,	as	the	Nirvana	principle,	reasserts	itself	as	the	
																																																								33	Laplanche,	Life	and	Death,	pg.	116	34	Freud,	Project,	pg.	54,	(outlined	by	myself)	35	Laplanche,	Life	and	Death,	pg.	57	
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tendency	towards	absolute	zero	or	the	‘death	drive’.”36		In	other	words,	it	becomes	associated	with	the	secondary	process.		And	the	death	drive,	following	the	Nirvana	principle,	picks	up	the	primary	process	of	a	complete	discharge	of	energy.		Hans	Loewald	observes	that	in	the	Economic	Problem	of	Masochism,	Freud	identifies	“three	different	aims”	concerning	the	vicissitudes	of	drives.		These	aims,	he	writes,	“correspond	to	the	three	principles	involved.”		They	are	the	“Nirvana	principle,”	which	is	“a	quantitative	reduction	of	the	stimulus	load;”	the	“pleasure	principle,”	which	is	a	“qualitative	characteristic	of	[the	Nirvana	principle];”	and	the	reality	principle,	which	is	a	“temporal	deferment	of	the	discharge	of	the	stimulus	and	a	temporary	acquiescence	in	the	unpleasure	of	tension.”37		And	so,	what	follows	are	merely	new	articulations	of	the	characteristics	that	manifest	themselves	from	original	principles	of	Freud’s	thought.	Between	the	works	of	the	Project	and	Beyond,	most	notably	in	the	Three	
Essays,	On	Narcissism,	and	Instincts	and	their	Vicissitudes,	Freud’s	formulation	of	drive	theory	changes	a	bit.		Here,	he	tries	to	explain	the	psychical	conflict	of	his	patients	by	maintaining	a	duality	–	an	opposition	–	of	self-preservative	and	sexual	drive	forces	at	work	within	the	psyche,	a	duality	he	stubbornly	maintains	at	every	turn	until	the	end.		He	differentiates	them	because,	in	the	former,	one	seeks	to	preserve	one’s	self	at	all	costs,	whereas	in	the	latter	–	the	sex	drives	–	one	can	risk	even	death	in	the	acquisition	of	their	aim,	dying	for	the	object	of	one’s	desire.	In	On	Narcissism,	which	Laplanche	observes	is	a	pivotal	point	in	Freud’s	work,	Freud	writes	that	there	is	an	“original	libidinal	cathexis	of	the	ego,	from	which																																																									36	Laplanche,	Life	and	Death,	pg.	117	37	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	28	
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some	is	later	given	off	to	objects,”38	and	“not	until	there	is	an	object-cathexis	is	it	possible	to	discriminate	a	sexual	energy	–	the	libido	–	from	an	energy	of	the	ego-instincts.”39		He	then	expands	upon	the	distinction,	writing,	“The	individual	does	actually	carry	on	a	twofold	existence:	one	to	serve	his	own	purposes	and	the	other	…	which	he	serves	against	his	will…”	where	sexuality	provides	“the	extension	of	individual	life	into	that	of	the	species.”40		In	other	words,	there	are	instincts	that	seek	to	preserve	the	individual	and	drives,	originally	derived	from	such	instincts,	which	will	risk	the	individual	for	the	fulfillment	of	their	aim.	When	we	reach	Beyond	the	Pleasure	Principle,	the	sex	drives	and	the	self-preservative	instincts	are	united	into	a	category	of	bound	energy	–	Eros	–	and	the	death	drive	is	introduced	so	as	to	describe	what	is	unheimlich	–	unhomely	or	uncanny	–	about	the	psyche	and	in	psychoanalysis	itself,	a	continual	repetition	of	behaviors	that	are	felt	as	unpleasurable	and	thus	cannot	be	explained	by	the	pleasure	principle	simply	put.		
A	Neurological	basis	
It	is	important	to	note	that	Freud’s	education	was	in	neurology	of	his	time.		But	while	a	neurologist,	he	saw	that	the	explanations	that	neuroscience	had	to	offer	were	inadequate	to	deal	with	the	mental	ailments	of	people	he	wanted	to	treat.		He	even	advised	other	analysts	not	to	base	research	on	the	neurosciences,	despite	psychoanalysis’	origin	in	such,	for	no	quick	progress	could	be	made	because																																																									38	Freud,	On	Narcissism,	pg.	75	39	Freud,	On	Narcissism,	pg.	76	40	Freud,	On	Narcissism,	pg.	78	
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knowledge	of	the	brain	was	wholly	insufficient,	and	could	therefore	pose	a	risk	to	the	emerging	field	of	psychology	or	the	patients	themselves.		Even	still,	he	yet	entertained	a	view	that	could	be	described	today	as	non-reductive	physicalism.		He	writes	in	a	late	work	An	Outline	of	Psychoanalysis:	We	know	two	kinds	of	things	about	what	we	call	our	psyche	(or	mental	life):	firstly,	…	the	brain	(or	nervous	system)	and,	on	the	other	hand,	our	acts	of	consciousness,	which	are	immediate	data	and	cannot	be	further	explained	by	any	sort	of	description.		Everything	that	lies	between	is	unknown	to	us,	and	the	data	do	not	include	any	direct	relation	between	these	two	terminal	points	of	our	knowledge.		If	it	existed,	it	would	at	the	most	afford	an	exact	location	of	the	processes	of	consciousness	and	would	give	us	no	help	towards	understanding	them.41		Thus	while	Freud	acknowledges	that	neuroscience	can	demonstrate	an	underlying	process	that	corresponds	to	consciousness	and	lived	experience,	it	is	insufficient	to	account	for	lived	experiences	even	if	a	complete,	neurological	picture	were	to	be	given.		Thus,	psychoanalysis	has	had	to	progress	through	mostly	qualitative	observations.		Freud	appears	adamant,	however,	that	a	physical,	quantitative	explanation	is	nonetheless	behind	lived	experiences.42	Neuro-psychoanalysis	regards	drives	and	motivational	behavior	as	originating	in	what	it	refers	to	as	the	limbic	or	dopaminergic	system	of	the	brain.		This	system	has,	from	Pavlov	on	through	contemporary	times,	been	referred	to	as																																																									41	Freud,	An	Outline	of	Psychoanalysis,	pp.	144-145	42	Throughout	Freud’s	corpus,	and	at	several	moments	in	the	above	mentioned	work,	he	speaks	of	the	relationship	between	quantity	and	quality,	seeing	psychology	as	being	justified	in	progressing	qualitatively	because	quantity	is	responsible	for	the	quality,	but	also	that	psychology	should	not	disengage	from	quantity	altogether	and	must,	at	some	point,	insure	coherence	of	explanations.	
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the	‘Brain	reward	system’.		In	an	article	titled	“An	evolutionary	Framework	to	Understand	Foraging,	Wanting,	and	Desire:	the	Neuropsychology	of	the	SEEKING	system,”	Jason	S.	Wright	and	Jaak	Panksepp	argue	that	viewing	the	neurological	system	as	a	“brain	reward	system”	is	misleading	and	produces	misconceptions	of	what	this	area	of	the	brain	actually	influences.		As	a	“Brain	reward	system,”	a	subject	is	said	to	engage	in	a	certain	behavior	because	it	has	somehow	associated	the	behavior	with	some	reward.		Classical	conditioning,	as	exemplified	by	Pavlov’s	dog	or	Skinner’s	pigeons,	are	examples	of	this	view.		They	argue	instead	that	a	“SEEKING	view	provides	a	more	coherent	understanding	of	how	this	emotional	system	generates	joie	de	vivre	as	well	as	many	psychiatrically	relevant	vicissitudes	of	excessive	motivational	‘drive.’”43	Wright	and	Panksepp	observe	that	evidence	for	a	SEEKING	system	rather	than	a	brain	reward	system	began	to	emerge	in	the	1970’s	concerning	experiments	on	the	hypothalamuses	of	rats	stimulated	with	electrodes.44		The	consequent	behavior	displayed	by	the	rats	involved	chewing	on	sticks,	drinking	water,	eating	food,	or	just	sniffing	around	their	enclosure.45		In	one	experiment,	rats	exemplified	‘hoarding’	behavior,	gathering	and	collecting	but	not	eating	nuts	that	had	been	laid	out	in	an	attached	but	separate	enclosure.46		Furthermore,	and	with	continued	stimulation,	“if	an	experimenter	removes	the	sticks	from	chewers’,	…	those	rats	gradually	begin	to	display	another	behavior,	be	it	drinking,	gnawing,	or	merely	types	
																																																								43	Wright	&	Panksepp,	Evolutionary	Framework,	pg.	5	44		Wright	&	Panksepp,	Evolutionary	Framework,	pp.	12	-	16	45	Wright	&	Panksepp,	Evolutionary	Framework,	pg.	16	46	Wright	&	Panksepp,	Evolutionary	Framework.	pg.	12	
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of	active	exploration,	etc.”47		This	corresponds	to	the	‘arbitrariness’	of	the	object	of	a	drive	in	Freudian	theory,	where	a	drive,	inhibited	in	satisfaction	of	one	object,	can	find	an	object	to	substitute	the	original.			Further	asserting	the	more	conceptually	integrative	potential	of	a	SEEKING	system,	Wright	and	Panksepp	write,	“Animals	indulged	in	consuming	rewards	tend	to	settle	down,”	and	“…	there	are	both	semantic	and	scientifically	substantive	differences	between	the	idea	of	hedonic	pleasure-reward	and	the	broader	idea	of	a	euphoric,	foraging	action-oriented	reward.”48		The	SEEKING	system	explains	both	behaviors.		Wright	and	Panksepp	further	observe	that	the	“SEEKING	represents	a	major	category	that	could	be	partially	symbolized	by	Eros,	since	this	system	participates	in	all	of	the	specific	prosocial	emotional	systems	–	LUST,	CARE,	and	PLAY	–	each	of	which	has	shared	as	well	as	unique	underpinnings.”49		They	treat	Eros,	here,	as	representing	that	which	is	driven	in	a	Freudian	sense,	rather	than	what	is	instinctual.	Then,	referencing	what	Freud	would	designate	as	instinctual	behavior,	Wright	and	Panksepp	write:	Primary	drives	and	incentives	are	those	that	are	instinctual	and	therefore	unconditioned.		[They]	receive	restricted	and	preprogrammed	input	from	bodily	sources	such	as	levels	of	bodily	energy,	heat,	and	water.		But	there	is	also	a	restricted	neural	output	that,	once	triggered,	brings	about	a	coherent	goal-directed	SEEKING	response	that	promptly	leads	to	learning.		Thus,	secondary	drives	and	incentives	are	learned,	providing	psychological	resolution	in	the	context	of	specific	life	events,	[and	without	which]	we																																																									47	Wright	&	Panksepp,	Evolutionary	Framework.	pg.	12	48	Wright	&	Panksepp,	Evolutionary	Framework.	pg.	12	49	Wright	&	Panksepp,	Evolutionary	Framework.	pg.	18	
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would	be	stuck	with	only	a	preset	number	of	possible	basic	behaviors,	with	little	ability	to	adapt	to	the	environment.50		This	would	correspond	to	the	claims	made	by	Freud	through	psychological	observation,	to	both	his	drive	theory	and	the	anaclitic	origin	of	drives	with	what	is	regarded	as	instinctual.		Furthermore,	Wright	and	Panksepp	observe	that	such	driven	behavior	is	“malleable,”	whereas	there	is	a	“dissociation	between	a	general	urge	to	interact	and	a	mechanism	that	connects	that	urge	toward	a	specific	end,”	because	rats	exhibit	“preferential	behavior”	when	undergoing	the	same	stimulus,	such	that	some	rats	prefer	gnawing	on	the	cage,	others	exploring,	and	others	chewing	on	sticks.51		This	also	demonstrates	the	bound	cathexis	of	an	‘arbitrary’	object	that	is	characteristic	of	drive	theory.		In	addition	to	this,	Wright	and	Panksepp	write,	“Homeostatic	detectors	generate	various	[such]	drive	states”	by	arousing	“the	SEEKING	system	to	promote	general	foraging.”52		The	neurological	basis	of	drives	is	shown	to	compel	subjects	toward	the	aim	of	homeostasis,	also	congruent	with	psychoanalytic	theory.		
A	Reconceptualization:		
a	Metonym	for	an	Entropic	‘Ziel’	
If	the	death	drive	is	essentially	an	entropic	principle	of	the	psyche,	which	through	Eros	tends	towards	homeostasis,	then	aggression	cannot	be	attributed	to	it.																																																									50	Wright	&	Panksepp,	Evolutionary	Framework.	pg.	19	51	Wright	&	Panksepp,	Evolutionary	Framework.	pg.	20	52	Wright	&	Panksepp,	Evolutionary	Framework.	pg.	13	
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Aggression	never	emerges	without	a	relation	to	an	object,	whether	the	object	is	external	(sadism)	or	internal	(the	subject,	as	in	secondary	masochism).		In	other	words,	the	most	telling	argument	against	attributing	aggression	to	the	death	drive	is	that	the	emergence	of	any	aggressivity	would	necessarily	depend	upon	Eros.		This	is	so	because,	as	previously	addressed,	all	object	relations	involve	libidinal	cathexes,	whether	self-	or	object-directed.		As	such,	all	object	relations	are	then	situated	within	the	structuring	and	unifying	qualities	of	Eros.		Aggression	would	emerge	as	a	frustration	of	the	bound	or	binding	characteristics	of	Eros,	as	a	comportment	towards	removing	the	cause	of	the	frustration,	to	master	what	was	otherwise	unmastered	by	other	means.		What	Freud	writes	about	Eros	within	the	text	of	Beyond	further	corroborates	this	view.		As	noted	above,	Freud	describes	Eros	(the	life	and	sex	drives)	as	“disturbers	of	the	peace	and	continually	bring	along	tensions	whose	release	is	felt	as	pleasure.”53		It	can	therefore	be	concluded	that	aggressiveness	is	never	observed	as	occurring	without	some	relation	to	the	characteristics	that	are	attributed	to	Eros.		Aggression	would	correspond	to	one	possible	release	of	the	tension	for	which	Eros	is	responsible.		Aggression,	then,	is	contingent	upon	the	success	or	failure	of	object	cathexes.		Positing	a	death	drive	as	a	drive	of	aggressiveness	and	destruction	or	dismemberment	almost	explicitly	depicts	the	drive	as	a	drive	towards	conflict;	this	actually	contradicts	its	nature	as	an	entropic	principle	tending	towards	the	metaphorical	peace	of	non-tension,	non-conflict,	Nirvana.		This	will	all	be	more	
																																																								53	Freud,	Beyond,	pg.	99	
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clearly	discussed	below	in	the	chapter	on	aggression	in	the	section	on	the	Vicissitudes	of	Drives.			In	section	five	of	Beyond,	Freud	gives	his	speculative	account	of	abiogenesis,	which	is	worth	quoting	at	length:	At	some	time,	and	though	the	influence	of	a	completely	inconceivable	force,54	the	characteristics	of	life	were	awakened	in	nonliving	matter.		Perhaps	this	was	a	process	similar	in	type	to	that	other	process	which	later	brought	about	the	emergence	of	consciousness	in	a	particular	layer	of	the	living	matter.		The	tension	then	arising	in	the	previously	inanimate	substance	strove	toward	equilibrium.		Thus	arose	the	first	drive:	the	drive	to	return	to	the	nonliving.		For	the	substance	living	at	that	time,	dying	was	still	easy;	there	was	probably	only	a	brief	course	of	life	to	be	run	through,	whose	direction	was	determined	by	the	chemical	structure	of	the	young	life.		For	a	long	time,	then,	living	substance	may	have	been	created	again	and	again,	and	may	have	died	easily,	until	there	was	a	change	in	definitive	external	influences,	forcing	the	still	surviving	substance	toward	greater	and	greater	deviations	from	its	original	path	of	life	and	toward	more	and	more	complex	detours	before	reaching	its	goal:	death.		These	detours	to	death…	would	offer	us	today	the	image	of	the	phenomena	of	life.	…55		This	speculative	account	is	perhaps	the	most	far-reaching	within	Freud’s	theories,	but	I	hope	to	show,	in	what	follows,	how	prescient	it	might	very	well	be.	From	the	exegesis	and	the	preceeding	commentary	above,	a	few	observations	can	be	made:	First,	Freud’s	dualism	collapses;	then,	the	notion	of	aggression	cannot																																																									54	An	‘unconceivable	force’	would	seem	to	correspond	most	closely	with	what	Freud	also	states	is	the	more	conceivable	force:	Eros,	which	found	former	expression	in	his	constancy	principle	and	later	discussions	of	libidinal	(energetic,	to	be	more	true	to	his	theory)	binding.	‘Unconceivable’	would	thus	appear	to	be	merely	rhetorical	and	absent	of	meaning	itself,	a	reading	that	is	further	justified	by	the	following	sentence.	55	Freud,	Beyond,	pp.	77-	78	
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be	linked	as	an	inherent	quality	to	the	death	drive,	whereas	it	emerges	from	the	secondary	process;	third,	the	death	drive	cannot	be	derived	from	Freud’s	theory	of	the	repetition	compulsion,	which	is	shown	to	be	in	relation	to	the	process	of	binding	and	thus	bears	a	direct	relation	to	the	secondary	process	while	displaying	a	“(conservative)	nature	of	drives	in	general”	in	the	manifestation	of	it;	and	finally,	the	plurality	of	death	drives,	as	well	as	ego-drives,	is	reduced	to	a	singularity,	a	drive	that	is	neither	instinct	nor	a	drive	in	the	strict	sense,	but	rather	an	underlying	principle	of	entropy	beneath	all	processes.		We	might	call	it	a	“meta-drive.”		But	however	it	might	be	that	life	emerged,	it	was	pressed	for	internal	reasons	towards	alleviating	tension,	towards	attaining	equilibrium,	Freud	writes.		Biologically,	there	might	be	many	different	instincts;	and	psychically,	there	might	be	a	plethora	of	drives	(which	also	have	a	somatic	foundation),	but	all	of	these	can	be	shown	to	be	evolutionarily	(biologically)	and	environmentally	(psychically)	influenced	manifestations	of	the	one,	singular	impetus	referred	to	first	as	the	principle	of	inertia,	then	the	pleasure	principle	in	general,	and	finally	the	Nirvana	principle	–	the	principle	of	entropy	–	which	is	metonymically	represented	by	the	death	drive.56	I	propose	a	reconceptualization	of	the	death	drive,	which	is	an	impetus	or	principle	of	motion	towards	an	aim	that	occurs	for	internal	reasons	and	is	articulated	as	an	inherent	disposition	–	a	“tendency	towards	zero.”		The	principle	cannot	just	be	transposed	from	physics	to	psychology	without	sufficient	reason,	lest	one	run	the	risk	of	making	a	categorical	error.		But	there	are	reasons	which,	taken	together,	prove	sufficient.		These	are:																																																									56	See,	for	example,	diagram	3	below	
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1. It	is	empirically	verifiable	in	the	domain	of	psychology	via	clinical	observation,	2. It	finds	coherence	with	the	physical	and	biological	sciences,	3. It	is	pragmatic;	viz.,	it’s	postulation	enables	the	development	of	a	coherent	picture	of	psychical	(individual	and	social)	phenomena	that	otherwise	would	lack	a	unified	explanation.		This	reconceptualization	of	the	death	drive	coheres	with	an	omnipresent	line	of	thought	throughout	psychoanalytic	theory	that	also	finds	correspondence	with	the	physical	and	natural	sciences	as	well	as	other	social	sciences.		Walker	writes,	“Twenty	years	before	W.	B.	Cannon	invented	the	word	homeostasis	…	the	notion	is	clearly	developed	in	Freud’s	mind.”57		The	death	drive	is	essentially	a	principle	of	entropy	and	it	most	often	shows	itself	as	a	tendency	towards	homeostasis	–		as	vicissitudes	of	the	death	drive	serviced	by	the	secondary	process,	Eros.	The	death	drive	emerges	as	a	representation	of	the	nirvana	principle,	appropriately	named	thus	because	it	is	a	tendency	towards	the	cessation	of	all	drives	and	desires,	which	is	itself	a	new	guise	given	to	what	was	originally	termed	the	“principle	of	inertia”	in	Freud’s	Project.		Laplanche	writes	that,	from	the	very	beginning,	in	the	Project,	the	principle	of	inertia	represents	“a	model	of	death	and	not	of	life.”58		It	is	derived	from	the	2nd	law	of	thermodynamics,	the	law	of	entropy,	and	Freud’s	consequent	discussions	of	psychical	energetics	and	economics	that	follow	from	this	form	the	core	of	what	is	called	his	metapsychology.59			
																																																								57	Walker,	“Freud	and	Homeostasis,”	pg.	61	58	Laplanche,	Life	and	Death,	pg.	58	59	Hans	Loewald	criticizes	the	term	‘metapsychology,’	seeing	it	as	a	pejorative	term	for	what	is,	or	should	be,	theoretical	science,	if	even	a	social	science.		Loewald	thus	
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Before	moving	on,	it	might	be	necessary	to	briefly	account	for	Freud’s	energic	descriptions	of	drives	and	instincts	or	psychical	life	in	general.		How	are	readers	supposed	to	regard	Freud’s	economic	model	of	the	psyche?		Is	Freud	speaking	metaphorically	about	energy?		Or	is	he	speaking	literally?		There	are	many	signs	for	each	interpretation,	but	I	think	it	is	illuminating	to	look	at	a	particular,	recurring	theme	for	Freud:	the	relationship	between	quantity	and	quality.		Freud	writes	that	psychoanalysis	must	proceed	qualitatively,	although	there	is	nonetheless	a	
quantitative	explanation	under	the	qualitative	observations	and	experiences.60		This	was	implied	in	the	above	quotation	on	the	neurological	basis	of	drive	theory.		Psychoanalysis	must	proceed	thus	because	the	neurological	sciences	of	his	time	were	impotent	to	explain	anything	sufficiently	or	offer	any	kind	of	treatment	to	sufficiently	aid	patients.		For	Freud,	then,	one	must	proceed	qualitatively	when	the	option	to	proceed	quantitatively	is	not	open	or	helpful.		But	even	were	it	open,	one	must	still	proceed	qualitatively,	alongside	and	in	coherence	with	the	quantitative	aspects,	for	quantitative	explanations	cannot	approach	the	lived	experiences	with	which	each	patient	is	learning	to	cope.	When	Freud	describes	an	energic,	hydraulic	model	of	the	psyche	he	is	probably	providing	a	qualitative	description	(i.e.,	non-physical).		As	such,	it	would	be																																																																																																																																																																						asserts	that	the	more	appropriate	term	would	be	theoretical	psychology,	in	line	with	the	term	‘theoretical	physics.’		See	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pp.	ix-x	60	Freud	returns	to	this	point	again	and	again.		He	goes	into	more	detail	concerning	this	aspect	near	the	end	of	his	life	in	Analysis	Terminable	and	Interminable.		Freud	writes	that	generalizations	are	necessary	to	”attain	intellectual	mastery	of	our	environment,”	and	“bring	order	into	chaos”	(Analysis	Interminable,	pg.	228).	Phenomena	are	thereby	simplified,	and	we	“cannot	avoid	falsifying	it	especially	if	we	are	dealing	with	processes	of	development	and	change.		What	we	are	concerned	with	is	a	qualitative	alteration,	and	as	a	rule	in	doing	so	we	neglect	…	a	quantitative	factor”	(Analysis	Interminable,	pg.	228).	
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a	mistake	to	interpret	it	literally	as	a	description	of	the	physical	–	i.e.,	quantitative	–	about	which	Freud	has	repeatedly	asserted	science	hasn’t	sufficient	knowledge	yet.			On	the	other	hand,	Freud’s	emphasis	on	the	quantitative	aspect	would	seem	to	indicate	that	he	actually	regards	the	energic,	hydraulic	descriptions	of	the	psyche	as	literally	applicable.		This,	too,	is	evidenced	by	The	Project,	his	attempt	at	a	scientific	–	i.e.,	quantitative,	measurable	–	psychology.		This	coheres	with	Freud’s	most	frequent	observations	of	hysterics.		Hysterics	presented	symptoms	that	portrayed	erratic	and	highly	energized	behavior,	and	the	symptoms	would	subside	after	having	been	acted	out,	as	if	what	had	occurred	was	the	expulsion	of	energy	–	a	quota	of	affect	–	that	had	become	burdensome,	leaving	the	hysteric	exhausted	and/or	more	composed.		It	is	a	qualitative	description	that	is	meant	to	also	simultaneously	correspond	to	a	possible	quantitative	explanation.		 Returning	to	Freud’s	literary	intention,	as	to	whether	he	thought	he	was	describing	psychical	processes	metaphorically	or	literally,	I	don’t	think	that	a	sufficient	answer	is	possible,	and	it	could	be	that	he	himself	alternates	between	the	two.		However,	I	think	it	might	be	reasonably	inferred	that	such	is	a	recurring	pattern	in	Freud’s	work,	and	we	can	interpret	the	‘metaphorical-or-literal’	question	similarly	to	the	death	drive:	both	the	metaphorical	and	the	literal	are	occurring,	even	simultaneously.		This	will	be	discussed	in	the	following	section.		This	might	be	frowned	upon	as	exemplifying	conceptual	confusion,	but	it	is	remarkably	consistent	and	coherent.		For	example,	the	neurological	sciences	have	largely	succeeded	in	locating	the	phenomena	of	drives	in	the	dopaminergic	part	of	the	brain	–	the	SEEKING	system	referenced	previously.		Drives,	simply	speaking,	are	not	energy	
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pressing	for	release,	but	instead	are	physically	reducible	to	quantities	of	neurotransmitters	(particularly	dopamine)	and	neurological	stimulations	of	portions	of	the	brain	association	with	such.		That	is	to	say,	drives	are	grounded	in	quantifiable	brain	chemistry	and	neuronal	stimulation.		However,	what	are	chemicals	except	a	particular	quantity	and/or	arrangement	of	energy?		According	to	thermodynamics	of	Freud’s	day,	1. Everything	is	energy	(there	is	nothing	that	is	not	theoretically	reducible	to	energy),	everything	is	physical	rather	than	material.	2. All	energy	functions	according	to	the	laws	of	thermodynamics.	3. The	brain	and	all	its	chemical	and	material	aspects	are	therefore	reducible	to	energy	and	thermodynamic	processes	(like	that	of	entropy).	Therefore,	drives	can	be	said	to	be,	literally,	expressions	of	energy	tending	towards	discharge	–	towards	entropic	dispersal.		The	problem,	however,	would	occur	in	the	actual	reduction.		And	Freud	did	attempt	such	a	speculative	reduction	a	number	of	times,	one	such	circumstance	being	in	Beyond	where	he	attempts	a	brief	account	of	how	life	emerged.61		To	sufficiently	establish	the	connection	between	the	quantitative,	physical,	literal	meaning	and	the	qualitative	feeling	of	a	rise	in	energy	that	needs	to	be	expended	or	put	into	use	–	the	‘metaphorical	sense’	–	requires	a	simple	supposition.		One	need	only	suppose	that	the	human	psyche	–	brains	in	general	–	are	evolved	into	mechanisms	of	dealing	with	energy	only	in	increasingly	more	complex	and	indirect	ways	than	the	inorganic.		The	brain	is	viewed	as	a	structure	that	that	evolved	from	entropic	processes	in	an	open	system,	where	more	energy	enters	than	leaves,	which	demands	action	to	“use	up”	the	energy,	and	which																																																									61	See	Freud,	Beyond,	pp.		77-78	quoted	above	at	fn.	46.		It	is	enlighteningly	in	coherence	with	the	Project.	
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has	increased	its	complexity	in	relation	to	the	ways	in	which	it	follows	those	entropic	processes.		Freud	reasonably	proposes	that	organisms	were	originally	‘mutants’,	deformities,	of	uninhibited	entropic	processes	affecting	the	inorganic,	altered	in	such	a	way	that	organisms	absorbed	energy	and	collected	it,	but	in	so	doing	needed	to	either	put	it	to	use	or	expend	it	along	detours	to	the	original	entropic	aim.		The	brain’s	‘purpose’,	one	might	say,	is	to	expend	energy	and	to	follow	the	very	process	that	it	had	apparently	compromised	in	its	very	formation.		It	has	evolved	more	and	more	complex	ways	of	using	and	expending	energy.			In	other	words,	the	brain	came	to	be	through	entropic	processes	in	an	open	system,	the	brain	operates	according	to	entropy	in	that	system,	and	could	theoretically	have	its	processes	described	quantitatively	(physically),	i.e.,	denoting	how	every	neuro-chemical	process	is	actually	the	expression	of	entropy	in	that	system.		This,	however,	does	not	seem	very	practical	or	useful,	nor	does	it	appear	as	yet	even	possible,	and	the	meaningfulness	of	such	explanations	for	psychology	is	highly	questionable.		But	it	nonetheless	is	sensible	to	speak	economically	and	hydraulically	of	the	drives	qualitatively,	to	describe	the	lived	experience	of	phenomena	metaphorically.		In	summary,	Freud’s	descriptions	are	metaphorical	–	
qualitative	–	but	at	the	same	time	imply	a	literal	coherence	and	are	therefore	metonymical	instead	of	simply	metaphorical.		For	Freud,	the	qualitative	or	metaphorical	descriptions	are	possible	in	virtue	of	the	quantitative,	and	the	qualitative	can	be	explanative	only	in	virtue	of	that	connection.	Now	let	us	return	to	a	clarification	of	how	the	death	drive,	and	its	relation	to	Eros,	should	be	conceived.		Duncan	Barford	quotes	the	late-twentieth	century	
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biologist	Lyall	Watson	as	saying,	“’Death	is	not	an	all-or-nothing	phenomenon’,”	and	Watson	“goes	on	to	cite	a	whole	range	of	clinical	and	everyday	phenomena	where	it	seems	reasonable	to	claim	that	the	human	individual	‘trades	a	temporary	“little	death”	for	the	more	permanent	big	one’.”62		This	corresponds	to	Freud’s	statement	that	the	emergence	of	life	is	a	“detour	to	death.”	Entropy	and	homeostasis	are	almost	explicitly	exemplified	in	Freud’s	theory	by	the	dualism	between	the	death	drive	and	Eros.		But	to	see	them	–	the	“little	deaths”	and	the	“big	one”	–	as	opposing	factors	is	a	mistake,	and	it	is	one	place	where	Freud	goes	wrong	in	his	theory.		
Pertaining	to	physical	systems:	Referencing	the	physicist	Sadi	Carnot,	the	biophysicists	Arto	Annilla	and	Erkki	Annilla	write	“high	entropy”	cannot	necessarily	be	equated	with	“high	disorder,”	for	“order	or	disorder	is	a	consequence	of	energy	dispersal,	not	an	end	in	itself	or	a	motive	force.”63		They	likewise	go	on	to	argue,	“The	concepts	of	entropy	and	order	have	become	mixed	with	each	other.		Owing	to	the	confusion,	it	has	become	accustomed	to	say	that	living	systems	would	export	entropy	to	maintain	their	internal	high	degree	of	order.”64		But	the	characterization	of	entropy	as	a	tendency	towards	the	increase	of	disorder	only	makes	sense	in	a	closed	system.		In	relation	to	evolutionary	theory,	Anilla	and	Anilla	further	argue,	“Often	the	universal	thermodynamic	principle	and	natural	selection	in	the	theory	of	evolution	are	viewed	as	opposing	forces.		This	is	a	misconception.”65		Nothing	in	the	universe	exists	in	an	entirely	closed	system,	especially	our	planet.		Sunlight	warms	the	planet,	and	life	itself	consumes	its	environment	while	the	energy	it	takes	is																																																									62	Watson,	quoted	in	Barford,	“In	Defense	of	Death,”	pg.	35	63	Annilla	&	Annilla,	“Why	did	life	Emerge?,”	pg.	3	64	Annilla	&	Annilla,	“Why	did	life	Emerge?,”	pg.	3	65	Annilla	&	Annilla,	“Why	did	life	Emerge?,”	pg.	12	
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recycled	and	portions	are	replenished.		The	earth	is	an	open	system	that	receives	more	energy	than	it	uses	or	than	escapes	it.		Thus,	the	association	between	‘entropy’	and	‘disorder’	falls	apart.	In	a	short	article	titled,	“Another	Face	of	Entropy”,	Peter	Weiss	discusses	various	experiments	being	done	by	biophysicists	that	show	entropy	producing	order.		This	would	fly	in	the	face	of	those	who	crudely	define	entropy	as	the	“increase	of	disorder.”			He	writes,	“Scientists	have	known	since	at	least	the	1940s	that	entropy	can	act	as	an	unseen	hand	to	create	order,”	but	“only	in	the	last	few	years	have	they	begun	to	suspect	–	and	demonstrate	–	how	elaborate	its	handiwork	can	be.”66		In	one	experiment	done	by	Arjun	Yodh,	Weiss	writes	that	while	the	entropy	of	a	few	parts	in	the	experiment	decreased,	the	“calculations	show	that	the	overall	entropy”	of	the	system,	all	of	its	parts,	increased.67		Weiss	further	references	research	done	by	Minton	and	Steven	B.	Zimmerman,	at	the	National	Institute	of	Health	in	Maryland,	USA,	who	“tied	entropic	forces	to	the	clustering	of	DNA	in	cells	lacking	a	nucleus.”68	This	shows	that	such	speculation	of	the	ordering	potential	of	entropy,	often	operating	as	a	constraint	or	as	a	trajectory	of	energy	dispersal,	is	entirely	grounded	in,	and	coherent	with,	the	natural	and	physical	sciences.	
Pertaining	to	Natural	systems:		In	an	article,	“Ecological	Succession	as	an	energy	dispersal	process,”	Peter	Würtz	and	Arto	Annilla	observe	that	entropy,	as	a	principle	of	motion	in	energy	diffusion,	can	be	used	to	describe	evolutionary	processes.		They	write,	“Ecological	succession	…	can	be	described	as	any	other																																																									66	Weiss,	“Another	Face”,	pg.	108	67	Weiss,	“Another	Face”,	pp.	108-109	68	Weiss,	“Another	Face,”	pg.	109	
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natural	process	that	progresses	by	flows	of	energy	toward	a	thermodynamic	stationary	state	where	all	energy	density	differences	have	vanished.”69		Following	from	this,	homeostasis	can	be	viewed	as	this	‘ordering’	phenomena	observed	in	evolution,	all	the	while	following	the	law	of	entropy.		Entropy	still	operates	at	the	core	of	the	dynamics	in	such	open	systems,	but	in	a	system	such	as	the	earth,	entropy	acquires	a	new	characteristic:	it	becomes	the	tendency	towards	homeostasis,	trending	towards	balance	and	stability	in	the	environment.	
Pertaining	to	Social	Systems:	The	constancy	principle,	which	can	be	observed	throughout	the	physical,	the	biological,	and	the	social	sciences,	is	a	principle	of	homeostasis,	brought	into	existence	by	the	‘exigencies	of	life’,	and	expressed	with	what	Freud	call’s	‘Eros’.		It	is	affected	by	the	primary	entropic	principle	and	born	from	it,	governed	by	it.		It	becomes	apparent	that,	in	Freud’s	proposition,	what	is	observed	as	the	binding	element,	allowing	the	perpetuation	of	a	degree	of	tension,	corresponds	to	Eros,	is	the	new	guise	for	the	constancy	principle	and	is	ultimately	“in	the	service	of	[the	death	drive].”70		It	seeks	a	compromise	–	a	homeostasis	that	can	only	be	dynamic,	i.e.,	fluctuating.71		In	an	Article	titled	“Dynamic	Homeostasis,”	the	zoologist	Alfred	Emerson	attempts	to	show	that,	proceeding	by	analogy	from	the	convergent	evolution	observed	between	ants	and	termites,	biological	systems	and	social	systems	can	be	shown	to	be	following	the	same	principle	of	homeostasis.		He																																																									69	Würtz	&	Annillia,	“Ecological	Succession,”	pg.	71	70	Freud,	Beyond,	pg.	58		71	Patricia	Kitcher,	in	her	criticisms	and	profound	misunderstanding	of	Freud,	writes,	“Freud	never	wavered	in	his	acceptance	of	evolutionary	naturalism	as	the	proper	approach	to	questions	of	social	organization”	(Freud,	pg.	204).71		This	would	be	one	(of	many)	numerous	instances,	contrary	to	Kitcher,	where	Freud’s	speculation,	based	on	his	knowledge	of	the	chemical	and	neurological	sciences	and	clinical	experiences,	would	be	shown	to	be	proven	prescient.			
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writes,	“It	seems	that	value	systems	and	attitudes	evolve	and	are	directed	by	dynamics	similar	to	those	found	in	biological	systems,”	and	further,	“Biology	should	be	able	to	supply	us	with	basic	principles	underlying	social	coordination.”72	Freud	is	thus	not	alone	in	thinking	that	biological	references	are	important	for	studying	what	emerges	in	human	psychical	and	social	life.			The	life	processes,	both	the	physical	and	the	psychical,	involve	the	development	of	relationships	with	the	environment	–	a	development	that	is	characterized	by	Freud	through	processes	of	libidinal	cathexes	and	vicissitudes	of	drives,	by	Darwin	as	exemplifying	‘fitness’	or	successes	or	failures	of	adaptation.		Würtz	and	Annilla	observe,	“The	2nd	Law	of	thermodynamics	…	expresses	interdependence	among	species,	i.e.,	the	ecological	integrity	where	no	species	is	detached	from	its	surroundings.”73		This	is	remarkably	in	line	with	what	Emerson	writes	of	the	interdependence	of	life	on	earth	as	a	whole,	or	as	members	of	a	species,	or	in	interspecies	relations.		He	writes,	“Both	exoadaptation	to	the	physical	and	biotic	environment,	and	endoadaptation	within	the	organismic	system	show	evolutionary	trends	toward	increased	homeostasis.”74		Thus,	in	homeostasis,	we	see	the	flipside	of	the	entropic	coin	–	a	production	of	order	via	discharge	or	cathexis	that	tends	towards	equilibrium,	whereas	an	increase	of	homeostasis	can	arise	in	an	open	system	through	entropic	energy	dispersals.		Homeostasis	appears	as	both	the	‘detour’	from	‘death’,	and	also	the	detour	to	death,	as	Freud	writes	of	Eros	in	Beyond.		In	both	cases,	if	we	are	to	take	their	expressions	to	their	ideal	extremes,	there	is	the																																																									72	Emerson,	“Dynamic	Homeostasis,”	pg.	68	73	Würtz	&	Annilla,	“Ecological	Succession,”	pg.	73	74	Emerson,	“Dynamic	Homeostasis,”	81	
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tending	towards	absolute	equilibrium	–	zero.		But	“Homeostasis	is	not	complete	and	static	equilibrium,”	writes	Emerson,	and	“homeostasis	may	result	from	the	maintenance	and	control	of	periodic	fluctuations.”75		Therefore,	Dynamic	homeostases,	rather	than	equilibrium,	result	from	entropy	in	an	open	system.	The	death	drive	is	an	amoral	and	indifferent	undercurrent	guiding	what	we	recognize	in	nature	and	psychology	as	homeostatic	tendencies	(and	where	what	is	regarded	as	benefiting	such	homeostasis	is	valued	as	good).		Emerson	ends	his	essay	writing	“The	scientific	principle	of	homeostasis	assists	in	the	resolution	of	many	controversies	and	dilemmas.		…	It	is	both	mechanism	and	trend	of	life	processes.”76	What	we	observe	are	the	homeostatic	processes.		But	underneath	these,	as	Freud	writes	of	the	death	drive,	is	a	guiding	principle	that	operates	silently	–	is	mute	–	but	which	governs	‘order	creating’	Eros.		That	is	to	say,	Eros	is	to	the	death	drive	as	homeostasis	is	to	entropy.		Homeostasis	itself	functions	according	to	entropy	although	the	result	–	order	–	might	appear	as	contradictory	to	the	result	one	would	expect	from	entropy	(disorder).		Homeostasis,	as	a	trend	in	psychical	life,	might	be	best	conceptualized	as	the	will	to	power	or	Bemächtigungstrieb,	which	will	be	described	in	the	following	chapters.		
																																																								75	Emerson,	“Dynamic	Homeostasis,”	75	76	Emerson,	“Dynamic	Homeostasis,”	84	
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	Figure	3			
Figure	1	illustrates	a	comparison	of	the	various	terms	employed	by	Freud	to	describe	
the	dynamic	processes	of	the	psyche	in	the	Earliest	writings,	such	as	the	Project	for	a	Scientific	Psychology,	and	the	later	writings,	the	formulations	of	which	first	truly	
emerge	in	Beyond	the	Pleasure	Principle.		
Figure	2	illustrates	the	reconceptualization	that	markedly	differs	little	from	what	is	
observed	in	Beyond	the	Pleasure	Principle,	subtracting,	of	course,	precarious	concepts	
such	as	the	repetition	compulsion	and	aggression,	as	well	as	dethroning	the	life	drives,	
Eros.	
	
Figure	3	illustrates	the	reconceptualization	concerning	the	relationship	between	
inherited	dispositions	of	behavior	(instincts)	and	environmentally	influenced	
dispositions	(drives).		The	death	drive,	while	rooted	at	the	level	of	uni-cellular	
organisms	by	Freud,	or	in	even	inorganic	matter	by	myself,	is	shown	as	neither	an	
instinct	nor	a	drive.		It	is	called	a	drive,	perhaps,	because	it	has	its	impetus,	its	aim,	
arbitrary	objects	as	means	towards	that	aim,	and	at	least	a	somatic	source	(Freud)	or	
merely	all	energy	in	general	as	the	source	(me).	
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Bemächtigungstrieb	
Freud	claims	the	concept	of	a	“drive”	is	“somewhat	obscure	but	…	is	indispensible	to	us	in	psychology.”77		He	and	Nietzsche	were	both	engaged	in	“depth	psychology,”	and	so	the	concept	of	a	drive	–	an	unconscious	pulsion	–	became	indispensible	to	them.			In	my	opinion,	when	Nietzsche	writes	“All	psychology	so	far	has	been	stuck	in	moral	prejudices	and	fears:	it	has	not	ventured	into	the	depths,”78	I	believe	this	is	a	criticism	not	only	persistently	prescient	in	the	field	of	psychology	and	analysis,	but	can	also	be	a	charge	leveled	against	Freud	as	well.	As	Winnicott	observes,	through	taking	the	death	drive	seriously,	Freud	and	Klein	actually	returned	to	a	theme	similar	in	kind	to	original	sin,79	which,	for	Nietzsche,	is	antagonistic	to	his	thesis	concerning	the	innocence	of	becoming.		However,	despite	this	difference,	Freud	and	Nietzsche	both	appear	to	be	similar	regarding	the	concepts	of	the	will	to	power	or	drive	to	mastery.		“To	grasp	psychology	as	morphology	and	the	doctrine	of	the	will	to	power,”80	is	something	that	both	Freud	and	Nietzsche	have	done.	A	quite	neglected	or	taken-for-granted	term	in	Freudian	theory	is	the	drive	for	mastery.		Freud’s	‘drive	to	master’,	however,	actually	has	its	roots	in	the	Project	as	the	constancy	principle	–	the	psychical	mechanisms	by	which	stimuli	are	‘mastered’.		In	Freud’s	later	works,	the	‘drive	to	master’	is	in	fact	a	characteristic	of	all	drives	in	general	–	the	life-	or	self-preservative	drives/instincts	as	well	as	the	sex																																																									77	Freud,	Instincts,	pg.	118	78	Nietzsche,	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§23	79	See	Winnicott,	Playing	and	Reality		80	Nietzsche,	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§23	
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drives.		He	writes	of	it	at	the	time	of	The	Three	Essays,	and	then	mostly	abandons	the	description	in	favor	of	the	cathecting,	binding,	and	counter-cathecting	activities	of	drives,	which	later	become	subsumed	under	Eros.		In	the	Three	Essays,	he	writes:	According	to	some	authorities	this	aggressive	element	of	the	sexual	instinct	…	is	a	contribution	derived	from	the	apparatus	for	obtaining	mastery,	which	is	concerned	with	the	satisfaction	of	the	other	and,	ontogenetically,	the	older	of	the	great	instinctual	needs.”81			And	further:	…	the	preference	for	the	hand	shown	by	boys	is	already	[indicative	of]	the	important	contribution	which	the	instinct	for	mastery	is	destined	to	make	to	masculine	sexual	activity.”82				Then	again	in	reference	to	voyeurism,	exhibitionism,	and	cruelty	in	childhood,	Freud	writes,	“Cruelty	in	general	comes	easily	to	the	childish	nature,	since	the	obstacle	that	brings	the	instinct	for	mastery	to	a	halt	at	another	person’s	pain	–	namely	a	capacity	for	pity	–	is	developed	relatively	late.”83		And	although	he	claims	this	drive	for	mastery	has	not	been	sufficiently	analyzed	as	of	yet,	“It	may	be	assumed	that	the	impulse	of	cruelty	arises	from	the	instinct	for	mastery…”84	This	is	of	course	involved	in	Freud’s	analysis	of	Leonardo	as	well.		This	becomes	clearer	when	Freud	notes	that	the	drive	for	knowledge,	what	in	Nietzsche	is	referred	to	also	as	the	drive	for	truth	as	well	as	the	drive	for	knowledge,	“cannot	be	counted	among	the	elementary																																																									81	Freud,	Three	Essays,	pg.	159	82	Freud,	Three	Essays,	pg.	188	83	Freud,	Three	Essays,	pg.	193	84	Freud,	Three	Essays,	pg.	193	
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instinctual	components,	nor	…	classed	as	exclusively	belonging	to	sexuality.		Its	activity	corresponds	on	the	one	hand	to	a	sublimated	manner	of	obtaining	mastery,	while	on	the	other	hand	it	makes	use	of	the	energy	of	scopophilia,”	but	might	be	said	to	be	aroused	by	a	preoccupation	with	sexual	‘problems’.85		Scopophilia	itself,	however,	is	also	a	manifestation	of	a	need	to	master.	In	Beyond,	Freud	introduces	the	term	Bemächtigungstrieb	–	the	drive	for	mastery/domination	–	which	Strachey	unfortunately	translated	as	instinct	for	mastery.		Freud	introduces	the	term,	possibly	influenced	by	Alfred	Adler’s	insistence	on	a	compensatory	striving	for	power,86	in	his	discussion	of	his	grandson’s	‘game’	in	order	to	illustrate	the	motivation	for	play	as	well	as	the	phenomenon	of	repetition.		Freud	locates	this	‘drive	for	mastery’	as	a	manifestation	of	the	death	drive,	as	what	is	beyond	the	pleasure-unpleasure	principle.	The	second	section	of	Beyond	predominantly	concerns	what	Freud	calls	“traumatic	neurosis”	or	what	we	today	call	“Post-Traumatic	Stress	Disorder”	(PTSD).		For	Freud,	“traumatic	neurosis”	appears	to	be	produced	after	an	encounter	with	a	horrific	experience	that	endures,	finds	no	resolution,	and	exemplifies	material	with	which	the	psyche	cannot	perform	its	binding	function.		This	point	is	further	demonstrated	by	Freud’s	brief	discussion	of	fright	in	contrast	to	fear	and	anxiety.		He	claims	that	in	“ordinary	traumatic	neuroses	…	the	weightiest	element	in	their	causation	seemed	to	be	the	factor	of	surprise,	of	fright,”	and	a	physical	wound,																																																									85	Freud,	Three	Essays,	pg.	194	86	Adler	was	considerably	influenced	and	inspired	by	Nietzsche’s	works.		This	is	one	of	several	indirect	contacts	between	Freud	and	Nietzsche	throughout	Freud’s	career.	See,	for	notes	on	the	complex	relation	between	Freud	and	Adler	concerning	the	dual-drive	theory,	Kristin	White’s	paper	(2010)	on	Bemächtigungstrieb.	
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if	acquired	at	the	same	time,	“seemed	to	counteract	the	development	of	a	neurosis.”87		The	physical	wound	itself	introduces	to	the	victim	an	embodied	experience,	one	with	which,	however	painful,	can	be	come	to	terms.		In	other	words,	and	injury	is	an	experience	with	which	a	victim	can	relate	libidinally	as	a	concrete	experience,	fostering	a	capacity	of	bound	cathexis,	even	a	negative	cathexis.		Without	the	accompanying	physical	trauma,	the	victim	is	less	able	to	develop	a	coherent	perception	of	the	experience	–	is	without	sufficient	means	of	relating	to	it	–	and	thus	develops	a	‘neurosis’.		“Anxiety,”	writes	Freud,	“denotes	a	certain	state	of	expecting	danger	and	preparing	for	it,	even	for	an	unknown	danger.		Fear	requires	a	definite	object	to	be	feared.		Fright,	though,	designates	the	state	of	a	person	who	encounters	danger	unprepared;	it	emphasizes	the	factor	of	surprise.”88		The	distinction	he	makes	between	anxiety,	fear,	and	fright	further	illustrates	the	diminished	capacity	of	the	victim	to	cathect	–	to	bind	with	–	his/her	experience.		That	is	to	say,	there	is	a	failure	to	make	sense	of,	to	make	meaningful,	experience.		Fright	involves	surprise.		Anxiety	and	fear,	on	the	other	hand,	involve	anticipation	of	a	(potentially)	cognizable	object	or	experience,	both	of	which	would	further	one’s	ability	of	cathexis	or	counter-cathexis	and	thus	integration.89		 Immediately	following	his	introduction	of	traumatic	neurosis	in	Beyond,	Freud	recalls	an	experience	of	his	when	he	went	to	visit	his	daughter,	Sophie,	and	was	able	to	observe	his	grandson	at	play.		He	recalled	that	his	grandson,	who	was																																																									87	Freud,	Beyond,	pg.	55	88	Freud,	Beyond,	pg.	55	89	Anxiety	generally	involves	repression,	however,	and	so	would	denote	a	counter-
cathexis,	rather	than	a	mere	cathexis.		It	is	also	interesting	to	note	the	Sartre	makes	a	similar	distinction	between	anguish	and	fear	in	Being	and	Nothingness	as	Freud	makes	between	anxiety	and	fear	(see	Sartre,	Being	and	Nothingness,	pg.	53).	
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ordinarily	well	behaved,	had	an	“annoying	habit”	of	throwing	his	toys	away	into	hard-to-reach	places.		When	playing	with	a	spool	of	thread,	the	child	would	throw	it	away,	but	by	holding	onto	the	thread	would	then	pull	it	back	with	an	expression	of	joy.		Freud’s	analysis	of	this	incident	was	that	the	child’s	game	was	in	part	analogous	to	his	mothers’	departures	and	returns	from	his	presence.		Many	children,	Freud	notes,	“express	similar	hostile	impulses	of	throwing	objects	away	from	themselves	as	substitutes	for	people.”90	The	child	was	trying	to	master,	control,	or	come	to	grips	with	the	experience	of	physical	transience.		Libidinal	cathexes,	as	Freud	discusses	in	
Mourning	and	Melancholia,	are	central	to	coming	to	terms	with	experiences,	particularly	of	transience,	and	require	the	redistribution	of	libidinal	energy	or	the	learned	capacity	to	do	so.91		Further,	Freud	writes,	“It	can	be	seen	that	in	play	children	repeat	everything	that	has	made	a	great	impression	on	them	in	life,	and	that	here	they	are	abreacting	the	strength	of	that	impression	–	mastering	the	situation,	as	it	were.”92		Such	behavior	should	be	regarded	as	an	attempt	to	come	to	terms	with	an	experience	that	is	first	felt	as	unpleasurable	by	understanding	it	and/or	otherwise	neutralizing	it	through	the	mastery	of	it.		This	is	the	point	at	which	Freud	introduces	the	term	‘Bemächtigungstrieb’	to	denote	a	repetition	of	an	event	that	is	experienced	as	unpleasurable,	but	which,	through	the	repetition,	appears	to	display	the	aim	of	trying	to	master	or	obtain	control	of	the	unpleasurable	
																																																								90	Freud,	Beyond,	pg.	58	91	Freud	writes	in	Mourning	and	Melancholia,	“The	libido’s	attachment	to	the	lost	object	is	met	by	the	verdict	of	reality	that	the	object	no	longer	exists;	and	the	ego…	is	persuaded	by	the	sum	of	the	narcissistic	satisfactions	it	derives	from	being	alive	to	sever	its	attachment	to	the	object”	(pg.	255),	allowing	a	redistribution	of	the	libido.	92	Freud,	Beyond,	pg.	58		
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event	by	some	means,	and	thereby	extracting	from	the	repetition	a	degree	of	pleasure.	This	discussion	of	the	‘repetitive’	behavior	of	children	within	the	same	section	in	which	Freud	discusses	‘traumatic	neurosis’	is	meaningful.		Relating	these	two	different	circumstances	to	each	other,	Freud	sees	an	underlying	principle	at	work.		Since	his	next	section	is	on	the	repetition	compulsion,	the	reader	can	assume	that	these	two	situations	are	meant	as	introductions	to	it.		Freud	writes	of	the	repetition	compulsion	thus:	“We	would	like	to	know	…	what	function	it	corresponds	to,	under	what	conditions	it	can	emerge,	and	in	what	relation	it	stands	to	the	pleasure	principle.”93		In	neurology,	pathways	between	neurons	are	formed	by	experiences	–	the	stronger	the	experience	the	more	impressionable	they	are,	carving	out	grander	pathways	from	neuron	to	neuron.		As	such,	the	emotion	or	thought	caused,	and	the	consequent	behavior	effected,	becomes	the	more	predictable	pattern	of	behavior	under	similar	circumstances	in	the	future,	require	only	certain	triggers	to	commence	the	neuronal	connections.		This	explains	the	repetition	Freud	observes	during	transference	in	clinical	practice,	and	it	also	explains	the	‘fixation’	of	those	with	PTSD	or	even	of	children	throwing	away	objects,	all	of	which	appear	as	attempts	to	master	–	to	neutralize	–	stimuli.		Freud	is	pointing	out	that	in	each	situation	there	is	a	tendency	to	come	to	terms	with	an	experience.	These	operations	are	attempts	at	mastering	that	which	is	outside	a	subject’s	control.	With	a	curious	appeal	to	Nietzsche	in	his	discussion	of	the	repetition	compulsion,	Freud	further	illustrates,	“This	‘eternal	recurrence	of	the	same’	does																																																									93	Freud,	Beyond,	pg.	65	
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not	surprise	us	when	it	is	an	active	behavior	of	the	person	involved,	and	when	we	can	discover	in	his	being	the	unchanging	character	trait	that	must	express	itself	in	the	repetition	of	the	same	experiences.		We	are	much	more	strongly	affected	by	those	cases	in	which	a	person	seems	to	experience	passively	something	over	which	he	has	no	influence.”94		With	the	compulsion	to	repeat,	a	person	undergoes	a	kind	of	helpless	‘fatalism’,	one	that	analysis	is	supposed	to	bring	about	the	power	or	the	ability	to	alter.95		I’m	not	sure	to	what	extent	Freud	understands	or	misunderstands	Nietzsche	by	way	of	his	allusion.		Certainly,	Nietzsche	indicates	a	need	to	overcome	prior	ways	of	‘becoming’,	towards	healthier	horizons.		And	there	is	also	in	Nietzsche	a	realization	that	a	symptom	of	illness	or	decadence	is	precisely	the	inability	to	alter	anything.		It	appears	to	me	as	though	they	might	be	on	the	same	page,	even	if	Freud	somewhat	misappropriates	Nietzsche’s	terminology.		According	to	my	reading	of	Freud,	his	emphasis	on	the	use	of	analysis	after	introducing	the	term	
Bemächtigungstrieb	appears	to	imply	that	analysis	provides	a	healthier	means	of	mastering	a	cycle	by	which	one	was	previously	mastered,	as	it	were.	Freud	reiterates	the	differences	between	bound	(resting)	energy	and	
unbound	(free)	energy	–	a	distinction	that	was	yet	again	already	made	in	the	Project,	where	the	principle	of	inertia	consisted	of	free	energy,	and	the	principle	of																																																									94	Freud,	Beyond,	pg.	64	95	Interestingly,	Freud	also	incorporates,	implicitly,	a	personal	anecdote	in	his	illustration	of	a	repetition	compulsion;	namely,	that	of	his	relationship	with	Carl	Jung	and/or	Alfred	Adler.		He	writes,	“Everyone	knows	people	whose	human	relationships	all	end	up	in	the	same	way,”	such	as	“benefactors	who	are	eventually	deserted	in	resentment	by	ever	one	of	their	protégés	–	as	much	as	these	protégés	may	otherwise	differ	from	one	another,	and	who	thus	seem	fated	to	taste	to	the	dregs	all	the	bitterness	of	ingratitude.		This	includes	men	whose	friendships	all	end	in	the	same	way:	betrayal”	(Beyond,	pg.	64).	
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constancy	implied	a	binding	of	energy.		Freud	writes,	‘The	‘binding’	of	the	energy	streaming	into	the	mental	apparatus	consists	in	its	conversion	from	the	free-flowing	state	to	the	resting	state.”		In	other	words,	the	cathectic	process	appears	to	be	geared	towards	the	stabilization	or	incorporation	of	energy	(or	content)	that	is	unstable	and	unorganized	by	organizing	it.		Further,	Freud	writes,	“A	system	that	is	itself	highly	charged	is	capable	of	receiving	new	streams	of	energy	and	transforming	it	into	resting	charge	–	mentally	‘binding’	it.”96		Thus	again,	he	is	repeating	what	was	referred	to	as	the	principles	of	inertia	and	constancy	in	the	project,	characterized	as	consisting	of	free	and	bound	energy,	an	entropic	principle	of	discharge	and	a	homeostatic	stability	respectively.	‘Binding’	is	what	can	serve	as	a	means	of	protecting	the	organism,	in	a	sense	protecting	it	from	a	‘traumatic’	experience	by	enabling	it	to	sufficiently	cope	with	stimuli.		‘Binding’,	Freud	appears	to	say,	is	a	means	of	mastery.		We’ve	thus	returned	to	a	discussion	of	the	topic	with	which	Freud	had	opened	section	two	–	that	of	traumatic	neurosis.		Freud	writes,	“The	higher	the	resting	charge	of	the	system	itself,	the	greater	will	be	its	binding	force;	conversely,	the	lower	its	charge,	the	less	it	will	be	capable	of	receiving	new	streams	of	energy	and	the	more	violent	will	be	the	consequences	of	such	a	breach	of	the	shield	against	stimuli.”97		Freud	follows	this,	saying,	“binding”	is	itself	that	transformation	of	free	energy	into	a	“resting	state”	–	bound	energy.98																																																											96	Freud,	Beyond,	pg.	70	97	Freud,	Beyond,	pg.	70	98	Freud,	Beyond,	pg.	71.		Interestingly,	Freud	goes	on	to	link	the	“higher	resting	charge”	with	what	he	then	calls	a		“super	charge	of	the	receptive	systems”	that	exemplifies	“anxiety,”	and	which	“constitutes	the	last	line	of	defense	for	the	shield	
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Freud	claims	that	dreams	of	those	with	traumatic	neurosis,	which	cause	the	patient	to	relive	the	traumatic	event,	cannot	be	seen	to	obey	the	pleasure	principle,	and	so	there	is	thus	a	beyond,	which,	as	mentioned	earlier,	is	indicated	by	the	repetition	compulsion.		He	writes,	“The	aforementioned	dreams	of	traumatic-neurotics	cannot	be	considered	wish	fulfillments.”		Instead,	“…	they	obey	the	repetition	compulsion.”99		And	so	Freud	concludes	writing,	“If	there	is	a	‘beyond	the	pleasure	principle,’	it	is	only	logical	to	admit	a	time	before	the	wish	fulfilling	tendency	of	dreams,”	but	that	“this	is	not	to	contradict	their	later	function.”		So	the	wish-fulfilling	characteristic	of	dreams	is	still	maintained,	but	the	repetition	compulsion	is	regarded	as	indicative	of	something	prior	to	it,	prior	to	the	
pleasurable	aims	of	those	wishes	at	least,	as	a	motivating	factor	and,	in	Freud’s	view	must	then	be	beyond	–	underneath	–	the	wish-fulfilling	function.		Interestingly,	Freud’s	claim	of	a	repetition	occurring	as	a	tendency	towards	mastery	has	a	lot	in	common	with	new	work	being	done	in	‘imagery	rehearsal	therapy’	for	patients	with	PTSD.			In	an	article	reporting	research	done	by	Carl	Nappi	et	al.,	It	is	reported	that	veterans	who	suffered	from	symptoms	of	PTSD	such	as	nightmares	and	insomnia	showed	marked	improvement	after	undergoing	imagery	rehearsal	therapy.																																																																																																																																																																							against	stimuli”	(Freud,	Beyond,	pg.	72).	This	is	interesting	because	it	links	anxiety,	contra	common	sense	and	Freud’s	earlier	formulation	of	anxiety	resulting	from	unbound	energy,	with	bound	energy,	as	an	‘anticipation’	of	sorts.		And	so	one	might	ask,	with	what	is	anxiety	bound?		It	would	seem	that,	since	anxiety	involves	the	
anticipation	of	a	danger,	the	energy	in	a	sense	is	bound	with	what	is	perceived	as	dangerous,	or,	abstractly,	danger	itself.	In	other	words,	anxiety	is	bound	in	a	negative	cathexis	with	aspects	of	the	environment.		Freud	remarks	that	the	dreams	of	those	with	traumatic	neuroses	“seek	to	master	the	stimulus	by	developing	anxiety,	the	lack	of	which	was	the	cause	of	the	[condition]”	(Freud,	Beyond,	pg.	72).	99	Freud,	Beyond,	pg.	72	
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“Veterans	reported	significant	reductions	in	nightmare	frequency	and	intensity,	insomnia	severity,	and	PTSD	symptoms	following	a	full	course	of	[Imagery	Rehearsal	Therapy].”100	This,	the	authors	note,	expands	on	and	validates	previous	research	done	to	indicate	benefits	of	such	therapy.	In	a	meta-analysis	of	various	research	done	on	the	topic,	Melynda	D.	Casement	and	Leslie	M.	Swanson	observe	the	same	results.		They	write:	The	results	from	this	meta-analysis	indicate	that	IR	improves	sleep	and	reduces	PTSD	symptoms	across	a	diverse	range	of	samples	and	treatment	protocols.	As	expected,	both	nightmare	frequency	and	general	sleep	quality	improve	with	treatment.	Perhaps	less	expected,	IR	produces	large	decreases	in	PTSD	symptoms	even	though	global	PTSD	symptoms	are	not	directly	targeted	by	this	treatment.	Furthermore,	analysis	of	long-term	treatment	outcomes	indicated	that	the	benefits	of	IR	for	both	sleep	and	PTSD	symptoms	were	sustained	for	6	to	12	months	following	treatment	completion.101			What	this	would	appear	to	indicate	is	that	imagery	rehearsal	reduces	the	symptoms	through	providing	a	means	of	mastering	the	unpleasant	stimuli.		Casement	and	Swanson	also	suggest	efficacious	methods	for	IRT:	“Proposed	mechanisms	of	IR	include	habituation,	emotional	catharsis/	abreaction,	mastery,	cognitive	reappraisal,	competitive	retrieval,	and	improved	sleep	regulation.”102		All	of	these	methods	are	intended	to	deal	with	either	the	ideas	that	threateningly	present	themselves	(such	as	cognitive	reappraisal),	or	cathartically	diminishing	the	nervous	energy.				 What	cannot	be	doubted,	according	to	research,	is	the	efficacy	of	mastering	
																																																								100	Nappi,	Carl,	“Effectiveness	of	Imagery	Rehearsal,”	pg.	242	101	Casement,	Melynda,	“A	Meta-Analaysis	of	Imagery	Rehearsal,”	pg.	572	102	Casement,	Melynda,	“A	Meta-Analaysis	of	Imagery	Rehearsal,”	pg.	573	
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stimuli.		Is	this	enough,	though,	to	suppose	that	this	is	what	Freud	noticed	in	dreams?		I’m	not	sure	it	is;	the	purpose	of	the	dreams	or	nightmares	might	or	might	not	be	to	master	unpleasurable	events	by	repeating	them.		The	nightmares	might	result	merely	from	an	inability	to	master,	to	bring	all	that	free	energy	into	a	bound	state,	for	example.		But	I	think	it	is	nonetheless	significant	that	the	persistence	of	what	is	not	mastered	is	unpleasurable,	implying	that	what	is	felt	as	pleasurable	
would	be	mastery,	and	that	mastery	would,	in	imagery	rehearsal	therapy,	appear	to	alleviate	the	symptoms	if	not	also	treat	the	underlying	causes.	Observing	the	repetition	compulsion	at	work	in	his	grandson’s	play	as	well	as	in	PTSD	and	therapy	in	general,	Freud	writes,	“The	repetition	compulsion	…	reproduces	past	experiences	that	include	no	possibility	of	pleasure,	and	which	at	no	time	can	have	been	gratification	even	of	subsequently	repressed	drive	impulses.”103		In	her	paper	on	the	term	Bemächtigungstrieb,	Kristin	White	acknowledges	that	Jeremy	Holmes	writes	there	are	two	different	ways	in	which	power	might	be	conceived:	...	Power	can	be	used	for	good	or	ill,	captured	in	a	series	of	binary	oppositions:	tyranny	versus	democracy;	heteronomy	versus	autonomy;	master	⁄	slave	relationship	versus	a	contractual	relationship	freely	entered	into;	power	over	versus	power	to;	conformism	versus	agency;	omnipotence	⁄	impotence	versus	limited	but	real	potency.104		What	is	really	interesting	is	that	it	is	not	the	repetition	compulsion	itself	that	is	new	and	‘beyond	the	pleasure	principle’;	rather,	what	is	beyond	the	pleasure	principle	is																																																									103	Freud,	Beyond,	pg	62	104	Jeremy	Holmes,	Exploring	in	Security.	London:	Routledge,	2010	pg.	66,	quoted	in	White,	Kristin,	“Notes	on	Bemächtigungstrieb,”	pg.	818	
	 50	
in	fact	Bemächtigungstrieb.		This	is	the	reasoning	behind	Freud’s	reference	to	his	grandson	in	a	discussion	of	repetitious	behavior	in	which	he	introduces	the	mysterious	term.			However,	White	points	out,	Strachey’s	translation	does	not	do	the	term	justice,	for	it	is	intended	in	a	dominating,	sadistic,	and	destructive	sense,	so	that	what	Freud	recognizes	in	his	grandson’s	behavior	is	the	attempt	to	exact	revenge	upon	his	mother	for	abandoning	him	as	a	means	of	mastering	the	unpleasure	of	that	abandonment.105			Eros	is	actually	more	responsible	for	psychical	disturbances	than	the	death	drive,	for	the	death	drive	aims	at	peace,	at	Nirvana,	and	Eros	prevents	this	through	a	secondary	process	that	inhibits	direct	discharge.		Freud	writes:	The	life	drives	have	so	much	more	to	do	with	our	internal	perception	since	
they	act	as	disturbers	of	the	peace	and	continually	bring	along	tensions	whose	
release	is	felt	as	pleasure,	while	the	death	drives	seem	to	do	their	work	inconspicuously.		The	pleasure	principle	seems	to	serve	the	death	drive	
directly.		It	does	guard	against	external	stimuli,	considered	dangers	by	both	types	of	drives,	but	guards	especially	against	increases	in	internal	stimuli	aiming	to	make	the	task	of	living	more	difficult.106		Eros,	not	the	death	drive,	is	responsible	for	‘disturbing	the	peace’.		
Bemächtigungstrieb	is	an	essential	aspect	of	aggression,	hence	the	term’s	
																																																								105	What	will	be	made	clearer	later	is	that	‘revenge’	is	something	secondary,	which	Nietzsche	articulates	well,	and	is	the	manifestation	not	of	aggression	but	of	passive	aggression.	106	Freud,	Beyond,	pg.	99	
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introduction	by	Freud	in	Beyond	as	what	is	beyond	the	principle	of	pleasure	–	as	an	expression	of	the	death	drive	filtered	through	Eros	and	object	relations.			A	place	where	this	term	makes	another	appearance	is	in	The	Economic	
Problem	of	Masochism.		There,	Freud	writes,	“The	libido	has	the	task	of	making	the	destroying	instinct	innocuous,	and	it	fulfills	the	task	by	diverting	that	instinct	to	a	great	extent	outwards	…	towards	objects	in	the	external	world.		The	instinct	is	then	called	the	destructive	instinct,	the	instinct	for	mastery,	or	the	will	to	power.”107	What	Freud	is	describing	is	the	death	drive	served	by	Eros	in	its	relations	with	external	objects,	and	those	relations	are	characterized	as	manifestations	of	a	‘will	to	power’.		What	begins	as	the	death	drive,	which	Freud	writes	is	loosely	identifiable	with	primary	masochism,	is	redirected	outwards,	and	is	regarded	as	sadism.		But,	this	sadism	can	“be	once	more	introjected,	turned	inwards,	and	in	this	way	regress	to	its	earlier	situation.		If	this	happens,	a	secondary	masochism	is	produced,	which	is	added	to	the	original	masochism.”108		As	I	hope	to	explain	sufficiently	below	in	the	section	on	Aggression,	primary	masochism	is	neither	aggressive	nor	destructive,	but	is	really	confused	(and	confusing)	because	of	such	a	description.	Primary	masochism	is	only	a	metonym	for	what	occurs	in	entropic	dissolution,	which	is	an	apparent	destruction,	although	destruction	is	not	the	aim	of	the	tendency.		That	is,	entropic	dissolution	might	manifest	in	the	appearance	of	a	kind	of	‘destruction’	or	dismemberment	without	actually	aiming	at	such.	I’d	like	to	suggest	that	Freud’s	concept	of	a	drive	to	mastery,	referred	to	as	
Bemächtigungstrieb	in	Beyond,	indicates	the	same	observation	that	Nietzsche	makes																																																									107	Freud,	Economic	Problem	of	Masochism,	pg.	163	(my	emphasis).	108	Freud,	Economic	Problem	of	Masochism,	pg.	164	
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with	his	reference	to	der	Wille	zur	Macht,	a	will	to	power	that	is	retroductively	inferred	from	empirical	patterns	and	trajectories	of	drives.		Both	appear	to	manifest	themselves	in	conscious	awareness	as	a	drive	to	dominate,	and/or	have	power	over.		And	Nietzsche	describes	the	will	to	power	in	thermodynamic	terms	closely	paralleling	the	descriptions	that	Freud	uses	to	describe	the	death	drive	and	Eros.109	Freud	sometimes	describes	the	epiphenomena	of	pleasure	similarly	to	Nietzsche	as	well,	as	corresponding	to	the	attainment	of	mastery.		For	example,	in	Group	
Psychology,	Freud	writes,	“There	is	always	a	feeling	of	triumph	when	something	in	the	ego	coincides	with	the	ego	ideal.		And	the	sense	of	guilt	(as	well	as	the	sense	of	inferiority)	can	also	be	understood	as	an	expression	of	tension	between	the	ego	and	the	ego	ideal.”110		In	other	words,	pleasure	is	a	consequence	of	mastery	and	unpleasure	of	the	inability	to	master.		In	short,	I’m	suggesting	that	the	Wille	zur	
Macht	is	identical	with	what	Freud	sees	as	the	servitude	of	Eros	to	the	death	drive	–	the	death	drive	interpreted	through	Eros.		It	is	an	entropic	principle	that	can	only	proceed	by	means	of	objects	and	relations	with	them,	either	discharging	upon	them,	identifying	with	them,	introjecting	them	(as	in	the	case	of	melancholy),	or	otherwise	binding	with	them.	
	
	
																																																									109	This	will	be	demonstrated	in	the	following	section.	110	Freud,	Group	Psychology,	pg.	131	
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The	Will	to	Power	is	Entropic	and	Empirical	
The	book	that	is	most	known	for	Nietzsche’s	introduction	of	the	will	to	power,	perhaps	because	he	articulates	it	less	ambiguously	there,	is	Beyond	Good	and	
Evil.		There,	he	writes	of	an	“old,	eternal	story”	where	people,	for	example	philosophers,	are	always	creating	the	world	in	their	own	image,	and	it	cannot	happen	otherwise;	“philosophy	is	this	tyrannical	drive	itself,	the	most	spiritual	will	to	power,	to	the	‘creation	of	the	world’,	to	the	causa	prima.”111		It	is	articulated,	so	to	speak,	as	the	‘first	cause’,	but	which	should	not	be	regarded	so	much	as	the	‘unmoved	mover’,	for	it	is	always	moving,	changing,	becoming.		Rather,	it	is	‘il	primo	
motore’,	the	primary	engine	or	driving	force.112			But	the	most	notorious	passage	on	the	will	to	power	describes	it	as	an	underlying	physical	‘truth’	to	the	universe,	a	passage	that	is	highly	contentious,	controversial,	and	from	which	a	wide	range	of	readings	concerning	what	Nietzsche	means	by	‘will	to	power’	are	derived.113		What	leads	Nietzsche	to	refer	to	a	‘will	to	power’	is	likely	also	what	led	Freud	to	refer	to	a	death	drive	and	Bemächtigungstrieb:	the	realization	that	human	beings	and	sentient	life	in	general	do	not	strive	first	and	foremost	for	pleasure.		Also	similarly,	they	both	discover	their	respective	hypotheses	in	non-sentient	life	and	even	loosely	in	the	inorganic.			
																																																								111	Nietzsche,	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§9	112	Freud	uses	this	word	in	reference	to	Eros	(roughly)	in	Leonardo.		It	is	not	my	intention	to	conflate	the	Will	to	Power	with	self-preservative	instincts	or	sex	drives;	it	is	neither,	and	coheres	best	with	Freud’s	Bemachtigungstrieb.		What	I	intend	is	to	express	the	inspirational,	creative	force	by	which	the	will	to	power	is	characterized.	113	This	is	in	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§36,	and	I	will	address	it	below.	
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Like	Freud,	Nietzsche	also	initially	regards	pleasure	and	unpleasure	as	somewhat	determinative.		Although	Nietzsche	writes	in	his	notebooks	of	1872-1873	that	he	doubts	pleasure	and	displeasure	are	universal	sensations,114	a	recurring	theme	throughout	much	of	his	early	work	asserts	that	pleasure	and	displeasure	are	influential	factors	in	all	of	nature.		“All	logic	of	nature	[reduces	to]	a	system	of	
pleasure	and	displeasure.		Everything	grasps	for	pleasure	and	flees	from	displeasure,	these	are	the	eternal	laws	of	nature.”115	This,	of	course,	is	a	similar	theme	taken	up	by	Freud	in	his	theory,	where	Freud	asserts	that	the	psyche	essentially	functions	by	warding	off	unpleasurable	sensations	by	seeking	at	least	a	negative	pleasure	–	the	negation	of	unpleasure	–	if	not	seeking	a	positive	pleasure,	such	as	being	in	love,	which	is	also	illustrated	by	Nietzsche	in	his	discussions	of	Dionysian	intoxication.				 This	theme	recurs	in	Nietzsche	throughout	his	works	with	slight	variations.		For	example,	in	Human,	Nietzsche	writes,	“In	our	primary	condition,	all	that	interests	us	organic	beings	in	anything	is	its	relationship	to	us	in	respect	of	pleasure	and	pain.”116		But	soon,	like	Freud,	he	recognizes	that	pleasure	and	displeasure	are	
not	motivational	factors,	or	at	least	not	the	primary	aims.		Pleasure	becomes	an	
affect	of	at	least	the	illusion	of	an	increase	of	power.			Nietzsche	sees	that,	according	to	empiricists,	“every	living	thing	is	supposed	to	be	striving”	towards	happiness.117		However,	Nietzsche	observes	that	it	is	“notably	enlightening	to	posit	power	in	place	of	individual	‘happiness’,”	–	that	“there	is	a	striving	for	power,	for	an	increase	of	
																																																								114	Writings	form	the	Early	Notebooks,	19[142]	115	Writings	from	the	Early	Notebooks,	19	[161]	116	Nietzsche,	Human,	All	too	Human,	1.18	117	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§688		see	also	The	Will	to	Power,	§657,	658,	&	669	
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power”	instead.118		Why	does	Nietzsche	think	this	is	enlightening?		He	is	correct	that	humans	have	generally	thought	that	the	end,	the	general	aim	of	all	striving	is,	or	ought	to	be,	happiness.		This	is	the	case	from	at	least	Aristotle	through	Kant	and	the	Utilitarians.		Kant	and	the	utilitarians	also	both	saw	that	happiness	would	seem	to	coincide	with	what	brings	one	pleasure;	it	is	an	‘empirically’	derived	notion	that	refers	to	at	least	the	absence	of	unpleasure	if	not	the	procurement	of	pleasure	as	its	qualification.		But	Nietzsche	observes,	“Pleasure	is	only	a	symptom	of	the	feeling	of	power	attained,	a	consciousness	of	a	difference.”119	The	consciousness	of	a	difference	is	the	consciousness	–	the	affective	awareness	–	of	being	better	off	than	one	was	previously.		Nietzsche	goes	on	to	note,	parenthetically:	“There	is	no	striving	for	pleasure:	but	pleasure	supervenes	when	that	which	is	being	striven	for”	–	that	is,	‘power’	–	“is	attained:	pleasure	is	an	accompaniment,	pleasure	is	not	the	motive.”120		How	can	Nietzsche	claim	that	pleasure	is	not	striven	for?		Empirically,	it	is	an	absurd	claim	that	is	refuted	by	numerous	counter-examples,	some	of	which	he	himself	provides	acknowledging	libertinism	and	hedonism.		What	are	these	if	not	the	act	of	pursuing	pleasure	for	the	sake	of	pleasure?121			The	libertine,	in	the	acquisition	of	his/her	aim	–	pleasure	–	is	conscious	of	a	difference,	of	a	betterment	of	his/her	lot.		Rather,	I	think	Nietzsche’s	point	here	is	
not	that	people	don’t	strive	for	pleasure;	people	do.		His	point	is	that	every	striving	for	pleasure	is	misguided,	that	what	people	are	really	after,	even	when	they	believe	what	they	want	is	pleasure,	is	actually	underneath	pleasure,	the	attainment	of	which																																																									118	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§688	119	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§688	120	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§688	121	See,	for	example,	The	Will	to	Power,	§42	
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gives	rise	to	it.		The	feeling	of	pleasure	is	an	affect	of	the	enhancement	of	power,	caused,	one	might	say,	by	the	attainment	of	power	or	mastery.		The	libertine,	however,	confuses	cause	and	effect	and	seeks	to	have	the	effect	without	its	cause.		This	is	something	Nietzsche	lists	as	one	of	the	general	types	of	decadence:	One	who	“confuses	cause	and	effect.”122			One	can	think	of	a	drug	user	who	artificially	attains	the	‘feeling	of	power’	without	having	done	what	is	necessary	to	procure	it	authentically.	So	how	can	one	make	sense	of	this	in	light	of	the	passage	from	Human	above?		I	think	one	can	make	sense	of	this	by	recognizing	that	we	relate	to	the	world	according	to	our	affects.		Our	affects	are	in	the	sensation	or	feeling	of	pleasure	and	displeasure.		It	does	not	mean	that	this	is	what	striving,	reductively,	is	towards,	but	rather	that	through	which	we	are	able	to	infer	our	aim:	mastery.		In	such	away,	a	decadent	spirit	will	feel	pleasure	in	turning	away	from	life,	either	as	a	libertine	or	ascetically.		This	is	how	they	‘master’	their	existence,	and	they	receive	their	compensation	for	it.		Stronger	spirits,	however,	rather	than	shut	out	the	world	or	repudiate	their	desires,	will	take	on	challenges	in	life	and	acquire	mastery,	rewarded	by	pleasure	rather	than	compensated	with	it.	The	‘doctrine	of	will	to	power’	has	largely	been	misinterpreted	as	metaphysical.		But,	this	invites	several	misunderstandings	of	Nietzsche	who	simultaneously	criticizes	metaphysics.		Nietzsche	abandons	metaphysics	after	the	
Birth	and	does	not	return	to	it.		Nietzsche	is	not	reengaging	in	metaphysics	as	he	had	dabbled	in	it	before,	but	has	consistently	repudiated	it	from	Human	on	through	the																																																									122	See,	for	example,	The	Will	to	Power,	§44	
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rest	of	his	career.		Also,	I	do	not	think	that	Nietzsche	ever	veered	away	from	believing	that	art	and	creativity	were	central	aspects,	indeed	the	fulcrum,	of	existence.		Even	while	he	valued	science,	it	was	in	relation	to	art	and	creativity,	such	as	when	he	writes,	“The	scientist	is	the	further	evolution	of	the	artist.”123	So	art	still,	in	varying	ways,	is	always	‘the	proper	task	of	life’,	but	it	shouldn’t,	after	The	Birth,	be	regarded	as	a	metaphysical	activity.	Christoph	Cox	correctly	observes,	“[The]	will	to	power	is	not	a	metaphysical	
theory,”	but	is	instead	“an	empirical	theory	–	a	broad,	hypothetical	attempt	to	provide	a	unifying	explanation	for	the	observable	features	of	the	natural	world.		In	this	sense,	it	is	akin	to	scientific	theories	such	as	mechanism,	thermodynamics,	and	evolutionary	theory;	and	Nietzsche	affirms	it	as	such.”124		Rather	than	a	metaphysical	claim,	Nietzsche	derives	it	from	his	interpretation	of	patterns	he	observes	–	a	repeating	theme	in	the	various	‘effects’	or	affects	he	observes	in	relations	between	things.		Cox	writes,	“Nietzsche	proposes	will	to	power	as	the	naturalistic	theory	par	excellence,	a	rigorously	anti-metaphysical	attempt	to	account	for	the	multiplicity	and	perpetual	becoming	of	the	natural	world	without	recourse	to	ontotheological	[postulations].”125		Heidegger	might	still	be	right	that	“will	to	power	constitutes	Nietzsche’s	answer	to	the	metaphysical	question	concerning	the	essence	of	what	is,”	as	Clark	observes,126	but	it	appears	to	me	that	the	answer	need	not	be	metaphysical;	an	answer	might	be	an	empirical	theory,	which	the	will	to	power																																																									123	Nietzsche,		124	Cox,	Nietzsche	Naturalism	and	Interpretation,	pp.	214-215	emphasis	mine	125	I	have	changed	Cox’s	word	from	‘posit’	to	‘postulation’	because	I	believe	that	is	the	meaning	intended,	particularly	with	reference	to	‘ontotheology’.	126	Clark,	Nietzsche	on	Truth	and	Philosophy,	pg.	206	
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actually	is,	by	denying	some	metaphysical	essence,	although	it	will	leave	those	who	need	to	believe	in	a	stronger	foundation	unsatisfied.		 This	view	is	in	agreement	with	Kaufmann’s	work	on	Nietzsche	where	will	to	power	is	presented	as	an	empirical	theory.127		Maudemarie	Clark	agrees	to	an	extent	with	this	view.		She	claims	the	will	to	power	is	inductively	inferred	from	experience.		She	emphasizes	the	psychological	relevance	of	it.		“When	Nietzsche	first	talks	about	the	will	to	power,	it	is	in	psychological	contexts,”	she	writes.		“His	point	is	to	explain	specific	kinds	of	human	behavior.		There	is	no	attempt	to	give	a	cosmological	theory	…	in	these	works.		Nietzsche’s	concern	is	the	human	world,	not	the	cosmos.”128		I	think	she	is	correct	to	emphasize	psychology,	as	Nietzsche’s	chief	concern	throughout	his	career	pertains	to	the	psychical	constitution	of	individuals	and	their	interrelations.		I	think	she	also	is	correct	to	regard	the	will	to	power	as	providing	an	empirical	theory	rather	than	a	metaphysical	one.		However,	I	think	Clark	is	wrong	to	imply	that	Nietzsche	does	not	also	attribute	the	will	to	power	to	inorganic	and	even	cosmological	aspects.		Numerous	passages	demonstrate	that	Nietzsche	sees	will	to	power	in	everything.		Below,	I	offer	my	account	of	will	to	power.		Clark	is	hostile	to	this	description	that	Nietzsche	provides	in	BGE	§36,	and	I	will	address	her	hostility	(and	misinterpretation)	in	the	following	section.		For	now,	I	merely	wish	to	illustrate	how	Nietzsche	conceives	of	the	will	to	power.	
																																																								127	There	are	moments	where	Kaufmann	implied	something	metaphysical,	and	moments	when	he	appears	to	claim	its	usefulness	is	only	psychological,	but	explicitly	Kaufmann	refers	to	it	as	an	empirical	theory.	128	Clark,	Nietzsche	on	Truth	and	Philosophy,	pp.	209-210	
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There	are	several	aspects	of	this	passage	that	require	elucidation.		And	I’ll	explain	as	I	go	along	the	importance	of	each	aspect	within	Nietzsche’s	thought	as	concerning	the	ensuing	discussions.	Nietzsche	writes:	Assuming	that	our	world	of	desires	and	passions	is	the	only	thing	‘given’	as	real,	that	we	cannot	get	down	or	up	to	any	‘reality’	except	the	reality	of	our	drives	…	–	aren’t	we	allowed	to	make	the	attempt	and	pose	the	question	as	to	whether	something	like	this	‘given’	isn’t	enough	to	render	the	so-called	mechanistic	(and	thus	material)	world	comprehensible	as	well?129		Nietzsche’s	point	here	is	in	coherence	with	his	view	that	we	need	to	focus	on	the	
appearances	of	things	and	not	postulate	some	underlying	metaphysical	truth	behind	the	appearances.		We	need	to	examine	the	world	as	it	appears	to	us,	to	focus	on	the	‘given’,	to	examine	life	empirically.		And	the	‘given’	world	of	appearance	involves	not	only	sense	perception	but	our	feelings,	affects,	and	passions	as	well.		These	are	also	‘givens’,	and	we	can’t	suppose	that	there	is	any	other	reality	other	than	the	given,	at	least	not	until	other	efforts	prove	futile.				…	I	mean,	it	might	allow	us	to	understand	the	mechanistic	world	as	belonging	to	the	same	plane	of	reality	as	our	affects	themselves	–,	as	a	primitive	form	of	the	world	of	affect,	where	everything	is	contained	in	a	powerful	unity	before	branching	off	and	organizing	itself	in	the	organic	process.		…	We	would	be	able	to	understand	the	mechanistic	world	as	a	kind	of	life	of	the	drives,	where	all	the	organic	functions	…	are	still	synthetically	bound	together	–	as	a	pre-form	of	life?130				
																																																								129	Nietzsche,	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§36	130	Nietzsche,	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§36	
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Here,	Nietzsche’s	speculating	that	such	an	empirical	inference	would	allow	us	to	be	able	to	interpret	and	understand	the	‘given’	without	recourse	to	anything	metaphysical	or	supersensuous.	At	this	point	Nietzsche	writes	that	the	will	to	power	can	provide	a	simpler	explanation,	using	‘Occam’s	Razor’,	instead	of	multiplying	unnecessary	or	ad	hoc	explanations.		He	then	asks	if	we	can	regard	the	will	to	power	as	efficacious.		The	belief	in	‘causality’	is	justified	because	causality	is	part	of	the	‘given’;	we	see	this	or	that	effect	that	or	this,	for	example.		We	feel	our	own	affects	and	passions	as	effects	of	certain	causes.		…	we	must	venture	the	hypothesis	that	everywhere	‘effects’	are	recognized,	will	is	effecting	will	–	and	that	every	mechanistic	event	in	which	a	force	is	active	is	really	a	force	and	effect	of	the	will.		–	Assuming,	finally,	that	we	succeeded	in	explaining	our	entire	life	of	drives	as	the	organization	and	outgrowth	of	one	basic	form	of	will	(namely,	the	will	to	power,	which	is	my	claim);	assuming	we	could	trace	all	organic	function	back	to	this	will	to	power	and	find	that	it	even	solved	the	problem	of	procreation	and	nutrition	(which	is	a	single	problem);	then	we	will	have	earned	the	right	to	clearly	designate	all	efficacious	force	as:	will	to	power.		The	world	seen	from	inside,	the	world	determined	and	described	with	respect	to	its	‘intelligible	character’	–	would	be	just	this	‘will	to	power’	and	nothing	else.131		First,	why	‘will	to	power’	and	not	just	‘will’?		‘Will	to	power’	is	an	inference	from	the	‘given’	world	of	appearances,	such	that	all	the	becoming,	transformations,	etc.,	exemplify	a	pattern	that	coheres	with	the	notion	of	a	‘will	to	power’.		This	empirical	inference	describes	the	universe	as	essentially	a	‘will	to	power’,	‘drive	to	master’;	a																																																									131	Nietzsche,	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§36	
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tendency	towards	growth	and	expansion,	towards	expenditure,	towards	stability.		Furthermore,	it	would	explain	human	affects,	passions,	drives,	and	willing.		Everything	would	be	reducible	to	complex	expressions	of	the	‘will	to	power’.		This	inference	would	be	confirmed,	for	Nietzsche,	if	it	is	useful	for	understanding	the	various	phenomenon	in	the	given	world.		In	other	words,	its	confirmation	could	entail	a	pragmatic	theory	of	truth,	being	true	insofar	as	it	is	useful.		But	it	can	only	be	useful	if	and	only	if,	as	an	explanation,	it	also	coheres	with	the	‘given’,	and	all	other	accepted	interpretations.		Thus	there	is,	one	could	say,	synthetic	unity	of	coherent	and	pragmatic	notions	of	validity.132		Pragmatism,	however,	depends	upon	coherence,	and	so	validity	–	what	one	takes	to	be	the	truth	–	depends	more	than	anything	on	coherence,	and	coherence	serves	as	the	basis	for	pragmatism.		This	will	be	explained	further	below	in	the	section	on	“Will	to	Power	as	Interpretation.”	Clark	observes	that	a	reason	for	Kaufman’s	psychological	interpretation	of	the	will	to	power	was	to	“answer	the	objection	that	…	the	will	to	power	does	not	explain	anything,”	if	it	is	found	everywhere,	because	it	“empties	it	of	all	meaning”	and	makes	it	“devoid	of	explanatory	power.”133		I	don’t	think	that	either	Kaufman	or	Clark	are	correct	in	their	approach;	rather,	I	think	it	is	because	will	to	power	is	everywhere,	including	in	the	dynamics	of	inorganic	entities,	that	it	actually	gains,	rather	than	loses,	explanatory	power,	although	the	explanations	also	gain	
																																																								132	A	correspondence	theory	of	truth	is	involved	only	regarding	the	correspondence	to	particular	interpretations	which	are	themselves	only	pragmatic	and/or	coherent.		An	aesthetic	valuations	normally	decides	their	coherence.		And	does	not	take	into	consideration	a	‘realist’	notion	of	validity.	This	will	become	clear	in	the	next	chapter	on	aesthetics.	133	Clark,	Nietzsche	on	Truth	and	Philosophy,	pg.	210	
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complexity	in	reference	to	it,	such	as,	comparably,	the	2nd	Law	of	Thermodynamics	(which	I’ve	already	demonstrated	to	be	complex	in	a	very	simplistic	way).		So	what	is	will	to	power?		Nietzsche	writes,	“The	victorious	concept	of	‘force’,	by	means	of	which	our	physicists	have	created	God	and	the	world,	still	needs	to	be	completed:	an	inner	world	must	be	ascribed	to	it,	which	I	designate	as	‘will	to	power’.”134		Nietzsche	is	not	a	materialist.		He	no-where	adheres	to	an	atomistic	view	of	the	world.135		Rather,	he	is	a	physicalist,	emphasizing	the	role	of	energy	and	forces,	rather	than	material	bodies.		His	physicalism	also	can	be	regarded	as	mechanistic	to	an	extent,	with	regard	to	the	play	of	forces	and	the	relentless	expenditures	and	transformations	of	energy,	but	the	mechanism	is	distinct	from	the	kind	that	he	has	criticized.		And	Nietzsche’s	physicalism	is	actually	quite	compatible	with	the	2nd	law	of	thermodynamics,	even	complimentary	to	it	with	respect	to	the	will	to	power	as	is	the	appearance	of	Bemächtigungstrieb	in	Freud	as	a	synthetic	operation	of	Eros	serving	the	death	drive.	Cox	observes	that	the	2nd	law	of	thermodynamics	appears	to	counter	the	ontotheological	aspects	of	mechanism,	but	writes,	“Even	if	the	thermodynamic	revolution	…	alters	this	picture	by	introducing	time,	irreversibility,	and	openness,	it	does	so	only	to	reintroduce	stasis,	indifference,	and	being	as	the	telos	of	the	system:	entropic	equilibrium.”136		I	do	not	think	that	this	conceptualization	of	a	telos	is	accurate,	however.		First	of	all,	there	isn’t	and	cannot	be	stasis,	according	to																																																									134	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§619.		Christoph	Cox	(Nietzsche:	Naturalism	and	Interpretaton,	pg.	220)	obervses	that	Kaufmann	&	Hollingdale	have	mistakenly	mistranslated	eine	innere	Welt	as	‘an	inner	will’.		I	have	used	Cox’s	correction.	135	See,	e.g.,	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§635	136	Cox,	Nietzsche	Naturalism	and	Interpretation,	pg.	220	
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thermodynamics,	but	a	trajectory	towards	stasis.		Then,	while	it	does	describe	a	
tendency	or	trajectory,	it	does	not	depict	a	purposiveness	one	observes	in	the	metaphysics	of	Kant	or	of	Aristotle.		The	telos	of	entropy,	if	one	can	call	it	that	(and	I	don’t	think	one	can,	strictly	speaking)	posits	nothing	that	is	not	also	posited	by	Nietzsche’s	reference	to	the	will	to	power,	which	can	be	said	to	have	a	telos	as	well	on	the	same	(loosely	meant)	grounds	as	entropy.	But	I	think	this	risks	conflating	what	is	a	principle	–	that	is,	an	empirically	observable	phenomena,	a	pattern	of	appearances	that	relentlessly	displays	itself	in	nature	–	with	purposiveness	or	telos	as	conceptualized,	for	example,	by	Kant	or	Aristotle.			Furthermore,	entropy	pertains	to	energy	and	actually	can	be	regarded	as	contrary	to	the	very	atomism	that	Nietzsche	also	criticizes.		Cox	writes:	In	place	of	an	ontology	of	atomic	unities	each	of	which	contains	‘will’	as	an	effective	capacity,	Nietzsche	substitutes	a	holistic	ontology	of	relatively	stable	power-complexes	essentially	bound	to	one	another	by	lines	of	force	(resistance,	domination,	submission,	alliance,	etc.).		Hence,	each	of	these	complexes	exists	in	an	intricate	web	of	tension	with	neighboring	power-complexes;	and	‘will	–	‘will	to	power’	–	is	just	a	name	for	this	state	of	tension,	this	straining	‘towards	which’	and	‘away	form	which’.”137		According	to	Cox,	Nietzsche’s	doctrine	of	the	will	to	power	postures	itself	as	an	alternative	theory.		“The	dynamic	force	of	will	to	power,”	writes	cox,	“is	a	function	of	the	difference	of	powers	and	the	tension	between	them.		A	generalized	equivalence	or	equilibrium	of	forces,	then,	would	signal	an	end	to	this	power-struggle	and,	
																																																								137	Cox,	Nietzsche:	Naturalism	and	Interpretation,	pg.	221	
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hence,	an	end	to	becoming,”	the	possibility	of	which	Nietzsche	denies.138		In	this	light,	Cox	writes,	“Nietzsche	challenges	both	the	mechanistic	hypothesis	of	God	the	watchmaker	and	the	thermodynamic	hypothesis	of	thermal	equilibrium	or	‘heat	death’.”139		But	a	‘heat	death’	is	only	one	such	possibility	of	entropy	in	the	universe.		Another	is	the	‘rubber	band’	effect,	where	the	universe	could	‘snap	back’	to	where	it	had	begun	to	expand	and	begin	again	its	endless	sea	of	becoming.		There	are	several	possibilities.		And	as	already	described	above,	Cox’s	‘refutation’	is	based	largely	on	a	misconception	of	thermodynamics.		The	unfortunate	formulation	of	the	2nd	law	of	thermodynamics	originally	described	the	dynamics	of	a	closed	system.		But	even	in	a	closed	system,	there	is	no	postulation	of	an	‘unmoved	mover’	at	the	origin	of	force	and	movement	and	change.		Only	in	a	closed	system,	which	the	earth	is	not	because	of	the	continuous	import	of	energy	from	the	sun,	can	Cox’s	(and	Nietzsche’s?)	misapprehension	be	entertained	that	Biological	evolution	seems	to	“contradict	the	trajectory	of	thermodynamics.”140		As	described	above,	in	an	open	system	entropy	can	actually	be	regarded	as	an	ordering	principle,	much	like	the	will	to	power.	Cox	observes	that	Bataille	sees	the	same	forces	at	play	in	nature	of	which	Nietzsche	conceives	in	positing	the	will	to	power.		For	Bataille,	“the	dynamic	force	of	nature	(that	which	propels	growth,	sexuality,	procreation,	struggle,	and	death)	and	of	culture	(production,	form-giving,	creativity,	and	play)	is	the	superabundance	of	energy	in	the	biosphere	and	the	compulsion	to	expend	it.”141		“It’s	not	necessity	but	
																																																								138	Cox,	Nietzsche:	Naturalism	and	Interpretation,	pg.	222	139	Cox,	Nietzsche:	Naturalism	and	Interpretation,	pg.	223	140	Cox,	Nietzsche:	Naturalism	and	Interpretation,	pg.	224	141	Cox,	Nietzsche:	Naturalism	and	Interpretation,	pg.	231	
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its	contrary,	‘luxury’,	that	presents	living	matter	and	mankind	with	their	fundamental	problems,”	writes	Bataille,142	thus	observing	the	same	need	to	expend.	In	my	opinion,	Bataille	gives	excellent	descriptions	of	entropy	in	an	open	system,	very	much	aligned	with	Nietzsche’s	physical	conception	of	will	to	power.		Bataille’s	description	of	the	organic	in	The	Accursed	Share,	for	example,	reads	thus:	The	living	organism,	in	a	situation	determined	by	the	play	of	energy	on	the	surface	of	the	globe,	ordinarily	receives	more	energy	than	is	necessary	for	maintaining	life;	the	excess	energy	…	can	be	used	for	growth	of	a	system	(e.g.,	an	organism);	if	the	system	can	no	longer	grow,	or	if	the	excess	cannot	be	completely	absorbed	in	its	growth,	it	must	necessarily	be	lost	without	profit;	it	must	be	spent,	willingly	or	not,	gloriously	or	catastrophically.143			Elsewhere	he	writes,	“On	the	surface	of	the	globe,”	and	“for	living	matter	in	general,	energy	is	always	in	excess,”144	identifying	the	play	of	energy	on	earth	as	an	open	system	because	it	results	from	the	endless	light	from	the	sun,	receiving	from	the	sun	without	return.145			The	will	to	power	is,	when	Nietzsche	offers	a	physical	explanation,	always	described	as	entropy	in	an	open	system.146		Aside	from	the	above,	one	can	look	at	the	prologue	of	Zarathustra,	where	Zarathustra	speaks	to	the	Sun	(implying	an	affinity	between	himself	and	the	sun),	likening	himself	to	a	bee	
																																																								142	Bataille,	Accursed	Share,	vol.	1	pg.	12	143	Bataille,	The	Accursed	Share,	vol.	1	pg.	21	144	Bataille,	The	Accursed	Share,	vol.	1	pg.	23	145	Bataille,	The	Accursed	Share,	vol.	1	pg.	23	&	28	146	See	above	references	to	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§36,	or	below	reference	in	the	section	on	the	Dionysian.	
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with	an	excess	of	honey,	and	must	consequently	‘go	under’	and	expend	his	energy,	his	wisdom,	with	others	because	he	has	become	‘over-full’.147			Nietzsche	is	very	hostile	to	teleological	suppositions	made	in	the	sciences	and	philosophy,	in	particular	concerning	‘life-preservative’	or	‘self-preservative’	instincts.		Nietzsche	writes,	“Physiologists	should	think	again	before	positing	the	‘instinct	of	self-preservation’	as	the	cardinal	drive	in	an	organic	creature.		A	living	thing	wants	above	all	to	discharge	its	force:	‘preservation’	is	only	a	consequence	of	this.		–	beware	of	superfluous	teleological	principles!	The	entire	concept	‘instinct	of	preservation’	is	one	of	them.”148		Here,	however,	we	can	observe	the	close	affinity	between	what	Nietzsche	describes	and	what	Freud	has	described,	as	a	‘discharge	of	strength’	for	Nietzsche,	a	discharge	of	‘tension’	or	‘surplus	energy’	for	Freud.		In	Nietzsche,	as	with	Freud,	this	can	be	seen	to	follow	the	entropic	principle.		Nietzsche	does	not	repudiate	mechanism	entirely,	but	only	atomistic	mechanism;	as	BGE	36	demonstrates,	Nietzsche’s	‘claim’	is	that	the	will	to	power	provides	a	non-atomistic	and	mechanistic	explanation	for	phenomena.			Nietzsche’s	point,	really,	is	that	it	is	a	mistake	to	think	that	forces	move	
towards	anything.		As	I’ve	argued	elsewhere,	this	is	an	example	of	myopic	retrospect.		Correspondingly,	things	cannot	be	described	or	explained	as	progressive.		Nietzsche	often	takes	aim	at	Darwin	and	evolutionary	theory	on	this	point,	although	he	seems	to	understand	the	theory	mostly	through	the	eyes	of	‘Darwin’s’	spin	
																																																								147	Nietzsche,	Zarathustra,	prologue	§1	148	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§650	and	also	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§13	
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doctors’,149	such	as	Herbert	Spencer.		According	to	Spencer,	“natural	selection	gradually	promotes	an	increasingly	better	fit	between	organisms	and	their	environment.”150		However,	Nietzsche	counters	this,	arguing,	“Humanity	does	not	represent	a	development	for	the	better,	does	not	represent	something	stronger	or	higher	the	way	people	these	days	think	it	does.		‘Progress’	is	just	a	modern	idea,	which	is	to	say	a	false	idea.”151		One	might	add	as	well,	it	is	a	decadent	idea,	an	interpretation	that	would	allow	weaker	spirits	the	illusion	of	being	‘better’	than	preceding	spirits.152		All	of	this	is	meant	to	emphasize	how	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	avoid	myopic	retrospection,	and	his	alignment	of	the	will	to	power	with	entropic	forces	allows	for	the	prevalent	teleological	illusion	that	many	have	historically	believed,	but	also	explains	it	away	as	mere	illusion.					
																																																								149	Cox,	Nietzsche	Naturalism	and	Interpretation,	pg.	224.		Cox	attrubtes	this	term	to	Stephen	Gould,	referring	perhaps	to	Spencer.	150	Cox,	Nietzsche	Naturalism	and	Interpretation,	pg.	226	151	Nietzsche	AC	§4,	see	also,	for	a	lengthy	tirade,	The	Will	to	Power,	§684-685	152	Darwin,	however,	as	Cox	and	Daniel	Dennett	observe,	was	‘antiprogressivist’.152		That	is,	Darwin	did	not	see	evolution	as	purposively	projecting	progressively	‘better’	organisms	into	the	future.		It	is	all	a	matter	of	chance.		As	Dennett	writes:	stupidity.152		Evolution	is	a	‘game	of	chance’	or	a	dice	roll,	to	use	Nietzsche’s	metaphor,	and	does	not	have	an	ontotheological	or	Hegelian	progressivism	in	view.		Dennett	observes	that	Nietzsche,	while	often	aiming	at	Darwin,	actually	defended	Darwin’s	views	from	spin	doctors	such	as	Spencer.		Dennett	does	not	offer	a	great	understanding	of	Nietzsche,	misunderstands,	for	example,	Eternal	Reccurrance	and	its	significance	in	his	book.		However,	I	does	observe	and	appreciate	Nietzsche’s	position	on	evolutionary	theory.	
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Drive	or	Desire?	
Freud	observes	that	we	can	never	be	conscious	of	a	drive.		He	writes,	“A	[drive]	can	never	become	an	object	of	consciousness	–	only	the	idea	that	represents	the	[drive]	can.		…	If	the	[drive]	did	not	attach	itself	to	an	idea	or	manifest	itself	as	an	affective	state,	we	could	know	nothing	about	it.”153		The	aspect	of	the	drive	of	which	we	can	become	conscious,	for	him,	is	the	idea	with	which	a	drive	is	cathected	or	the	affect/feeling	associated	with	it.		But	a	further	complication	is	that	rarely,	if	ever,	is	an	idea	such	a	direct	representative	of	the	drive,	but	instead	representative	of	a	representative,	such	as	when	a	snake	substitutes	the	idea	of	a	penis,	and	where	the	penis	itself	can	denote	something	else	about	the	drive	(denoting	a	wish,	or	fear,	etc.).			 In	his	work	The	Unconscious,	Freud	describes	repression	as	the	censorship	of	content;	that	is,	the	refusal	to	allow	unconscious	content	into	consciousness	by	restricting	it	at	a	preconscious	level.		He	writes,	“The	censorship	that	takes	place	in	the	system	Pcs.,	repression,	“is	essentially	a	process	affecting	ideas.”154		This	is	central	to	Freud’s	introduction	of	the	notion	of	an	anticathexis.		An	anticathexis	first	involves	the	withdrawal	of	cathexis	from	the	idea	in	the	unconscious,	and	is	substituted	by	another	idea.		It	is	the	means	in	which	“the	system	Pcs.	protects	itself	from	the	pressure	upon	it	of	the	unconscious	idea.	…	It	is	this	which	represents	the	permanent	expenditure	[of	energy]	of	a	primal	repression,	and	which	also	
																																																								153	Freud,	The	Unconscious,	pg.	177	154	Freud,	The	Unconscious,	pg.	180	
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guarantees	the	permanence	of	that	repression.”155		Furthermore,	it	would	appear	that	the	“cathexis	which	is	withdrawn”	from	the	primary	idea	“is	used	for	anticathexis.”156		A	great	anecdote	to	serve	as	an	example	of	this	process	is	the	case	study	of	Anna	O.			The	Nachträglichkeit	that	takes	place	in	her	preconscious	substitution	of	laughter	for	being	sexually	abused	is	a	significant	example	of	this	process.		The	main	point	that	I	am	trying	to	argue	here	is:	desire	is	conscious,	and	integral	to	desire	and	is	the	idea	of	the	thing	that	we	believe	we	desire.		A	drive,	which	largely	determines	what	is	desired,	and	with	which	an	original	idea	is	cathected,	is	not	conscious	and	cannot	be	conscious.		But	the	idea,	as	well	as	the	affects,	associated	with	desire,	are	‘refractions’	of	the	unconscious	material	(drives	and	unconscious	ideas),	so	that	a	distinction	must	be	made	between	that	which	one	
desires	and	that	towards	which	one	is	driven.	Nietzsche	also	observes	that	desire	is	not	the	same	as	will	to	power,	and	that	we	are	only	conscious	of	desire	although	behind	desires	are	drives	of	which	we	are	hardly	conscious.		He	writes:	
That	one	desires	to	combat	the	vehemence	of	a	drive	at	all	…	does	not	stand	within	our	own	power;	nor	does	the	choice	of	any	particular	method;	nor	does	the	success	or	failure	of	this	method.		What	is	clearly	the	case	is	that	in	this	entire	procedure	of	our	intellect	is	only	the	blind	instrument	of	another	
drive	which	is	a	rival	of	the	drive	whose	vehemence	is	tormenting	us	…	While	‘we’	believe	we	are	complaining	about	the	vehemence	of	a	drive,	at	bottom	it	is	one	drive	which	is	complaining	about	another;	that	is	to	say:	for	us	to	become	aware	that	we	are	suffering	from	the	vehemence	of	a	drive	presupposes	the	existence	of	another	equally	vehement	or	even	more																																																									155	Freud,	The	Unconscious,	pg.	181	156	Freud,	The	unconscious,	pg.	181	
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vehement	drive,	and	that	a	struggle	is	in	prospect	in	which	our	intellect	is	going	to	have	to	take	sides.157		Gemes	claims	that	Nietzsche	“seems	to	have	subpersonal	units	engaged	in	acts	of	recognition	that	we	normally	ascribe	to	consciousness.”158		Gemes	points	out,	however,	that	modern	psychology	and	philosophy	of	mind	“have	little	trouble	ascribing	the	functional	equivalent	of	recognition	capacities	to	subpersonal	units.”159		Gemes	presents	another	solution	to	the	problem.	The	finite	quota	of	energy	that	each	individual	has	at	their	disposal	provides	a	solution	because	if	one	drive	appropriates	most	of	the	energy	resources,	then	the	other	drives	are	thereby	weakened,	and	no	kind	of	recognition	or	choice,	subpersonal	or	otherwise,	is	needed.160			It	is	possible,	however,	to	read	this	in	another	way.		Gemes	finds	the	above	passage	appears	to	“allow	that	our	conscious	selves	may	be	aware	of	the	drive	that	is	causing	us	distress,”	even	while	it	“emphasizes	another	drive,	not	the	conscious	I,	as	the	repressing	force.”161		However,	where	Nietzsche	writes	that	our	‘intellect	is	blind’	and	that	neither	the	choice	nor	the	success	or	failure	is	within	our	power,	it	appears	that	it	is	something	of	which	we	are	not	conscious.		And	here,	he	precisely	differentiates	between	desire	and	drive.		He	speaks	of	one	wanting162	to	combat	a	drive.		Who	wants	this?		How	is	it	thus	desired?		It	is	desired	only	because	of	a	
																																																								157	Nietzsche,	Daybreak,	§109	158	Gemes,	Sublimation,	pg.	50	159	Gemes,	Sublimation,	pg.	50	160	for	Gemes’	account,	see	Gemes,	“Sublimation…,”	pg.	51	161	Gemes,	“Sublimation…,”	pg.	50	162	The	German	will	has	in	this	edition	been	translated	as	‘desire’.			
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configuration	of	drives	of	which	one	is	not	conscious.		It	appears	in	consciousness	as	an	opposition,	a	desire	to	repress.		This	is	sufficiently	addressed	by	Gardner’s	distinction	between	motivational	states	and	propositional	attitudes	addressed	above.		It	seems	to	me	that	where	one	wants	to	combat	a	drive	at	all,	it	denotes	an	ascetic	standpoint,	and	therefore	is	–	as	is	the	desire	–	a	product	of	reaction-formation.163		But	this	reaction-formation	would	be	one	particular	instantiation	of	desire,	and	not	indicative	of	desire	in	general.	The	will	to	power	is,	for	Nietzsche,	a	component	of	all	drives	and	desires.		In	
The	Anti-Christ,	Nietzsche	writes,	“The	old	word	‘will’	only	serves	to	describe	a	result,	a	type	of	individual	reaction	that	necessarily	follows	from	a	quantity	of	partly	contradictory,	partly	harmonious	stimuli.”164		‘Will’,	as	in	willing	or	desire,	is	a	terminal	phenomenon.			“Everything	of	which	we	become	conscious	is	a	terminal	phenomenon,	an	end	–	and	causes	nothing.”165		Mere	willing	is	something	of	which	one	is	cognizant	and	is	therefore	allowed	into	consciousness	by	the	ego.	Nietzsche	writes,	“The	will	to	power	is	the	primitive	form	of	affect,	that	all	other	affects	are	only	developments	of	it.”166	The	will	to	power	is	thus	not	identifiable	with	affects,	passions,	and	feelings	directly,	but	is	instead	the	‘primitive	form’	of	them	–	their	origin	or	source,	as	it	were.	
																																																								163	This	will	be	made	more	clear	bellow	in	the	section	on	the	vicissitudes	of	drives.		What	I	am	claiming	is	that	desire	is,	for	Nietzsche,	a	formation	in	consciousness	that	occurs	in	the	reaction	against	another	drive	(or	group	of	drives)	in	order	to	reinforce	the	reaction	–	a	reaction	that	involves	the	operation	of	repression.		What	I’m	claiming,	then,	is	that	desire	is	often	the	result	of	a	reaction-formation.	164	Nietzsche	The	Anti-Christ,	§14	165	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§480	166	Nietzcshe,	The	Will	to	Power,	§688	
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When	Nietzsche	speaks	of	a	“Free	Will,”	he	is	speaking	of	willing	as	it	corresponds	to	desire	rather	than	to	drives	or	a	component	factor	of	drives.		This	is	evident	by	the	fact	that	one	of	Nietzsche’s	reasons	for	denying	a	free	will	is	expressed	by	the	assertion	that	what	one	believes	one	is	free	to	will	is	actually	determined	by	what	one	is	driven	to	will,	over	which	one	has	little	control.		Willing	is	conscious,	but	for	Nietzsche,	all	conscious	thought	and	feeling,	all	desire,	is	rooted	in	the	drives	or	instincts.167		In	BGE	§19,	Nietzsche	explicitly	speaks	of	willing	as	an	
affect	of	several	distinct	psychical	and	embodied	phenomena.168		First,	he	is	criticizing	the	supposition	of	a	free	will.		The	will	that	is	identified	with	‘free	will’	is	distinct	from	the	will	to	power.		Secondly,	and	in	relation	to	this,	this	‘free	will’	is	an	
affect.		As	such,	it	is	what	is	consciously	recognized	from	all	these	underlying	elements.		Will,	as	affect,	is	essentially	what	we	know	as	desire.			 Maudemarie	Clark	thinks	that	Nietzsche	does	not	believe	in	the	most	well-known	passage	in	which	Nietzsche	introduces	the	will	to	power	in	Beyond	Good	and	
Evil.		Her	claim	is	virtually	impossible	to	justify,	however,	since	Nietzsche	does	note,	parenthetically,	that	it	is	[his]	claim.		Clark	claims	that	Nietzsche	rejects	the	view	of																																																									167	see	Nietzsche,	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§3	168	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§19.		Nietzsche	writes,	“Philosophers	tend	to	talk	about	the	will	as	if	it	were	the	most	familiar	thing	in	the	world,”	attributing	such	a	view	to	Schopenhauer.		But,	Nietzsche	continues:	Willing	strikes	me	as,	above	all,	something	complicated,	something	unified	only	in	a	word	…	in	every	act	of	willing	there	is	…	a	plurality	of	feelings,	namely:	the	feeling	of	the	state	away	from	which,	the	feeling	of	the	state	
towards	which,	and	the	feeling	of	this	‘away	from’	and	‘towards’	themselves.		But	this	is	accompanied	by	the	feeling	of	the	muscles.		…	Just	as	feeling	–	and	indeed	many	feelings	–	must	be	recognized	as	ingredients	of	the	will,	thought	must	be	as	well.		In	every	act	of	will	there	is	a	commandeering	thought	…	Third,	the	will	is	not	just	a	complex	of	feeling	and	thinking;	rather,	it	is	fundamentally	an	affect:	and	specifically	the	affect	of	the	command.		…	We	are	…	both	the	one	who	commands	and	the	one	who	obeys.	
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will	to	power	that	he	provides	because	of	two	premises.169		The	first	premise,	she	writes,	is	that	“only	the	world	of	our	desires	and	passions	is	‘given’	as	real,	and	that	we	cannot	get	up,	or	down,	to	any	other	‘reality’	than	that	of	our	drives,”	and	this	suggests	“we	have	knowledge	regarding	the	existence	and	nature	of	our	drives,	but	not	regarding	anything	else,	that	is,	the	external	or	material	world.”170		She	is	trying	to	understand	the	will	to	power	as	the	postulation	of	something	external	or	material	as	a	realist.171		Clark	claims	that	‘knowledge’	of	the	drives	must	entail	an	a	priori	postulation	of	them,	rather	than	seeing	them	as	being	a	hypothesis	inferred	from	the	‘given’.		She	then	incredibly	claims	that	it	would	suggest	a	kind	of	Cartesian	priority	of	the	res	cogitans	over	the	res	extensa.172	This	absurd	interpretation	I	hope	I’ve	already	explained	away	implicitly.		Nietzsche	is	concerned	with	appearances,	the	‘given’,	and	as	such;	he	is	concerned	with	the	affects	as	well	as	sensory	experiences	of	the	external	world.		This	is	his	point.		Both	what	I	feel	of	myself	and	what	I	observe	are	included	in	an	empirical	understanding.		Knowledge	of	the	drives	is	empirically	based,	inferred	retroductively	from	experience	and	observation;	there	is	no	a	priori	postulation,	but	an	a	posteriori	retroduction.			 		 Clark	does	come	close	to	recognizing	the	solution	I	propose	here,	that	the	will	to	power,	like	the	drives,	is	not	conscious.		However,	she	argues,	“If	will	is	not	conscious,	it	becomes	impossible	to	understand	how	BGE	36	would	support	its	first																																																									169	Please	refer	again	to	my	description	of	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§36	above	170	Clark,	Nietzsche	on	Truth	and	Philosophy,	pg.	213	171	Notice,	here,	that	what	Nietzsche	claims	we	can	‘know’	are	the	affects	–	desire	and	passion.		But	as	affects,	such	are	refracted	aspects	of	drives.		Drives	are	inferred	retroductively	from	the	existence	of	desires	and	passions	that	are	complexes	and	otherwise	inexplicable.			172	Clark,	Nietzsche	on	Truth	and	Philosophy,	pg.	213	
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premise:	that	only	willing	is	‘given’,	and	that	we	cannot	get	up	or	down	to	any	world	beyond	our	drives.”173	She’s	thus	conflated	willing	with	the	drives,	and	the	drives	with	the	will	to	power,	the	same	mistake	that	Sartre	makes	in	conflating	motivational	states	with	propositional	attitudes.		The	will	to	power,	however,	is	precisely	what	is	not	consciously	known	and	only	inferred	from	patterns	of	observation,	analogous	to	the	inference	of	dark	matter	or	entropy.		Desire	is	known,	or	felt,	and	is	generally	available	to	conscious/self-conscious	awareness.		But	as	addressed	previously,	desire	is	only	a	refracted	drive,	or	the	refracted	result	of	a	collection	of	drives	and	affects.		The	will	to	power	is	a	component	aspect	to	drives	and	instincts,	and	even	a	physical	principle	that	explains	the	patterns	of	tendencies	to	stability	and	a	reduction	of	tension	in	even	the	inorganic	(as	Eros	appears	to	be	for	Freud	in	the	service	of	the	death	drive).174		Richard	Schacht,	Clark	observes,	makes	a	similar	point.		She	writes:	Schacht	denies	that	Nietzsche’s	use	of	‘will’	to	describe	the	world’s	‘intelligible	character’	conflicts	with	his	dismissal	of	will	as	‘just	a	word’	on	the	grounds	that	‘will’	is	used	here	as	a	metaphor,	with	the	conceptual		content	of	‘will	to	power’	specified	and	exhausted	through	the	idea	of	a	tendency	or	disposition	of	forces	‘to	extend	their	influence	and	dominate	others.175		Although	I	disagree	with	the	final	word	on	the	matter,	that	the	disposition	to	‘dominate	others’	is	anything	other	than	secondary	to	the	will	to	power,	I	think																																																									173	Clark,	Nietzsche	on	Truth	and	Philosophy,	pg.	217	fn.	1	174	as,	for	example,	Bemächtigungstrieb.	As	a	reminder,	that	‘tendency	to	stability’	that	determines	drives	and	instincts	is,	in	psychical	life,	a	will	to	mastery	–	to	organize	and	to	unify	where	possible,	or	to	annihilate	where	impossible.			175	Clark,	Nietzsche	on	Truth	and	Philosophy,	pg.	217	
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Schacht	makes	a	similar	point	that	I	am	trying	to	make.		Clark,	however,	disagrees	with	it,	arguing	that	it	would	“appeal	to	our	intuition	of	ourselves	as	causal	in	the	act	of	willing	as	a	basis	for	interpreting	the	material	world	as	will	to	power,”	but	which,	in	GS	127,	“Nietzsche	accused	Schopenhauer	of	enthroning	a	‘primeval	mythology’.”176		In	other	words,	Clark	only	sees	in	this	interpretation	a	metaphysical	conception	of	the	will	to	power,	precisely	the	metaphysical	interpretation	–	of	things-in-themselves	–	which	Nietzsche	rejects.177		But	this	is	mistaken.		The	will	to	power,	like	the	drives	(which	display	the	pattern	of	it),	is	an	empirical	inference,	a	retroduction.	She	also	takes	issue	with	what	she	claims	is	Nietzsche’s	‘second	premise’.		She	objects	to	Nietzsche’s	assertion	that	we	“must	attempt	to	explain	the	rest	of	the	world	in	terms	of	the	will’s	kind	of	causality.”178		She	objects	because	she	thinks	this	amounts	to	projecting	the	conscious	will	into	the	operations	of	the	physical	world.	Notice,	too,	this	is	a	conflation	people	often	make	in	reading	Schopenhauer	as	well.179		Rather,	Nietzsche	sees	in	willing	a	pattern	towards	expansion	and	growth	also	observable	in	the	organic	and	inorganic,	and	applies	the	word	‘will’	–	empty	of	its	sentient	content,	as	a	term	–	a	metonym,	even	–	to	describe	such	patterns	in																																																									176	Clark,	Nietzsche	on	Truth	and	Philosophy,	pg.	217	177	Danto	attempted	this	interpretation,	and	Clark	correctly	criticizes	it:	Clark,	Nietzsche	on	Truth	and	Philosophy,	pg.217	fn.	1	178	Clark,	Nietzsche	on	Truth	and	Philosophy,	pg.	214	179	Clark	actually	makes	this	conflation	concerning	Shcopenhauer	as	well.		She	writes	that	the	first	premise	would	“be	incompatible	with	BG	19’s	criticism	of	philosophers	like	Schopenhauer	who	‘speak	of	the	will	as	if	it	were	the	best-known	thing	in	the	world.”		Clark,	Nietzsche	on	Truth	and	Philosophy,	pg.	214.		For	Schopenhauer,	the	‘will’	is	the	best	known,	but	this	is	not	to	be	conflated	with	The	
Will,	which	is	postulated	as	the	thing	in	itself	behind	all	conscious	willing.		(SEE	CRITICISM)	
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nature.		However,	Clark	writes,	concluding	her	argument,	that	BGE	36	cannot	therefore	be	attributed	to	Nietzsche.		“The	problem,”	she	writes,	“is	not	that	it	makes	use	of	the	idea	of	will,	but	that	it	depends	crucially	on	what	Nietzsche	has	explicitly	and	repeatedly	rejected,	a	belief	in	the	causality	of	the	will.”180		Here,	it	becomes	clearest	that	she	conflates	the	will	of	will	to	power	with	willing	or	desire	and	intentionality	in	general.	Clark	raises	an	interesting	point	in	her	objection	to	Kaufmann’s	account	of	
will	to	power	as	‘psychological’	and	empiricist.		She	writes	that	in	instances	of	rape,	the	desire	for	power	is	often	contrasted	with	a	desire	for	sex,	where	a	rapist	seeks	to	have	power	over,	and	dominate,	another.		The	fact	that	this	contrast	exists	suggests	that	there	are	behaviors	outside	the	scope	of	a	power	dynamic.181		Clark	suggests	that	Kaufmann’s	empiricist	interpretation	of	the	will	to	power	“can	be	maintained	in	the	face	of	this	kind	of	objection	only	if	the	will	to	power	is	defined	so	that	at	least	some	possible	motives	are	not	instances	of	it.”182		But	this,	of	course,	would	severely	deform	Nietzsche’s	notion	of	it,	for	he	writes,	“The	world	is	will	to	power	–	and	nothing	besides!”183		I	don’t	think	her	objection	stands	to	scrutiny.		Aside	from	the	persisting	view	of	will	as	desire,	the	‘will	to	power’	is	not	a	need	to	dominate	others,	but	might	manifest	itself	as	such	in	consciousness,	such	as	in	Hegel’s	life	and	death	struggle.		Her	problem	again	is	attributing	to	the	will	to	power	a	conscious	representative,	only	now	concerning	the	‘power’	instead	of	the	‘will’	of	will	to	power.																																																									180	Clark,	Nietzsche	on	Truth	and	Philosophy,	pg.	215	181	See	Clark,	Nietzsche	on	Truth	and	Philosophy,	pg.	210	182	Clark,	Nietzsche	on	Truth	and	Philosophy,	pg.	211	183	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,1067	
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Clark	then	experiments	with	the	notion	of	power	as	“the	ability	to	do	or	get	what	one	wants,”	and	contrasts	it	with	the	satisfaction	of	the	will	to	power,	“a	sense	of	power,”	which	she	writes	“has	then	nothing	essential	to	do	with	power	over	others,	but	is	a	sense	of	one’s	effectiveness	in	the	world.”184	This	is	precisely	how,	I	argue,	it	should	be	interpreted,	absent	the	propositional	attitude	in	‘wanting’.		However,	she	claims	this	amounts	to	“thinking	of	the	will	to	power	as	a	second-order	desire	for	the	ability	to	satisfy	one’s	other,	or	first	order,	desires.”185		She	thus	understands	it	entirely	backwards.		What	has	happened	here	is	her	inability	to	correctly	understand	the	will	of	will	to	power	has	had	the	effect	of	misunderstanding	power	as	well,	for	she	can	only	see	power	as	something	other	than	dominance	if	‘will’	is	regarded	as	a	‘second-order	desire’.	In	instances	where	humans	are	craving	power	in	terms	of	dominance	or	power	over	others,	this	does	often	appear	as	a	conscious,	or	at	least	pre-conscious,	pursuit.		So	it	would	suggest	that	there	are	two	orders	of	willing,	comparable	to	the	‘drive	vs.	desire’	discussion	addressed	above.		And	Clark	claims	that	it	seems	absurd	to	suppose	that	a	desire	for	power	–	as	in	dominance	or	power	over	X	–	could	emerge	unless	other	pre-existing	desires	were	left	unsatisfied.186		But	there	are	no	‘pre-existing	desires’,	only	drives	(which	also	express	will	to	power)	and	affects.		Otherwise,	this	is	congruent	with	the	discussion	of	aggression	below,	where	it	manifests	only	in	the	frustration	of	the	secondary	process;	that	is,	it	is	itself	
																																																								184	Clark,	Nietzsche	on	Truth	and	Philosophy,	pg.	211	185	Clark,	Nietzsche	on	Truth	and	Philosophy,	pg.	211	186	Clark,	Nietzsche	on	Truth	and	Philosophy,	pg.	211	
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secondary,	and	contingent	on	the	impotence	in	direct	discharge	or	the	binding	qualities	of	Eros.		Nietzsche	himself	writes:	…	I	have	found	strength	where	no	one	previous	searched,	in	simple,	mild,	and	pleasant	people,	without	the	least	inclination	to	rule	–	and,	vice	versa,	the	inclination	to	rule	has	often	seemed	to	be	an	indication	of	inner	weakness;	they	fear	their	own	slave	soul	and	throw	over	her	a	royal	coat	…	Powerful	natures	dominate,	it	is	a	necessity	for	which	they	needn’t	lift	a	finger.	Even	if,	during	their	lifetime,	they	bury	themselves	in	a	garden	house!187		Thus	for	Nietzsche,	those	who	are	strong	or	are	powerful	never	desire	strength	or	power;	it	is	part	of	their	nature	or	constitution	to	be	so,	although	they,	too,	are	full	of	‘will	to	power’.		However,	Clark	–	along	with	Sartre	–	relegates	all	human	psychical	experience	to	that	realm	of	conscious	striving.			Clark	observes	that	if	the	will	to	power	is	to	be	consistent	with	the	rejection	of	metaphysics,	then	it	must,	as	Kaufmann	suggests,	be	empirical.		She	also	agrees	that	it	is	explanatorily	illuminating	for	some	aspects	about	human	behavior;	and	yet,	where	everything	is	viewed	as	an	expression	of	will	to	power,	she	finds	it	implausible	or	uninteresting,	and	suggests	Nietzsche	could	not	have	believed	such.188		She	concludes,	“Nietzsche’s	doctrine	of	will	to	power	may	be	construed	as	an	empirical	hypothesis	…	but	only	at	the	cost	of	depriving	it	of	all	plausibility,”	and	rendering	Nietzsche	“less	astute	about	psychological	matters	than	many	(including	
																																																								187	Nietzsche	Nachlass	Fragment,	Fall	1880	6[206]	(my	translation.	Taken	from	‘Nietzsche	Source’	http://www.nietzschesource.org)	188	Clark,	Nietzsche	on	Truth	and	Philosophy,	pg.	212	
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Freud).”189		Rather,	it	is	only	her	misinterpretation	of	Nietzsche	that	renders	the	empirical	interpretation	implausible.		Her	conclusion	seems	to	be	derived	from	her	inability	to	cognize	the	will	or	the	power	of	“will	to	power”	as	anything	other	than	conscious;	that	is,	she	fails	to	see	that	Nietzsche	is	doing	exactly	what	Freud	had	also	done:	retroductively	infer	from	empirical	phenomena.			The	empirical	phenomena	that	Nietzsche	observes	involve	relentless	expansions	and	growths	of	forms	of	life,	even	non-sentient	life.		And	he	also	makes	a	similar	observation	of	the	inorganic;	otherwise	he	would	not	claim	that	everything	is	will	to	power.		But	in	saying	everything	is	will	to	power,	he	is	not	asserting	that	there	is	in	the	inorganic	or	non-sentient	life	a	desiring	or	an	aspiration	for	power,	let	alone	a	feeling	of	power.		Rather,	he	observes	the	desire	for	power	among	humans,	and	recognizes	that	it	is	an	expression	of	the	same	patterns	of	phenomena	observable	in	
everything.		What	I	hope	to	have	demonstrated	is	that	Clark’s	misinterpretation	of	the	will	to	power,	particularly	in	passages	such	as	BGE	§36,	hinges	on	two	factors:	her	conflation	of	conscious	desire	and	conscious	power	with	unconscious	drives	(aspects	of	the	will	to	power)	or	physical	trends	towards	homeostasis.		She	misunderstands	both	the	will	and	the	power	of	Nietzsche’s	“will	to	power.”			
																																																								189	Clark,	Nietzsche	on	Truth	and	Philosophy,	pg.	211,	it	is	interesting	that	She	makes	this	allusion	to	Freud,	for	Freud	actually	has	very	similar	views	regarding	a	will	to	
mastery,	evident	in	both	sadism	and	masochism,	which	I	argue	is	a	false	dilemma	between	the	two	orientations	of	a	drive	for	mastery	–	oriented	towards	others	in	the	case	of	the	former,	and	towards	the	self	in	the	case	of	the	latter.		Freud	himself	introduces	the	term	‘Bemachtigungstrieb’	in	Beyond	the	Pleasure	Principle	to	explain	what	is	‘beyond	pleasure’,	much	as	Nietzsche’s	‘will	to	power’	is	beyond	pleasure.		See	above	for	a	discussion	of	this.	
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Dionysos:	The	Affectations	of	the	Will	to	Power	
	‘The	grand	old	eternal	writer	of	the	comedy	of	our	existence.”190		In	his	late	notebooks,	Nietzsche	identifies	the	Dionysian	with	the	will	to	power.		There	are	two	important	aspects	to	the	passage	to	which	I	refer	below;	the	second	concerns	the	identity	of	the	Dionysian	with	the	will	to	power.		The	first	I	will	address	because	of	its	importance	to	the	scope	of	this	thesis,	where	Nietzsche	describes	the	will	to	power	(and	the	Dionysian)	as	a	play	of	forces	endlessly	transforming,	as	if	describing	his	take	on	energy,	never	created	or	destroyed,	but	continuously	altering	the	forms	it	takes.		Nietzsche	writes:		This	world:	a	monster	of	force,	without	beginning,	without	end,	a	fixed,	iron	quantity	of	force	which	grows	neither	larger	nor	smaller,	which	doesn’t	exhaust	but	only	transforms	itself,	as	a	whole	unchanging	in	size,	an	economy	without	expenditure	and	losses,	but	equally	without	increase,	without	income,	enclosed	by	‘nothingness’	as	by	a	boundary,	not	something	blurred,	squandered,	not	something	infinitely	extended;191		Importantly,	this	is	an	interpretation	that	references,	or	is	grounded	upon,	science	and	in	particular	in	relation	to	thermodynamics.		He	describes	the	entropy	in	a	closed	system,192	with	‘nothingness’	as	its	only	boundary	because	energy	and	the	play	of	forces	is	all	there	is	–	or	rather,	all	we	may	suppose	there	is.		But	it	is	a	closed	
																																																								190	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	preface	§7	191	Nietzsche,	Writings	form	the	late	notebooks,	[38]	12	June	–	July	1885,	pg.	38	192	Nietzsche	description,	as	will	be	discerned	below,	appears	to	pertain	more	to	the	fluctuations	of	energy	in	an	open	system,	such	as	in	an	ecosystem	discussed	above.		However,	he	describes	it	holistically	as	a	fixed	quantity,	and	for	that	reason	is	a	‘closed	system’.		It	seems	to	me,	that	Nietzsche	might	be	conflated	the	two	scenarios.	
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system	that	is	not,	and	perhaps	could	never	become,	‘stable’	or	attain	equilibrium.		This	depiction	is	indicative	of	Nietzsche’s	empiricism.		The	‘size’	never	changes	because,	according	to	a	holistic	view	of	the	world,	energy	is	not	created	or	destroyed	but	transforms,	engages	in	economies	of	transference,	but	holistically	neither	increases	nor	diminishes.			And	then,	he	describes	entropy	as	it	might	function	in	an	open	system,	writing:	…	as	a	determinate	force	set	into	a	determinate	space,	and	not	into	a	space	that	is	anywhere	‘empty’	but	as	force	everywhere,	as	a	play	of	forces	and	force-waves	simultaneously	one	and	‘many’,	accumulating	here	while	diminishing	there,	an	ocean	of	forces	storming	and	flooding	within	themselves,	eternally	changing,	eternally	rushing	back,	with	tremendous	years	of	recurrence,	with	an	ebb	and	flood	of	its	forms	…	then	coming	home	from	abundance	to	simplicity,	from	the	play	of	contradiction	back	to	the	pleasure	of	harmony…	affirming	itself	even	in	this	sameness	of	its	courses	and	years,	blessing	itself	as	what	must	eternally	return,	as	a	becoming	that	knows	no	satiety,	no	surfeit,	no	fatigue	–	this,	my	Dionysian	world	of	eternal	self-creating,	of	eternal	self-destroying,	this	mystery	world	of	dual	delights,	this	my	beyond	good	and	evil,	without	goal,	unless	there	is	a	goal	in	the	happiness	of	the	circle,	without	will,	unless	a	ring	feels	good	will	towards	itself	–	do	you	want	a	name	for	this	world?		A	solution	to	all	its	riddles?		A	
Light	for	you	too,	for	you,	the	most	secret,	strongest,	most	intrepid,	most	midnightly?	–	This	world	is	the	will	to	power	–	and	nothing	besides!		And	you	yourselves	too	are	this	will	to	power	–	and	nothing	besides!193		Describing	entropy	in	an	open	system,	Nietzsche	observes	that	energy	oscillates	back	and	forth	from	multifarious	and	often	conflicting	configurations	into	harmony	and	back	again.		And	rather	than	equilibrium,	there	is	a	dynamic	homeostasis,	and																																																									193	Nietzsche,	Writings	form	the	late	notebooks,	[38]	12	June	–	July	1885,	pg.	38	
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one	that	is	only	transitory.		It	is	necessarily	‘dynamic’	because	it	is	always	in	flux.		In	this	sense,	Nietzsche	closely	describes	what	was	addressed	above:	energy	dispersal	in	ecosystems	as	described	by	Anilla,	and	evolutionary	dynamics	described	by	Emerson.			Nietzsche	first	says	that	this	world	is	his	‘Dionysian’	world	view.		But	then,	he	suddenly	names	it	instead	‘will	to	power’.		This	“world	of	eternal	self-creation,	of	eternal	self-destruction,”	as	Nietzsche	writes	of	it,	is	the	world	as	will	to	power	–	an	endless	play	or	dance	of	energy	and	force.		Adrian	Del	Caro	writes,	“Since	we	are	in	the	world,	and	since	the	world	is	will	to	power,	we,	too,	are	nothing	but	will	to	power,	with	the	admixture	of	the	human	element”194	so	that	the	“will	to	power	and	eternal	recurrence	both	fall	into	the	current	of	the	Dionysian	and	are	carried	by	it	as	a	symbol	carries	meaning.”195		I’d	rather,	pedantically,	clarify	that	it	is	the	Dionysian	that	is	located	in	the	current	of	the	will	to	power	–	the	Dionysian	elements	are	those	aspects	of	will	to	power	that	are	prescient	for	sentient	beings.		For	sentient	beings,	I	argue,	the	will	to	power	is	recognized	as	Dionysos,	as	
desire,	feeling,	passion	–	as	all	affective	aspects	of	the	will	to	power	in	psychical	life.		The	world	as	will	to	power	is	a	relentlessly	transforming	world	of	energy.		The	Dionysian	aspects	are	the	‘creative’	and	inspirational	aspects,	feelings	of	intoxication	that	we	experience	as	artists,	although	these,	too,	are	also	only	will	to	power,	pulsating	and	coursing	through	us.		I	argue	that	the	Dionysian,	after	The	Birth,	should	be	thought	of	as	the	affective	aspect	of	will	to	power.		The	Dionysian	is	what																																																									194	One	might,	rather,	say	“the	admixture	of	the	sentient	animal	element,”	because	Nietzsche	is	often	keen	on	deflating	the	distinction	humans	make	between	themselves	and	the	rest	of	nature.	195	Del	Caro,	“Nietzschean	Self-Transformation,”	pg.	79	
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is	felt	in	the	‘festive	joys	of	mankind’,	and	which,	for	better	or	worse,	are	expressions	of	the	will	to	power,	expressing	itself	in	us	or	through	us	as	passion,	as	what	is	driven	in	desire,	as	inspiration,	and	as	feelings	of	need.	For	Nietzsche,	passion,	feeling,	and	affect	are	all	affective	presentations	of	the	will	to	power	in	consciousness.		This	will	become	clearer	below.		But	for	now,	it	should	suffice	just	to	quote	Nietzsche,	“…	The	will	to	power	is	the	primitive	form	of	affect,	that	all	other	affects	are	only	developments	of	it.”196		And	Nietzsche	also	goes	on	to	write	that	the	feeling	of	pleasure	(an	affect)	is	epiphenomenal	to	the	attainment	or	increase	of	‘power’	(or	mastery).197		The	will	to	power	is	a	‘doctrine’	that	physically	describes	the	patterns	of	homeostasis,	towards	mastery	psychically	–	homeostasis	in	both	respects	–	and	is	affectively	depicted	as	the	Dionysian.			In	BGE	§23,	for	example.	Nietzsche	describes	the	lust	for	power	as	an	
affect.198		The	lust	for	power,	as	an	affect,	is	a	refraction	of	the	will	to	power	that	is	experienced	as	the	Dionysian,	just	as	desire	is	a	refraction	of	a	drive.		The	Dionysian	are	aspects	of	will	to	power	that	we	experience.		It	is,	to	put	it	another	way,	the	clay	we’re	given	to	mold	in	intentionality.		It	is	the	inspiration	we	feel	to	over-come	an	obstacle,	whether	intra-	or	inter-psychically.		In	the	sections	on	aesthetics,	I’ll	explicitly	associate	this	feeling	with	the	feeling	of	sublimity.																																																												196	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§688	197	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§688	198	Nietzsche,	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§23	
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III.	 VICISSITUDES	of	DRIVES	
Defense	Mechanisms	
Our	vicissitudes	are	the	trajectories	or	paths	of	drives	attributable	to	Eros.		They	are	the	means	by	which	we	relate	with	ourselves	or	with	the	world	as	essentially	driven,	motivated	subjects.		There	are	two	ways	of	regarding	our	vicissitudes	of	drives	and	the	more	specific	defense	mechanisms	attributed	to	them.		One	way	to	view	defense	mechanisms	might	be:	the	means	by	which	we	incorporate	stimuli,	such	that	internal	stimulus	x	will	be	incorporated	through	a	particular	mechanism	that	might	repress,	disavow,	or	otherwise	filter	out	threatening	aspects	of	stimuli.		In	this	sense,	a	‘compromise	formation’	emerges	as	a	kind	of	remnant	of	threatening	stimuli,	generally	maintaining	a	kind	of	‘symbolic’	linkage.		In	this	sense,	a	defense	mechanism	is	a	means	of	mastery.		Another	way	of	viewing	defenses,	however,	is	generally	as	failures	of	incorporation,	failures	to	make	meaning	and	a	conservative	endeavor	to	perpetuate	a	meaning	previously	cathected.		‘Meaning’,	here,	should	be	understood	as	an	interpretation	that	obtains	a	kind	of	psychical	homeostasis.199	In	this	sense,	defense	mechanisms	are	also	means	of	mastery,	but	the	emphasis	is	on	an	inability	to	make	meaning.		There	is	still	a	product,	a																																																									199	According	to	the	second	view,	Sublimation	cannot	be	regarded	as	among	the	defenses	because	the	vicissitude	of	sublimation	–	on	its	own	–	does	not	involve	any	kind	of	repudiation.		Sublimation	is	the	vicissitude	by	which	content	can	be	maximally	incorporated	or	integrated	whilst	nonetheless	occurring	via	detours	or	indirect	expressions	–	a	diversion	of	stimuli	to	another	destination,	as	it	were,	instead	of	a	damming	up	of	its	flow	(repression)	or	the	attempted	to	eradicate	it	(disavowal	and	some	forms	of	aggression).			This	will	become	more	clear	in	the	following	discussions	of	vicissitudes.		
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compromise,	in	which	meaning	is	located,	but	there	is	much	that	has	been	sacrificed	or	repudiated	for	the	sake	of	that	meaning.		And	all	of	our	defenses	–	means	of	mastering	by	repudiating	–	are	determined	by	the	vicissitudes	of	repression	or	disavowal	(or	aggression).		 Our	vicissitudes	essentially	structure	and	organize	the	stimuli	we	receive	into	a	whole	that	is	palatable	to	us.		Our	vicissitudes	are	the	ways	by	which	we	relate	with	ourselves	and	our	world,	conditioning	our	reception	of	every	eliciting	situation.		For	example,	I	might	relate	to	the	world	by	disavowing	or	seeking	to	destroy	this	or	that	aspect	of	it;	I	might	relate	to	the	world	by	repressing	this	or	that	drive	which	seeks	satisfaction	in	it.		Our	vicissitudes	are	the	means	by	which	we	engage	with	the	world.		They	structure	our	relations	and	are	further	the	means	by	which	we	relate.		The	vicissitude	of	repression	structures	one’s	sexuality,	for	example,	and	the	consequent	sexuality	–	the	product	of	that	repression	–	is	the	means	by	which	one	consequently	relates	sexually	to	objects	in	the	world.	Freud	lists	four	basic	vicissitudes	that	a	drive	might	‘undergo’.		These	are:	Reversal	into	its	opposite.	Turning	round	upon	the	subject’s	own	self.	Repression.	Sublimation.200		Freud	observes,	however,	that	the	first	two	processes	appear	to	at	least	over-lap,	to	“converge	or	coincide.”201		And	further	on,	when	they	become	affiliated	with	the	feeling	of	pity,	the	vicissitude	of	reaction-formation	is	described.		And	reaction-																																																								200	Freud,	Instincts	and	their	Vicissitudes,	pg.	126	201	Freud,	Instincts	and	their	Vicissitudes,	pg.	127	
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formation	is	defined	as	a	drive’s	“reversal	into	its	opposite,”	underpinned	by	repression.	One	of	the	more	recent	and	prominent	researchers	in	defense	mechanisms	is	Georges	E.	Vaillant.		He	observed	that	some	defenses	were	healthier	than	others,	some	more	mature,	while	others	were	more	pathogenic	or	disruptive.		He	thus	classified	defenses	according	to	four	different	categories.		His	classifications	are	as	follows:	I. ‘Psychotic’	Defenses	1. Delusional	projection	–	delusions	about	external	reality	2. Denial	–	denial	of	external	reality	3. Distortion	–	reshaping	of	external	reality	II. ‘Immature’	Defenses	4. Projection	–	attributing	aspects	of	oneself	to	others	5. Schizoid	Fantasy	–	the	use	of	fantasy	for	gratification	in	‘autistic	retreat’		6. Hypochondriasis	–	transformation	of	negative	feelings	into	physical	symptoms	or	concerns.	7. Passive-Aggressive	behavior	–	aggression	towards	others	expressed	indirectly	8. Acting	Out	–	impulsive,	disruptive	behavior	that	inhibits	conscious	awareness	of	affects.	9. Dissociation	–	the	exclusion	of	content	associated	with	undesirable	emotions	III. ‘Neurotic’	Defenses	10. Repression	–	unconscious	inhibition	of	impulse	memories,	or	ideas	and	preventing	expression	of	instincts	and	feelings.	11. Displacement	–	redirecting	one’s	feelings	to	less	threatening	content	
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12. Reaction	formation	–	“Conscious	affect	and/or	behavior	that	is	diametrically	opposed	to	an	unacceptable	instinctual	impulse”	13. Intellectualization	–	Thinking	or	speaking	about	emotionally	laden	content	that	“leaves	the	associated	affect	unconscious”	IV. ‘Mature’	Defenses	14. Altruism	–	constructive	and	instinctually	gratifying	service	to	others	15. Humor	–	“overt	expression	of	feelings”	without	the	effect	of	discomfort	neither	on	others	nor	in	oneself.	16. Suppression	–	the	capacity	to	be	conscious	of	conflicts	but	“postpone	action,	affective	response,	or	ideational	worrying.”	17. 	Anticipation	–	“Realistic	anticipation	of	or	planning	for	future	inner	discomfort.”	18. Sublimation	–	“Indirect	or	attenuated	expression	of	instincts	without	adverse	consequences	or	marked	loss	of	pleasure”202		The	Diagnostic	and	Statistics	Manual	IV	TR	expanded	its	descriptions	of	defense	mechanisms	after	research	done	by	Georges	E.	Vaillant,	largely	incorporating	his	categorization	of	mature	defenses.203	At	first	glance,	it	becomes	obvious	that	any	Nietzschean	would	take	issue	with	the	inclusion	of	‘Altruism’	as	a	‘Mature’	defense.		It	seems	the	sole	reason	that	makes	it	‘mature’	is	that	altruistic	behavior	is	just	socially	and/or	personally	valued	as	‘good’,	and	is	thus	included	among	the	mature	defenses	despite	the	fact	that,	as	will	be	shown	in	the	last	section	of	this	thesis,	it	generally	arises	through	the	use	of	several	immature	and	neurotic	defenses.204		For	the	moment,	suffice	it	to	say	that	
																																																								202	Vaillant,	George	E.		Ego	Mechanisms	of	Defense,	pp.	243-248	203	DSM	IV	TR	pp.	808-811	204	See	the	chapter	on	Ethics.		I	demonstrate	the	etiology	of	altruism	as	originating	with	reaction-formation	in	particular.	
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Vaillant	is	here	making	the	same	mistake	as	Kohlberg	by	injecting	personal	or	cultural	values	into	the	evaluation	of	content.		Furthermore,	altruism	and	others	(e.g.,	delusional	projection),	appear	to	be	symptoms	of	defenses	rather	than	actual	defenses.		 There	is	also	a	considerable	over-lap	with	some	defenses.		For	example,	intellectualization	(neurotic)	appears	to	require	dissociation	(immature)	of	affect,	and	the	dissociation	itself	depends	upon	repression.		How	intellectualization	can	then	be	categorized	as	‘neurotic’	when	it	depends	upon	a	mechanism	that	is	‘immature’	(less	healthy),	or	upon	another	‘neurotic’	defense,	is	questionable.		The	only	justification	would	be	that	intellectualization	can,	in	some	areas,	be	regarded	as	socially	valuable,	such	as	in	academic	circles,	and	of	which	Kant’s	emphasis	on	disinterestedness	is	a	good	example.		And	again,	I	wouldn’t	even	classify	humor	as	a	‘defense’	or	‘coping’	style	absent	other	defenses,	but	instead	see	it	as	possibly	healthy	and	more	of	an	attitude	or	general	disposition,	more	of	a	symptom	than	a	defense,205	unless	it	is	used	as	means	of	repressing	or	disavowing	content.				 There	are	minor	practical	issues	with	the	inclusion	of	anticipation	and	suppression	among	the	mature	defenses,	although	there	is	ample	reason	for	their	inclusion	there	as	well.		Suppression	can	be	healthy.		There	are	appropriate	times	and	places	for	dealing	with	issues,	and	suppression	allows	for	deferment	so	that	issues	can	be	faced	when	and	where	appropriate.		But	its	inclusion	among	the	mature	defenses	can,	for	practical	purposes,	be	a	naiveté.		It	attributes	too	much	
																																																								205	This	is	a	good	example	of	Nietzsche’s	criticisms	concerning	the	confusion	of	cause	and	effect.	
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control	to	the	defensive	agent	and	overlooks	significant	pathological	consequences.206				 What	is	important	are	the	implicit	reasons	for	Vaillant’s	taxonomy	of	defenses.		The	classifications	of	‘mature’	and	‘immature’,	and	what	is	included	among	them	make	this	more	apparent.		He	classifies	at	least	some	of	the	defenses	based	upon	what	is	more	or	less	societally	accepted	or	valued.		This	is	mistaken,	for	what	is	societally	valued,	such	as	altruism,	might	yet	be	significantly	harmful	to	an	individual,	a	product	of	further	dysfunction,	and	ironically	unhealthy	for	society.		I	agree	with	Vaillant’s	classification	of	defenses	pertaining	to	those	that	are	psychotic	and	those	that	are	neurotic.		Those	defenses	that	are	psychotic	refer	to	the	relation																																																									206	A	few	words	might	be	said	on	the	defense	‘suppression’	and	the	misuse	of	‘repression’	in	place	of	it	or	‘oppression’.		Oppression	is	an	externalized	action,	such	as	the	‘oppression	of	minorities’	in	a	society,	or	the	‘oppression	of	slaves’,	or	even	the	‘oppression	of	human	nature’	by	society,	and	so	forth.		It	is	analogous	to	repression	and	suppression	in	that	it	is	meant	to	keep	down,	and	repudiate,	some	aspect	or	keep	it	in	a	place	that	does	not	disturb	the	ego.		But	suppression	and	repression	are,	by	contrast,	internal	operations.		Marcuse	conflates	all	three	in	Eros	
and	Civilization,	although	he	acknowledges	that	he	does	not	distinguish	between	suppression	and	repression.		However,	one	of	the	objectives	of	his	is	to	deal	with	societal	oppressions	of	human	nature,	which	then	prompt	repressions	or	suppressions.		Suppression,	conceptually,	appears	to	be	an	action	analogous	to	the	unconscious-preconscious	operation	of	repression,	only	that	it	occurs	as	a	conscious	attempt	to	repudiate	endogenous	stimuli	(ideas,	feelings,	compulsions,	etc.).		Suppression	itself	cannot	strictly	be	regarded	as	egodystonic,	for	it	can	be	used	merely	as	a	‘deferment’,	such	that,	perhaps,	a	circumstance	might	be	inappropriate	in	dealing	with	such	stimuli	and	therefore	one	‘suppresses’	it	temporarily	to	focus	on	a	task	at	hand.		But	the	key	is	the	temporary	nature	of	such	an	arrangement,	as	well	as	the	flexibility	and	a	non-pathological	nature	of	such	an	operation.		But	in	this	sense,	it	can	hardly	be	regarded	as	a	defensive	operation	at	all.		Then,	were	suppression	to	become	chronic,	or	extended	beyond	a	temporary	deferment,	and	become	an	actual	avoidance	of	stimuli/content,	then	it	should	be	regarded	as	an	egodystonic,	defensive	operation.		In	such	instances,	it	is	pathological,	and	can	very	well	lead,	as	a	slippery	slope,	to	actual	repression	through	the	habituation	of	avoiding	certain	content/stimuli	in	consciousness.		
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between	the	subject	and	external	reality.		What	is	neurotic	pertains	to	how	the	individual	expresses	(or	not)	his	or	her	inner	reality	–	one’s	instincts,	drives,	desires	–	in	relation	to	environmental	concerns.		In	other	words,	implicit	in	every	psychotic	defense	is	the	repudiation	of	at	least	some	aspects	of	external	reality;	implicit	in	every	neurotic	defense	is	the	repudiation	of	one’s	instincts,	drives,	or	desires.		Relying	solely	on	this	classification	and	the	mechanisms	mentioned	by	Vaillant,	as	well	as	some	he	omitted	but	are	extremely	important	(rationalization)	we	then	arrive	at	the	below:	I. Psychotic	Defenses	1. Delusional	Projection	2. Denial	3. Distortion	4. Projection	5. Rationalization	II. Neurotic	Defenses	6. Repression	7. Dissociation	8. Schizoid	Fantasy	9. Reaction	Formation	10. Intellectualization	11. Humor	12. Passive-Aggression	13. Acting	Out	14. Displacement	15. Hypochondriasis		Among	the	psychotic	defenses,	Disavowal	(or	denial)	is	primary,	and	every	other	one	is	a	means	of	disavowing	(as	in	the	case	of	delusions	or	projections)	or	a	means	
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of	justifying	or	reinforcing	a	disavowal	(as	in	the	case	of	rationalization).		Among	the	Neurotic	defenses,	repression	is	primary,	and	the	others	are	intended	to	either	support	or	reinforce	the	repression	(as	in	the	case	of	reaction-formation);	deal	with	the	remainder	of	the	repressed	(as	in	the	case	of	schizoid	fantasies);	or	otherwise	respond	to	the	repressions	(as	in	the	case	of	conversions,	acting	out,	passive-aggression,	or	hypochondriasis;	the	latter	being	masochistic,	and	passive-aggression	and	acting	out	either	sadistic	or	masochistic).		For	the	purposes	of	this	thesis,	I	look	at	the	more	significant	vicissitudes	–	disavowal	and	repression	–	at	times	making	mention	of	other	particular	expressions	of	psychotic	or	neurotic	defenses	for	the	sake	of	precision	where	relevant.		I	have,	it	can	be	observed,	included	‘schizoid	fantasy’	as	neurotic	defenses,	for	as	Freud	observes,	“The	neurotic	often	chooses	to	ignore	the	troubling,	threatening	aspects	of	reality	and	may	come	to	create	one	that	is	satisfying	in	a	world	of	phantasy,	of	a	domain	which	became	separated	from	external	reality	at	the	time	of	the	introduction	of	the	reality	principle.”207		This	domain,	Freud	writes,	is	like	a	“reservation,”	and	“has	since	been	kept	free	from	the	demands	of	the	exigencies	of	life.”208		What	differentiates	the	phantasying	at	play	in	psychoses	and	neuroses,	Freud	observes,	is	the	phantasies	of	psychotics	actually	replace	external	reality,	whereas	for	the	neurotic	they	are	an	addendum	to	it	or	a	refuge	from	it.	What	is	apparent	in	the	above	classification	is	that	all	of	these	aforementioned	defenses	entail	the	indirect	satisfaction	of	a	drive;	the	psychotic	is	satisfied	directly	but	only	by	means	of	disavowal,	and	for	that	reason	may	be																																																									207	Freud,	“The	loss	of	Reality”	pg.	187	208	Freud,	“The	loss	of	Reality”	pg.	187	
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thought	of	as	indirect	despite	the	drive	following	the	primary	process.		The	neurotic	is	satisfied	through	the	formation	of	symptoms	as	a	compromise	formation	or	through	a	displacement	of	energy	in	other	directions.		And	so	we	end	up	with	a	contrast	between	defenses	that	require	the	vicissitudes	of	repression	or	disavowal,	and	those	that	are	conducive	to	the	ego	but	do	not	have	the	same	requirement.		The	former	will	be	referred	to	as	egodystonic	and	the	latter	as	egosyntonic.209		But	aggression	also	involves	a	kind	of	existential	disavowal.		In	aggression	one	acts	against,	existentially	opposing,	those	aspects	of	reality	that	are	disturbing	or	threatening	to	the	ego,	frustrating	it	in	its	aspiration	for	satisfaction.		It	is	a	direct	expression	of	drives	opposed	to	the	reality	of	things.		For	this	reason,	it	will	be	regarded	as	egodystonic	although	neither	psychotic	nor	neurotic.		Passive-
aggression	is	of	course	neurotic.		So	what	we	have	left	to	work	with,	for	the	purposes	of	this	paper,	are	vicissitudes	classified	as	follows:	I. Egodystonic	a. Psychotic	i. Disavowal	b. Neurotic	i. Repression	ii. Reaction-formation	iii. Passive-aggression	c. Aggression	II. Egosyntonic	a. Sublimation																																																											209	These	terms	will	be	explained	more	clearly	in	what	follows	
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Terminology:	Egodystonic	or	Egosyntonic	
By	way	of	introducing	this	unpopular	terminology,	I	will	enumerate	a	few	examples	from	Strachey’s	translations	of	Freud’s	texts.		First,	In	Autobiographical	
Notes	on	a	Case	of	Paranoia,	Freud	speaks	of	a	particular	category	of	drives	as	egosyntonic.210		Then,	in	On	Narcissism,	Freud	writes	that	two	different	“cases	must	be	distinguished,	according	to	whether	the	erotic	cathexes	are	egosyntonic,	or,	on	the	contrary,	have	suffered	repression.”211		Here,	the	term	‘egosyntonic’	is	used	to	denote	the	character	of	a	particular	constitution	with	respect	to	vicissitudes	of	drives	that	have	or	have	not	been	followed.		Then,	in	The	Unconscious,	Freud	writes	of	the	unconscious	becoming	egosyntonic	when	“repression	is	removed”	and	the	“repressed	activity	is	admitted	as	a	reinforcement	of	the	one	intended	by	the	ego.”212		And	in	Some	Character	Types,	Freud	writes	that	a	neurosis	develops	from	a	“conflict	between	a	person’s	libidinal	wishes	and	the	part	of	his	personality	we	call	his	ego,”	which	“includes	his	ideals	of	personality.		A	pathogenic	conflict	of	this	kind	takes	place	only	when	the	libido	tries	to	follow	paths	and	aims	which	the	ego	has	…	prohibited.”		The	libido	then	manifests	itself	in	neurotic	symptoms	only	when	it	is	thus	“deprived	of	the	possibility	of	an	ideal	egosyntonic	satisfaction.”213		Then	in	The	
Introductory	Lectures,	Freud	describes	a	psychical	conflict	between	divergent	sexual	trends	as	being	between	one	that	is,	“we	might	say,	‘egosyntonic’,	while	the	other	
																																																								210	Freud,	Notes	on	a	Case	of	Paranoia,	pg.	67	211	Freud,	On	Narcissism,	pg.	99	212	Freud,	The	Unconscious,	pg.	195	213	Freud,	Some	Character	Types,	pg.	316	
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provokes	the	ego’s	defense.”214		Thus	in	his	metapsychological	papers	(and	the	following	Introductory	Lecture),	Freud	speaks	of	‘egosyntonic’	as	pertaining	to	a	configuration	of	drives	or	their	vicissitudes.	In	The	Language	of	Psychoanalysis,	Laplanche	and	Pontalis	write	thus	about	the	term	‘egosyntonic’:		It	connotes	the	idea	that	the	psychical	conflict	does	not	imply	an	opposition	between	the	ego	in	abstracto	and	all	instinct,	but	rather	one	between	two	kinds	of	instincts,	those	which	are	compatible	with	the	ego	(ego-instincts)	and	those	which	are	antagonistic	to	it	(ichwidrig)	or	dystonic	(nicht	
ichgerecht)	and	consequently	repressed.215	And	central	to	the	use,	it	“implies	a	view	of	the	ego	as	total,	integrated,	ideal	–	as	it	is	defined,	for	example,	in	‘On	Narcissism’.”216		In	the	original	German,	‘egosyntonic’	appears	as	ichgerecht,	‘egodystonic’	as	Ichwidrig	and	nicht	Ichgerecht.		These	terms	are	generally	of	common	usage	in	German,	but,	like	many	other	terms	used	by	Freud,	were	translated	into	English	by	Strachey	with	terms	that	sound	more	clinical.			The	terms	‘egosyntonic’	and	‘egodystonic’	have	generally	been	appropriated	for	use	by	ego-psychology	and	object-relations	theorists	as	adjectives	characterizing	an	object,	idea,	or	symptom	with	regard	to	its	conduciveness	to	the	integrity	of	the	ego	(or	ego	ideal).		They	further	are	made	use	of	in	psychiatry.		In	the	DSM	IV-TR,	One	of	the	ways	of	distinguishing	Obsessive-Compulsive	Disorder	from	Obsessive-Compulsive	Personality	Disorder	is,	for	example,	by	the	former	causing	disturbance																																																									214	Freud,	Introductory	Lectures,	pg.	250	215	Laplanche	&	Pontalis,	Language	of	Psychoanalysis,	pp.	151-152	216	Laplanche	&	Pontalis,	Language	of	Psychoanalysis,	pg.	152	
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to	the	ego	–	characterized	as	egodystonic	–	whereas	the	latter,	the	personality	disorder,	generally	doesn’t	cause	such	disturbance	and	is	therefore	regarded	as	
egosyntonic.		In	fact,	many	Personality	Disorders	are	difficult	to	assess,	the	DSM	states,	in	virtue	of	the	fact	that	the	“characteristics	that	define	a	Personality	Disorder	may	not	be	considered	problematic	by	the	individual	(i.e.,	the	traits	are	often	egosyntonic).”217		Considering	Nietzsche’s	numerous	descriptions	of	noble	spirits	and	‘higher	types’,	the	use	of	these	terms	that	I	am	proposing	becomes	a	bit	dangerous	in	that	light.		Especially	concerning	noble	spirits,	arguably	exemplified	by	Cesare	Borgia,	the	use	of	the	term	‘egosyntonic’	could	easily	be	misinterpreted	as	valorizing	a	personality	disorder;	and	in	the	case	of	Cesare	Borgia,	Anti-Social	Personality	Disorder	specifically.		Controversially,	homosexuality	was	once	described	in	previous	versions	of	the	DSM	as	‘egodystonic’,	although	this	has	since	been	removed	as	a	diagnosis	entirely.		 The	reason	for	characterizing	something	as	egosyntonic	or	egodystonic	quickly	becomes	clear,	however:	it	pertains	to,	respectively,	the	harmony	or	dissonance	with	which	stimuli	or	content	–	drives,	behaviors,	ideas,	or	external	aspects	of	reality	–	are	experienced	in	relation	to	the	ego	(or	ideal	ego).		But	I	think	the	use	of	the	terms	in	such	a	fashion	only	serves	a	tautology.		(What	is	egosyntonic?		That	which	is	compatible	with	the	ego.		What’s	compatible	with	the	ego?		That	which	is	egosyntonic).			Rather,	I	think	it	is	possible	to	use	these	terms	in	ways	that	are	more	useful	and	open	up	horizons	of	meaning	that	might	otherwise	lie	concealed.		I	find	the	terms	more	valuable	in	a	theory	that	depicts	them	as	central	not	only	to																																																									217	American	Psychiatric	Association,	DSM	IV-TR	pg.	686	
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object	relations	but	also	characterizing	relations	rather	than	merely	the	feeling	of	such	relations.		According	to	former	use,	the	terms	denote	only	content	that	is	troubling	to	the	ego	(or	ego	ideal).		According	to	my	use,	the	terms	refer	to	the	way	in	which	content	is	related	to	the	ego.		Central	to	this	is	the	relationship.		So,	for	example,	if	the	ego	does	regard	a	drive	as	threatening,	and	does	not	repress	it,	then	the	ego’s	relation	to	the	drive	is	egosyntonic.		If	the	ego	represses	the	drive,	then	the	relation	to	the	drive	is	egodystonic.		Regarding	external	stimuli,	if	some	aspect	of	reality	is	disturbing	to	the	ego,	the	ego	can	relate	to	it	in	several	ways:	aggressively,	by	trying	to	annihilate	it;	through	disavowal,	by	denying	its	existence	entirely	(and	thus	protecting	the	ego’s	integrity);	or	by	coming	to	terms	with	it	in	such	a	way	that	makes	it	amenable	to	the	ego.		Only	the	latter	case	is	egosyntonic.			Yet	another	way	of	explaining	this	would	be	to	say:	‘egodystonic’	refers	to	action	taken	against	a	thing	that	threatens	the	ego’s	harmony;		‘egosyntonic’	refers,	on	the	other	hand,	to	an	incorporation	or	use	of	a	thing,	a	working	with	what	is	the	case	instead	of	a	repudiation	of	it.		The	emphasis	is	always	on	the	relation,	the	‘with’	or	the	‘against’.		This	will	all	become	clearer	in	my	exposition	of	the	various	vicissitudes	below	which	I	hope	will	also	demonstrate	the	usefulness	I’ve	found	in	this	terminology	regarding	the	various	vicissitudes	that	might	be	undertaken	by	the	ego.	 Two	more	clarifications	should	be	made	as	well.		First,	if	I	speak	of	an	‘egosyntonic	constitution’,	I	am	referring	to	a	psyche	that	(more	or	less)	–	in	
abstracto	–	is	configured	in	such	a	way	by	the	vicissitudes	of	drives	that	the	relating	is	(more	or	less)	egosyntonic.		Conversely,	if	I	write	of	an	‘egodystonic	constitution’,	
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the	reverse	would	be	the	case	(more	or	less).		For	example,	if	a	patient	displays	neurotic	or	psychotic	symptoms,	one	can	infer	from	this	that,	respectively,	repressions	or	disavowals	are	at	work,	in	which	case	the	patient	can	be	regarded	as	symptomatic	of	a	(more	or	less)	egodystonic	constitution	in	proportion	to	the	repressions	or	disavowals.		Furthermore,	it	can	be	the	case	that	vicissitudes	of	repression	and	disavowal	are	comorbid	in	one	patient,	some	pathologically,	some	not.		In	such	instances,	it	wouldn’t	be	accurate	to	describe	a	patient	as	‘neurotically’	or	‘psychotically’	constituted	concerning	the	vicissitudes,	but	it	does	make	sense	descriptively	to	describe	such	a	patient	as	egodystonically	constituted.		Obviously,	such	a	description	is	an	abstraction,	for	the	psyche’s	use	of	various	vicissitudes	are,	in	practice,	quite	complex,	and	no	one	patient	uses	only	egodystonic	or	egosyntonic	vicissitudes;	rather,	there	is	always	some	admixture	to	varying	degrees,	hence	why	I	emphasize	‘more	or	less’	in	the	descriptions.	Secondly,	I	will	also	write	of	an	orientation	as	being	egodystonic	or	egosyntonic.		In	such	instances,	I	am	emphasizing	the	relation	such	that,	for	example,	an	egosyntonic	orientation	towards	a	drive,	thing,	or	idea	would	imply	that	the	psychical	constitution	is	such	that	an	egosyntonic	relation	with	the	drive,	thing,	or	idea	is	probable.		This	will	all	become	clearer	in	the	section	on	aesthetics	and	ethics.		Because	the	basis	of	these	terms	concerns	the	vicissitudes,	it	is	important	to	note	that	these	refer	to	the	means	of	resolving	psychical	conflict.		Although	‘egosyntonic’	could	possibly	be	used	outside	of	the	presence	of	any	such	conflict	in	abstracto,	the	terms	are	more	useful	in	describing	the	means	of	resolution,	a	vicissitude	(or	
	 98	
defense)	that	generally	determines	the	means	of	relating	in	the	face	of	psychical	conflict.			See	the	diagram	below	for	an	illustration.	Any	discussion	of	the	ego	invites	many	confused	and	confusing	notions	of	self-hood,	and	in	a	discussion	of	defense	mechanisms	or	the	vicissitudes	of	drives	it	particularly	invites	the	infamous	charges	made	by	Sartre,	known	as	the	gate-keeper	or	second	man	problems.		How	can	the	vicissitudes	or	defenses	–	e.g.,	repression	or	disavowal	–	take	place	unconsciously	when	the	‘ego’,	which	is	largely	conscious	or	at	least	preconscious	(having	the	ability	to	be	conscious),	is	supposedly	responsible	for	the	repressions	and	disavowals?		“The	censor	…	must	know	what	it	is	repressing,”218	writes	Sartre.		“It	is	a	fair	question	to	ask	what	part	of	himself	can	thus	resist.		It	cannot	be	the	‘ego’,	envisaged	as	a	psychic	totality	of	the	facts	of	consciousness.”219			He	continues,	noting,	“We	are	compelled	to	admit	that	the	censor	must	choose	and	in	order	to	choose	must	be	aware	of	doing	so.”220		In	this	sense,	it	must	be	conscious	of	the	repression	and	what	is	being	repressed.		But	the	purpose	of	the	repression	is	to	not	be	conscious	of	x	or	y.		And	so,	“What	type	of	self-consciousness	can	the	censor	have?		It	must	be	the	consciousness	(of)	being	conscious	of	the	drive	to	be	repressed,	but	precisely	in	order	to	not	be	conscious	of	it.”		And	so,	Sartre	concludes,	“the	censor	is	in	bad	faith,”	and	psychoanalysis	has	only	“established	between	the	unconscious	and	consciousness	an	autonomous	consciousness	in	bad	faith.”221		There	is	thus	a	“second	man”	of	sorts	in	bad	faith	with	the	ego.	
																																																								218	Sartre,	Being	and	Nothingness,	pg.	75	219	Sartre,	Being	and	Nothingness,	pg.	75	220	Sartre,	Being	and	Nothingness,	pg.	75	221	Sartre,	Being	and	Nothingness,	pg.	76	
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In	Sartre’s	own	rationalist	project,	taken	up	by	the	school	of	existential	analysis,222	the	unconscious	is	itself	denied,	or	at	the	very	least	glossed	over.		However,	I	find	this	extremely	problematic.		But	I	also	find	equally	problematic	the	position	of	ego	psychology	that	often	glosses	over	the	problems	raised	by	Sartre	and	others.		My	uses	of	the	terms	‘egosyntonic’	and	‘egodystonic’	inevitably	–	and	unfortunately	–	invite	notions	of	ego	psychology.		For	this	reason,	I	must	briefly	address	this	issue	before	moving	on,	although	I	intend	to	keep	it	brief	as	it	is	not	of	central	concern	to	my	thesis.	I	align	my	own	views,	and	therefore	the	arguments	of	this	thesis,	with	the	views	of	Nietzsche	on	the	matter	of	the	‘ego’	or	notions	of	the	‘self’.		I	don’t	think	there	is	a	‘self’	or	an	‘ego’	–	not	one	to	be	discovered	or	ostensibly	point	to	as	a	something	with	thing-hood.			And	I	believe	that	Freud’s	psychical	topography	of	the	id-ego-superego	division	was	only	ever	genuinely	intended	pragmatically	–	to	speak	about	that	which	would	otherwise	have	remained	ineffable.223		The	self	is	only	a																																																									222	Also	called	“Daseinsanalysis”	223	I	further	think	the	notion	of	a	‘self’	is	even	detrimental,	psychically,	and	is	indicative	of	an	unhealthy	relation	(an	‘egodystonic’	orientation)	with	the	world	and	oneself.		There	is	no	‘ego’.		However,	the	‘ego’	and	the	‘self’	are	useful	terms.			My	position	is	that	there	is	no	‘ego’,	no	‘super-ego’,	and	no	‘id’	(unless	we	speak	vaguely	of	the	id	as	the	totality	of	instincts	and	drives	and	other	such	motivational	states).		As	with	most	things	in	Freud’s	theoretical	work,	he	used	provisional,	operational	descriptions	in	order	to	explain	phenomena,	often	admitting	that	the	descriptions	themselves	might	need	to	be	altered	or	thrown	away.		He	said	as	much	of	the	drives,	and	could	possibly	say	as	much	about	the	tripartite	topography	as	well.			There	is,	however,	an	ego-ideal.		The	‘ego-ideal’	is	the	notion	that	we	have	of	ourselves.		The	ego-ideal	is	the	synthetic	unity	or	totality	of	which	we	can	be	conscious	after	the	defenses	have	done	their	work.		There	is	no	other	kind	of	‘self’	of	which	we	can,	logically,	be	cognizant	other	than	the	‘ego-ideal’.		It	is	an	idea	of	consciousness	and	as	such	it	is	composed	of	the	refracted	bits	of	drives	and	ideas	that	make	their	way	into	consciousness	as	desires,	wishes,	fantasies,	for	example.	It’s	something	of	which	everyone	falls	short,	but	something	towards	which	we	are	
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potential	coming	to	be.		It	is	something	that	never	is	but	is	always	becoming,	which	is	what	Nietzsche	meant	when	he	writes,	“I	am	not	a	human	being,	I	am	dynamite.”224		I	believe	there	is	only	an	ego	ideal	(the	idea	of	oneself	which	is	the	remainder	or	substitution	for	everything	the	defenses	already	filtered	out).			Sartre	is	mistaken	on	two	accounts.		First,	he	believes	the	‘ego’	is	that	of	which	we	are	conscious,	and	further	that	the	ego	even	exists	at	all	(it	doesn’t;	only	the	ego-ideal	exists,	and	it	only	as	a	fluctuating,	inconsistent	idea).		Secondly,	he	does	not	grasp	the	distinction	between	drives	and	desires,	but	regards	all	motivations	as	products	of	conscious	or	rational	intentionality.		On	this	point,	I	believe	Sartre	gets	tangled	up	in	the	language	Freud	uses	to	describe	phenomena.		For	example,	Freud	might	speak	of	content	as	being	allowed	into	consciousness.		The	term	“allowed”	implies	that	there	is	an	agency	allowing	x	or	y	into	consciousness.		But	this	only	indicates	an	insufficiency	of	language	–	the	same	insufficiency	we	encounter	when	speak	of	evolution,	for	example.		When	biologists	speak	of	evolutionary	change,	or	the	acquisition	of	certain	traits,	they	often	use	intentional	language.		A	bird,	for	example,	might	be	said	to	have	evolved	feathers	and	hollow	bones	so	that	it	could	fly.		But	this	is	the	error	of	myopic	retrospect.		In	the	same	sense,	Sartre	misunderstand	Freud’s	descriptions	as	expressing	a	kind	of	rational	intentionality	that	only	consciousness	can	have.		Sartre,	we	can	say,	mistakenly																																																																																																																																																																						always	growing	towards.		The	ego-ideal	should	not	be	conflated	with	the	super-ego.		As	will	become	clear	further	on,	particularly	in	the	chapter	on	Moral	Masochism,	the	super-ego	is	actually	indicative	of	an	egodystonic	orientation	with	oneself	and	the	world.		The	feeling	of	guilt,	which	must	be	distinguished	from	the	feeling	of	shame,223	is	always	indicative	of	an	unhealthy	attitude.		Falling	short	of	an	our	‘ego-idea’	brings	forth	one	or	the	other,	shame	without	the	super-ego;	or	guilt	in	effect	of	the	super-ego.			224	Neitzsche,	Ecce	Homo,		
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conflates	drives	with	desires,	and	correspondingly,	vicissitudes	with	intentionality.	Something	is	‘allowed’	into	consciousness	not	by	some	agency,	but	because	it	was	selected	by	unconscious	processes	without	design	or	purpose	but	merely	because	it	somehow	fit	some	accidental	neuronal	event	with	motivational	states	so	that	it	would	only	appear	as	if	it	were	for	this	purpose.225		It	becomes	clear	from	the	get-go	that	he	approaches	the	issue	with	a	rationalist	bias	and	discounts	what	is	unconscious	and	irrational,	and	therefore	fails	to	see	or	make	proper	distinctions	between	various	phenomena.		To	answer	these	issues,	I	believe	Sebastian	Gardner	provides	a	more	than	sufficient	account	in	his	work	Irrationality	and	the	Philosophy	of	Psychoanalysis.		There,	Gardner	observes	a	difference	between	motivational	states	and	propositional	attitudes,	where	motivational	states	refer	to	non-conscious	instinctual	demands.226		Gardner	writes,	“From	motivational	states	proceed	desire	and	wish.”227		For	Freud,	Gardner	observes,	“The	representations	of	the	infant	and	the	dreamer	are	caused	by	
wishes.		Wishes	are	conative	states	whose	causes,	in	these	instances,	are	simple	universal	biological	requirements,	the	most	basic	instinctual	demands.”228		The	wishes	“…	issue	directly	from	motivational	states.”229		Rational	satisfactions,	in	contrast	to	the	satisfactions	of	motivational	states,	involve	“propositional	content,”																																																									225	See,	for	example,	Freud,	“Neurosis	and	Psychosis,”	pg.	50	where	Freud	writes	that	the	ego	“has	no	power”	over	the	mechanism	of	repression	and	the	content	that	comes	to	the	fore	as	substitutes	or	compromises.	226	My	only	criticism	of	Gardner’s	account	is	he	never	speaks	of	drives,	and	therefore	fails	to	sufficiently	make	a	connection	between	instincts	and	drives	that	could	have	possibly	further	enriched	is	own,	already	rewarding	account.			227	Gardner,	Irrationality,	pg.	172	228	Gardner,	Irrationality,	pg.	120	229	Gardner,	Irrationality,	pg.	120	
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whereas	“wish-fulfillment	only	pre-propositional	content.”230		Thus	Gardner	envisages	the	difference	between	motivational	states	and	propositional	attitudes.		Gardner	observes	that	every	“propositional	desire	stands	in	a	relation	of	‘derivation’	to	a	state	of	instinctual	demand.”231		This	relation	was	noted	above	in	the	contrasting	drives	and	desires	where	desires	are	described	as	the	‘refracted’	bits	of	drives	that	are	allowed	into	consciousness	after	defensive	operations.		In	general,	this	thesis	aligns	with	the	views	put	forward	by	Gardner	(and,	I	believe,	Nietzsche	as	well).		Instead,	there	are	irrational	motivational	states	of	which	we	are	not	conscious	but	from	which	our	conscious	desires	and	beliefs	about	the	world	are	derived	and	therefore	condition	our	thinking	that	we	regard	as	rational.		“Psychoanalytic	theory	is	not,	pace	Sartre	and	others,	a	theory	of	self-deception,”232	writes	Gardner.		For	Gardner,	psychoanalytic	theory	hinges	on	wishes	and	fantasies.		To	do	away	with	a	‘second	man’	or	gate-keeper	problem,	all	that	is	required	is	that	one	supposes	certain	vicissitudes	of	drives	are	selected,	one	might	say,	according	to	how	unpleasurable	stimuli	is	‘mastered’	in	the	environment	via	various	vicissitudes,	as	successes	or	failures	of	incorporation/integration.			I	align	my	view	with	Nietzsche’s,	who	writes,	“That	one	desires	to	combat	the	vehemence	of	a	drive	at	all	…	does	not	stand	within	our	own	power;	nor	does	the	choice	of	any	particular	method;	nor	does	the	success	or	failure	of	this	method…”233	It	is	a	process	that	is	generally	unconscious.		To	conclude	this	point,	it	should	therefore	be	clear	that	my	use	of	the	terms	egosyntonic	and	egodystonic	do	not	refer	to	an	ego-agency	of																																																									230	Gardner,	Irrationality,	pg.	122	231	Gardner,	Irrationality,	pg.	123	232	Gardner,	Irrationality,	pg.	10	233	Nietzsche	Daybreak,	§109	
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consciousness	that	does	the	repudiating	or	incorporating.		Rather,	my	use	of	such	terms	that	include	the	prefix	‘ego’	are	meant	pragmatically,	in	the	same	sense	in	which	I	believe	Freud	ultimately	intended	his	psychical	topography.		By	using	such	terms	I	mean	only	to	signify	a	relation	between	one’s	self	(which	doesn’t	exist	as	anything	other	than	a	conscious	interpretation	of	my	‘self’	as	a	totality	and	unity),	and	the	world,	or	even	in	relation	to	one’s	self	as	such	an	interpretation.			
	
	
Pictured	here	are	the	various	vicissitudes	by	which	drives	might	be	expressed.	On	the	
left	are	possible	egodystonic	vicissitudes,	and	on	the	right	egosyntonic.		A	direct	
expression	is	included	on	the	right	because	there	are,	one	can	assume,	instances	where	
direct	expressions	might	avoid	both	repressions	(obviously)	and	disavowals	or	acts	of	
aggression.	
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Psychical	Conflict	–	Neuroses	&	Psychoses	
The	foundation	of	drive	theory	concerns	psychical	conflict.		And	in	his	Introductory	Lectures,	Freud	writes:	The	meaning	of	psychical	conflict	can	be	adequately	expressed	…	by	saying	that	for	an	external	frustration	to	become	pathogenic	an	internal	frustration	must	be	added	to	it.		In	that	case,	of	course,	the	external	frustration	removes	one	possibility	of	satisfaction	and	the	internal	frustration	seeks	to	exclude	another	possibility,	about	which	the	conflict	then	breaks	out.234		In	other	words,	something	external	is	frustrating	only	because	of	the	demands	of	something	internal	as	well.		But	the	internal	stimuli	–	the	drives	–	are	also	frustrating	in	light	of	the	external.		Often,	the	instance	of	psychical	conflict	is	one	that	breaks	out	between	two	separate	classes	of	drives,	the	demand	of	the	ego-instincts,	which	are	narcissistic,	for	example,	and	the	sexual	drives	which	are	cathected	with	external	objects.		So,	he	further	goes	on	to	note,	“The	pathogenic	conflict	is	thus	one	between	the	ego-instincts	and	the	sexual	instincts.”235		This	same	conflict	was	observed	previously	after	his	reformulation	of	drive	theory	as	a	conflict	between	the	death	drive	and	Eros.		I	do	not	think	that	this	kind	of	presentation	of	psychical	conflict	is	necessary	though.		It	appears	as	if	Freud	is	trying	to	construct,	
post	hoc,	a	reason	for	the	conflict	when	it	is	sufficient	to	acknowledge	that,	as	drives	make	demands,	external	reality	–	or	the	superego	–	is	naturally	restrictive	or	constraining,	and	ultimately	when	no	other	means	for	satisfaction	(such	as	through	
																																																								234	Freud,	Introductory	Lectures,	pg.	350	235	Freud,	Introductory	Lectures,	pg.	350	
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sublimation)	are	available,	then	either	internal	reality	(the	drives)	or	external	reality	(objects,	or	various	aspects)	will	be	compromised	to	resolve	the	conflict,	resulting	in	either	repressions	or	disavowals,	respectively.				
Repression	–	Verdrängung	
In	Inhibitions,	Symptoms,	and	Anxiety,	Freud	distinguishes	between	his	uses	of	the	terms	‘repression’	on	the	one	hand	and	‘defense’	on	the	other.		Repression	is	a	defense,	but	it	is	only	one	of	several	possible	defenses.		Freud	writes	that	the	“old	concept	of	defense”	should	be	employed	“as	a	general	designation	for	all	the	techniques	which	the	ego	makes	use	of	in	conflicts	which	may	lead	to	a	neurosis,	while	…	‘repression’”	should	refer	to	a	“special	method	of	defense.”236		Freud	is	here	using	the	term	‘defense’	to	designate	all	those	defenses,	which	make	use	of	repression,	that	is,	neurotic	defenses.		However,	these	are	not	the	only	ones	present,	as	indicated	above.		And	next,	I	will	discuss	the	other	dominant	defense:	disavowal.	Laplanche	and	Pontalis	observer	that	“‘Defense’	is	a	generic	concept	from	the	start,”	designating	a	“general	tendency”	of	resolving	psychical	conflict	that	carries	over	from	Freud’s	original	theory	of	the	law	of	constancy;237	that	is,	‘defense’	is	used	to	designate	those	psychical	operations	that	combat	stimuli	of	which	the	psychical	apparatus	(e.g.,	the	ego)	cannot	make	use	and	is	thus	felt	as	unpleasurable.		Repression	is	a	defense	that	specifically	operates	against	endogenous	stimuli	–	the	instincts	and	drives	–	by	keeping	them	from	consciousness.		Dynamically,	Laplanche	
																																																								236	Freud,	Inhibitions,	Symptoms,	pg.	163	237	Laplanche	&	Pontalis,	Language	of	Psychoanalysis,	pg.	391	
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and	Pontalis	observe	that	‘repression’	implies	the	“Maintenance	of	an	anticathexis,238	and	[is]	liable	at	any	moment	to	be	defeated	by	the	strength	of	the	unconscious	wish	which	is	striving	to	return	into	consciousness	and	motility.”239		And	in	this	instance,	much	of	the	libido	will	be	used	in	maintaining	the	anticathexes,	which,	in	dealing	with	the	quantitative	aspect,	alleviates	some	of	the	drive’s	‘vehemence’	and	pressure.		But,	Freud	also	points	out,	it	is	a	pressure	that	never	stops,	and	there	is	always	a	question	of	a	psyche’s	strength	in	the	maintenance	of	these	anticathexes	and	the	‘quota	of	affect’	attributable	to	the	drive.			In	his	essay	“Repression,”	Freud	distinguished	between	three	separate	phases	of	repression.		The	first,	‘primal	repression’,	designating	perhaps	the	first	use	of	repression	in	psychical	life,	is	“not	directed	against	the	instinct	as	such	but	against	its	signs	or	‘representatives’,	which	are	denied	entrance	to	the	conscious	and	to	which	the	instinct	remains	fixated.”240		In	other	words,	repression	is	an	action	against	the	ideas	with	which	drives,	in	the	primary	process,	are	cathected.		An	example	might	be	the	cathexis	of	a	sex	drive	with	the	mother’s	breast	–	the	breast	as	idea	–	for	example.		The	second	phase	is	‘repression	proper’	which	entails	a	“repulsion	[Abstossung]	operating	from	the	direction	of	a	higher	agency;”241	that	is,	the	ego	or	usually	the	preconscious	aspect	of	the	ego.			
																																																								238	‘Anticathexis’	is	interchangeable	with	the	term	‘counter-cathexis’.		No	distinction	can	be	made	between	the	two	conceptually,	and	I	will	use	both	terms	depending	on	who	I	am	referencing.	239	Laplanche	&	Pontalis,	Language	of	Psychoanalysis,	pg.	393	240	Laplanche	&	Pontalis,	Language	of	Psychoanalysis,	pg.	393	241	Laplanche	&	Pontalis,	Language	of	Psychoanalysis,	pg.	393	
	 107	
	 The	third	phase	is	identified	by	Laplanche	and	Pontalis	as	the	‘return	of	the	repressed’	as	is	exemplified	in	symptoms,	dreams,	etc.242	In	such	instances,	the	dams	that	held	back	unconscious	content	are	undone	or	removed,	as	in	the	case	of	dreams;	or	in	the	case	of	symptoms,	repression’s	anticathexes	can	be	regarded	as	‘failed’,	for	aspects	of	what	has	been	repressed	make	their	way	into	conscious	life	in	the	guise	of	a	symptom	formation,	generally	composed	of	ideas	(often	translated	nonetheless	by	the	preconscious	system)	or	quota	of	affect.	One	of	the	possible	results	of	repression	is	hysteria	where	the	quantity	–	the	economic	factor	–	is	deal	with	by	cathartic	expressions	through	the	mediation	of	substitutes.		Freud	writes,	“Insofar	as	repression	in	[conversion]	hysteria	is	made	possible	only	by	the	extensive	formation	of	substitutes,	it	may	be	judged	to	be	entirely	unsuccessful;	as	regards	dealing	with	the	quota	of	affects,	however,	which	is	the	true	task	of	repression,	it	generally	signifies	a	total	success.”243		The	substitutes	are	never	themselves	sufficient	for	dealing	with	the	repressed	content,	but	the	formation	of	hysterical	symptoms	deals	with	the	quantity	sufficiently	through	discharging	it,	although	in	such	instances	the	repressions	themselves	are	failed	repressions.	A	different	picture	is	present	in	obsessional	neurosis,	Freud	writes.		In	obsessional	neurosis	–	of	which	Leonardo	da	Vinci	and	Immanuel	Kant	are	later	diagnosed	–	one	finds	“as	its	basis	a	regression	owing	to	which	a	sadistic	trend	has	been	substituted	for	an	affectionate	one.		It	is	this	hostile	impulsion	against	someone	
																																																								242	Laplanche	&	Pontalis,	Language	of	Psychoanalysis,	pg.	393	243	Freud,	Repression,	pg.	156	
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who	is	loved	which	is	subjected	to	repression.”244		Freud	claims	that	this	repudiation	of	ideational	content	is,	at	first,	successful.		And	as	a	result	of	the	repression,	“there	arises	an	alteration	in	the	ego	in	the	shape	of	increased	conscientiousness.”		Furthermore,	“in	this	instance,	as	in	all	others,	repression	has	brought	about	a	withdrawal	of	libido.”245		In	other	words,	the	libido	has	decathected	from	the	ideational	content	to	which	it	had	been	cathected.		But	now,	in	obsessional	neuroses,	“it	has	made	use	of	reaction-formation	for	this	purpose,	by	intensifying	an	opposite.”246		In	other	words,	an	original	sadistic	impulse	is	regarded	as	unacceptable,	or	even	threatening,	to	the	ego.		Consequently,	it	is	repressed.		But	what	then	occurs	is	it	is	turned	around	into	its	opposite,	and	the	libido	is	recathected,	as	it	were,	with	conscientiousness	–	a	care	for	others	–	in	its	stead,	and	often	results	in	what	Freud	later	calls	“moral	masochism.”		The	vicissitude	of	reaction-formation	is	made	use	of	as	a	means	of	reinforcing	a	repression	or	as	compensation	for	it.				
Disavowal	–	Verleugnung	
	 In	The	Language	of	Psychoanalysis,	Laplanche	and	Pontalis	observe	that	
Verleugnung	is	“…	used	by	Freud	in	the	specific	sense	of	a	mode	of	defense	which	consists	in	the	subject’s	refusing	to	recognize	the	reality	of	a	traumatic	perception	–	most	especially	the	perception	of	the	absence	of	the	woman’s	penis.		Freud	invokes	
																																																								244	Freud,	Repression,	pg.	156	245	Freud,	Repression,	pg.	157	246	Freud,	Repression,	pg.	157	
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this	mechanism	particularly	when	accounting	for	fetishism	and	the	psychoses.”247		In	other	words,	disavowal	is	used	to	discuss	defensive	operations	that	oppose	
external	reality,	in	contrast	to	repression,	which	on	the	other	hand	opposes	internal	reality.		Disavowal	is	most	often	the	operation	that	accounts	for	the	development	of	psychotic	symptoms,	whereas	repression	is	responsible	for	the	development	of	neurotic	symptoms.		Laplanche	and	Pontalis	observe	that	he	never	really	worked	out	a	theory	of	disavowal	as	he	had	for	repression,	but	“there	is	nonetheless	a	definite	consistency	in	the	evolution	of	this	concept	in	his	work.”248		One	reason	why	Freud	did	not	spend	as	much	time	on	this	mechanism	is	perhaps	because	he	did	not	like	working	with	psychotics.		Freud	was	very	empathic,	and	so	psychotics	could	be	very	troubling.		Furthermore,	psychotics	are	unreasonably	difficult	to	engage	with	in	therapy,	and	aren’t	so	susceptible	to	transference,	which	is	so	central	to	the	analytic	procedure.		Thus,	Freud	hadn’t	the	clinical	exposure	to	psychoses	as	he	had	to	repression	in	the	neuroses,	and	theoretical	advances	concerning	such	constitutions	are	more	cumbersome,	wrought	with	more	difficulty.		Many	psychoanalysts	refuse	to	work	with	patients	who	are	largely	psychotically	constituted	for	these	reasons.249		 For	Otto	Rank,	the	psychoanalyst	with	whom	originated	the	idea	of	the	Birth	Trauma,	disavowal	is	primary.		He	writes,	“The	original	nature	of	denial	is	seen	in	the	attempt	to	oppose	to	a	painful	reality,	the	power	of	the	individual	will,”	but,	faced	with	reality,	the	“denial	mechanism	is	turned	entirely	inward	where	it																																																									247	Laplanche	&	Pontalis,	Language	of	Psychoanalysis,	pg.	118	248	Laplanche	&	Pontalis,	Language	of	Psychoanalysis,	pg.	118	249	One	exception	would	be	Jung,	who	himself	suffered	some	psychotic	episodes,	and	was	very	taken	with	the	‘symbols’	that	he	observed	in	psychotic	symptoms	and	ideation,	compelling	his	development	of	the	theory	of	the	collective	unconscious	as	well	as	is	later,	and	controversially,	his	work	on	Alchemy.	
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expresses	itself	…	in	the	sphere	of	consciousness	as	repression.”250		Otto	Rank,	thus,	asserts	that	repression	is	a	kind	of	disavowal,	but	one	that,	instead	of	disavowing	the	external	world	as	it	is	perceived,	disavows	the	demands	placed	on	it	by	the	id	via	the	mechanism	of	repression.		I	tend	to	think	that	he	is	correct.		Speculatively,	it	makes	more	sense	that,	as	an	infant	increasingly	faces	unpleasure	as	it	becomes	disillusioned	from	its	primary	narcissism,	it	is	likely	to	first	disavow	the	differentiations	and	separations,	the	loss	of	narcissistic	significance.			Then,	as	the	infant	also	encounters	the	demand	placed	upon	it	by	its	own	endogenous	stimuli,	it	would	then	enforce	a	similar	operation	concerning	such.		This	also	makes	sense	in	relation	to	the	nature	of	disavowals	in	general,	which	indicate	a	regression	to	a	primary	narcissism	and	feeling	of	omnipotence.		This	is	not	an	important	focus	for	me	here,	but	I’d	like	to	point	out	that	it	would	seem,	thus,	that	disavowal	precedes	repression	chronologically,	and	that	repression	is	in	a	sense	a	disavowal	turned	inwards.		In	both	cases,	stimuli	are	repudiated.		
The	Distinction	
Freud	writes,	“The	most	important	genetic	difference	between	a	neurosis	and	a	psychosis”	is	that	the	“neurosis	is	the	result	of	a	conflict	between	the	ego	and	its	id,	whereas	psychosis	is	the	analogous	outcome	of	a	similar	disturbance	in	the	relations	between	the	ego	and	the	external	world.”251		A	neurosis	develops	from	the	
repression	of	the	drives,	and	a	psychosis	develops	by	disavowing	reality.		A	neurosis																																																									250	Rank,	Truth	and	Reality,	pg.	38	‘denial’	is	here	probably	best	translated	as	‘disavowal’,	although	I	have	left	it	alone.	251	Freud,	“Neurosis	and	Psychosis,”	pg.	149.		I	have	removed	Freud’s	emphasis.	
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develops	because	“The	repressed	material	struggles	against	[the	repression].		It	creates	for	itself,	along	other	paths	over	which	the	ego	has	no	power,	a	substitutive	representation	–	the	symptom,”	and	which	is	to	be	regarded	as	a	“compromise.”252		This	‘substitute’	or	‘compromise’	is	one	of	several	possible	manifestations.		The	ones	with	which	Freud	has	from	the	beginning	mostly	been	concerned	are	the	formation	of	‘hysterical’	symptoms	and	other	such	neurotic	behaviors	one	can	observe	in	OCD	and	so	on.253	Another	manifestation	is	a	schizoid	fantasy,	to	be	distinguished	from	a	delusion.		One	of	Freud’s	first	accounts	of	a	delusional	patient	is	given	in	his	paper	“The	Neuro-Psychoses	of	Defense.”		In	this	paper,	he	describes	a	woman	who	felt	an	“impulsive	affection”	for	a	man	who	did	not	return	her	love.254		Freud	describes	an	instance	when	the	woman,	“being	met	by	fresh	painful	impressions”	of	the	man’s	unreturned	love,	waited	for	him	to	arrive	by	train	on	a	“particular	day	…	of	family	celebration.”		Freud	continues:	But	the	day	wore	on	and	he	did	not	appear.		When	all	the	trains	by	which	he	could	have	arrived	had	come	and	gone,	she	passed	into	a	state	of	hallucinatory	confusion:	he	had	arrived,	she	heard	his	voice	in	the	garden,	she	hurried	down	in	her	nightdress	to	receive	him.		From	that	time	on	she	
																																																								252	Freud,	“Neurosis	and	Psychosis,”	pg.	50	253	Freud,	of	course,	did	not	differentiate	as	precisely	as	we	do	now	between	the	various	formations	of	symptoms.		He	was	focused	on	the	etiology	and	their	possible	cure	by	fostering	an	alteration	at	the	root	cause	of	the	formation.			254	Freud,	“Neuro-Psychoses	of	Defense,”	pg.	58	
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lived	for	two	months	in	a	happy	dream,	whose	content	was	that	he	was	there,	always	by	her	side…255	What	has	occurred	is	that	instead	of	repressing	the	drives	that	demand	their	satisfaction	through	the	man	(the	love	object	with	which	they’re	cathected),	the	ego	has	effectively	cut	itself	off	from	the	reality	of	the	situation.		Freud	writes,	“The	ego	has	fended	off	the	incompatible	idea	through	a	flight	into	psychosis.”256		The	idea	that	would	correspond	to	reality	is	rejected	–	it	is	disavowed	–	and	in	its	place	an	idea	is	erected	that	is	compatible	with	the	subject’s	desires.		Freud	writes	that	a	“delusion	is	found	applied	like	a	patch	over	the	place	where	originally	a	rent	had	appeared	in	the	ego’s	relation	to	the	external	world.”257	In	both	neuroses	and	psychoses,	writes	Freud,	there	is	a	“rebellion	on	the	part	of	the	id	against	the	external	world,	of	its	unwillingness	–	or,	if	one	prefers,	its	incapacity	–	to	adapt	itself	to	the	exigencies	of	reality,	to	[Necessity].”258		In	both,	therefore,	there	is	the	incapacity	to	accommodate	reality.		Freud	appears	focused	on	the	‘loosening’	of	the	relation	to	reality	in	the	second	step	of	neuroses,	versus	the	outright	disavowal	in	the	first	step	of	psychoses,	rather	than	on	the	differentiating	factors	of	their	first	steps:	repression	and	disavowal.		He	writes:	…	in	a	neurosis	the	ego,	in	its	dependence	on	reality,	suppresses	a	piece	of	the	id	(of	instinctual	life),	whereas	in	a	psychosis,	this	same	ego,	in	the	service	of	the	id,	withdraws	from	a	piece	of	reality.		Thus	for	a	neurosis	the	
																																																								255	Freud,	“Neuro-Psychoses	of	Defense,”	pp.	58-59	256	Freud,	“Neuro-Psychoses	of	Defense,”	pg.	59	257	Freud,	“Neurosis	and	Psychosis,”	pg.	151	258	Freud,	“The	loss	of	Reality”	pg.	185	
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decisive	factor	would	be	the	predominance	of	the	influence	of	reality,	whereas	for	a	psychosis	it	would	be	the	predominance	of	the	id.259	Thus	the	neurosis,	in	its	attunement	to	reality,	results	from	the	repression	of	one’s	drives	that	the	reality-principle	demands.		Psychosis,	on	the	other	hand,	results	from	disavowing	reality	in	order	to	foster	satisfaction,	generally	by	way	of	delusional	fantasies.		However,	Freud	observes,	“This	does	not	at	all	agree	with	the	observation	…	that	every	neurosis	disturbs	the	patient’s	relation	to	reality	in	some	way,	…	and	that,	in	its	severe	forms,	it	actually	signifies	a	flight	from	real	life.”260		This	would	appear	to	be	a	contradiction,	as	Freud	observes,	but	he	states	it	is	easily	resolved	by	seeing	that	the	vicissitude	(repression)	is	not	the	neurosis,	but	the	beginning	of	one.			The	neurosis	consists	rather	in	the	processes	which	provides	a	compensation	for	the	portion	of	the	id	that	has	been	damaged	–	that	is	to	say,	in	the	reaction	against	the	repression	and	in	the	failure	of	the	repression.		The	loosening	of	the	relation	to	reality	is	a	consequence	of	this	second	step	in	the	formation	of	a	neurosis,	and	…	the	loss	of	reality	[might	be	seen	to]	affect	precisely	that	piece	of	reality	as	a	result	of	whose	demands	the	instinctual	repression	ensued.261	For	an	example	that	uses	Freud’s	development	theory,	we	can	think	of	someone	fixated262	at	the	anal	stage	of	development,	and	who,	in	accommodating	external	reality,	will	repress	particular	drives	and	develop	a	neurotic	disposition	towards																																																									259	Freud,	“The	loss	of	Reality”	pg.	183	260	Freud,	“The	loss	of	Reality”	pg.	183	261	Freud,	“The	loss	of	Reality”	pg.	183	262	Fixation	is	the	rigid	libidinal	cathexis	to	particular	content	by	means	of	which	the	drives	seek	satisfaction.	
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cleanliness	and	regularity.		The	loosening	of	reality	can	be	observed	in	the	paranoia	of	germs	or	dirt.		Freud	thus	envisions	a	two-step	process	in	the	development	of	neurotic	symptoms:	repression,	and	then	compensation	or	symptoms.		 There	may	be	observed	a	two-step	process	in	psychosis	as	well,	Freud	observes.		The	first	entails	disavowal.		The	second	step	is	made	in	a	“more	autocratic	manner,”	writes	Freud,	“by	the	creation	of	a	new	reality	which	no	longer	raises	the	same	objections	as	the	old	one	that	has	been	given	up.”263		Thus	it	is	the	first	step	that	most	differentiates	the	two	developments	–	the	neurotic	initially	repressing	internal	reality	(the	instincts	or	drives),	the	psychotic	initially	disavowing	external	reality,	and	the	second	step	of	each	appears	as	a	‘reconstruction’,	as	either	a	compensation	or	symptom	or	a	delusion.		Yet	Freud	writes,	“The	initial	difference	is	expressed	…	in	the	final	outcome:	neurosis	does	not	disavow	reality,	it	only	ignores	it;	psychosis	disavows	it	and	tries	to	replace	it.”264		What	differentiates	the	phantasying	at	play	in	psychoses	and	neuroses,	Freud	observes,	is	the	phantasies	of	psychotics	actually	replace	external	reality,	whereas	for	the	neurotic	they	are	an	addendum	to	it	or	a	refuge	from	it.265		Interestingly,	Freud	writes,	“We	call	behavior	‘normal’	or	‘healthy’,	if	it	combines	certain	features	of	both	[neurotic	and	psychotic]	reactions	–	if	it	disavows	the	reality	as	little	as	does	a	neurosis,	but	if	it	then	exerts	itself,	as	does	a	psychosis,	to	effect	an	alteration	of	that	reality.”266		But	what	he	defines	as	‘normal’	does	not	mean	‘healthy’.		Rather,	Freud	speaks	of	normal	as	in	conformity	with	societal	norms.		And	it	appears	he	defines	‘normal’	as	entailing																																																									263	Freud,	“The	loss	of	Reality”	pg.	185	264	Freud,	“The	loss	of	Reality”	pg.	185	265	Freud,	“The	loss	of	Reality”	pg.	187	266	Freud,	“The	loss	of	Reality”	pg.	185	
	 115	
some	admixture	of	neurotic	and	psychotic	constitutions.		‘Normal’	appears	to	be	minimally	egodystonic.		
AGGRESSION	
There	are	problems	inherent	to	the	discourse	of	aggression	in	relation	to	the	death	drive.		Aggression	is	given	only	two	forms,	or	directions,	of	expression:	sadism	and	masochism	(other-	or	self-directed).			Aggression	is	always	linked	with	the	intent	to	cause	either	unpleasure	(non-sexual)	or	pain	(sexual).267		Aggression	carries	with	it	the	notions	of	unethical	behavior	(or,	sometimes	morally	good,	as	Havi	Carel	writes	of	protectiveness);268	that	is	to	say,	it	is	rarely	morally	or	ethically	neutral	but	is	either	in	one	camp	or	the	other	–	good	or	evil.			But	aside	from	the	ethical	attributions	to	aggression,	the	notion	that	aggression	itself	is	innate,	as	an	intrinsic	character	of	the	death	drive,	appears	questionable.			Laplanche	observes	that	the	death	drive,	regarded	as	an	instinct	of	aggression,	satisfies	two	separate	issues	in	psychoanalysis.		He	writes,	“two	intentions	coincide	in	the	affirmation	of	the	death	drive,	as	it	appears	in	Beyond	the	
Pleasure	Principle:	to	reaffirm	the	fundamental	economic	principle	of	psychoanalysis,”	which,	in	its	most	radical	form,	is	“the	tendency	to	zero.”		But	also,	along	side	this,	“To	give	a	metapsychological	status	…	to	the	increasingly	numerous	and	impressive	discoveries	of	psychoanalytic	inquiry	concerning	the	register	of																																																									267	Laplanche	is	careful	to	distinguish	unpleasure	from	pain,	pointing	to	the	possibility	that	aggression	is	not	always	sexual	in	nature,	but	that	“pain”	is,	contrary	to	mere	“unpleasure”,	always	sexual.		For	example,	see	Life	and	Death,	pp.	85	–	100	on	aggression.	268	See	Carel,	ibid,	pg.	126	
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‘aggressiveness’	or	‘destructiveness’.”269		In	other	words,	Laplanche	claims	that,	because	psychoanalysis	has	observed	aggression	prevalently,	and	at	very	early	ages,270	it	became	reasonable	to	suppose	that	there	is	in	fact	an	instinct	for	aggression.		But	he	also	claims	it	‘satisfies’	the	assertion	of	the	entropic	principle	in	psychical	functions,	seen	as	a	‘direct’	and	uninhibited	discharge	(‘towards	zero’).		There	are	several	problems	with	this	view,	however,	and	I	will	argue	that	aggression	should	not	be	brought	into	the	primary	process,	and	that	this	complicates	rather	than	simplifies	things.		With	respect	to	the	death	drive,	Laplanche	observes	that	Freud	“first	had	in	mind	an	originary	self-destructiveness,	and	only	secondarily	an	aggressivity	re-directed	to	the	external	world.”271		Laplanche	first	recognizes	that	the	death	drive	is	not	directly	linked	to	aggressiveness,	but	that	it	becomes	so	later	on.		He	writes:	One	can	note	that	when	Freud	understands	his	death	drive	retrospectively	as	an	aggressive	drive,	he	claims	to	be	relating	his	discovery	to	the	treatment	of	sadism	and	masochism.		Yet	this	claim	by	Freud	is	among	the	most	dubious:	on	the	one	hand,	he	had	already	previously	highlighted	and	studied	in	detail	the	phenomena	of	sadism	and	masochism	without	the	invocation	of	a	specific	drive;	and	on	the	other	hand,	if	one	looks	closely	at	Beyond	the	Pleasure	
Principle,	one	sees	that	observations	of	sadism	or	masochism	…	are	never	called	on	as	an	opening	move	in	the	introduction	of	the	death	drive.272		Freud’s	theory	of	an	‘aggressive	instinct’,	Laplanche	observes,	has	its	origin	not	in	a	new	discovery,	but	in	a	conceptual	necessity	that	became	apparent	when	Freud																																																									269	Laplanche,	Life	and	Death,	pg	85	270	As	indicated	in	the	work	of	Melanie	Kleine,	for	examples	271	Laplanche,	So-Called	Death	Drive,	pg	44	272	Laplanche,	So-Called	Death	Drive,	pg	45	
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discovered	primary	narcissism.		Laplanche	observes	that	at	this	point,	with	the	publication	of	Beyond,	and	in	the	works	after	1920,	…	what	is	considered	the	initial	stage	is	the	reflexive,	masochistic	moment:	to	make	oneself	suffer	or	destroy	oneself.	…	Before	1920,	on	the	contrary	…	it	would	be	the	activity	directed	towards	an	external	object	–	sadism	–	that	would	be	first	…	whereas	masochism	would	be	the	turning	round	of	this	initial	attitude,	a	turning	round	that	is	…	easily	understandable	in	terms	of	obstacles	encountered	in	the	external	world	and,	above	all,	of	the	guilt	caused	by	aggression.273				This	would	also	be	consistent	with	primary	narcissism,	which	Laplanche	identifies	as	the	new	element	that	gave	rise	to	Beyond	the	Pleasure	Principle.		Laplanche	writes,	“The	essential	dimension	of	the	affirmation	of	a	death	drive	lies	neither	in	the	discovery	of	aggressiveness,	or	in	its	theorization,	nor	even	in	the	fact	of	hypostatizing	it	as	a	biological	tendency	or	a	metaphysical	universal.		It	is	in	the	idea	that	aggressiveness	is	first	of	all	directed	against	the	subject	…	before	being	deflected	toward	the	outside.”274		There	is	a	hermeneutic	problem	here,	however,	in	describing	the	death	drive	as	‘self-destructive’;	it	imposes	on	the	entropic	principle	the	hypothesized	consequence	of	that	tendency	to	zero,	where	a	diminution	of	energy	towards	a	zero	sum	necessarily	implies	the	‘destruction’	of	the	entity	regarded	as	‘self’,	although	‘self-destruction’	is	not	the	‘telos’	of	that	tendency.			Then,	Laplanche	also	writes,	“The	death	drive,	a	concept	that	seems	quite	undialectical,	is	present,	in	Freud’s	final	formulations,	not	as	an	element	in	conflict	
																																																								273	Laplanche,	Life	and	Death,	pg	89	274	Laplanche,	Life	and	Death,	pg	86	
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but	as	conflict	itself	substantialized,	an	internal	principle	of	strife	and	disunion.”275		But	can	this	be	so?		Freud	had	mentioned	in	Beyond	that	it	is	Eros,	not	the	death	drive,	that	is	to	be	regarded	as	“disturber	of	the	peace.”		And	since	the	death	drive	can	never	be	cognized	directly,	according	to	Freud,	but	must	always	be	observed	through	the	filter	of	its	interaction	with	Eros,	can	one	rightly	call	the	death	drive	a	principle	of	strife	–	of	conflict	substantialized?		Even	within	Freudian	theory,	there	are	problems	with	this	view.		Rather,	Eros	–	providing	the	detours	to	death	–	should	be	regarded	as	what	allows	for	disruption	because	of	its	demands.		Aggression	is	the	result	of	dissatisfaction	or	frustration	in	the	demands	of	Eros,	energy	that	must	be	discharged,	and	that,	owing	to	constraints	of	reality	and/or	creative	impotence,	cannot	be	sublimated	and	is	unable	to	be	repressed.		I	want	to	recall	what	Nietzsche	writes	of	Cruelty.	In	Daybreak,	echoed	in	the	Genealogy	later,	Nietzsche	writes	of	cruelty	as	“one	of	the	oldest	festive	joys	of	mankind.”		And	“in	the	act	of	cruelty	the	community	refreshes	itself	and	for	once	throws	off	the	gloom	of	constant	fear	and	caution,”	and	in	which	“it	is	imagined	that	the	gods	too	are	refreshed	and	in	festive	mood	when	they	are	offered	the	spectacle	of	cruelty	–	and	thus	there	creeps	into	the	world	the	idea	that	voluntary	suffering,	self-chosen	torture,	is	meaningful	and	valuable.”276		Interestingly,	Nietzsche	here	also	asserts	that	cruelty	is	enjoyed	by	those	who	have	been	“made	hard	by	deprivation	and	morality,”	and,	although	they	are	“full	of	strength,”	perhaps	owing	merely	to	their	stoic	hardness,	they	are	also	full	of	
																																																								275	Laplanche,	Life	and	Death,	pg	122	276	Nietzsche,	Daybreak	I	§18	
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“revengefulness,	hostility,	deceit	and	suspicion.”277		Such	spirits	do	not	fit	the	bill	for	what	Nietzsche	later	describes	as	noble	spirits.		Instead,	such	spirits	are	weak	or	fettered	spirits,	and	their	‘cruelty’	is	associated	with	a	failure	of	repression	as	is	Wagnerian	hysteria.278		Although	in	the	Genealogy	Nietzsche	also	describes	cruelty	in	relation	to	the	noble	spirit,	here	the	description	appears	to	be	accompanied	by	a	kind	of	spiritual	weakness	and	deprivation,	and	ressentiment,	insofar	as	the	cruelty	is	performed	on	others,	and	bad	conscience,	insofar	as	cruelty	is	redirected	towards	one’s	self,	to	make	one’s	self	suffer.			Referencing	what	later	becomes	regarded	as	‘ascetic	priests’,	Nietzsche	writes:	All	those	spiritual	leaders	of	the	peoples	who	were	able	to	stir	something	into	motion	within	the	inert	blue	fertile	mud	of	their	customs	have,	in	addition	to	madness,	also	had	need	of	voluntary	torture	if	they	were	to	inspire	belief	–	and	first	and	foremost	…	their	own	belief	in	themselves!		The	more	their	spirit	ventured	on	to	new	paths	and	was	as	a	consequence	tormented	by	pangs	of	conscience	and	spasms	of	anxiety,	the	more	cruelly	did	they	rage	against	their	own	flesh,	their	own	appetites	and	their	own	health.279				There	appears	then,	an	analogue	found	later	in	Freud’s	work	in	the	Three	Essays,	where	the	primary	direction	of	one’s	drives	is	sadistic,	but	might	then	be	turned	against	the	self	–	the	same	drives	–	and	become	masochistic.		But	Nietzsche’s	account	isn’t	as	simple	either.		Nietzsche	also	finds	two	different	reasons	for	cruelty	in	the	sadistic	position:	cruelty	as	the	product	of	a	mere	natural	disposition	in	the	case	of	the	noble	spirit	(an	immediate,	violent	response),	or	cruelty	as	the	product	of																																																									277	Nietzsche,	Daybreak	I	§18	278	See	the	section	on	Wagnerian	hysteria	and	Dionysian	intoxication	279	Nietzsche,	Daybreak,	I	§18	
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ressentiment	in	the	case	of	the	weaker	or	fettered	spirit,	projecting	their	unhappiness	onto	the	external	other,	and	finding	joy	in	the	cruel	acts	in	passive-
aggression.		Nietzsche,	later	echoed	by	Freud,	associates	bad	conscience	with	
masochism.		Freud	later	refers	to	this	as	moral	masochism.280	Nietzsche	and	Freud281	both,	however,	regard	cruelty	and	aggression	as	part	of	man’s	nature.		What	becomes	clear	in	Freud,	however,	is	that	even	man’s	natural	aggressive	disposition	is	itself	secondary	and	contingent	on	the	frustration	of	the	
binding	character	of	Eros	–	frustrations,	that	is,	of	relating.			In	the	Genealogy,	Nietzsche	writes,	“Cruelty	is	part	of	the	festive	joy	of	the	ancients	and,	indeed,	is	an	ingredient	in	nearly	every	pleasure	they	have,”	cruelty	was	a	“feast.”282		Yet	cruelty	was	once	experienced	differently	than	it	is	now,	and	perhaps	would	not	have	been	regarded	as	‘cruelty’	as	such,	but	merely	a	direct	expression	of	one’s	nature	only	retrospectively	regarded	as	‘cruel’	in	the	same	sense	that	people	judge	nature	as	‘cruel’,	despite	the	fact	that	there	is	no	maliciousness	in	nature.		For	Nietzsche	goes	on	to	assert,	“At	the	time	when	mankind	felt	no	shame	towards	cruelty,	life	on	earth	was	more	cheerful	than	it	is	today,	with	its	pessimists.		The	heavens	darkened	over	man	in	direct	proportion	to	the	increase	in	his	feelings	of	shame	at	being	man.”283	In	other	words,	mankind	had	become	ashamed	of	its	nature	and	sought	to	dissociate	itself	from	nature.		And	on	this	path,	“he	finds	not	only	that	the	joy	and	innocence	of																																																									280	See,	for	example,	the	section	on	Moral	Masochism	281	Only	Freud	after	the	turning	point	of	1920	explicitly	asserts	that	aggressivity	is	inherent	to	the	nature	of	humans.		Prior	to	this	point	he	made	no	explicit	statement	on	the	matter,	and	explained	aggression	more	in	terms	of	the	vicissitudes	of	the	sex	drives	(which	were	acquired	in	relation	to	the	instincts	rather	than	being	inherited	like	the	instincts).	282	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	II	§6	283	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	II	§7	
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animals	is	disgusting,	but	that	life	itself	is	distasteful.”284	The	guilt	man	learned	to	feel	for	his	nature	tainted	his	perspective	of	all	of	nature,	so	that	he	came	to	find	life	itself	distasteful.		At	this	point,	aggression	and	cruelty	are	still	practiced	by	mankind	but	have	become	passive-aggression;	it	is	a	cruelty	that	cathartically	releases	itself	from	preceding	repressions.	What	I	mean	to	illustrate	is	that	the	slave	spirit	is	passive-aggressive,	either	sadistically	or	masochistically,	owing	to	their	constitution.		The	noble	spirit,	on	the	other	hand,	is	possibly	aggressive	(generally	sadistically)	for	reasons	of	creative	
impotence,	because	a	noble	spirit,	as	conceived	by	Nietzsche,285	is	capable	of	only	unmediated	expressions	of	drives,	and	therefore	is	not	capable	of	sublimation,	let	alone	other	egodystonic	vicissitudes.286	The	noble	spirit	is	regarded	as	healthier	by	Nietzsche	because	it	represents	raw	nature,	uninhibited	in	its	expression	and	with	a	strength	to	express	itself,	but	Nietzsche	does	not,	on	account	of	this,	suggest	we	should	be	noble.		Rather,	noble	spirits	are	merely	closer	to	his	vision	of	the	
Übermensch.		
…	Similar	to	Disavowal	What,	then,	is	aggression?		It	seems	there	is	sufficient	reason	to	state	that	it	is	a	vicissitude	the	potential	of	which	is	provided	biologically	and,	to	an	extent,	is	‘selected	for’	in	the	sense	mentioned	above…	a	creative	impotence	or	an																																																									284	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	II	§7	285	see,	for	example,	my	section	on	Human	Geist	286	see,	for	example,	my	section	on	Creativity	where	creativity	is	demonstrated	in	research	to	emerge	not	only	from	sublimation	but	from	a	flexibility	of	a	multitude	of	vicissitudes.	
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environmental	or	spiritual	impoverishment.		But	what	is	it	that	makes	it	arise	in	the	first?		Anna	Freud	has	suggested,	among	others,	that	the	source	is	frustration.		This,	of	course,	is	also	the	precipitating	factor	of	neuroses	–	or	for	that	matter	–	psychoses.		Freud	writes,	“people	fall	ill	of	a	neurosis	as	a	result	of	frustration”	–	“	...	the	frustration	of	the	satisfaction	of	their	libidinal	wishes.”287		Furthermore,	a	“pathogenic	conflict	of	this	kind	takes	place”	when	the	libido	is	“deprived	of	the	possibility	of	an	ideal	ego-syntonic	satisfaction.”288		In	other	words,	a	neurosis	is	the	result	of	a	frustration	of	unsatisfied	drives,	and	the	frustration	itself	arises	from	the	inability	to	egosyntonically	channel	the	drive	towards	other	objects	or	intermediate	aims.		It	appears	reasonable	to	claim	that	aggression	manifests	itself	in	situations	that	frustrate	libidinal	satisfaction,	but	also	situations	where	repression	and	disavowal	are	not	possible	or	utilized,	and	there	is	an	inability	or	unwillingness	to	find	other	possibilities	of	expression,	such	as	sublimation.		Laplanche	writes,	“There	is	no	trace,	in	the	biology	which	Freud	wished	to	use	as	his	fundamental	reference,	of	the	cruel,	sadistic	behavior,	the	destructiveness	with	no	aim	but	the	sheer	pleasure	of	destroying,	which	characterizes	the	human	being.”289			And	further,	such	a	conclusion	“invalidates	the	ascription	of	any	biological	or	even	zoological	basis	to	the	sexual	death	drive.”290		Instead,	Laplanche	remarks,	it	is	something	“human,	all	too	human,”	the	foundation	of	aggression	is	psychical.291		
																																																								287	Freud,	Some	Character	Types,	pg.	316	288	Freud,	Some	Character	Types,	pg.	316	289	Laplanche,	So-Called	Death	Drive,	pg	55	290	Laplanche,	So-Called	Death	Drive,	pg	55	291	Laplanche,	So-Called	Death	Drive,	pg	55	
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There	is	nothing	to	suggest	that	aggression,	though	seemingly	a	substantial	biological	disposition,	is	anything	more	primary	than	any	other	behavioral	dispositions	in	relation	to	objects,	which	are	of	a	secondary	nature,	such	as	neuroses	and	psychoses.		Analogously,	the	possible	vicissitudes	of	disavowal	and	repression	are	biologically	provided	as	potentialities,	but	their	enactment	actually	appears	to	occur	only	when	other	binding	operations	of	Eros	fail	for	whatever	reason.		Therefore,	we	cannot	ascribe	to	a	view	of	a	primary	and	unavoidable	instinct	or	drive	to	aggressiveness	that	is	not	also	fundamentally	preceded	by	a	frustration	that	arises	from	a	substantial	failure	of	the	secondary	process	as	is	the	case	for	other	vicissitudes.		Aggression	is	not	attributable	to	a	drive	but	should	instead	be	regarded	as	a	vicissitude,	a	means	of	relating,	or	at	the	least	a	symptom	of	a	defense,	such	as	“acting	out”	might	be.	Aggression	emerges	from	the	frustration	of	drives	as	a	means	of	procuring	satisfaction.		Aggression	is	a	vicissitude	that	has	been	deflected	from	the	original	aim,	such	as	a	union	with,	or	incorporation	of,	some	object;	and	the	vicissitude	becomes	aggression	as	a	means	of	reconciling	the	frustration	of	the	failure,	and	thus	becomes	directed	against	the	object.		When	aggression	emerges,	it	does	so	in	relation	to	a	different	intermediate	aim	and/or	object	than	that	with	which	the	drive	was	originally	associated.		When	only	the	original	intermediary	aim	of	union	with	is	replaced	by	destructiveness	and	action	against	an	object	is	there	manifested	what	has	typically	been	called	aggression	proper:		a	rebellion	against	and	desire	to	destroy,	annihilate,	or	subvert	the	object.		When	the	object	is	itself	exchanged	for	another,	because	of	the	fear	of	retaliation	or	other	such	fears,	then	what	emerges	is	
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what	has	typically	been	labeled	passive-aggression,	a	prerequisite	of	which	is	originally	repression	or	suppression.		Aggression	proper	entails	no	repression,	whereas	passive-aggression	is	contingent	on	repression	or	suppression.	Aggression	is	a	behavior	that	is	necessarily	felt	as	pleasurable	by	the	aggressing	agent.		It	is	a	means	of	mastering	what	is	regarded	as	a	resistance,	so	that	annihilation	of	the	frustrating,	threatening	object	masters	it	and	is	thus	felt	as	pleasurable.		By	analogy	to	neuroses,	neuroses	develop	as	a	means	of	procuring	some	satisfaction	when	the	original	aim	is	repressed,	of	mastering	endogenous	stimuli.		But	aggression	should	not	be	regarded	as	a	neurosis.		Aggression	is	strictly	the	expression	of	free	energy	directed	against	an	object	or	substitute	object	when	the	energy	was,	for	internal	or	external	reasons,	unable	to	establish	the	relation	originally	sought.292	In	a	sense,	Aggression	is	therefore	comparable	to	the	vicissitude	disavowal.		The	orientation	is	the	same:	attempting	to	eradicate	that	which	is	traumatic	or	threatening	to	the	ego	and	external	to	it.		Jonathan	Lear	observes	that,	in	Ancient	Greece,	“The	killing	of	Socrates	manifests	a	psychotic	understanding	of	how	to	get	rid	
of	a	disruption:	one	treats	a	non-thing	as	though	it	were	a	thing	and	then	destroys	it.”293		And	also,	“The	Athenians	react	to	this	trauma	by	trying	to	kill	it	off.”294		Lear	thus	explicitly	compares	aggression	to	disavowal,	the	vicissitude	underpinning	psychoses.		A	difference,	however,	is	located	in	the	fact	that	disavowal	involves	an	individual’s	psychical	action	in	a	refusal	to	acknowledge	an	aspect	of	external	reality.																																																										292	Holt	has	provided	a	great	description	of	the	difference	between	bound	and	free	cathexis.	293	Lear,	Happiness,	pg.	102	(my	emphasis)	294	Lear,	Happiness,	pg.	102	
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Aggression,	on	the	other	hand,	does	acknowledge	that	reality,	but	only	so	as	to	
eradicate	it	physically.		In	both,	the	aim	is	the	same:	to	annihilate	a	frustrating	or	threatening	aspect	of	the	external	the	world.			But	disavowal,	on	the	one	hand,	is	a	psychical	operation;	aggression,	on	the	other	hand,	a	physical	one.			Lear	writes,	“There	is	an	important	difference	between	saying	that	aggression	is	fundamental	to	human	life	…	and	saying	that	it	flows	from	a	fundamental	aggressive	force.”295		Rather,	what	he	proposes,	and	also	what	would	seem	more	consistent	with	the	Nirvana	and	constancy/reality	principles,	is:	“Aggression	emerges	from	a	breakdown	in	the	mind’s	efforts	to	make	meaning	–	that	is,	a	breakdown	which	cannot	be	healed	by	subsequent	efforts	to	make	meaning.”296	In	other	words,	Aggression	emerges	from	a	creative	impotence	when	faced	by	a	frustration	of	the	secondary	process.		Aggression	results	form	a	failure	to	make	meaning,	which	is	to	say,	it	fails	to	integrate	or	incorporate	some	aspect	of	reality	and	therefore	seeks	its	eradication	or	subservience.	Bataille	offers	an	example	of	this.		He	observes	that	war	is	generally	the	result	of	not	finding	other	means	of	expending	excess	energy	in	productive,	or	non-productive,	ways.297		While	the	Aztecs	expended	energy	meaningfully	in	wars	and	in	sacrifices,298	other	Native	American	tribes	expended	energy	by	giving	gifts,	called	the	‘Potlatch’,	where	it	was	more	honorable	to	give	than	to	receive,	and	which	signified	power.299		Buddhists	in	Tibet,	for	example,	expended	energy	through	living																																																									295	Lear,	Happiness,	pg.	113	296	Lear,	Happiness,	pg.	113	297	Bataille,	The	Accursed	Share,	vol.	1	pg.	25	298	Bataille,	The	Accursed	Share,	vol.	1	pp.	45-61	299	Bataille,	The	Accursed	Share,	vol.	1	pp.	63-77	
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a	purely	contemplative,	and	thus	unproductive,	life.300		These	are	some	of	the	ways	in	which	Bataille	describes	the	expenditure	of	energy	in	civilization.		Others	have	been	the	production	of	cultural	artifacts	–	art,	music,	monuments	to	the	dead	as	well	as	to	the	living	or	to	ideas.		“Our	ignorance,”	he	writes,	“only	has	this	incontestable	effect:	It	causes	us	to	undergo	what	we	could	bring	about	in	our	own	way,	if	we	understood.”301		To	clarify,	it	‘causes	us	to	undergo’	what	we	could	have	brought	about	by	entirely	other	means,	such	as	the	expenditure	of	energy	and	resources	in	the	development	of	culture	instead	of	wasting	it	annihilating	each	other	or	those	aspects	of	the	environment	that	are	antagonistic	to	our	drives	and	desires.		Instead	of	acting	aggressively	out	of	creative	impotence	or	ressentiment,	there	is	the	possibility	of	expending	energy	through	sublimations	of	our	drives	when	encountering	frustrations	by	the	reality	principle.		For	these	reasons,	aggression	can	be	appropriately	understood	as	a	means	of	relating	that	is	egodystonic.	In	instances	of	self-defense,	however,	‘aggressive’	behavior	cannot	be	regarded	as	egodystonic,	nor	even	as	aggression.		In	self-defense,	one	is	not	the	
aggressor.		The	Aggressor	is	the	one	who	is	aggressive;	that	is,	on	the	offense.		The	aggressor	is	the	one	who	is	acting	out	of	frustration,	and,	most	importantly,	because	of	an	inability	to	otherwise	cope	with	the	frustration	egosyntonically.		Nietzsche	also	writes	that,	as	will	to	power,	it	is	natural	for	things	to	expand	their	powers.		“Intoxicated	by	moral	narcotics,	one	speaks	of	the	right	of	the	individual	to	defend	himself;	in	the	same	sense	one	might	also	speak	of	his	right	to	attack:	for	both	are	necessities	…	[But]	a	right	is	acquired	through	treaties	…	self-protection	and	self-																																																								300	Bataille,	The	Accursed	Share,	vol.	1	pp.	93-110	301	Bataille,	The	Accursed	Share,	vol.	1	pg.	23	
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defense	do	not	rest	on	the	basis	of	a	treaty.”302		They’re	natural	to	life,	expressions	of	will	to	power.		Here,	I	think	one	needs	to	beware	that	defense	is	being	used	not	to	speak	of	a	psychical	action	as	above,	but	as	defending	one’s	self	from	a	real,	existential	threat.		And	Nietzsche	doesn’t	want	one	to	lose	the	capacity	or	strength	to	defend	oneself,	as,	for	example,	one	might	say	the	stereotypic	Buddhist	might,	or	the	Christian	who	‘turns	the	other	cheek’.		For	this	reason,	Nietzsche	writes,	“A	society	that	definitely	and	instinctively	gives	up	war	and	conquest	is	in	decline.”303		What	he	means	is:	a	society	no	longer	capable	of	aggression	is	in	decline.304		This	does	not,	however,	coincide	with	Havi	Carel’s	claim	that	violence	we	attribute	to	aggressiveness	itself	is	‘good’	in	some	contexts.		Rather,	it	merely	indicates	that	‘violence’	is	a	vicissitude	that	might	be	interpreted	as	good	in	some	contexts.	Laplanche	writes	that	Eros	is	not	quite	able	to	account	for	everything,	such	as	the	“destructive	and	destabilizing	aspects	of	sexuality	in	itself.”305		This	might	be	true	to	a	point,	in	that	the	life/sex	drives	are	in	the	service	of	another	principle	(the	nirvana	principle).		But	if	Laplanche	is	correct	about	what	Eros	cannot	account	for,	surely	it	is	also	in	contradiction	with	what	Freud	writes	of	sexual	and	life	drives	as	those	destabilizing	factors	in	Beyond	whose	analogues	are	the	‘exigencies	of	life’	and	prevent	the	goal	of	‘death’.		Freud	writes,	“The	life	drives	have	so	much	more	to	do																																																									302	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§728	(my	emphasis	on	right	to	emphasize	Nietzsche’s	point)	303	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§728	304	Admittedly,	this	is	a	simplification.		There	are	scenarios	in	life	when	one	might	be	called	upon	to	defend	one’s	self,	or	aspects	of	one’s	life,	by	acting	offensively	against	a	perceived	threat.		I	don’t	wish	to	get	into	this	concern	here,	but	merely	point	out	that	aggression	can,	and	should,	be	regarded	as	an	egodystonic	vicissitude	in	at	least	most	instances.			305	Laplanche,	So-Called	Death	Drive,	pg	48	
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with	our	internal	perception	since	they	act	as	disturbers	of	the	peace	and	continually	bring	along	tensions	whose	release	is	felt	as	pleasure,	while	the	death	drives	seem	to	do	their	work	inconspicuously.”306		It	can	therefore	be	concluded	that	aggressiveness	is	never	observed	as	occurring	outside	the	operations	of	Eros	or	in	some	relation	to	the	characteristics	attributable	to	it.		The	death	drive	is	inferred	from	aggression	and	Bemächtigungstrieb,	but	that	drive	to	dominate	inescapably	bears	the	stamp	of	Eros	and	the	secondary	process	–	a	means	of	relating.		Aggression,	if	related	to	the	death	drive	at	all,	is	what	appears	in	as	an	attempt	at	mastery	that	occurs	through	the	secondary	processes	of	Eros	and	is	colored,	or	covered	over,	by	it.		There	is	no	‘innate	aggression’,	but	only	a	primary	process	of	discharge	that,	in	Eros,	becomes	a	drive	for	mastery,	a	will	to	power,	that	can	
manifest	as	aggression,	a	drive	to	dominate,	or	a	will	to	have	power	over.		And	according	to	Nietzsche,	it	is	important	not	to	lose	that	capacity,	whilst	nonetheless	learning	to	live	along	other	modes	of	mastery.		
Sublimation:	A	Single	Egosyntonic	Vicissitude	
Freud	writes	in	his	letters	to	Fleiss	in	the	1890s	that	phantasies	are	involved	in	sublimation.307		And	he	further	describes	phantasies	as	“protective	structures	[Schutzbauten],	sublimations	of	the	facts,	embellishments	of	them,	and	at	the	same	time	[they]	serve	for	self-exonerations.”308		Hans	Loewald	observes	that	Freud	also	
																																																								306	Freud,	Beyond,	pg.	99	307	Freud,	Draft	L	[1897],	pg.	248	quoted	by	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	1	308	Freud,	Letter	61	[1897],	pg.	247	quoted	by	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	1	
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“speaks	of	phantasies	as	Schutzdichtungenen,	protective	fictions.”309		This	description	of	sublimation	in	relation	to	phantasying	can	be	seen	as	a	description	of	the	formation	of	schizoid	fantasies.		The	notion	of	the	construction	of	phantasies	through	a	vicissitude	of	sublimation	would	suggest	that	schizoid	phantasies	are	also	attributable	to	sublimation,	which	would	make	such	neurotic	substitute	formations	contingent	on	the	capacity	to	sublimate	into	a	compensatory	satisfaction,	a	‘refuge’.		However,	phantasying	is	also	a	basic	act	of	the	imagination.		To	this	extent,	it	can	also	be	regarded	as	involving	‘illusions’	that	need	not	be	thought	of	as	neurotic	or	even	psychotic	(although	they	may	very	well	be).			However,	as	I	hope	to	show	below,	Freud	mostly	abandons	this	view	of	sublimation	broadly,	and	distinguishes	it	from	other	operations	that	involve	repressions,	such	as	reaction-formations.	Near	the	end	of	his	life	in	Analysis	Terminable	and	Interminable,	Freud	returns	to	the	‘neglected	concept	of	quantity’.		Jonathan	Lear	observes,	“repression	is	one	of	the	mind’s	most	primitive	and	pervasive	defenses	against	the	unwanted	and	the	intolerable,	but,	Freud	now	says,	it	is	of	limited	value	as	a	defense	against	quantity.”310		This	was	always	the	case	in	Freud’s	theory,	though;	contrary	to	Lear,	this	is	nothing	new.		The	existence	of	neuroses	was	always	explained	in	terms	of	quantity,	in	that	a	quota	of	energy	will	always	demand	expression/expenditure,	and	the	repression	of	a	drive	can	only	quite	ephemerally	avoid	the	expression	of	libido	that	would	quickly	find	expression	in	a	symptom	or	compromise	formation.		Repressions	“cannot	hold	out	against	an	increase	in	the	strength	of	the	[drives],”	writes	Freud,	but	“Analysis	…	enables	the	ego,	which	has	attained	greater	maturity																																																									309	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	2	310	Lear,	Happiness	Death,	pg.	108	
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and	strength,	to	undertake	a	revision	of	these	old	repressions.”311		The	revision	occurs	by	finding	or	creating	new	techniques	of	managing	the	quantitative	factor,	ideally	without	repressions.		Freud	thus	writes	that	what	needs	to	occur	in	analysis	is	the	replacement	of	“repressions	that	are	insecure	by	reliable	ego-syntonic	controls.”312		Freud	continues,	“…	it	is	always	a	question	of	the	quantitative	factor,	
which	is	so	easily	overlooked.”313		And	concerning	the	task	of	analysis,	Freud	writes,	“The	real	achievement	of	analytic	therapy	would	be	the	subsequent	correction	of	the	original	process	of	repression,	a	correction	which	puts	an	end	to	the	dominance	of	the	quantitative	factor.”314		What	kind	of	correction	would	Freud	have	in	mind	if	not	sublimation?			Freud	claims,	“Not	every	neurotic	has	a	high	talent	for	sublimation.”315		Freud	frequently	echoes	this	throughout	his	works,	including	in	Leonardo.		This	observation,	if	true,	makes	the	analytic	situation	quite	dangerous.		In	analysis,	the	analyst	is	engaged	in	a	transference	with	the	analysand	with	the	aim	of	undoing	repressions	that	are	responsible	for	the	manifestations	of	neuroses.316		If	some	analysands	don’t	possess	much	of	a	capacity	for	sublimation,	then	how	can	undoing	repressions	benefit	the	patient?		Freud	further	observes,	“Many	people	fall	ill	precisely	from	an	attempt	to	sublimate	their	instincts	beyond	the	degree	permitted	by	their	organization	and	that	in	those	who	have	a	capacity	for	sublimation	the																																																									311	Freud,	Analysis	Terminable	and	Interminable,	pg.	227	312	Freud,	Analysis	Terminable	and	Interminable,	pg.	226	313	Freud,	Analysis	Terminable	and	Interminable,	pp.	229-230	314	Freud,	Analysis	Terminable	and	Interminable,	pg.	227	315	Freud,	Recommendations,	pg.	118	316	I’d	like	to	add,	although	Freud	felt	conflicted	about	treated	patients	with	psychoses,	that	the	analyst	also	facilitates	the	‘undoing’	of	disavowals	–	facilitates	
disillusionment,	as	it	were.	
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process	usually	takes	place	of	itself	as	soon	as	their	inhibitions	have	been	overcome	by	analysis.”317			Loewald	observes	that	in	this	situation	the	analyst	is	in	a	position	to	help	the	‘weak’	analysand	by	indicating	“new	aims	for	the	instinctual	trends	present	in	his	patient.”318		In	other	words,	psychoanalysis	would	then	be	‘educative’	or	‘informative’,	in	a	sense	‘directive’	in	giving	direction	to	patients	with	less	of	a	capacity	for	sublimation.		This	is	what	Loewald	terms	‘pseudo	sublimation’.319			He	observes	that	the	analyst	is,	in	practice,	something	like	a	‘civilizing	agent’,	assisting	the	analysand	in	becoming	more	‘normally’	oriented	in	life,	in	civilization.		As	such,		“in	the	best	sense	of	the	word	civilizing,	when	forcefully	directing	the	patient	to	higher	aims	he	undoes	his	own	work	and	contributes	to	further	misery	and	‘discontent’	instead	of	promoting	the	patient’s	own	development.”320	For	this	reason,	Freud	claims,	“As	a	doctor,	one	must	be	tolerant	to	the	weakness	of	a	patient.”321	And	a	patient	should	not	be	forced,	as	it	were,	into	pursuing	higher	aims	of	which	(s)he	is	not	capable.		Freud	later	claims	in	Analysis	Terminable	and	
Interminable	that	sometimes	the	analyst	needs	to	stop	the	treatment	not	at	a	cure,	but	when	things	are	‘good	enough’.322			Traditionally,	sublimation	has	been	regarded	as	a	defense	mechanism,	albeit	a	‘successful	defense’.		However,	Loewald	claims,	“Sublimation	cannot	be	subsumed	
																																																								317	Freud,	Analysis	Terminable,	pg.		318	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	39	319	It	appears	to	me	as	though	‘pseudo-sublimation’	is	actually	something	like	a	reaction-formation,	whereby	the	analyst	is	able	to	give	to	an	analysand	a	‘formation’	that	can	be	used	to	more	successfully	‘neutralize’	the	libido.	320	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	39	321	Freud,	Recommendations,	pg.	119	322	Freud,	Analysis	Terminable,	pg.	
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under	the	general	heading	of	defense.”323		There	are	significant	differences	that	Loewald	observes	between	sublimation	and	other	‘defenses’.		Sublimation	is	to	be	distinguished	from	vicissitudes	that	involve	repression.		Loewald	writes:	In	contrast	to	what	is	the	case	in	repression,	in	sublimation	instinctual	impulses	are	said	not	to	be	averted,	but	to	be	diverted	from	their	aim	of	satisfaction	in	immediate	discharge.		Their	corresponding	percepts,	memories,	and	fantasies	are	not	repressed	(as	occurs	in	countercathexis)	but	instead	…	are	made	more	acceptable	by	some	disguise	or	embellishment.324		Generally,	the	term	‘defense’,	concerning	psychical	processes,	is	used	to	denote	an	operation	whereby	a	subject	impairs	or	prevents	the	recognition	of	threatening	stimuli	or	content.		Loewald	writes	that,	loosely,	it	“comprises	everything	that	in	some	way	does	not	conform	to	what	is	postulated	as	the	inherent	pressure	for	discharge	of	an	instinctual	current.”325		In	other	words,	‘defense’	is	generally	synonymous	with	the	secondary	process	whereby	the	direct	discharge	of	energy	–	the	primary	process	–	is	inhibited	or	prevented.		“On	the	other	hand,”	Loewald	continues,	“the	more	narrow	reference	of	the	term	defense	is	to	only	those	processes	…	that	dam	up,	block,	or	run	against	the	instinctual	stream	and	that	take	the	form	of	‘countercathexes’	erected	or	maintained	by	the	ego.”326		Loewald,	however,	is	over-looking	the	other	important	vicissitude	of	disavowal	(which	is	a	nearly	unmediated	expression).		As	mentioned	already,	disavowal	does	not	inhibit	or	dam	up	the	‘instinctual’	flow,	but	instead	allows	it	at	the	expense	of	external	reality.		Loewald																																																									323	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	36	324	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	37	325	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	4	326	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	4	
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only	makes	a	distinction	between	“processes	that	dam	up,	countercathect	instinctual	life	and	processes	that	channel	and	organize	it.”327		“Sublimation,”	emphasizes	Loewald,	“is	not	a	form	of	defense	–	not	even	of	‘successful’	defense	–	against	instinctual	life,	the	id,	desire,	passion,	the	unconscious;	instead	sublimation	belongs	in	the	area	of	ego	development	and	of	internalization	as	distinguished	from	defense.”328		One	of	the	troubles	with	reading	Freud	is	he	never	truly	saw	the	possibility,	although	he	flirted	with	it,	of	an	aim	being	inhibited	
without	the	use	of	repression.	However,	Freud	also	makes	a	distinction	between	repression	and	sublimation.		Freud	writes:	…	Owing	to	their	repression,	neurotics	have	sacrificed	many	sources	of	mental	energy	whose	contribution	would	have	been	of	great	value	in	the	formation	of	their	character	and	in	their	activity	in	life.		We	know	a	far	more	expedient	process	of	development,	called	‘sublimation’,	in	which	the	energy	of	the	infantile	wishful	impulses	is	not	cut	off	but	remains	ready	for	use	…	Premature	repression	makes	the	sublimation	of	the	repressed	[drive]	impossible;	when	the	repression	is	lifted,	the	path	to	sublimation	becomes	free	once	more.329		Freud	thus	articulates	a	general	antagonism	between	repression	and	sublimation	whereas	the	act	of	repression	impairs	or	entirely	prevents	the	possibility	of	sublimation.		I’d	like	to	emphasize	a	few	other	points	here.		The	first,	Freud	is	cautious	in	describing	sublimation	as	a	desexualization;	he	writes	that	‘perhaps’	the	aim	is	no	longer	sexual.		I	think	this	caution	is	warranted	in	two	respects:	it	is	
																																																								327	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	5	328	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	33	329	Freud,	Introductory	Lectures,	pp.	53-54	
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contingent	on	what	one	means	by	‘sexual’;	does	it	denote	direct,	narrow	sexual	interaction	as	in	copulation?		Or	does	it	denote	the	drive	itself	as	a	drive	for	a	sexual	aim?		In	other	words,	does	‘sexual’	pertain	to	the	direct	aim	of	the	drive,	or	does	it	pertain	to	the	characterization	of	the	drive	as	sexual?		The	second	point	I’d	like	to	make	I	think	provides	the	answer.		 Freud	writes	of	the	exchange	of	one	aim	–	one	that	is	sexual	–	for	an	aim	that	is	‘higher’.330		Thus,	it	would	appear	that	the	‘desexualization’	involved	in	sublimation	refers	to	the	narrow,	properly	sexual	activity	where	the	aim	is,	strictly	speaking,	copulation,	or	the	object	is	the	one	through	whom	that	aim	is	sought,	or	by	whom	one’s	drive	was	aroused.		Therefore,	there	are	no	sufficient	grounds	for	claiming	that	in	sublimation	the	drive	itself	finds	an	expression	that	is	nonsexual,	but	rather	the	drive	itself	finds	an	aim	in	which	it	can	express	itself	but	an	aim	that	is	not	narrowly	sexual.		Freud	also	writes,	“The	most	important	vicissitude	which	a	[drive]	can	undergo	seems	to	be	sublimation;	here	both	object	and	aim	are	changed,	so	that	what	was	originally	a	sexual	[drive]	finds	satisfaction	in	some	achievement																																																									330	The	designation	of	the	new	aim	as	‘higher’	is	problematic.		It	again	raises	the	question	of	moral	and	cultural	prejudice	in	discussions	of	sublimation,	where	what	which	is	merely	culturally	‘appropriate’	or	‘valued’	is	regarded	as	‘higher’	than	that	which	is	generally	condemned,	e.g.,	sexuality	and	one’s	basic,	natural	drives.		Loewald	also	observes,	“When	specific	higher	cultural	values	are	emphasized,	sublimation	begins	to	be	seen	as	a	talent	or	an	‘art’	possessed	only	by	a	fortunate	minority”	(Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	39)	Part	of	the	problem	is	in	the	prejudices,	or	cultural	valuations,	attributed	to	such	activities,	such	that	we	judge	a	particular	vicissitude	as	‘good’	merely	because	we,	even	for	egodystonic	reasons,	might	find	it	valuable.		This	is	the	case	when	Nietzsche	writes	that	slave	spirits	generally	value	things	on	the	basis	of	‘utility’.		What	I	aim	to	say	is:	it	is	a	mistake	to	describe	a	vicissitude	as	‘sublimation’	only	in	virtue	of	the	valuation	of	the	result.		If	civilization	is	largely	egodystonic,	for	example,	then	the	things	it	finds	valuable	are	what	coheres	with	that	egodystonic	constitution,	and	are	thus	likely	products	of	egodystonic	vicissitudes	as	well.	
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which	is	no	longer	sexual	but	has	a	higher	social	or	ethical	valuation.”		Involved	in	sublimation	is	not	only	the	change	of	aim	but	also	the	change	of	object.		I	think	to	understand	Freud	correctly	here,	the	change	of	aim	doesn’t	have	so	much	to	do	with	the	character	of	the	drive,	but	rather	the	activity	by	which	the	drive	might	find	satisfaction.		For	example,	satisfaction	of	a	sex	drive	might	be	attained	in	art	rather	than	the	literal	copulative	act	with	another	being,	and	so	the	object	necessarily	changes	as	well,	taking	as	the	medium	for	the	art	materials	instead	of	another	human	being.		But	despite	the	change	in	aim	and	object,	the	character	of	the	drive	–	a	sex	drive	–	remains	the	same.		It	infuses	a	non-sexual	activity	–	such	as	art	–	with	sexuality.331	In	becoming	‘desexualized’,	it	infuses	what	is	externally	non-sexual	with	sexuality	and	eroticism.			 Loewald	observes,	“Again	unlike	repression,	[sublimation]	is	described	not	as	anti-instinctual	but	as	utilizing	…	instinctual	forces	for	particular	acceptable	or	highly	valued	purposes	through	channeling	and	modulating	them.		Repression,”	on	the	other	hand,	“prevents	sublimation,”	but	“the	removal	of	repression	facilitates	it.”332		Said	differently,	Loewald	writes,	“Repression	means	exclusion	of	instinctual	currents	from	the	coherent	ego,	and	thus	a	restriction	or	impoverishment	of	the	ego;	in	sublimation	these	currents	are	encompassed	within	the	ego-organization	by	way	of	channeling,	organizing	processes.”333		Sublimation,	it	appears,	entails	the	infusion	
of	sexuality	(qua	sex	drive)	into	an	activity,	repression	the	repudiation	of	it.																																																									331	Key	to	my	reading	of	Freud	is	discerning	what	he	means	as	‘sexual’	–	at	times	it	can	be	taken	broadly;	here,	I	interpret	it	narrowly	as	concerning	literal	sexual	intercourse.	332	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	38	333	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	38	
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Loewald	writes,	“Aim	inhibition	is	a	central	feature	in	the	classical	theory	of	sublimation.”	And	when	Freud	refers	to	“tender-affectionate,	‘aim-inhibited’	currents,”	these	are	“subsumed	under	sublimation.”334		In	the	postscript	to	Group	
Psychology,	Freud	writes	that	the	“affectionate	emotional	ties,”	despite	appearing	nonsexual,	“are	derived	from	impulsions	which	have	a	sexual	aim.”335		He	continues:		We	are	justified	in	saying	that	they	have	been	diverted	from	these	sexual	aims,	even	though	there	is	some	difficulty	in	giving	a	description	of	such	a	diversion	of	aim	…	Moreover,	those	[drives]	which	are	inhibited	in	their	aims	always	preserve	some	few	of	their	original	sexual	aims;	even	an	affectionate	devotee,	even	a	friend	or	an	admirer,	desires	the	physical	proximity	and	the	sight	of	the	person	who	is	not	loved	only	in	the	‘Pauline’	sense.336		In	other	words,	the	original	sexual	aim	has	been	given	up	in	such	relations,	and	yet	something	of	it	nonetheless	persists	and	is	manifest	in	the	affection	for	a	friend,	for	example.		Furthermore,	Freud	continues,	“We	may	recognize	in	this	diversion	of	aim	a	beginning	of	the	sublimation	of	the	sexual	instincts,	or	on	the	other	hand	we	may	fix	the	limits	of	sublimation	at	some	more	distant	point.”337	Freud	thus	recognizes	in	sublimation	what	was	already	described	in	Plato’s	Symposium,	whereby	original,	erotic	love	increasingly	is	transformed	into	‘higher’	states,	but	where	the	original,	sexual	drive	–	the	erotic	–	is	still	preserved	and	fills	each	level	with	passion.		However,	this	movement	in	the	Symposium	does	not	involve	inhibition,	but	rather	a	
																																																								334	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	25	335	Freud,	Group	Psychology,	pg.	138	336	Freud,	Group	Psychology,	pg.	138	337	Freud,	Group	Psychology,	pg.	139	
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kind	of	seduction	into	other	channels,	a	seduction	that	is	close	to	a	kind	of	‘enlightening’	realization.				 Anna	Freud	sees	sublimation	as	integral	to	the	development	of	children.		For	her,	sublimation	is	a	natural	process	that	takes	place	unconsciously	in	childhood.		She	writes,	“Sublimation	takes	place	in	early	childhood.		It	is	an	involuntary	process	that	cannot	be	brought	about	intentionally,	and	is	not	accompanied	by	conscious	awareness.		The	child	cannot	be	forced	to	sublimate	his	[drives].”338		Her	assertion	that	it	takes	place	unconsciously	does	not	preclude	sublimation	from	being	susceptible	to	conscious	influence	or	direction,	especially	in	adulthood.		But	she	claims	sublimation	is	more	difficult	to	turn	to	as	adults	if	it	is	not	developed	as	a	vicissitude	in	childhood.		She	writes,	“Where	the	ability	to	sublimate	has	developed	in	early	childhood,	the	[drive]	wishes	become	less	inexorable	in	their	claims,	more	ready	to	accept	substitutive	gratifications	and	therefore	more	adaptable	to	the	circumstances	of	life.”339	It	is	also	nonetheless	significant	that	it	is	recognized	as	a	vicissitude	that	is,	or	can	be,	unconscious,	particularly	in	childhood,	and	generally	natural.		This	is	also	interesting	because	it	points	out	that	forcing	a	displacement	or	substitutive	satisfaction	is	actually	antagonistic	to	sublimation.		Such	force	might	be	seen	as	an	instigating	factor	in	the	use	of	reaction-formation	or	repression	instead	of	sublimation.		I	suggest	such	‘force’	should	be	regarded	broadly	to	involve	manners	of	coercion	as	well	as	punishment,	etc.		However,	she	also	observes,	“While	…	unduly	severe	and	restrictive	upbringing	may	prepare	the	way	for	all	sorts	of	neurotic	disturbances,	excessive	freedom	…	predisposes	the	child	to	social																																																									338	Freud,	Anna,	“Sublimation,”	pg.	28	I	have	substituted	‘drives’	for	‘instincts’	339	Freud,	Anna,	“Sublimation,”	pg.	29	I’ve	substituted	‘drive’	for	‘instinctual’	
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maladjustments.”340		In	other	words,	Anna	Freud	does	see	a	need	to	nonetheless	encourage	adjustment	to	societal	standards,	supposing	that	such	encouragement	would	then	lead	a	child	naturally	towards	possible	sublimations	of	drives	rather	than	repressions.		I	think	the	view,	theoretically	more	so	than	practically,	is	dangerous,	for	a	child	could	be	encouraged	in	a	number	of	directions	that,	ultimately,	might	require	egodystonic	vicissitudes.341			To	recapitulate	so	far,	the	neurotic	defenses	are	those	that	combat	the	drives;	the	psychotic	defenses	are	those	that	combat	the	external	world	(or,	at	least,	the	‘perceptions’	of	it).		Sublimation	is	a	vicissitude	that,	unlike	psychotic	vicissitudes	but	like	neurotic	vicissitudes,	moderates	the	expression	of	drives.		But	for	Loewald,	repression	should	be	contrasted	with	sublimation	because	sublimation	does	not	involve	repression.		“The	fundamental	aim,”	he	writes,	“is	not	given	up	or	blocked,”	but	instead	takes	detours.342		Sublimation	cannot	entail	the	non-sexual	expression	of	a	sexual	drive,	but	is	instead	involves	the	infusion	of	sexuality	by	sex	drive	in	the	non-sexual,	merely	divert	from	its	aim.		
…	vs.	Internalization	
	 Ken	Gemes	aptly	observes	that	Loewald’s	use	of	the	term	“internalization,”	especially	in	reference	to	Nietzsche’s	Genealogy	“as	a	precursor	for	his	own	notion	of	
																																																								340	Freud,	Anna,	“Sublimation,”	pg.	27	341	This	point	will	become	more	clear	in	the	section	on	The	Link.		The	vicissitudes	I	am	thinking	of	are	those	religious	delusions	and	schizoid	fantasies	that	impair	egosyntonic	relating.	342	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	42	
	 139	
internalization,”343	does	seem	to	point	to	repression,	as	such	was	implied	in	the	
Genealogy.		However,	as	I’ve	demonstrated,	Loewald	also	speaks	of	sublimation	as	distinct	from,	and	not	inclusive	of,	repression.		For	Loewald,	repression	is	actually	
antagonistic	to	the	vicissitude	of	sublimation.		So	how	can	Loewald	then	identify	sublimation	with	a	process	of	internalization?		Is	it	clumsiness	or	a	contradiction?		Or	are	there	instances	of	internalization	that	are	repressive	and	instances	that	aren’t?		To	illustrate	the	breadth	of	Loewald’s	term	‘internalization’,	I	will	merely	quote	him	on	the	various	psychical	processes	that	it	involves.		In	a	paper	titled	“Internalization,	Separation,	Mourning,	and	the	Superego,”	he	writes:	I	use	the	term	‘internalization’	here	as	a	general	term	for	certain	processes	of	transformation	by	which	relationships	and	interactions	between	the	individual	psychic	apparatus	and	its	environment	are	changed	into	inner	relationships	and	interactions	within	the	psychic	apparatus.	Thus	an	inner	world	is	constituted	and	it	in	turn	entertains	relationships	and	interactions	with	the	outer	world.	The	term	‘internalization’	therefore	covers	such	‘mechanisms’	as	incorporation,	introjection,	and	identification,	or	those	referred	to	by	the	terms	‘internal	object’	and	‘internalized	object’,	as	well	as	such	‘vicissitudes	of	instincts’	as	the	‘turning	inward’	of	libidinal	and	aggressive	drives.344		I	quoted	this	at	length	to	address	several	aspects.		The	first	I	would	like	to	briefly	
																																																								343	Gemes,	“Sublimation…,”	pg.	53	344	Loewald,	“internalization,”	pg.	1119	
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mention	is	the	affinity	that	this	has	with	Pichon-Rivière’s	concept	of	the	‘link’,345	whereas	it	involves	the	same	processes	as	‘the	link’	in	interpersonal	relations	and	the	reciprocal	influence	of	inner	and	outer	realities.346		 Furthermore,	he	does	discuss	‘internalization’	as	involving	repression,	as	the	‘turning	inward’	of	libidinal	and	aggressive	drives,	in	which	case	aggression	will	be	acting	on	the	ego	in	instances	of	moral	masochism,347	or	the	ego	will	take	itself	as	love-object	as	in	secondary	narcissism	or	secondary	masochism.		He	also	mentions	‘introjection’	which	is	a	term	used	to	denote	a	‘psychoneurosis’	of	melancholia	whereas	the	loss	of	a	love-object	is	loosely	disavowed,	the	object	is	‘introjected’,	set	up	inside	the	ego.		So	these	aspects	of	‘internalization’	are	certainly	egodystonic.	Loewald	also	suggests	that	the	superego	is	a	product	of	what	he	calls	‘Internalization’.348		But	the	superego,	as	described	by	Freud,	is	the	result	of	
reaction-formation,	whereby	certain	identifications	with	external	objects,	such	as	the	father,	are	internalized	and	construct	the	ego	ideal	or	superego,	the	‘social	conscience’,	as	it	were;	reaction-formation,	Freud	writes,	is	the	source	of	the	social	conscience	–	our	moral	sentiment	and	all	our	feelings	of	disgust,	shame,	and	various	valuations.		However,	‘internalization’	also	involves	terms	like	‘incorporation’,	which	does	not	imply	repression	or	disavowal,	but	instead,	a	relatedness	with	things,	and	of	making	a	place	for	things	in	one’s	psychical	life.		By	‘internalization’,	it	appears	Loewald	is	trying	to	include	too	many	conflicting	operations.		Thus,	while	Loewald	discusses	sublimation	as	‘internalization’,	Gemes	correctly	identifies	egodystonic																																																									345	See	below	on	the	section	concerning	the	Link	346	See	below	on	‘The	Link’	for	more	on	this.	347	See	below	in	ethics	on	moral	masochism	and	Kant’s	deontology	348	Loewald,	“internalization,”	pg.	1113	
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vicissitudes	at	play	in	‘internalization’	that	are	antagonistic	to	Loewald’s	conception	of	sublimation.			
…	vs.	Reaction-Formation	
Reaction	Formation	is,	in	my	opinion,	the	trickiest	and	most	convoluted	of	all	the	vicissitudes	to	which	Freud	refers	in	his	corpus.		In	the	Three	Essays	it	is	what	is	responsible	for	all	our	feelings	of	disgust,	shame,	guilt,	and	correspondingly	our	aesthetic	and	moral	valuations.		Around	the	time	of	Freud’s	On	Narcissism,	it	is	regarded	as	the	vicissitude	of	a	‘reversal	into	the	opposite’,	such	as	in	the	instance	of	
pity,	which	is	also	seen	to	“converge	or	coincide”	with	the	vicissitude	he	terms	“turning	around	upon	the	subject’s	own	self.”349		And	in	The	Ego	and	the	Id,	reaction-formation	is	regarded	as	what	is	responsible	for	the	very	formation	of	the	superego,	the	‘social	conscience’,	and	in	the	following	work	is	thus	implied	as	what	is	behind	the	‘categorical	imperative’	of	duty	in	Kant’s	ethics	specifically,	which	he	claims	is	the	result	of	a	particularly	vehement	superego.				 On	face	value,	it’s	easy	to	see	how	these	various	descriptions	are	connected.		Throughout,	everything	moral,	everything	altruistic,	and	everything	masochistic	(and	in	a	sense,	sadistic	too	in	the	second	formulation)	is	attributed,	somehow,	to	reaction	formation.		However,	looking	more	closely	at	these	instances,	it	appears	to	be	very	confused,	or	at	least	confusing	and	unclear,	conceptually.			
																																																								349	This	is	the	most	significant	complication	in	the	matter.		I	will	not	deal	with	it	here	for	the	sake	of	space,	but	according	to	my	interpretation,	reaction-formation	is	generally	attributed	to	these	vicissitudes.		I	alluded	to	this	above	in	the	section	of	psychical	conflict.	
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I	will	begin	explaining	this	mechanism	by	reference	to	‘disgust’	in	the	Three	
Essays.		There,	Freud	writes,	“Disgust	seems	to	be	one	of	the	forces	which	have	led	to	a	restriction	of	the	sexual	instincts.”350		Then,	after	discussing	the	various	‘perversions	of	sexual	life’,	Freud	writes	that	the	study	shows	us	“The	sexual	instinct	has	to	struggle	against	certain	mental	forces	which	act	as	resistances,	and	of	which	shame	and	disgust	are	the	most	prominent.”351		Then,	when	writing	about	sexuality	in	childhood,	Freud	observes:	It	is	during	this	period	of	total	or	only	partial	latency	that	are	built	up	the	mental	forces	which	are	later	to	impede	the	course	of	the	sexual	instinct	and,	like	dams,	restrict	its	flow	–	disgust,	feelings	of	shame	and	claims	of	aesthetic	and	moral	ideals.		One	gets	the	impression	from	civilized	children	that	the	construction	of	these	dams	is	a	product	of	education,	and	no	doubt	education	has	much	to	do	with	it.		But	in	reality	…	it	can	occasionally	occur	without	any	help	from	education.352		This	is	just	prior	to	his	introduction	of	reaction-formation	and	sublimation.		Freud	observes	that	historians	generally	attribute	cultural	achievements	to	the	“diversion	of	sexual	instinctual	forces	from	sexual	aims	and	their	direction	to	new	ones	–	a	process	that	deserves	the	name	of	sublimation.”353	And	Freud	places	its	beginning	in	the	period	of	latency.354		But,	during	the	period	of	latency,	all	sexual	impulses	or	stimulation	of	the	erotogenous	zones	can	be	said	to	“arouse	unpleasurable	feelings.																																																										350	Freud,	Three	Essays,	pg.	152	351	Freud,	Three	Essays,	pg.	162	352	Freud,	Three	Essays,	pg.	178	353	Freud,	Three	Essays,	pg.	178		354	Freud,	Three	Essays,	pg.	178	His	daughter	Anna	Freud,	as	well	as	Hans	Loewald,	both	locate	the	vicissitude	of	sublimation	in	the	earliest	stages	of	childhood…	even	at	the	weaning	process.	
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They	consequently	evoke	opposing	mental	forces	(reacting	impulses)	which,	in	order	to	suppress	this	unpleasure	effectively,	build	up	the	mental	dams	that	I	have	already	mentioned	–	disgust,	shame,	and	morality.”355		This	is	the	vicissitude	of	reaction-formation.	The	‘mental	dams’	are	the	formations	that	facilitate	the	repressions	–	the	reactions	–	against	drives.		 So	for	Freud,	the	forces,	or	mental	dams,	that	resist	the	sexual	impulses	that	are	felt	as	unpleasure	are	actually	reaction-formations.		And	he	suggests	that	these	‘reacting	impulses’	form	and	construct	these	dams	–	these	resistances	–	that	he	refers	to	as	disgust,	from	the	beginning,	but	also	feelings	of	shame	as	well	as	
aesthetic	and	moral	ideals.		But	how	is	this	to	be	differentiated	from	sublimation,	which,	according	to	many	people,	is	also	responsible	for	the	formation	of	ideals?356		Importantly,	Freud	adds	a	footnote	in	1915,	around	the	time	that	he	was	working	on	his	Papers	on	Metapsychology,	which	both	adds	clarity	and	confusion.		In	the	footnote,	he	writes:	In	the	case	I	am	here	discussing,	the	sublimation	of	sexual	instinctual	forces	takes	place	along	the	path	of	reaction-formation.		But	in	general	it	is	possible	to	distinguish	the	concepts	of	sublimation	and	reaction-formation	from	each	other	as	two	different	processes.		Sublimation	can	also	take	place	by	other	and	simpler	mechanisms.357	
																																																								355	Freud,	Three	Essays,	pg.	178,	pg.	178	356	e.g.	Hans	Loewald	and	the	Ego	Ideal	357	Freud,	Three	Essays,	pg.	178,	fn.	2	(he	added	it	in	1915).		See,	for	example,	remarks	on	the	following	pages.		Where	reaction-formations	do	not	merely	adhere	to,	or	introject,	pre-existing	social	content,	sublimation	could	be	said	to	be	involved	in	the	formative	aspect	of	reaction-formation,	taking	place	by	more	complicated	means	by	first	requiring	the	repression	as	a	precipitating	factor.		In	such	an	instance,	sublimation	–	with	which	repression	is	antagonistic	–	would	appear	to	operate	with	
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	He	is	here	alluding	to	what	he	specifically	addresses	in	the	summary	of	the	work,	where	he	writes	of	sublimation:	…	according	to	the	completeness	or	incompleteness	of	the	sublimation,	a	characterological	analysis	of	a	highly	gifted	individual,	and	in	particular	one	with	an	artistic	disposition,	may	reveal	a	mixture,	in	every	proportion,	of	efficacy,	perversion	and	neurosis.	A	Subspecies	of	sublimation	is	to	be	found	in	
suppression	by	reaction-formation,	which,	as	we	have	seen,	begins	during	a	child’s	period	of	latency	and	continues	…	throughout	his	whole	life.		What	we	describe	as	a	person’s	‘character’	is	built	up	to	a	considerable	extent	from	the	material	of	sexual	excitations	and	is	composed	of	instincts	that	have	been	fixed	since	childhood,	of	constructions	achieved	by	means	of	sublimation,	and	of	other	constructions,	employed	for	effectively	holding	in	check	perverse	impulses	which	have	been	recognized	as	being	unutilizable.		The	multifariously	perverse	sexual	disposition	of	childhood	can	accordingly	be	regarded	as	the	source	of	a	number	of	our	virtues,	insofar	as	through	reaction-formation	it	stimulates	their	development.358		He	writes	that	a	reaction-formation	is:	1.		a	sub-species	of	sublimation;	and	2.	largely	comes	to	the	fore	in	latency;	and	3.	responsible	for	the	development	of	‘virtue’.		He	also,	however,	recognizes	sublimation	as	responsible	for	character	development.		Is	this	an	inconsistency	with	no.	3?		Then	there	is	the	‘mixture’	of	dispositions	that	are	‘efficacious,	perverse,	and	neurotic’	in	artists,	and	this	appears	to	be	largely	owing	to	‘incompleteness’	in	sublimation,	or,	as	above,	‘along	the	path	
																																																																																																																																																																					what	escapes	repression.		Reaction-formation	is,	then,	something	like	‘complex	sublimation’	and	not	sublimation	proper.	358	Freud,	Three	Essays,	pp.	237-238	(my	emphasis)	
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of	reaction-formation’.		Freud	also	writes	in	the	same	summary	that	during	the	period	of	latency	…		…	the	production	of	sexual	excitation	is	not	by	any	means	stopped	but	continues	and	produces	a	store	of	energy	which	is	employed	to	a	great	extent	for	purposes	other	than	sexual	–	namely,	on	the	one	hand	in	contributing	the	sexual	components	to	social	feelings	and	on	the	other	hand	(through	repression	and	reaction-formation)	in	building	up	the	subsequently	developed	barriers	against	sexuality.359		In	other	words,	reaction-formation	comes	to	the	fore	during	the	period	of	latency	to	construct	the	mental	dams	that	influence	which	drives	are	to	be	repressed.	Freud	writes	at	times	of	sublimation	in	broad	ways	that	indicate	not	sublimation	as	discussed	above,	but	instead	reaction-formations:	Sexual	ideas	belonging	to	the	family-complex	and	incestuous	object	choice	is	made	use	of	in	representing	the	highest	ethical	and	religious	interests	of	man	–	that	is,	they	have	illuminated	an	important	instance	of	the	sublimation	of	the	erotic	instinctual	forces	and	of	their	transformation	into	trends	which	can	no	longer	be	called	erotic.360	The	last	portion	of	the	quote,	articulated	as	a	‘transformation’	into	what	‘can	no	longer	be	called	erotic’	is	not	sublimation	but	instead	reaction-formation:	it	is	the	reversal	of	the	erotic	into	the	non-erotic	(its	opposite).		Were	it	sublimation,	the	ethical	and	religious	would	be	infused	with	eroticism	and	instead	merely	diverted	in	its	concrete	aims,	so	that	the	general	aim	of	erotic	satisfaction	is	still	accomplished	without	repression	of	the	erotic.			
																																																								359	Freud,	Three	Essays,	pg.	232	360	Freud,	On	the	History	of	the	Psychoanalytic	Movement,	pg.	61	
	 146	
When	addressing	substitute	satisfaction,	Laplanche	and	Pontalis	observe	that	the	substitute	can	be	viewed	economically	and/or	symbolically;	respectively,	a	“symptom	furnishes	the	unconscious	wish	with	a	replacement	satisfaction,”	and/or	“one	content	of	the	unconscious	is	supplanted	by	another.”361		More	to	the	point:		The	term	‘substitute	satisfaction’	should	be	seen	in	conjunction	with	‘compromise-formation’	and	‘reaction-formation’.		Every	symptom,	inasmuch	as	it	is	the	product	of	the	defensive	conflict,	is	a	compromise	formation.		In	so	far	as	it	is	principally	the	wish	which	seeks	satisfaction	by	means	of	the	symptom,	this	symptom	appears	above	all	as	a	substitute-formation;	in	reaction-formations,	by	contrast,	the	defensive	process	predominates.362		I’d	like	to	suggest,	however,	that	every	reaction-formation	is	a	compromise-	and	substitute-formation,	although	it	might	be	possible	to	conceive	of	the	latter	as	not	necessarily	entailing	the	former.		When	reaction-formations	take	place,	they	do	so	by	finding	in	reality	an	idea	the	acceptance	of	which	is	a	compromise	for	the	repudiated	drive.		Reaction-formation	can	also	form	a	substitute	with	the	aid	of	a	repression.		Certain	neurotic	symptoms,	however,	such	as	conversion	disorder,	can’t	be	strictly	regarded	as	reaction-formation,	but	nonetheless	can	be	loosely	referred	to	as	‘compromise’	formations.			Laplanche	and	Pontalis	claim	that	reaction-formations	acquire	“a	symptomatic	value	when	they	display	a	rigid,	forced	or	compulsive	aspect,”	such	as	extreme	cleanliness.		Reaction-formations	also	can	be	seen	symptomatically	when	
																																																								361	Laplanche	&	Pontalis,	The	Language	of	Psychoanalysis.	pg.	434	362	Laplanche	&	Pontalis,	The	Language	of	Psychoanalysis.	pg.	434	
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“they	lead	directly	to	the	result	opposite	to	the	one	consciously	intended,”363	as	in	the	case	of	some	priests	who	take	vows	of	celibacy	that	haphazardly	lead	them	into	committing	heinous	sexual	crimes.		This	might	also	happen	in	the	‘return	of	the	repressed’	where	that	from	which	one	seeks	escape	perpetually	presents	itself.		In	the	case	of	Leonardo,	his	intent	with	art	was	possibly	to	pursue	‘beauty’	and	a	
reaction	against	what	he	regarded	as	disgusting:	namely,	human	sexuality.		Loewald	also	observes,	“Cleanliness	and	orderliness,	for	instance,	are	traits	that	master	anal	impulses	in	the	service	of	ego	organization.”		This	is	an	example	of	reaction-
formation	and	is	to	a	large	extent	observed	in	the	process	of	“character	formation.”364		Loewald	writes	that	it	can	be	very	difficult	to	distinguish	the	two	in	a	clinical	setting,	but	that	the	two	might	be	distinguished	according	to	the	flexibility	or	inflexibility	observed.		Inflexibility,	in	my	interpretation,	generally	denotes	a	more	or	less	neurotic	constitution,	which	means,	in	other	words,	that	repression	is	involved.		Loewald	writes,	“The	flexibility	and	adaptiveness	of	such	traits	decides	to	a	large	extent	whether	we	consider	them	in	terms	of	reaction	formation	(as	we	do	if	they	are	inflexible	and	all-pervasive)	or	of	sublimation.”365	Intellectualization,	claims	Loewald,	“furnishes	a	good	example	of	the	fluctuations	between	reaction-formation	and	sublimation.”366		I	don’t	think	it	does.		He	explains	his	assertion	on	the	basis	of	its	“two	faces	of	defense	and	advance	and	expansion	in	mental	life.”367		This,	however,	draws	upon	a	misclassification	of																																																									363	Laplanche	&	Pontalis,	The	Language	of	Psychoanalysis.	pg.	376	364	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	40	365	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	40	366	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	40	367	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	40	
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sublimation	as	being	the	source	of	the	‘higher’	and	‘more	valued’	aspects	of	culture,	which	is	a	biased	interpretation	and	cannot	be	used	to	distinguish	sublimation	from	reaction	formation.		In	fact,	I	think	intellectualization	is,	as	a	defense,	only	
attributable	to	reaction	formation.		A	key	aspect	of	the	defense,	as	mentioned	above,	is	a	dissociation	or	displacement	of	the	quota	of	affect	from	content	so	that	content	can	be	dealt	with	without	emotional	significance.		All	the	‘intellectual	resources’,	including	an	overdependence	on	rationality	and	logic	and	a	repression	of	emotional,	affective	content	denotes	the	same	mastery	of	anal	impulses	observed	in	cleanliness.		This	is	not	to	say,	however,	that	intellectuality	and	rational	pursuits	are	only	reaction-formations;	such	pursuits	might	be,	or	at	least	entail	some	admixture	of,	sublimations.		But	intellectualization	is	rigid,	inflexible,	and	is	a	defense	enacted	precisely	in	opposition	to	the	accommodation	of	affective	aspects.368			Like	Freud,	Nietzsche	also	recognizes	a	process	of	reaction-formation	with	respect	to	morality	and	the	tendencies	of	the	herd.		He	writes,	“Inwardness	grows	as	powerful	drives	that	have	been	denied	outward	release	by	the	establishment	of	peace	and	society	seek	compensation	by	turning	inward	in	concert	with	the	imagination.		The	thirst	for	enmity,	cruelty,	revenge,	violence	turns	back,	is	repressed.”369		The	‘moral’	and	‘social	conscience’	is	explicitly	regarded	by	Freud	as	a	product	of	reaction-formation.		Freud	writes	that	anxiety	is	resolved	often	in	vicissitudes	that	result	in	“conversion,	reaction-formation,	or	the	construction	of	
																																																								368	I	will	comment	more	on	these	various	aspects	of	reaction-formation	in	my	discussion	of	Kant.	369	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§376	
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protections	(phobias).”370		And	more	to	the	point,	“Conscience	is	itself	a	reaction-
formation	against	the	evil	that	is	perceived	in	the	id.		The	more	strongly	the	latter	is	suppressed,	the	more	active	is	the	conscience.”371	Reaction-formation	constructs,	or	forms	as	it	were,	the	superego	from	the	introjected	or	internalized	identification.		The	formative	aspect	is	the	conscience;	the	reactive	aspect	is	the	vicissitude:	repression.		Owing	to	various	valuations	formed	in	latency,	drives	are	repressed	(the	reaction);	or	when	drives	are	repressed	because	of	angst	or	fear	or	the	unattainability	of	satisfaction,	‘ideas’	are	consequently	formed	that	reinforce	the	repressions.		Both	instances	are,	according	to	my	understanding,	examples	of	reaction-formation.		Reaction-formation	can	thus	take	place	by	two	distinct	means:	either	societal	content	is	provided	and	functions	as	the	formative	aspect	that	promotes	and	maintains	repression,	or	the	inability	to	satisfy	a	drive	promotes	repression	and	the	formative	aspect	creates	the	substitution	that	helps	maintain	it.		The	former	is	often	indicative	of	morality,	and	the	latter	indicative	of	schizoid	fantasies	in	particular.	In	Thoughts	on	War	and	Death,	Freud	writes	that	reaction-formations	are	
“facilitated	by	the	circumstance	that	some	instinctual	impulses	make	their	appearance	almost	from	the	first	in	pairs	of	opposites.”372		A	good	example	of	such	ambivalence	is	the	scenario,	depicted	by	Klein,	of	one	breast	being	perceived	as	bad	and	the	other	good.		For	Freud,	the	ambivalence	is	often	presented	as	a	love/hate	relationship	with	the	rival	father.		But	ambivalence,	it	must	be	pointed	out,	is	not	a																																																									370	Freud,	On	Narcissism,	pg.	86	371	Freud,	Dream-Interpretation,	pg.	134	(my	emphasis)	372	Freud,	Thoughts	on	War,	pg.	281	
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requirement	for	reaction-formation.		Freud	is	quite	explicit	asserting	that	reaction-formations	are	only	facilitated	by	such.		And	of	course,	arguably,	such	‘opposites’	do	not	exist	but	are	themselves,	perhaps,	created	for	their	usefulness	for	reaction-formations,	an	assertion	that	Nietzsche	himself	makes	regarding	the	notions	of	good	and	evil	and	other	such	‘opposites’.		In	the	same	paragraph,	Freud	also	notes	significantly,	“Reaction-formations	against	certain	instincts	take	the	deceptive	form	of	a	change	in	their	content,	as	though	egoism	had	changed	into	altruism,	or	cruelty	into	pity.”373	Freud	thus	describes	reaction-formation	almost	exactly	as	Nietzsche	describes	the	spiritual	transformation	and	degeneration	of	Christianity.		
The	Case	of	Leonardo	
An	important	work	of	Freud’s	that	discusses	the	vicissitude	of	sublimation	is	his	‘psycho-biography’	of	Leonardo	da	Vinci,	first	published	in	1910,	about	twenty	years	prior	to	Civilization	and	its	Discontents.		In	this	work,	Freud	attempts	to	explain,	using	Leonardo	as	an	example,	vicissitudes	of	the	sex	drive,	in	particular	the	vicissitude	of	sublimation,	which	he	claims	leads	to	socio-cultural	‘progress’;	namely,	through	art	and	science.		However,	the	application	of	the	vicissitude	of	sublimation	to	Leonardo	is	problematic,	as	I	hope	to	make	clear.		Freud	writes	in	the	New	Introductory	Lectures	that	a	“modification	of	the	aim	and	a	change	of	object,	in	which	our	social	valuation	is	taken	into	account,	is	described	by	us	as	‘sublimation’.”374		Indeed,	Freud	seems	to	describe	sublimation																																																									373	Freud,	Thoughts	on	War,	pg.	281	374	Freud,	New	Introductory	Lectures,	pg.	97,	emphasis	mine.	
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frequently	in	terms	of	a	drive	being	redirected	from	a	socially	condemned	aim	to	one	that	is	socially	valued	or	revered.		Gemes	correctly	criticizes	the	distinguishing	factor	of	social	valuation.		He	imagines	a	subject	who	would	otherwise	be	diagnosed	with	obsessive	compulsive	disorder,	due	to	behaviors	of	stepping	over	cracks	in	the	sidewalk	or	conceivably	any	other	type	of	‘ritual’,	and	presenting	such	neurotic	symptoms	as	“performance	art.”		If	this	subject	received	“social	acclaim	for	his	continual	performances,”	asks	Gemes,	would	that	“move	his	activity	from	neurotic	symptom	to	sublimation?”375		Gemes	observes	that	Laplanche	and	Pontalis	ask	a	similar	question,	“Should	the	fact	that	activities	described	as	sublimated	in	a	given	culture	are	accorded	particularly	high	social	esteem	be	taken	as	a	defining	characteristic	of	sublimation?”376		The	distinction	would	be	ultimately	meaningless,	and	determined	only	after	the	fact,	retrospectively,	so	that	sublimation	would	not	be	itself	a	vicissitude,	but	rather	a	valuation	of	behaviors	that	are	within	a	territory	of	social	reverence	and	would	ultimately	be	socio-culturally	relative.		The	problem	with	using	social	valuations	as	a	distinguishing	factor	is	that	social	valuations	tend	to	be	reaction-formations	themselves.		The	ego	ideal	or	superego	itself	is	the	product	of	a	reaction	formation.		And	in	the	Three	Essays,	Freud	writes	that	reaction-formations	“evoke	opposing	mental	forces	(reacting	impulses)	which,	in	order	to	suppress	this	unpleasure	effectively,	build	up	mental	dams,”	Freud	writes.		Examples	of	such	“mental	dams”	are:	“disgust,	shame	and	morality,”377	and	‘conscience’	as	mentioned	before,	and	thus	social	valuations.																																																										375	Gemes,	Ken.		“Freud	and	Nietzsche	on	Sublimation,”	pg.	40	376	Laplanche	&	Pontalis,	The	Language	of	Psychoanalysis,	pg.	433	377	Freud,	Three	Essays,	pg.	178	
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Rather,	I	think	we	need	to	recall	that	reaction-formation	is	described	by	Freud	as	a	‘sub	species’	of	sublimation.378		Freud	appears	to	use	‘sublimation’	as	an	umbrella	for	sublimation	proper	and	reaction-formation.		That	there	is	a	‘sublimation	proper’	is	indicated	by	the	fact	that	Freud	also	refers	to	sublimation	as	a	‘simpler’	path	than	reaction-formation.379		The	real	question	is:	in	contexts	where	reaction-formation	is	involved	in	creative	productivity,	can	reaction-formation	be	solely	responsible,	or	is	sublimation	also	involved	‘along	the	path	of	reaction-formation’?		I	can’t	see	a	way	of	distinguishing	one	from	the	other,	although	it	appears	implied	that	sublimation	can	occur	with	reaction-formation,	as	discussed	previous	concerning	schizoid	fantasies,	for	example,	but	that	reaction-formation	is	itself	capable	of	formations	without	sublimation	(as	the	‘mental	dams’,	at	least),	and	thus	possibly	art	and	science	as	well.		But	I	think	it	is	sufficient	to	merely	point	out	that	the	creation	of	things	can	be	determined	by	reaction-formations	whether	or	not	sublimation	does	play	a	part.		On	this	point,	see	the	preceding	chapter	on	reaction-formation.			Loewald,	however,	writes,	“the	productions	of	science,	art,	philosophy,	religious	thought	and	ritual	[are]	sublimations	par	excellence.”		His	inclusion	of	religion	in	toto,	as	well	as	to	varying	degrees	philosophy,	science,	and	art,	demonstrates	that	Loewald	might	be	confused	at	times	about	the	proper	etiology	of	various	cultural	products.		Certainly,	the	obsessiveness	of	Leonardo	with	art	and	then	science,	his	perfectionism,	his	rigid	external	orientation,	all	demonstrate	that	even	these	were	largely	neurotic	activities.		But	as	mentioned	previously,	“The																																																									378	This	was	specifically	addressed	in	the	section	on	reaction-formation,	referencing	a	quotation	by	Freud	in	the	Three	Essays.	379	For	more	on	this,	see	the	preceding	section	on	reaction-formation.	
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inhibited	[drives]	are	capable	of	any	degree	of	admixture	with	the	uninhibited;	they	can	be	transformed	back	into	them,	just	as	they	arose	out	of	them.”380		Thus,	in	this	sense,	one	should	not	conceive	of	any	vicissitudes	as	having	a	monopoly	on	drive	expression;	rather,	one	can	simultaneously	express	drives	through	sublimation,	whilst	nonetheless	also	employing	neurotic	or	psychotic	defenses.		Religions	might	make	use	of	the	vicissitude	of	sublimation,	for	example,	whilst	it	ultimately	depends	for	its	existence	–	its	birth	and	perpetuation	–	on	egodystonic	vicissitudes,	both	neurotic	and	psychotic,	schizoid	fantasies	and	delusions.		Correspondingly,	one	can	say	that	metaphysics	is	egodystonically	oriented	towards	the	ascetic	ideal	of	truth.		Art	and	science,	indicated	by	Leonardo	da	Vinci,	might	also	make	use	of	reaction-formations	or	other	egodystonic	vicissitudes,	admittedly	perhaps	mixed	with	sublimations.	Leonardo	da	Vinci	has	generally	been	regarded	as	Freud’s	exemplar	of	sublimation.		However,	Ken	Gemes	notices	that	Freud’s	work	on	Leonardo	illustrates	a	confusion	between	sublimations	and	that	of	neurotic	symptoms.		He	writes,	“After	holding	up	Leonardo	as	a	model	of	sublimation	throughout	the	essay,	…	Freud	…	concludes	that	we	must	place	Leonardo	close	to	the	obsessional	neurotic.”381		Gemes	then	observes	that,	in	the	case	of	Leonardo	presented	by	Freud,	“The	distance	between	sublimation	and	neurotic	symptoms	seems	vanishingly	small	…	both	of	which	count	as	substitute	formations.”382		In	the	case	of	Leonardo,	Freud	seems	to	attribute	to	sublimation	the	same	etiology	of	his	neuroses:	repression	of																																																									380	Freud,	Group	Pscyhology,	pg.	139	381	Gemes,	“Sublimation,”	pg.	40	382	Gemes,	“Sublimation,”	pg.	40	
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sexual	aims.		In	addition,	the	creative	and	scientific	endeavors	are	presented	as	a	‘return	of	the	repressed’,	also	discussed	in	Freud’s	work	The	Uncanny	addressed	below.383		Gemes	points	out	that	this	is	used	to	describe	neurotic	substitute	formations	in	Freud’s	essay	‘Repression’.384		There,	Freud	writes,	for	example,	“The	mechanism	of	repression	becomes	accessible	to	us	only	by	our	deducing,”	–	I’d	like	to	add	retroductively,	for	precision	–	“that	mechanism	from	the	outcome	of	the	repression.”385		In	other	words,	it	is	retroductively	inferred	from	the	symptom,	compromise,	or	substitute.		The	repressed	ideational	content	“creates	a	substitute	
formation,”	and	repression	also	“leaves	symptoms	behind	it.”386		Both	the	substitutes	and	the	symptoms	are	“indications	of	a	return	of	the	repressed,	and	owe	their	existence	to	quite	other	processes.”387		These	other	processes	might	be	‘conversion’,	‘reaction-formation’,	or	‘hysteria’,	for	example.		The	return	of	the	repressed,	das	
Unheimlich,	makes	its	presence	felt	to	Leonardo	as	he	attempts	to	return	to	art	after	his	sojourns	into	science	and	engineering.			In	an	early	childhood	memory,	Leonardo	recounts	a	story	of	a	kite	–	a	medium	sized	bird	–	(which	was	mistranslated	into	a	vulture,	a	mistranslation	Freud	clumsily	glossed	over	despite	being	fluent	in	Italian).		The	kite	landed	beside	him	and	swished	its	tail	back	and	forth	inside	little	Leonardo’s	mouth.		Leonardo	recounts	that	this	memory	was	why	he	had	always	taken	a	great	interest	in	birds	
																																																								383	See	the	section	on	the	unheimlich	aesthetic	of	psychoanalysis	384	Freud,	Repression,	pg.	154.		Referenced	by	Ken	Gemes,	“Freud	and	Nietzsche	on		Sublimation,”	pg.	39	385	Freud,	Repression,	pg.	154.			386	Freud,	Repression,	pg.	154	387	Freud,	Repression,	pg.	154	
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and	in	flight.		Freud	identifies	the	kite	as	a	substitution	for	the	mother,388	reminiscent	of	suckling,	the	first	sources	of	sensual	pleasure	in	life.389		And	yet	this	is	also	a	homosexual	phantasy	that	was	being	transposed	onto	a	memory	–	more	of	a	constructed	fantasy	than	a	memory	–	from	his	childhood.		The	‘memory’	is	thus	a	perfect	example	of	Nachträglichkeit	–	afterwardsness	–	an	important	concept	in	Freudian	theory	that	Freud	peculiarly	does	not	mention	in	his	psychobiography	of	Leonardo	whilst	nonetheless	describing	the	operation	as	a	part	of	Leonardo’s	psychical	development.			When	Leonardo’s	mother	died,	he	unemotionally	jotted	down	in	his	diary	an	account	of	the	funeral	expenses.		Freud	observes	that	these	are	neurotic	symptoms,	the	lack	of	emotion	for	his	mother,	for	whom	he	loved	dearly	and	with	whom	he	closely	identified,	and	the	sole	mention	he	provides	of	her	is	with	“trifling	notes”390	of	the	expenses	for	the	funeral.		She	is	merely	implied.		Freud	claims	that	Leonardo’s	passionate	and	erotic	feelings	for	his	mother	had	“become	unconscious,”	and	were	subsequently	“displaced.”		The	“unintelligible”	entry	in	his	diary	had	“emerged	as	a	
compromise	from	this	neurotic	conflict.”391	Freud	thus	explains	some	of	the	symptoms	of	Leonardo	as	compromise-formations.	It	appears	that	something	like	
intellectualization	has	here	occurred,	which,	as	addressed	above,	is	peculiar	to	reaction-formation,	the	displacement	or	dissociation	of	affect	from	content.			A	further	neurotic	symptom	that	Freud	discusses	regarding	Leonardo	is	how	much	time	he	took	to	complete	anything.		“The	slowness	with	which	Leonardo																																																									388	Freud,	Leonardo,	pg.	88	389	Freud,	Leonardo,	pg.	87	390	Freud,	Leonardo,	pg.	104	391	Freud,	Leonardo,	pg.	105,	emphasis	mine.	
	 156	
worked	was	proverbial,”392	writes	Freud.		And	in	fact,	Leonardo	often	left	things	unfinished.		He	exemplified	a	kind	of	frustrating	perfectionism	in	relation	to	his	work.		Many	art	critics	see	completion	in	Leonardo’s	works,	but	“it	is	not	so	much	a	question	of	their	being	unfinished	as	of	his	declaring	them	to	be	so.”393			In	Leonardo,	Freud	thus	recognizes	the	symptoms	of	perfectionism	and	meticulousness	involved	in	his	otherwise	general	diagnosis	of	Leonardo	as	having	an	obsessional	neurosis.		The	origin	Leonardo’s	neurosis,	Freud	proposes,	was	likely	his	repressed	sexuality.		It	would	indicate,	in	Freud’s	developmental	terminology,	an	anal	fixation	and	a	corresponding	reaction-formation	that	represses	the	sexual	fixation	in	correlation	with	the	formation	of	perfectionism.		Freud	asserts	that	in	all	likelihood	Leonardo	was	homosexually	oriented,	but	that	his	“affectionate	relations	with	the	young	men	[with	whom	he]	shared	his	existence	did	not	extend	to	sexual	activity.”394		But	this	was	at	a	time	when	the	socio-cultural	norms	were	weighed	extensively	against	homosexual	orientations	especially	(and	sex	in	general	to	varying	degrees).			Freud	depicts	Leonardo’s	world	as	being	a	time	when	there	was	a	‘struggle’	between	two	extremes:	living	“sensuously	without	restraint”	and	“gloomy	asceticism,”	but	that	Leonardo	represented	a	“cool	repudiation	of	sexuality.”395		In	other	words,	Leonardo	was	not	‘free’	sensuously,	and	yet	was	not	caged	to	a	gloomy	repressive	life	either.		He	states	that	Leonardo	was	likely	a	celibate	homosexual,	and	therefore	needed	to	repress	is	sex	drives	and	find	socially	appropriate	outlets	for																																																									392	Freud,	Leonardo,	pg.	67	393	Freud,	Leonardo,	pg.	66	394	Freud,	Leonardo,	pg.	73	395	Freud,	Leonardo,	pg.	69	
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them.		Leonardo	repudiated	sexuality,	writing,	“The	act	of	procreation	and	everything	connected	with	it	is	so	disgusting	that	mankind	would	soon	die	out	if	it	were	not	an	old-established	custom	and	if	there	were	not	pretty	faces	and	sensuous	natures.”396	As	noticed	above,	Freud	claims	that	feelings	of	disgust	serve	as	the	mental	dams	of	reaction-formations.		Leonardo	wanted,	as	if	by	an	escape	from	sexuality	into	a	schizoid	fantasy,	to	present	a	completely	desexualized	beauty	in	his	work,	to	liberate	beauty	from	sexual	desire	and	all	he	found	disgusting.		He	could	not	allow	himself	the	free	expression	of	his	sexuality,	but	rather	than	be	resigned	to	unhappiness	in	effect	of	the	repression	of	his	sexual	desires,	Leonardo	channeled	the	libidinal	energy	into	art	and	science.		He,	according	to	Freud,	‘sublimated’	his	drives	that	would	ordinarily	seek	sexual	aims	and	objects.		Leonardo’s	scientific	orientation	first	began	in	the	service	of	his	art,397	Freud	observes,	in	order	to	be	able	to	better	understand	the	subjects	of	his	art.		In	this	way,	Leonardo	was	passing	from	a	surface	understanding	to	something	behind	the	mere	appearance.		For	Freud,	writes	Loewald,	science	is	also	a	sublimatory	activity,	and	was	regarded	as	“the	most	mature	way	of	eliminating	illusions	and	embellishments,	to	look	at	whatever	reality	may	be	with	clear,	unflinching	eyes	and	to	master	reality	in	some	measure.		Science	for	him	was	an	attempt	at	sober	disillusionment,	at	that	disenchantment	he	thought	was	necessary	to	attain	true	maturity.”398		However,	Freud	points	out	that	Leonardo’s	endeavors	were	always	externally	directed,399	indicating	that	Leonardo	was	refusing	to	acknowledge	his	internal	nature.		Later,																																																									396	Freud,	Leonardo,	pg.	69	397	Freud,	Leonardo,	pg.	76	398	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	43	399	Freud,	Leonardo,	pg.	76	
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when	Leonardo	attempts	to	return	to	art,	his	new	‘scientific’	orientation	made	art	disturbing	to	him,	and	he	was	unable	to	find	satisfaction	in	art.		Freud	writes,	“The	artist	had	once	taken	the	investigator	into	his	service	to	assist	him;	now	the	servant	had	become	the	stronger	and	suppressed	his	master.”400		The	reason	for	this	inability	to	return	to	art	is	two	fold:	first,	it	returns	to	something	of	a	more	sensuous	nature,	and	this	was	something	that	Leonardo	was	avoiding,	reacting	against.		Secondly,	Freud	observes	that	homosexual	phantasies,	whilst	repressed	by	Leonardo,	still	seeped	into	the	works	of	art	and	disturbed	him.		In	other	words,	the	result	was	a	‘return	of	the	repressed’.		The	refusal	of	Leonardo	to	incorporate	his	sensuality	and	eroticism	into	his	activities,	and	his	consequent	neurotic	emphasis	on	externality	at	the	expense	of	internality,	was	reinforced	more	in	objective	science	than	in	art.	Freud	claims	that	the	“enjoyment	and	passions	that	inspire	and	provide	the	richest	experiences	were	absent	for	Leonardo,”	yet	contradictorily	also	asserts	that	Leonardo	celebrated	a	kind	of	“sublime	religious	feeling”	–	ecstasy	–	pertaining	to	his	scientific	discoveries.401		It	appears	that	everything	that	one	would	feel	for	sex	Leonardo	substituted	with	science.		In	other	words,	scientific	discoveries	become	substitute	formations	for	sexuality.		Leonardo	believed	that	one	should	postpone	loving	anything	until	sufficient	knowledge	was	acquired	about	them,	and	only	then	could	one	be	justified	in	hating	or	loving.		This	postponement,	really	an	avoidance,	and	a	rationalization,	meant	that	the	pursuit	of	knowledge	ended	up	substituting	
																																																								400	Freud,	Leonardo,	pg.	77	401	Freud,	Leonardo,	pg.	75	
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knowledge	for	love,	denied	sexual	love	even	a	place	in	art	and	science,	and	deferring	embodied	love	indefinitely.	Although	Freud	attempts	to	present	Leonardo	as	an	archetype	of	sublimation,	such	an	attempt	can	only	end	in	failure.		This	follows	the	discussion	as	well	as	the	preceding	sections	on	reaction-formation	and	sublimation,	where	the	repression	essential	in	reaction-formation	is	generally	antagonistic	to	sublimation	proper.		Sublimation	has	been	described	as	a	vicissitude	that	precludes	repression	and	disavowal,	proceeds	by	‘simpler	means’	as	Freud	notes.	Leonardo,	therefore,	should	not	be	considered	an	exemplar	of	sublimation,	but	instead	of	reaction-formation,	that	‘sub-species’	of	sublimation.		He	was	an	obsessional	neurotic	unable	to	accommodate	or	incorporate	his	sexuality	in	his	endeavors,	and	practiced	a	rigid,	inflexible	and	obsessive	avoidance	of	it.		Everything	Leonardo	did	appears	to	have	been	in	opposition	to	his	sex	drives,	so	that	his	‘passion’	in	science	and	art	were	neurotic	satisfactions,	generated	by	–	if	not	solely,	then	at	least	largely	–	reaction-formations.		
Creativity	and	Defense	Mechanisms	
Following	from	the	discussion	of	Leonardo	da	Vinci	above,	it’s	important	to	underline	that,	while	he	was	an	archetype	of	genius	for	Freud,	even	of	sublimation,	he	was	not	free	of	psychical	conflict;	he	was	instead	quite	laden	with	it.		But	it	was	not	the	conflict	alone	that	was	remarkable,	but	his	means	of	resolving	it.		In	this	respect,	Freud	appears	to	align	his	views	with	that	of	Schopenhauer	who	saw	(implicitly)	that	genius	seemed	to	be	entrenched	in	a	kind	of	neurotic	suffering	
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necessary	for	such.		This	is	demonstrated	exactly	in	the	research	done	by	Carlson	discussed	in	what	follows.			The	point	I	wish	to	make	here	is	that	creativity	does	not	require	sublimation	–	the	only	non-direct,	egosyntonic	vicissitude	–	but	what	we	at	times	mistakenly	regard	as	“creative”	can	occur	through	egodystonic	means	or	relating,	either	mixed	with	it	or	along	vicissitudes	entirely	apart	from	it.		Creativity	might	happen	along	paths	of	repression	or	disavowal,	even	aggression	or	acting	out.		So,	we	can	interpret	Leonardo	as	being	highly	creative,	indeed	perhaps	as	a	genius,	and	yet	also	admit	that	his	“creativity”	did	not	necessarily	come	from	a	place	of	health	but	instead,	at	least	to	large	extent,	from	egodystonic	vicissitudes.		Some	recent	research	into	the	relationship	between	creativity	and	defense	mechanisms	has	shown	that	people	often	regarded	as	the	most	creative	in	fact	display	a	larger	array	of	operative	defense	mechanisms,	as	well	as	a	greater	flexibility	among	them.		In	a	recent	study	by	George	Domino,	et	al.	the	creativity	of	participants	were	assessed	with	tests	for	creativity.		Ten	psychiatric	residents	rated	the	participants	according	to	presented	defense	mechanisms	(as	articulated	by	Vaillant),	“using	a	9-point	scale	that	reflected	the	frequency	with	which	a	participant	exhibited	a	particular	defense	style.”402		There	are	some	potential	setbacks	with	the	study,	such	that	the	experiment	presupposed	a	correlation	between	creativity	and	defensive	style,	but	this	is	mitigated	by	the	possibility	of	a	psychiatric	resident	not	observing	a	defensive	style	whilst	nonetheless	possibly	being	presented	with	examples	of	high	creativity.403	404																																																									402	Domino,	George,	et	al.	“”Creativity	and	Ego	Defense	Mechanisms”	pg.	20	403	Domino,	George,	et	al.	“”Creativity	and	Ego	Defense	Mechanisms”	pg.	20	.		In	the	study,	“Three	defense	styles	(delusional	projection,	denial,	and	distortion),	which	
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Domino	writes,	“The	portrait	that	emerges	of	the	high-creative	in	contrast	to	the	low-creative	person	is	that	of	an	individual	who	shows	a	much	richer	psycho-dynamic	life	(more	ego	defenses	evident),	who	uses	not	only	more	mature	defenses	but	more	immature	and	neurotic	defenses	as	well.”405		“These	results,”	writes	Domino,	“seem	to	coincide	with	the	richer	fantasy	life	typically	associated	with	creativity.”406		The	researchers	further	observed:	Of	the	15	ego	defense	styles	considered	in	this	study,	significant	differences	between	creative	groups	were	obtained	on	13	of	them,	with	4	defense	styles	(projection,	passive-aggressive	behavior,	repression,	and	altruism)	judged	to	be	used	more	often	by	the	low-creative	group,	and	9	(schizoid	fantasy,	acting	out,	dissociation,	displacement,	reaction-formation,	intellectualization,	humor,	suppression,	and	sublimation)	judged	to	be	used	more	often	by	the	high-creative	type.407		Despite	the	fact	that	high-creative	types	were	seen	to	display	a	wealth	of	defense	styles,	even	of	the	immature	sort	described	by	Vaillant,	Domino	writes	that	the	results	suggest	“a	greater	degree	of	psychological	maturity	present	in	the	high-creative	group.”408		This	assertion	seems	highly	questionable	regarding	the	findings,																																																																																																																																																																						Vaillant	labeled	‘psychotic’	defenses,	proved	to	be	too	infrequent	for	statistical	purposes	and	thus	were	dropped	from	further	consideration.”	404	Domino,	George,	et	al.	“”Creativity	and	Ego	Defense	Mechanisms”	pg.	21	The	researchers	also	noted	that	the	“reliability	data	suggest	that	the	two	most	complex	elements,	the	ratings	of	the	haiku	poetry	and	the	ratings	of	the	ego	defense	styles,	were	also	the	least	reliable	and	hence	the	least	valid,”	and	this	is	likely	due	to	the	fact	that	in	each	case	an	observer	was	qualitatively	judging	to	the	best	of	their	ability,	rather	than	being	a	standardized	test	in	which	differences	might	be	
quantitatively	measured.			405	Domino,	George,	et	al.	“”Creativity	and	Ego	Defense	Mechanisms”	pg.	22	406	Domino,	George,	et	al.	“”Creativity	and	Ego	Defense	Mechanisms”	pg.	24	407	Domino,	George,	et	al.	“”Creativity	and	Ego	Defense	Mechanisms”	pg.	20	408	Domino,	George,	et	al.	“”Creativity	and	Ego	Defense	Mechanisms”	pg.	24	
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and	would	at	best	depend	upon	how	Domino	means	“psychological	maturity,”	whereas	the	assertion	would	be	consistent	with	the	results	if	the	meaning	is	not	in	relation	to	Vaillant’s	categorization	of	defense	styles	(mature,	immature,	etc.),	but	more	in	relation	to	social	valuation	of	adaptivity,	flexibility,	etc.			Ingegerd	Carlsson,	et	al.,	sought	to	examine	the	flexibility	of	defensive	styles	and	feelings	of	anxiety	in	relation	to	high	or	low	creative	types.		She	writes	that	a	rigid	system	of	defenses	might	prevent	the	accommodation	of	new	thoughts	and	ideas,	particularly	of	thinking	‘outside	the	box’,	as	it	were.		In	her	study,	published	in	the	article	“Anxiety	and	Flexibility	of	Defense	Related	to	High	or	Low	Creativity,”	she	observes,	“repression	is	…	positively	related	to	creativity.”409		This	assertion	is	markedly	inconsistent	with	the	findings	of	Domino,	et	al.,	where	it	is	asserted,	“High-creative	participants	…	show	substantially	less	repression	than	low-creative	individuals.”410		This	inconsistency	might,	however,	be	due	to	the	weaknesses	I’ve	observed	in	the	study	by	Domino	et	al.,	as	well	as	to	some	conceptual	confusion.		For	Domino	also	observes	that,	regarding	the	defense	of	Reaction-Formation,	“the	mean	of	the	highly	creative	sample	was	significantly	higher	than	that	of	the	low-creative	sample.”411	And	the	same	was	true	for	other	vicissitudes	such	as	intellectualization	and	schizoid	fantasy,	all	of	which	require	repression.		A	further	weakness	in	the	study	of	Domino,	et	al.,	might	then	be	said	to	be	drawing	an	excessively	strict	
																																																								409	Carlsson,	Ingegerd.	“Anxiety	and	Flexibility	of	Defense,”	pg.	314	410	Domino,	George,	et	al.	“”Creativity	and	Ego	Defense	Mechanisms”	pg.	23	411	Domino,	George,	et	al.	“”Creativity	and	Ego	Defense	Mechanisms”	pg.	23	
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boundary	among	various	defenses;	for,	although	repression	can	operate	without	reaction-formation,	the	reverse	is	impossible.412	Interestingly,	In	Carlsson’s	study,	“Projection	and	regression	were	more	common	in	the	high-creative	group.”413		Furthermore,	these	defenses	themselves	“imply	a	certain	degree	of	immaturity…	However,	because	these	signs	appeared	together	with	more	mature	defenses	as	well,	they	could	in	that	context	indicate	a	certain	openness	to	childlike	function	or	adaptive	regression.”		Carlsson	aptly	observes	that	creativity,	whilst	perhaps	produced	correlatively	with	specific	defenses,	would	seem	to	indicate	a	kind	of	flexibility	among	defensive	styles,	rather	than	a	rigid	defensive	structure.		“Creative	men	and	women,”	she	writes,	“move	relatively	freely	along	the	primary-secondary	process	continuum.”414		The	higher	levels	of	anxiety	among	creative	types,	Carlsson	observes,	is	illustrated	by	“higher	basal	arousal”	and	“higher	overall	blood	flow.”415	
																																																								412	The	weaknesses	in	Carlsson’s	study	involves	the	poor	number	of	defenses	for	which	the	participants	were	assessed.		She	includes,	for	example,	only	defenses	such	as	Repression,	Projection/Sensitivity,	and	Regression.	This	was	also	examined	alongside	mood	disorders	(anxiety	and	depression),	as	well	as	tendencies	towards	isolation.		Remarkably,	Carlsson	neither	mentions	nor	examines	sublimation	or	reaction-formation	–	two	defenses	most	frequently	associated	with	creativity!		So,	while	the	study	by	Domino	et	al.	showed	some	conceptual	confusion,	the	study	of	Carlsson	might	not	be	sufficient	for	an	analysis	of	defenses	specifically,	although	indicative	of	substantial	findings	such	as	the	relation	between	mood	disorders	and	creativity.		See	Carlsson,	Ingegerd.	“Anxiety	and	Flexibility	of	Defense,”	pg.	345.	“The	high-creative	group	showed	more	signs	of	anxiety	…	than	the	low-creative	group,”	and	further,	“There	was	no	score	for	depression	in	the	high-creative	group	and	4	scores	in	the	low-creative	group.”	413	Carlsson,	Ingegerd.	“Anxiety	and	Flexibility	of	Defense,”	pg.	347	414	Carlsson,	Ingegerd.	“Anxiety	and	Flexibility	of	Defense,”	pg.	347	415	Carlsson,	Ingegerd.	“Anxiety	and	Flexibility	of	Defense,”	pg.	346.		It’s	not	much	of	a	stretch	to	align	this	description	with	Nietzsche’s	characterization	of	the	Dionysian.	
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These	studies,	despite	their	many	flaws	concerning	conceptualization,	theorization	and	analysis,	nonetheless	indicate	that	there	is	a	connection	between	creativity	and	defense	mechanisms,	that	individuals	regarded	as	highly	creative	display	a	flexibility	of	defensive	styles,	and	that	creativity	in	general	–	as	socio-culturally	valued	productions	–	cannot	be	attributed	to	one	defense	mechanism	alone.	 For	this	reason,	we	see	in	Freud’s	psychobiography	of	Leonardo	Da	Vinci	an	individual	to	whom	one	could	refer	to	as	being	‘resourcefully	defensive’,	in	that	Leonardo	was	able	to	exercise	a	plethora	of	defense	mechanisms,	each	of	which	displayed	symptoms	in	his	art	and	his	scientific	researches,	as	well	as	a	relative	flexibility	among	them	so	that,	were	one	to	fail,	another	would	come	in	to	the	rescue.		This	was	indicated	above	in	the	discussion	of	Leonardo	turning	to	focus	on	scientific	researches	when	art	‘no	longer	did	it	for	him.’		In	the	Introductory	Lectures,	Freud	acknowledges	the	multiplicity	of	drives,	such	that	one	need	not	be	regarded	as	following	the	same	vicissitudes	of	others.		He	writes:	…	We	have	to	take	into	consideration	the	fact	that	the	[drives],	the	pulsating	sexual	excitements,	are	extraordinarily	plastic.		They	may	appear	in	each	others’	places.		One	of	them	may	accumulate	the	intensity	of	others.		When	the	satisfaction	of	one	is	denied	by	reality,	the	satisfaction	of	another	may	offer	total	compensation.		They	behave	in	relation	to	each	other	like	a	network,	like	communicating	channels	that	are	filled	with	water.416		In	this	way,	not	only	is	the	psyche	itself	an	admixture	of	various	vicissitudes	in	operation	simultaneously,	but	drives	are	also	each	part	of	a	complicated	network																																																									416	Freud,	Introductory	Lectures,	pg.	345,	also	quoted	by	Lacan,	Ethics,	pg.	112	
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feeding	on,	supplanting,	and	influencing	each	other	or	giving	each	other	content	and	incentives	corresponding	to	each	vicissitude	in	operation.		In	Leonardo,	one	finds	above	all	defense	mechanisms	other	than	sublimation,	although	perhaps	in	operation	with	sublimation.417		 What	I	hope	to	have	illustrated	in	the	discussion	thus	far	is	that	creativity	is	essentially	a	psychical	employment	of	operations	regarded	as	defense	mechanisms,	meant	loosely	to	include	sublimation	as	well.		More	specifically,	what	we	regard	as	‘creative’	can	be	either	egodystonic	or	egosyntonic	in	its	activity.		Merely	regarding	Leonardo	as	a	creative	genius	does	nothing	to	justify	regarding	him	as	an	archetype	of	sublimation.		Rather,	one	can	be	creative	along	mostly	egodystonic	vicissitudes,	or	for	reasons	of	such,	as	it	appears	Leonardo	might	have	been.		Thirdly,	I	mean	to	foreshadow	a	distinction	I	will	later	make	between	the	valuations	and	interpretations	made	by	free	or	Übermenschlich	spirits	and	those	more	egodystonic	types	such	as	the	fettered	or	ascetic	spirits	(or	even	noble	spirits	who	must	merely	expend	their	energy	directly	and	cannot	divert	it,	do	not	have	mastery	of	it).		I	also	aim	to	highlight	my	claim	that	all	relating	is	aesthetic,	that	every	relationship	is	the	product	of	either	egosyntonic	engagement	or	egodystonic	engagement	(often	resulting	from	a	creative	impotence),	or	usually	an	admixture	thereof.		Each	engagement	with	the	world	is	nothing	less	than	an	aesthetic	engagement,	much	as	an	artist	relates	with	his	or	her	medium.																																																										417	See	again	the	section	on	Leonardo	for	a	discussion	of	this,	regarding	the	simultaneous	‘admixture’	of	defenses	as	well	as	the	‘formative’	aspect	of	reaction-formation.			
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Play,	Creativity,	and	the	Tertiary	Process	
“I	do	not	know	any	other	way	of	handling	great	tasks	than	as	play:	as	a	sign	of	
greatness,	this	is	an	essential	presupposition.”418	
	Nietzsche	writes	that	a	‘creator’	is	simultaneously	a	destroyer	of	worlds.		And	perhaps	others	will	not	recognize	the	creator	as	such,	but	refer	to	him	only	as	an	annihilator,	as	if	looking	at	an	artist	who	chisels	away	at	stone	were	merely	regarded	as	destroying	the	stone.		But	these	creators	are	also	harvesters,	as	a	sculptor	can	be	said	to	harvest	an	image	from	the	marble	with	his	chisel;	these	creators	are	celebrators	who	above	all	enjoy	and	affirm	life.		“The	good”	–	says	Zarathustra,	speaking	of	those	who	adhere	to	the	morals	of	reaction-formation	–	“they	cannot	create.		They	are	always	the	beginning	of	the	end.”419		The	reason	they	cannot	create	is	because	they	cannot	destroy.		They	are	degenerating	spirits.		Furthermore,	they	are	too	rigid,	too	closed,	too	inflexible	to	be	able	to	play.	After	referencing	how	analysands	are	often	trying	to	find	themselves,	Donald	Winnicott	observes	in	a	noticeably	Schopenhauerian	view:	In	a	search	for	the	self	the	person	concerned	may	have	produced	something	valuable	in	terms	of	art,	but	a	successful	artist	may	be	universally	acclaimed	and	yet	have	failed	to	find	the	self	that	he	or	she	is	looking	for.		The	self	is	not	really	to	be	found	in	what	is	made	out	of	products	of	the	body	or	mind,	however	valuable	these	constructs	may	be	in	terms	of	beauty,	skill,	and	impact.		If	the	artist	(in	whatever	medium)	is	searching	for	the	self,	then	it	can	be	said	that	in	all	probability	there	is	already	some	failure	for	that	artist																																																									418	Nietzsche,	Ecce	Homo,	“Clever,”	§10	419	Nietzsche,	Zarathustra,	“On	Old	and	New	Tablets,”	§26	
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in	the	field	of	general	creative	living.		The	finished	creation	never	heals	the	underlying	lack	of	sense	of	self.420		The	connection	with	Schopenhauer	here	is	in	the	neurotic	constitution	of	the	artist	that	is	portrayed	here.		In	the	case	of	Schopenhauer,	however,	the	artist	is	generally	presented	as	one	attempting	to	get	at	‘things-in-themselves’,	or	the	Platonic	ideas	–	of	trying	to	acquire	knowledge	of	something	like	a	lost	unity	–	for	it	is	in	the	beautiful	in	which	the	subject	and	object	unite,	and	the	difference	is	nullified,	so	that	the	subject	is	supposed	to	find	it’s	‘soul’	–	the	Will		(or	the	objectification	of	it	as	an	idea)	–	in	the	contemplation	of	the	object.		Like	Schopenhauer,	Winnicott	observes	this	results	in	an	ultimate	failure.			For	Nietzsche,	it	is	precisely	the	‘lack	of	self’	–	not	merely	the	sense	of	it	–	that	leads	to	the	ridiculous	postulations	of	a	unitary	substratum	called	‘self’	or	‘subject’	for	which	one	searches.		Nietzsche	criticizes	the	need	to	postulate	an	existent	self.		There	is	no	‘doer’	no	‘subject’	or	‘self’	to	be	discovered.		“There	is	no	such	substratum:	there	is	no	‘being’	behind	doing,	effecting,	becoming;	‘the	doer’	is	merely	a	fiction	added	to	the	deed	–	the	deed	is	everything.”421	Regarding	the	notion	of	the	self,	Winnicott	writes,	“It	is	only	in	being	creative	that	the	individual	discovers	the	self.”422		If	one	‘discovers’	the	self	only	through	being	creative,	then	the	self	that	is	discovered	is	a	self	that	is	created.		Therefore,	it	is	inconsistent	to	suppose	there	is	an	extant	self	outside	of	its	creation.			
																																																								420	Winnicott,	Playing	and	Reality,	pg.	73	421	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	I	§13	422	Winnicott,	Playing	and	Reality,	pg.	73	
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Recall	the	game	of	Freud’s	grandson	who	sought	to	master	the	experience	of	his	mothers’	departures	through	reenacting	them	by	throwing	away	his	toys.		Winnicott	observes:	On	the	basis	of	playing	is	built	the	whole	of	man’s	experiential	existence.		No	longer	are	we	either	introvert	or	extrovert.		We	experience	life	in	the	area	of	transitional	phenomena,	in	the	exciting	interweave	of	subjectivity	and	objective	observation,	and	in	an	area	that	is	intermediate	between	the	inner	reality	of	the	individual	and	the	shared	reality	of	the	world	that	is	external	to	individuals.423				Winnicott	suggests	that	the	location	of	play	is	an	intermediary	realm	that	is	generally	reciprocally	affected	by	inner	and	outer	reality.		I	suggest	that	this	should	be	regarded	as	the	relationship	itself	–	as	that	which,	in	Nietzschean	terms,	is	inevitably	the	product	of	perspective	and	interpretation,	but	also	what	structures	interpretations.424		Importantly,	as	Winnicott	asserts,	it	is	the	location	of	play.		He	also	writes,	“It	is	in	playing	and	only	in	playing	that	the	individual	child	or	adult	is	able	to	be	creative…”425	This	location	of	play	from	which	interpretation	and	perspective	emerge	is	unavoidably	the	center	of	creativity.		Through	creativity	and	play,426	perspectives	and	interpretations	are	made	possible.			
																																																								423	Winnicott,	Playing	and	Reality,	pg.	86		424	As	previously	noted,	Nietzsche	writes,	“There	is	no	‘essence-in-itself’;	(the	
relations	…	constitute	the	essence)…”	(The	Will	to	Power,	§625).	425	Winnicott,	Playing	and	Reality,	pp.	72-73	426	By	‘play’,	I	believe	it	is	not	imprudent	to	draw	a	connection	to	experimentation	as	it	functions	in	Nietzsche’s	works,	particularly	in	the	period	from	Human,	All	too	
Human	through	Thus	Spoke	Zarathustra,	although	it	never	loses	its	importance	in	Nietzsche’s	works,	and	is	often	implicit	when	he	writes,	in	the	later	works,	of	means	of	creating	illusions	and	of	falsifying.	
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According	to	Winnicott,	the	therapeutic	process	in	psychoanalysis	also	involves	play.		He	writes:	Psychotherapy	takes	place	in	the	overlap	of	two	areas	of	playing,	that	of	the	patient	and	that	of	the	therapist.		Psychotherapy	has	to	do	with	two	people	playing	together.		The	corollary	of	this	is	that	where	playing	is	not	possible	then	the	work	done	by	the	therapist	is	directed	towards	bringing	the	patient	from	a	state	of	not	being	able	to	play	into	a	state	of	being	able	to	play.427		Where	the	aim	of	therapy	is	supposed	to	undue	repressions	and	resolve	disavowals,	play	is	essential	to	this	task.		In	other	words,	it	is	only	through	play	that	we	learn	to	
incorporate,	rather	than	repudiate,	aspects	of	the	world	and	ourselves.428		One	of	Loewald’s	key	assertions	in	the	role	of	sublimation	in	creativity	is	that	sublimation	restores	a	kind	of	psychical	unity,	or	evokes	it,	“in	the	form	of	a	symbolic	linkage.”429		Symbols	are	thus	a	means	by	which	the	vicissitude	of	sublimation	forms	unities	or	connections.		But	is	this	peculiar	to	sublimation?		I	think	to	answer	this	question	it	would	be	useful	to	look	at	work	done	on	creativity	
																																																								427	Winnicott,	Playing	and	Reality,	pg.	50	428	Interestingly,	Winnicott	acknowledges	that	others,	such	as	Melanie	Klein,	have	looked	at	children’s	play	in	therapy.		But	the	problem	with	Klein’s	approach	is	she	looked	at	it	objectively,	analyzing	the	children	based	on	symbols	or	manifest	content	in	their	play.	In	response	to	her,	and	other	psychoanalysts	in	her	vein,	Winnicott	writes	that	such	psychoanalysts	have	been	“too	busy	using	play	content	to	look	at	the	playing	child,	and	to	write	about	playing	as	a	thing	in	itself,”	and	instead,	play	is	“just	as	evident	in	the	analyses	of	adults”	(Playing	and	Reality,	pg.	54).		In	other	words,	play	is,	or	should	be,	involved	at	all	levels	of	therapy,	and	one	should	not	treat	it	as	merely	the	display	of	diagnosable	content.		His	disagreement	involves	the	same	critique	that	Nietzsche	leveled	against	Kant	and	Schopenhauer,	where	they	regarded	art	and	discussed	it	only	as	spectators	rather	than	as	artists.		So	too	Klein	looked	at	the	content	of	play	more	than	the	playing	child.			429	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	45	
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by	Silvano	Arieti.430	Arieti	writes,	“To	a	considerable	extent	[creativity]	consists	of	ancient,	obsolete,	and	primitive	mental	mechanisms	generally	relegated	to	those	recesses	of	the	psyche	that	are	under	the	domain	of	what	Freud	called	the	primary	process.”431		Per	the	previous	discussion	on	the	‘affective’	nature	of	drives,	we	can	relegate	this	to	what	Nietzsche	calls	the	‘Dionysian’.432		And	regarding	the	vicissitudes	above,	this	also	indicates	the	same	infusion	of	the	primary	process,	rather	than	a	defense	against	it,	into	the	secondary	process.	There	are	three	processes	of	mental	functioning	that	Arieti	observes	rather	than	the	two	generally	mentioned	in	psychoanalysis:		The	primary	process,	also	referred	to	as	the	paleological;433	as	well	as	the	secondary	and	tertiary	processes.434		For	Freud,	Arieti	observes,	“The	primary	process	…	is	a	way	in	which	the	psyche	functions,	especially	the	unconscious	part	of	the	psyche.		It	prevails	in	dreams	and	some	mental	illnesses,	especially	psychoses.”435		The	“secondary	process,”	on	the	other	hand,	“is	the	way	of	functioning	of	the	mind	when	it	is	awake	and	uses	common	logic.”436		It	is,	so	to	speak,	the	process	by	which	an	infant	is	able	to	differentiate	itself	from	the	world	or	the	world	from	it.		Disillusionment	is	peculiar	to																																																									430	Silvano	Arieti	is	an	often	neglected	theoretician	on	the	subject	of	creativity	in	psycholanalysis.		One	of	the	downfalls	of	his	work	on	creativity	is	that	he	generally	applies	more	of	a	formal,	rather	than	dynamic,	criteria	to	his	discussion.		In	fact,	there	are	moments	in	reading	his	work	where	one	might	think	that	they	are	reading	Kant	if	Kant	had	become	a	psychiatrist	or	psychoanalyst.		However,	there	are	benefits	to	this	as	well	that	I	think	compliment	the	whole	project.			431	Arieti,	Silvano,	Creativity,	pg.	12	432	See	‘Dionysian	as	Affective	aspect	of	will	to	power’	433	Loewald	refers	to	this	at	times	as	the	‘prelogical’.		See,	e.g.,	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	49	in	a	discussion	about	symbolism	434	Wright	and	Panksepp	also	observe	a	tertiary	process.		They	write:		435	Arieti,	Silvano,	Creativity,	pg.	12	436	Arieti,	Silvano,	Creativity,	pg.	12	
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the	secondary	process,	while	‘magical	thinking’	is	indicative	of	the	primary	process	and	for	this	reason	is	also	referred	to	as	‘paleological’.437		The	tertiary	process	comes	into	play	by	bringing	together	the	primary	process	with	what	has	become	separate	in	the	secondary	process.		Arieti	writes,	“Primary	process	mechanisms	reappear	in	the	creative	process	…	in	strange,	intricate	combinations	with	secondary	process	mechanisms	and	in	syntheses.		…	It	is	from	appropriate	matching	with	secondary	process	mechanisms	that	these	primitive	forms	…	become	innovating	powers.”438		Freud,	however,	never	spoke	of	a	tertiary	process.		But	it	appears	to	me	that	the	tertiary	process	serves	the	same	function	as	sublimation.		“Sublimation,”	writes	Loewald,	“brings	together	what	had	become	separate.”439		So	it	would	appear	that	the	act	of	creativity,	for	Arieti,	involves	sublimation,	a	synthesis	of	primary	and	secondary	processes.			Egodystonic	vicissitudes,	on	the	other	hand,	would	repudiate	the	primary	(as	in	the	case	of	repression)	or	repudiate	difference	in	the	secondary	process	(as	in	disavowal).	Arieti	does	not	make	this	comparison.		Notably,	he	appears	more	concerned	with	a	formal	analysis	of	mental	processes	in	creativity	rather	than	a	psychodynamic	analysis.440		“The	concept	of	the	tertiary	process	does	not	exist	in	Freudian	theory,”	Arieti	claims,	because	“Freud	…	stressed	the	importance	of	the	psychic	reality	as	something	to	be	distinguished	from	the	reality	of	the	external	world.		But	he	insisted	that	the	two	realities	must	remain	distinguished,	lest	psychic	reality	be	used	as	an																																																									437	It	can	involve	what	Arieti	has	observed	in	some	schizophrenics;	namely,	the	conflation	the	symbol	and	the	symbolized	so	that	the	symbol	(or	sign)	is	actually	identified	with	the	thing	it’s	meant	to	represent.	438	Arieti,	Silvano,	Creativity,	pg.	12	439	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	22	440	They	way	he	writes	of	mental	processes	appear	quite	Kantian	at	times.	
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escape	from	external	reality.”441		One	can	already	surmise	some	of	the	dangers	in	the	recuperation	of	the	primary	process	involved	in	creativity,	or	the	prevalence	of	mental	illness	among	those	who	are	regarded	as	highly	creative.442			 Arieti	observes	that	psychiatry	has	generally	followed	Freud’s	example,	and	maintained	a	distinction	between	primary	and	secondary	process	thinking,	the	latter	allowing	for	a	more	amenable	relation	to	external	reality.		“In	psychiatric	conditions	the	non-use	of	abstract	thinking	is	an	indication	of	illness,”443	writes	Arieti,	attributing	abstract	thinking	to	the	logical	secondary	process.		“However,”	he	observes,	“when	we	deal	with	the	problem	of	creativity,	a	different	prospect	is	desirable.		The	tertiary	process	…	blends	the	two	worlds	of	mind	and	matter,	and,	in	many	cases,	the	rational	with	the	irrational.		Instead	of	rejecting	the	primitive	…	the	creative	mind	integrates	it	with	normal	logical	processes	in	what	seems	a	‘magic’	synthesis	from	which	the	new,	the	unexpected,	and	the	desirable	emerge.”444		Needless	to	say,	the	ability	to	recuperate	the	primary	process	in	creativity	is	“shorn	of	newness	and	sublimity.”445		The	primary	process	is	“inexhaustible	…	as	a	source	of	content,”	writes	Arieti.		It	is	intoxicating.		He	further	observes,	again	illustrating	a	very	Nietzschean	notion	of	creativity	as	a	positive	liberation:																																																									441	Arieti,	Silvano,	Creativity	pp.	12-13	I	must	state,	however,	that	I’m	not	so	certain	that	Freud’s	use	of	the	vague	and	cumbersome	term	hypercathexis	does	not	to	an	extent	correspond	with	the	tertiary	process.			442	Originating,	perhaps,	with	Schopenhauer’s	remarks	on	the	neurotic	character	of	genius,	but	also	demonstrated	in	the	above	research	on	defense	mechanisms	and	creativity.		One	cannot	argue	that	to	be	“creative”	is	distinct	from	operations	of	a	mental	illness.		In	fact,	along	with	the	influence	of	the	primary	process	in	those	with	mental	illnesses,	we	can	say	that	creativity	is	often	fed	by	such	disturbances	443	Arieti,	Silvano,	Creativity,	pg.	83	444	Arieti,	Silvano,	Creativity,	pg.	13	445	Arieti,	Silvano,	Creativity,	pg.	12	
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The	creative	process	allows	man	to	liberate	himself	from	the	fetters	of	these	secondary	process	responses.		But	creativity	is	not	simply	originality	and	freedom.		It	is	more	than	that:	it	also	imposes	restrictions.		First	of	all,	although	it	uses	methods	other	than	the	secondary	process,	it	must	not	be	in	disagreement	with	the	secondary	process.		…	Secondly,	it	must	attain	an	additional	aim:	a	desirable	enlargement	of	human	experience	…		Thirdly,	the	creative	process	tends	to	fulfill	a	longing	or	a	search	for	a	new	object	or	for	a	state	of	experience	or	of	existence	which	is	not	easily	found	or	easily	attainable.		Especially	in	aesthetic	creativity,	the	work	often	represents	not	only	the	new	object	but	this	longing,	this	indefinite	search,	this	sustained	and	yet	never	completed	effort,	with	either	a	conscious	or	unconscious	motivation.446		For	Arieti,	one	can	be	‘fettered’	to	this	secondary	process	of	cognizing	only	difference	whereby	one	cannot	bring	difference	into	similitude.		This	is	a	task	for	the	tertiary	process	that	acknowledges	difference,	but	simultaneously	adjoins	it	with	identifications	made	in	the	primary	process.		Simultaneously,	whilst	acknowledging	difference,	the	similitude	that	is	also	discovered	or	created	is	infused	with	the	longing	of	the	primary	process	as	new	meanings	and	connections	are	formed.				Returning	to	the	vicissitude	of	sublimation,	“Sublimation,”	writes	Loewald,	“brings	together	what	had	become	separate.”447	What	had	become	separate	in	the	development	of	a	child	is	what	was	primarily	undifferentiated	–	self	and	world.		In	the	course	of	its	development,	it	becomes	‘disillusioned’,	as	it	were,	and	discovers	a	plethora	of	differentiations	between	itself	and	the	world	and	entities	in	it.		It	
																																																								446	Ariteti,	Silvano,	“The	rise	of	Creativity,”	pg.	52	I	should	note	that	Arieti	is	here	using	a	very	narrow	definition	of	aesthetics	–	far	narrower	than	my	own.			447	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	22	
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engages,	to	varying	degrees	of	success,	in	secondary	process	thinking.		Loewald’s	point	is	that	sublimation,	on	the	other	hand,	brings	these	differentiations	back	together.		Sublimation	is	a	peculiar	action	in	which	a	new	illusion	or	interpretation	is	constructed	in	order	to	come	to	terms	with	the	preceding	disillusionment.		It	fosters	a	whole	in	which	the	disillusionment	–	the	separateness	and	all	its	conflicting	elements	–	is	incorporated,	so	that,	simultaneously,	external	reality	is	mastered	and	psychical	reality	is	mastered	by	allowing	its	expression	in	it.		“In	its	most	developed	form	in	creative	work	it	culminates	in	celebration,”448	writes	Loewald.	What	is	being	celebrated?		Mastery.		The	pleasurable	feelings	in	sublimation	correspond	with	this	mastering	of	reality.		It	would	appear,	therefore,	that	sublimation	is	actually	what	is	involved	in	the	tertiary	process	as	described	by	Arieti.		The	mastery	entails	the	incorporation	of	the	primary	process	and	the	secondary	process	into	a	whole	that	is	amenable	to	each.		And	the	“celebration”	to	which	Loewald	refers	is	the	infusion	of	that	primary	process	into	the	new	interpretation.		“The	creative	process	is	shorn	of	newness	and	sublimity,”	Arieti	observes.		And	indeed,	as	Nietzsche	points	out	in	
Daybreak,	there	are	boundless	horizons	of	sublimity	to	be	discovered	in	our	creative	and	generative	efforts.449		For	Nietzsche,	this	represents	precisely	this	creative,	Heraclitian	child	at	play,	innocent	in	becoming	and	without	defenses	and	therefore	capable	of	incorporation.	
	
																																																									448	Loewald,	Sublimation,	pg.	22	449	This	is	addressed	further	in	the	section	on	the	Sublime	
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Will	to	Power	as	Artistry	
Freud	writes	that	the	task	of	the	nervous	system	is,	“speaking	in	general	terms	…	mastering	stimuli.”450		This	describes	the	activity	of	the	constancy	principle,	the	trend	towards	homeostasis,	and	roles	of	defense	mechanisms	and	vicissitudes	of	drives	that	determine,	and	are	reciprocally	determined	by,	our	relations.		The	mastery	of	stimuli	is	the	domain	of	Eros,	of	the	structuring,	ordering	capacities	attributed	to	it.		This	‘task	of	the	nervous	system’	is	also	involved	in	Nietzsche’s	theory	of	artistry.		But	this	‘mastery’	can	occur	along	several	different	vicissitudes.		Nietzsche	asserts	a	need	to	affirm	life	and	expand	the	will	to	live.		Denying	life	certainly	does	not	display	a	mastery	of	it.		Rather,	a	mastery	of	life	and	its	manifold	of	stimuli	require	an	engagement	with	it	by	incorporating	as	much	of	it	as	possible	into	one’s	own	existence.			I	share	a	similar	perspective	as	Nehamas	on	Nietzsche;	like	him,	I	think	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	can	be	described	as	‘aestheticism’.451		Nehamas	appears	to	focus	more	on	Nietzsche’s	philosophical	method,	however.		He	writes	that	it	“provides	at	least	part	of	the	motivation	for	perspectivism,”	and	also	“motivates	[Nietzsche]	to	create	what	we	may	call	a	literary	product,”452	that	is,	an	artwork.		On	the	other	hand,	I	think	focusing	on	the	philosophy	as	uncovering	the	aesthetic	ground	of	sentient	existence,	as	substantially	aesthetic	rather	than	methodically	aesthetic,	is	itself	informative.		It	illustrates	the	nucleus	of	all	means	of	valuations,	interpretations,	and	perspectives.		For	Nietzsche,	I	argue,	there	is	no	task,	no	deed,																																																									450	Freud,	Instincts	and	their	Vicissitudes,	pg.	118	451	Nehamas,	Nietzsche,	pg.	3	452	Nehamas,	Nietzsche,	pp.	3-4	
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no	relation	that	is	not	essentially	aesthetic.		Every	valuation,	interpretation,	and	relationship	is,	first	and	foremost,	aesthetically	or	artistically	based.		My	claim	is	thus,	in	a	sense,	stronger	than	that	made	by	Nehamas.453			Music	and	dance,	especially	considering	Wagner	and	Schopenhauer’s	influence	and	the	possibility	that	dance	would	represent	a	response	to	music,	i.e.	to	Schopenhauer	and	Wagner,	might	in	some	contexts	appear	even	more	appropriate	as	artistic	mediums	for	the	task	of	understanding	and	interpreting	Nietzsche.		I	do	not	think	that	Nehamas’	interpretation	is	wrong;	rather,	I	think	it	is	too	narrow.		Nehamas	writes,	“Nietzsche	…	looks	at	the	world	in	general	as	if	it	were	a	sort	of	artwork;	in	particular,	he	looks	at	it	as	if	it	were	a	literary	text,”	appealing	to	“…	the	creation	and	interpretation	of	literary	texts	and	characters.”454		I	think	Nehamas	is	correct:	Nietzsche	looks	at	the	world	as	if	it	were	art	and	we	are	all	artists.		But	Nietzsche	should	not	be	regarded	as	contained	within	a	peculiarly	literary	context	alone.		Nehamas	argues	that		such	an	interpretation	of	Nietzsche	makes	“many	of	[Nietzsche’s]	strange	ideas	appear	more	plausible	in	this	light.”455		That	is	perhaps																																																									453	One	of	my	minor	disagreements	with	Nehamas	concerns	his	focus	on	literature	and	text	as	the	artifice	by	which	Nietzsche	both	interprets	the	world	and	should	be	interpreted.		I	think	there	are	instances,	such	as	in	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	that	back	up	his	claim,	where	Nietzsche	speaks	of	the	possibility	of	a	difference	of	interpretation	among	different	people	who	“read	from	the	same	nature,”	explicitly	referring	to	the	interpretative	act	as	an	act	of	reading	and	interpreting	a	literary	text	(Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§22,	my	emphasis	on	read).		And	Nietzsche	also	alludes	frequently	to	poets	and	dramatists	and	prose	writers,	such	as	Goethe,	Heine,	Shakespeare,	etc.		However,	Nietzsche	also	frequently	refers	to	composers	as	well,	for	example,	such	as	Beethoven,	Mozart,	Brahms,	and	especially	Wagner;	and	refers	frequently	as	well	to	plastic	artists	such	as	Michelangelo	or	Raphael.	What	I	disagree	with	is	the	exclusive	focus	on	the	paradigm	of	literary	texts,	for	while	it	alone	is	not	an	incorrect	interpretation,	all	kinds	of	various	art	forms	also	appear.			454	Nehamas,	Nietzsche,	pg.	3	455	Nehamas,	Nietzsche,	pg.	3	
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true,	but	I	think	that	is	not	peculiar	to	literature	but	true	for	the	various	arts	in	general	to	which	Nietzsche	alludes.		Literature	is	only	one	such	art.		My	disagreement,	then,	is	not	so	much	the	use	that	Nehamas	makes	of	literature,	but	the	exclusive	focus	on	it.			I	Believe	Heidegger	is	correct	when	he	writes,	the	“Nucleus	of	will	to	power	
must	begin	precisely	here,	with	art.”456		Kaufmann	also	correctly	observes	that	Nietzsche	agreed	with	the	notion	in	Shakespeare’s	The	Winter’s	Tale	that	“Art	itself	is	Nature.”457	Why	is	this	important?		Because	the	will	to	power	is,	essentially,	a	creative	force.		Will	to	power	is	behind	every	doing	and	every	valuation.		It	is,	so	to	speak,	the	natural	‘hammer’	by	which	stone	is	destroyed	and	meaning,	for	sentient	beings,	relieved	from	it.		Following	the	previous	identification	of	the	Dionysian	as	
affective,	In	Nietzsche’s	depiction	of	Dionysos,	Nussbaum	observes,	there	is	a	“power	that	transforms	and	transfigures,	producing	a	new	artistry	of	rhythm	and	movement,	a	new	resourcefulness	of	language,	a	new	theatre	in	which	the	self,	fluid	and	unafraid,	both	creates	and	affirms	itself.”458	And	furthermore,	“The	artistry	of	human	desire,”	Nussbaum	writes,	“makes	the	human	being	into	a	work	of	art.		Love’s	magic	is	illusion.”459		Interestingly,	illusion	is	here	paired	with	the	Dionysian	and	thus	is	no	longer	Apollonian.		This	points	out	the	possibility	of	proceeding	in	relations	without	the	defensive	positions	that	the	Apollonian	represents.		
																																																								456	Heidegger,	Nietzsche,	pg.	67	457	Kaufmann,	Nietzsche,	pg.	260	458	Nussbaum,	“Transfiguration	and	Intoxication,”	pg.	65	459	Nussbaum,	“Transfiguration	and	Intoxication,”	pp.	64-64	
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Furthermore,	“This	intoxication	of	the	erotic	is	a	great	motive	to	the	affirmation	of	life	in	general.”460	The	will	to	power	is	a	will	to	mastery	(a	disposition	towards	homeostasis)	that	is	frequently	mistranslated	in	consciousness	as	a	will	to	have	power	over	everything	that	one	encounters.		This	was	sufficiently	articulated	in	the	first	section	of	this	thesis.		This	is	generally	presented	as	the	case	for	the	noble	spirit,	as	well	as	for	the	fettered	spirit	with	regard	to	passive-aggression	and	self-	or	other-mastery.		But	these	are	only	egodystonic	expressions	of	the	will	to	power.		I	suggest,	instead,	that	it	should	be	conceptualized	as	a	will	to	‘power’	or	‘mastery’	of	one’s	self	or	environmental	factors,	not	over	one’s	self	or	environmental	factors.		In	this	sense,	the	will	to	power	would	egosyntonically	be	seen	in	artistic	mastery,	for	example,	requiring	discipline	and	the	creativity	necessary	to	bring	conflicting	elements	into	a	kind	of	harmony	or	unity,	establishing	a	kind	of	order.				Heidegger	observes:	In	the	final	year	of	his	creative	life	Nietzsche	was	wont	to	designate	his	manner	of	thinking	as	‘philosophizing	with	the	hammer’.		…		It	means	to	hammer	out	a	content	and	an	essence,	to	sculpt	a	figure	out	of	the	stone.		Above	all	it	means	to	tap	all	things	with	the	hammer	to	hear	whether	or	not	they	yield	that	familiar	hollow	sound,	to	ask	whether	there	is	still	solidity	and	weight	in	things	or	whether	every	possible	center	of	gravity	has	vanished	from	them.461		I	think	Heidegger	is	accurate	with	his	assessment	of	what	it	means	to	‘philosophize	with	a	hammer’,	and	it	is	true	that	it	is	quite	fitting	of	Nietzsche’s	‘viewpoint’	–	regarding	both	the	content	and	his	method.		Heidegger	points	out,	accurately,	that																																																									460	Nussbaum,	“Transfiguration	and	Intoxication,”	pg.	65	461	Heidegger,	Nietzsche,	pg.	66	
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‘Nietzsche	wants	to	give	things	weight	and	importance	again.”462		And	Nietzsche	does	this,	through	his	philosophy,	as	a	sculptor	works	at	a	marble	slab,	destroying	the	stone	whilst	relieving	something	beautiful	imprisoned	in	it.	Heidegger’s	description	is	also	fitting	because	Nietzsche	regards	philosophy’s	usefulness	is	as	an	
aesthetic	practice,463	only	one	that	I	believe	is	consistent	with	traditionally	non-artistic	practices	of	science,	for	example,	in	order	to	make	life	meaningful	or	give	weight	to	existence.		 This	interpretation	echoes	a	passage	of	Zarathustra	as	well.		There,	Zarathustra	speaks,	“I	am	always	driven	anew	to	human	beings	by	my	ardent	will	to	create;	thus	the	hammer	is	driven	toward	the	stone.	/	Oh	you	human	beings,	in	the	stone	sleeps	an	image,	the	image	of	my	images!		A	shame	it	must	sleep	in	the	hardest,	ugliest	stone!	…	I	want	to	perfect	it,	for	a	shadow	came	to	me	…	/	the	overman’s	beauty	came	to	me	as	a	shadow.”464		Here,	Zarathustra	refers	to	his	will	to	create,	and	compares	it	to	a	sculptor	working	on	stone.		The	term	‘relief’,	used	specifically	to	denote	stonework	on	the	facade	of	buildings	becomes	pertinent	here;	the	artist	seeks	to	relieve	what	is	dormant	in	the	material.		The	term	is	derived	from	the	Latin	relevo,	which	means	‘to	raise’,	whereas	what	is	‘relieved’	from	the	material	gives	the	impression	of	having	emerged	naturally	from	it,	of	being	uncovered.		This	is	also	significantly	related	to	the	recurring	theme	of	pregnancy	in	Nietzsche’s	work,	where	there	is	also	some	potential	lying	dormant	and	which	one	merely	needs	to	
																																																								462	Heidegger,	Nietzsche,	pg.	66	463	Aesthetics,	for	Heidegger,	is	an	ontic	discipline,	and	my	use	of	the	term	is	not	limited	to	that.	464	Nietzsche,	Zarathustra,	II,	“On	the	Blessed	Isles”	pg.	67	
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bring	forth	into	the	world,	to	open	one’s	self	to	Dionysian	intoxications,	to	awaken	it,	and	then	put	it	into	use	towards	a	‘beautiful’	purpose	one	gives	to	it.		 The	will	to	power,	here,	is	also	not	expressed	as	a	working	against,	which	dominates	the	fettered	and	noble	ways	of	relating,	whereby	the	fettered	spirit	is	oriented	against	nature	(repressing	internal	nature	whilst	devaluing	external	nature),	and	the	noble	oriented	against	adversarial	nature.		Instead,	there	is	allowed	
an	expression	of	nature	…	in	both	senses.		Zarathustra	is	working	with	his	will	to	
create	and	destroy	by	chiseling	at	the	stone	with	his	hammer,	and,	conversely,	is	
working	with	external	nature	by	relieving	what	is	already	present	in	the	stone,	rather	
than	trying	to	force	the	appearance	of	what	is	lacking	in	it.		An	important	point	about	mastery	emerges	here:	the	kind	of	áskēsis	or	mastery	that	Nietzsche	envisions	allows	for	the	emergence	of	the	Übermensch	as	an	aesthetic	endeavor;	it	is	not	a	mastery	over	but	a	mastery	of,	in	the	same	sense	that	a	pianist	is	not	a	master	over	the	piano,	or	that	a	sculptor	is	not	a	master	over	the	stone,	but	is	in	each	case	instead	a	master	of	the	art.		Furthermore,	we	cannot	say	that	the	sculptor	is	a	master	of	stone,	which	would	treat	‘stone’	analytically	as	a	mere	object	of	a	relation,	but	is	instead	a	master	of	working	with	stone;	that	is	to	say,	the	mastery	has	turned	from	emphasizing	the	object	to	emphasizing	the	relation	and	the	activity.		Mastery	entails	the	way	in	which	the	artist	relates	with	the	material.		Following	from	the	above	chapters	on	the	vicissitudes,	this	relating	can	be	either	egosyntonic	or	egodystonic.	Previously,	it	was	observed	in	Beyond	Good	and	Evil	that	Nietzsche	describes	the	world	as	“will	to	power,	and	nothing	besides.”		In	his	notebooks	around	1885-1886,	roughly	the	same	time,	Nietzsche	describes	“The	world	as	a	work	of	art	that	
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gives	birth	to	itself.”465		The	world	is	thus	“will	to	power	and	nothing	besides”	as	well	as	“artist”	and	“art.”		Heidegger	observes,	“The	concept	of	art	and	of	the	work	of	art	is	obviously	extended	to	every	ability	to	bring	forth	and	to	everything	that	is	essentially	bringing	forth.”466	Heidegger	makes	these	observations:	1. Art	is	the	most	perspicuous	and	familiar	configuration	of	will	to	power;	2. Art	must	be	grasped	in	terms	of	the	artist;467	3. …	Art	is	the	basic	occurrence	of	all	beings;	to	the	extent	that	they	are,	beings	are	self-creating,	created.468	4. Art	is	the	distinctive	countermovement	to	nihilism.469	5. Art	is	worth	more	than	‘the	truth’.470		However,	I	think	one	should	understand	Nietzsche	as	stating	that	what	we	take	to	be	the	truth	is	artifice:	Truth	is	a	work	of	art.		What	I	mean	is	this:	truth	is	nothing	other	than	an	interpretation,	and	an	interpretation	is	nothing	other	than	the	product	of	artistry.		That	artistry	itself	is	determined	by	one’s	psychical	constitution	in	relation	to	the	will	to	power.		The	truth	that	emerges	from	the	creativity	of	the	will	to	power	is	deeply	and	unavoidably	sensuous,	born	of	the	‘realm	of	appearances’,	and	
interested.		But,	in	both	cases,	whether	the	truth	of	the	sensuous	or	the	truth	of	the	supersensuous,	the	general	notion	is	the	same:	Truth	is	a	work	of	art.		There	is	no	other	possibility	following	the	four	previous	points.		This	will	be	addressed	in	the	following	chapter	on	interpretation.	
																																																								465	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§796	466	Heidegger,	Nietzsche,	pg.	71	467	Heidegger,	Nietzsche,	pg.	71	#’s	1&2	appear	here.	468	Heidegger,	Nietzsche,	pg.	72	469	Heidegger,	Nietzsche,	pg.	73	470	Heidegger,	Nietzsche,	pg.	75	
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Nussbaum	writes	that,	according	to	Nietzsche,	“Art	teaches	us	perhaps	above	all	a	love	for	order	and	discipline.”471	An	exemplary	instance	where	this	is	the	case	is	when	Nietzsche	speaks	of	the	‘sublime	ones’	in	Zarathustra,	or	when	he	refers	to	the	‘grand	style’.		But	he	would	not	deny	that	Wagner	is	an	artist	whilst	nonetheless	criticizing	Wagner	for	having	poor	taste	and	a	lack	of	discipline,	etc.		Wagner	is	generally	always	regarded	as	an	artist	with	a	strong	personality	(at	least	until	
Parsifal),	whilst	nonetheless	exemplifying	art	that	is	decadent	and	lacking	discipline.		Art	often	‘teaches’	the	herd	and	weak,	degenerate	spirits	to	undo	their	repressions	in	orgies	of	hysteria,	completely	lacking	order,	and	it	leaves	one	with	nothing	but	former	repressions	to	which	one	returns	after	the	intoxication	subsides.		Art,	in	this	sense,	is	a	lightning	rod	for	energy	or	a	quota	of	affect	that	would,	without	it,	otherwise	be	repressed.472		However,	I	think	Nussbaum	is	correct	in	the	instance	of	‘great	art’,	with	‘good	taste’,	particularly	in	the	‘grand	style’,	all	of	which	characterize,	for	Nietzsche,	art	that	is	produced	egosyntonically,	presenting	order,	but	ordering	not	by	means	of	repressions	or	disavowals	as	in	other	artworks.			There	is	a	bifurcation	of	artistry,	of	creativity,	according	to	egodystonic	or	egosyntonic	vicissitudes.		Thus,	Nietzsche	writes,	“If	we	convalescents	still	need	art,	it	is	another	kind	of	art.”		It	would	be	“above	all:	an	art	for	artists,	only	for	artists!”473		In	other	words,	for	Nietzsche	the	only	need	for	art	that	is	permissible	for	a	convalescent	spirit	is	found	neither	in	the	consolation	of	art	for	a	spectator,	nor	in	the	instance	of	a	sick	artist,	but	in	the	activity	of	creation,	of	being	an	artist.		And	this																																																									471	Nussbaum,	“Transfiguration	and	Intoxication,”	pg.	60	472	This	is	also	the	case	for	great	personalities,	indicated	by	Freud	in	Group	
Psychology	and	by	Adorno	in	his	essay	on	“propaganda”	in	Culture	Theory.	473	Nietzsche,	The	Gay	Science,	preface	to	second	edition,	§	4	
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art	is	an	art	of	self-creation,	more	than	anything	–	an	art	of	one’s	becomings,	and	therefore	involving,	inextricably,	egosyntonic	means	of	relating	not	only	with	oneself	but	also	with	the	world.	The	most	significant	difference	between	Nietzsche	and	Schopenhauer	concerning	lebensphilosophie	–	that	is,	aside	from	Nietzsche’s	rejection	of	his	metaphysics	–	is	the	path	one	takes	when,	with	an	honest	gaze,	one	sees	the	meaninglessness	of	existence.		“Nietzsche’s	view,”	observes,	Nussbaum,	“is	not	a	simple	inversion	of	Schopenhauer’s.		For	he	agrees	with	Schopenhauer	that	what	an	honest	gaze	discovers	in	the	world	is	arbitrariness	and	the	absence	of	any	intrinsic	meaning.		But	he	disagrees	about	the	consequences	of	this	discovery	for	humanity’s	view	of	itself.”474		For	Schopenhauer,	the	honest	gaze	further	validates	resignation	and	life-denial.		And	this,	one	might	say,	is	the	road	most	often	taken.475		Nietzsche,	on	the	other	hand,	takes	the	road	least	taken	–	the	road	that	affirms	life	and	creates	meaning	where	meaning	is	lacking	(which	is	everywhere).		This	is	the	difference	between	Dionysian	and	romantic	pessimism,	an	active	and	reactive	nihilism	respectively.		Nietzsche	is	saying,	“whether	you	like	it	or	not,	you	are	an	artist,”	and,	throughout	his	work,	there	is	the	persistent	question:	“Now	that	I	have	shown	you	that	you	are	the	artist	of	your	world,	what	will	you	do?”476																																																												474	Nussbaum,	“Transfiguration	and	Intoxication,”	pg.	58	475	It	is	the	road	most	taken	by	passive	nihilists	who	are	not	subservient	to	their	delusions	or	schizoid	fantasies	of	God	or	redemption	in	afterlives.		The	road	least	taken	is	the	path	of	active	nihilism,	involving	the	same	honesty,	but	with	a	Dionysian	pessimism	rather	than	the	Romantic	pessimism	and	resignation.			476	I	am	putting	words	into	Nietzsche’s	mouth	here,	articulating	what	I	see	as	implicit	in	his	work.	
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Interpretation	as	Art	
Every	aspect	of	existence	entails	interpretation	and	perspective,	each	of	which	are	indicative	of	relations	and	the	ways	in	which	each	relation	is	constituted	with	respect	to	one’s	own	nature	–	one’s	drives	or	instincts	and	their	vicissitudes.		
All	relating	is	itself	artistry.		Every	relationship,	therefore,	is	art,	and	every	interpretation	a	critique	of	that	art	whilst	simultaneously	art	as	well.		Thus,	Nietzsche	writes,	“It	is	our	needs	that	interpret	the	world:	our	drives	and	their	for	and	against.”477		What	this	means	is,	our	drives	interpret	the	world	according	to	how	the	world	satisfies	our	drives.		We	incorporate	what	satisfies	us	and	repudiate	what	is	unsatisfying.		The	result	is	the	interpretation.		The	means	of	relating	procure	the	“relationship.”	Relating	with	any	aspect	of	the	world	involves	the	bestowal	of	values.		It	bestows	the	valuations	of	beauty,	sublimity,	ugliness,	and	horror,	for	example.		This	is,	perhaps,	true	as	well	in	Kant,	where	Kant	observes	that	Judgment	is	the	propaedeutic	to	both	theoretical	and	practical	reason.478		As	we’ve	already	seen,	perspective	and	interpretation	–	our	means	of	relating	–	are	largely	determined	by	the	will	to	power	and	the	various	vicissitudes	by	which	it	may	express	itself.		So	when	Nietzsche	writes	of	art,	it	is	not	a	sphere	of	study	separate	from	other	aspects	of	life	and	existence.		It	is	life	and	existence.		Matthew	Rampley	observes,	“Far	from	occupying	a	completely	autonomous	sphere,	art,	in	Nietzsche’s	thought,	constitutes	
																																																								477	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§481	478	See	Kant,	Critique	of	Judgment.		A	key	difference	is	that,	for	Kant,	judgment	appears	at	least	mostly	rational.		For	Nietzsche,	the	emphasis	is	placed	on	the	irrational	aspects	of	judgment.	
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the	material	expression	of	a	certain	relation	towards	the	world.	…	Art	is	a	particular	way	of	engaging	with	the	world.		…	It	does	not	symbolize	a	particular	conceptual	engagement	with	the	world,	it	is	that	engagement.”479		Any	critique	of	human	engagement	with	any	aspect	of	the	world	is	therefore	brought	under	a	critique	of	art	and	aesthetics.480		Nietzsche,	foreshadowing	works	in	contemporary	feminism	concerning	‘strong	objectivity,’481	writes,	“There	is	only	a	perspectival	seeing,	only	a	perspectival	‘knowing’;	the	more	affects	we	are	able	to	put	into	words	about	a	thing,	the	more	eyes,	various	eyes	we	are	able	to	use	for	the	same	thing,	the	more	complete	will	be	our	‘concept’	of	the	thing,	our	‘objectivity’.”482		Rather	than	maintaining	a	realist	stance	here,	I	think	this	should	instead	be	read	along	side	Daybreak	§449	where	Nietzsche	writes	that	an	openness	to	a	variety	of	perspectives,	even	conflicting	ones,	expands	one’s	own	perspectives	and	possibilities	of	becoming.		Nietzsche	writes,	“How	reluctant	I	am	to	force	my	own	ideas	upon	another!		How	I	rejoice	in	any	mood	and	secret	transformation	within	myself	which	means	that	the	ideas	of	another	have	prevailed	over	my	own!”483		He	further	describes	himself	as	something	like	a	“doctor	of	the	spirit”	for	those	in	need.		And	for	Nietzsche,	this	is	a	self-interested	orientation	as	well.																																																										479	Rampley,	Nietzsche,	Aesthetics,	and	Modernity	pg.	181	480	Nehamas	also	makes	this	point,	which	I	will	address	subsequently.	481	Unlike	Nietzsche’s	position,	strong	objectivity	generally	embraces	something	like	a	realist	notion.		However,	I	don’t	think	it	needs	too.		It	can,	as	Nietzsche’s	passage	in	D	§449	refers	to,	present	paths	to	the	sublime	in	virtue	of	the	access	to	various	perspectives	of	others,	and	creates	a	stronger	‘world-view’	not	by	corresponding	to	something	in	reality	but	in	virtue	of	the	mere	fact	that	it	incorporates	more.	482	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	III	§12	483	Nietzsche,	D	§449	
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To	be	like	a	little	inn	which	rejects	no	one	who	is	in	need	but	which	is	afterwards	forgotten	or	ridiculed!				To	be	able	to	be	humble,	so	as	to	be	accessible	to	many	and	humiliating	to	none!		…	Forever	in	a	kind	of	love	and	for	ever	in	a	kind	of	selfishness	and	self-enjoyment!		To	be	in	possession	of	a	dominion	and	at	the	same	time	concealed	and	renouncing!	To	lie	continually	in	the	sunshine	and	gentleness	of	grace,	and	yet	to	know	that	the	paths	that	rise	up	to	the	sublime	are	close	by!	–	That	would	be	a	life!	That	would	be	a	reason	for	a	long	life!484		What	are	these	paths	of	the	sublime?		According	to	my	reading,	it	is	the	openness	to	the	world,	even	the	perspectives	of	others.		This	is	what	presents	possibilities	of	the	sublime.		As	mentioned	above,	we	incorporate	what	satisfies	us	and	repudiate	what	is	unsatisfying.		The	picture	Nietzsche	paints	here	is	of	a	possibility	of	incorporating	as	much	as	possible,	finding	satisfaction	in	as	much	as	possible,	and	thereby	expanding	one’s	horizons	of	potential	becomings.		Nietzsche	envisions	one	who	is	completely	open	to	the	world,	every	aspect	and	experience	in	it.		Contrast	this	with	one	who	has	a	rigid	notion	of	beauty	and	is	thus	closed	to	other	interpretations	and	perspectives.		Nietzsche	writes	that	the	ascetic	ideal	“…	permits	of	no	other	interpretation,	no	other	goal,	and	rejects,	denies,	affirms,	conforms	only	with	reference	to	its	interpretation.”485		There	is	an	attempt	to	make	permanent,	static,	or	eternal	one’s	interpretation.		This	egodystonic	orientation	closes	oneself	off	from	
																																																								484	Nietzsche,	D	§449	485	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	III	§23	
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the	world,	severely	limiting	possibilities	of	feeling	and	becoming	as	if	one	were	to	never	leave	their	Konigsberg.486	Matthew	Rampley	makes	important	observations	that	he	personally	conceives	as	dialectical	but	need	not	be	regarded	as	such.487		One	important	observation	is	that	there	are	two	responses	to	nihilism:	a	passive	(or	reactive)	nihilism	and	an	active	nihilism.		He	describes	Passive	nihilism	thus:		Passive	nihilism	represents	a	pure	negativity,	in	terms	of	a	feeling	of	complete	meaninglessness	accompanied	by	a	state	of	inertia,	of	inactivity.		Although	passive	nihilism	represents	a	particularly	modern	crisis,	Nietzsche	regards	Buddhism	as	its	first	historical	expression,	and	its	themes	of	asceticism,	contemplative	withdrawal	from	life,	are	repeated	in	Christianity	and	metaphysics,	most	notably,	of	course,	in	Schopenhauer’s	ideal	of	the	ascetic	life.488		Active	Nihilism,	on	the	other	hand,	“must	also	consist	in	the	positing	of	new	values,	not	only	the	negation	of	the	existing	ones,	and	it	is	the	notion	of	interpretation	that	functions	as	the	medium	for	the	accomplishment	of	the	‘re-valuation	of	values’.”489		In	both	passive	and	active	nihilism	there	is	at	least	an	implicit	recognition	of	an	inherent	purposelessness	or	meaninglessness	in	life	and	existence.		Rampley,	however,	identifies	the	passive	nihilist	with	reactivity.		Modifying	Rampley’s	description	of	passive	and	active,	we	should	understand	the	valuations	of	Christians																																																									486	Kant	never	left	Konigsberg,	and	I	present	his	aesthetic	and	ethical	valuations	in	this	thesis	as	being	largely	egodystonically	constituted.	487	Several	Nietzsche	scholars	attribute	a	kind	of	dialectic	to	Nietzsche’s	philosophy,	Rampley	most	explicitly,	but	Kaufmann	also	in	passing.		I	disagree	with	this	view	but	haven’t	the	space	to	go	into	it	here.		It	erroneously	attributes	to	Nietzsche	a	rationalism	that	is	inconsistent	with	the	core	of	Nietzsche’s	philosophy.	488	Rampley,	Nietzsche	Aesthetics	and	Modernity,	pg.	34	489	Rampley,	Nietzsche	Aesthetics	and	Modernity,	pg.	34	
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(or	Buddhists)	to	be	the	reactive	element	of	passive	nihilism,	whereby	these	systems	construct	a	system	of	life-denial	or	valuations	of	the	‘hinter-worldly’	in	response	to,	or	in	reaction	against,	purposelessness	or	meaninglessness.490		This	is	observable	in	the	ascetic	ideal.		The	active	nihilist,	on	the	other	hand,	affirms	the	purposelessness	and	meaninglessness	as	a	door	opening	to	possibilities	of	becoming,	and	relishes	the	horizons	of	values	that	are	possible	for	one’s	own	creations	and	bestowals.		The	active	nihilist	does	not	react	against,	in	opposition	to,	the	inherent	purposelessness.		Nietzsche	writes,	“What	is	‘passive’?	–	To	be	hindered	from	moving	forward:	thus	an	act	of	resistance	and	reaction.		What	is	‘active’?	–	Reaching	out	for	power.”491	To	be	reactive,	it	appears,	would	also	reach	out	for	power,	but	it	does	so	out	of	weakness,	rather	than	strength,	and	reacts	against	the	meaninglessness	of	existence	instead	of	incorporating	it	as	a	divine,	creative	opportunity	as	in	the	case	of	the	active	nihilist.	My	point	is	that,	in	both	activity	and	reactivity,	one	bestows	values.		Nietzsche	writes:	All	‘purposes’,	‘aim’,	‘meaning’	are	only	modes	of	expression	and	metamorphoses	of	one	will	that	is	inherent	in	all	events:	the	will	to	power.		…		
All	valuations	are	only	consequences	and	narrow	perspectives	in	the	
service	of	this	one	will:	valuation	itself	is	only	this	will	to	power.492																																																										490	I	do	not	want	to	risk	conflating	reactive	nihilism	directly	with	the	notion	of	reaction-formation;	however,	I	think	the	two	are	indirectly	related.		Some	kinds	of	reactive	nihilism,	rather	than	following	vicissitudes	of	reaction-formation,	might	obtain	in	disavowals,	for	example,	or	other	vicissitudes	such	as	repression	or	passive-aggression.	491	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§657	492	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§675	(my	emphasis)	
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But	the	reasons	for	the	bestowals	couldn’t	be	more	different.		The	difference	concerns	the	psychical	constitution	of	the	person	bestowing	values.		“Value	is	the	highest	quantum	of	power	that	a	man	is	able	to	incorporate	–	a	man:	not	mankind!”493		Nietzsche	expressly	states	that	values	are	particular	to,	and	contingent	upon,	one’s	constitution,	on	how	much	one	can	incorporate	into	a	coherent	unity.		A	value	is	perspectival,	whereas	one’s	constitution	determines	how	one	sees	the	world,	accommodates	it,	and	thus	values	what	is	encountered.		Nietzsche	writes,	“Value	words	are	banners	raised	where	a	new	bliss	has	been	found	–	a	new	feeling.”494		That	bliss	can	only	be	hinter-worldly	or	ascetic	for	a	reactive	nihilist,	but	is	opened	to	new	sublimities,	as	mentioned	by	Ansell-Pearson,495	for	a	stronger,	übermenschlich	spirit.		Nietzsche	writes,	“The	will	to	power	interprets	…	In	fact,	interpretation	is	itself	a	means	of	becoming	master	of	something.”496		The	will	to	power	is,	in	every	value	bestowed	upon	the	world,	engaged	in	it	aesthetically	such	that	even	a	particular	perspective	or	interpretation	is	art.	Here,	an	issue	arises	concerning	relativity.		Are	things	so	entirely	relative	that	no	interpretation	is	better	than	any	other?		Or	are	there	clear	criteria	for	determining	which	perspective	or	interpretation	is	better?		Alexander	Nehamas	observes,	“If	perspectivism	is	correct,	and	…	every	interpretation	creates	its	own	facts,	then	it	may	seem	impossible	to	decide	whether	any	interpretation	is	or	is	not	correct.		And	if	there	is	nothing	of	which	all	these	are	the	interpretations,	then	the	very	idea	of	interpretation,	which	seems	to	require	at	least	that	there	be	something																																																									493	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§713	494	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§714	495	See	below	on	the	Sublime	496	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§643	
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there	to	be	interpreted,	begins	to	appear	itself	suspect.”497		This,	perhaps,	is	the	reason	why	Leiter	and	Clark	adhere	to	a	realist	interpretation,	so	that	there	is	some	neutral	standard	–	some	reality	–	around	which	interpretations	revolve	and	to	which	they	refer.		But	opposed	to	Leiter	and	Clark,	Nehamas	(along	with	Christoph	Cox	and	myself),	“accepts	Nietzsche’s	view	that	there	are	no	facts	that	are	independent	of	interpretation	and	that	are	therefore	capable	of	providing	the	common	object	of	which	all	interpretations	are	interpretations.”498		Likewise,	there	is	“no	neutral	standard	which	determines	in	every	case	which	of	our	interpretations	is	right	and	which	wrong.”499		Are	things	completely	relative	then,	without	some	interpretations	being	better	or	worse	than	others?		No.		With	Nehamas,	I	also	agree,	“some	interpretations	are	better	than	others.”500		For	Nietzsche,	it	is	obvious	that	he	
does	regard	some	interpretations	as	better	than	others,	or	else	much	of	what	he	writes	would	be	meaningless.		But	if	what	makes	some	interpretations	better	cannot	appeal	to	an	objective	reality	or	metaphysical	thing-in-itself,	then	there	arises	the	problem	of	explaining	how	some	interpretations	can	be	better	than	others.	One	of	the	of	the	implicit	foci	of	this	thesis	is	to	provide	a	unique	perspective	on	the	ground	by	which	some	interpretations	might	be	regarded	as	better	or	worse	in	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	as	well	as	in	general.		Although	Nietzsche	does	not	refer	to	defense	mechanisms	specifically	–	such	was	Freud’s	discovery	–	his	work	is	littered	with	descriptions	of	them.		What	he	criticizes	above	all	in	the	weak,	fettered	spirits	and	the	herd	–	the	decadent	spirits	–	are	the	defense	mechanisms	that	they	employ.																																																										497	Nehamas,	Nietzsche,	pg.	2	498	Nehamas,	Nietzsche,	pg.	3	499	Nehamas,	Nietzsche,	pg.	3	500	Nehamas,	Nietzsche,	pg.	3	
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For	example,	the	ascetics	are	criticized	for	repressing	their	nature,	the	religious	and	the	metaphysical	thinkers	for	being	delusional	and	disavowing	reality,	and	so	on.		Even	the	scientists	are	not	themselves	immune	from	such	defenses,	entertaining	the	ascetic	ideal	of	Truth.		The	defensiveness	is	also	criticized	in	those	who	aren’t	open	to	change	or	variation,	thus	indicating	a	fixation	that	psychoanalysis	would	later	regard	as	characteristic	of	a	neurotic	personality.		Nietzsche	also	writes,	“That	the	only	rightful	interpretation	of	the	world	should	be	one	to	which	you	have	a	right;	one	by	which	one	can	do	research	and	go	on	scientifically	in	your	sense	of	the	term	…	that	is	a	crudity	and	naiveté,	assuming	it	is	not	a	mental	illness,	an	idiocy.”501		What	Nietzsche	means,	consistent	with	his	characterizations	of	mental	illness	in	people	like	Wagner	(here	he	is	alluding	to	Herbert	Spencer),	is	that	one	displays	a	kind	of	psychical	weakness	in	closing	the	door	to	other	possible	interpretations	and	flaunting	only	one’s	own	as	if	it	were	the	Truth.		This	rigidity	is	indicative	of	an	egodystonic	constitution.			Just	prior	to	the	above	reference,	Nietzsche	writes	of	truth,	“One	shouldn’t	want	to	strip	it	of	its	ambiguous	character:	that,	gentleman,	is	what	good	taste	demands	–	above	all,	the	taste	of	reverence	for	everything	that	lies	beyond	your	horizon!”502	This	openness	is	egosyntonic.		Nietzsche	emphasizes	that	part	of	life’s	charm	and	seduction	is	in	recognizing	that	the	horizon	is	open,	rather	than	arrogantly,	defensively,	closing	it	off.		Why	defensively?		Because	closing	the	horizon	of	possibilities	makes	one	feel	secure	in	one’s	knowledge,	maintaining	a	delusion	or	fantasy	that	his/her	interpretation	is	the	truth,	repudiating	the	possibility	that	there																																																									501	Nietzsche,	The	Gay	Science,	§373	502	Nietzsche,	The	Gay	Science,	§373	
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are	other	interpretations,	or	even	an	expansion	of	one’s	own	from	any	moment.		To	close	one’s	self	off	from	change	exemplifies	the	fixation	and	rigidity	of	a	neurotic.				The	will	to	power,	in	effect,	shapes	the	ways	in	which	sense	impressions	are	received	and	hence	interpreted.		Nietzsche	writes:	
Belief	in	the	senses.		Is	a	fundamental	fact	of	our	intellect,	which	receives	from	the	sense	raw	material	that	it	interprets.		This	way	of	treating	the	raw	material	offered	by	the	senses	is,	considered	morally,	not	guided	by	an	intention	to	truth	but	as	if	by	a	will	to	overpower,	assimilate,	consume.		Our	constant	functions	are	absolutely	egoistic,	Machiavellian,	unscrupulous,	subtle.		Commanding	and	obeying	pushed	to	the	extreme,	and	so	that	it	can	obey	perfectly,	the	individual	organ	has	much	freedom.503			This	demonstrates	how	the	will	to	power	gives	shape	and	style	to	the	world	based	on	what	it	is	able	to	incorporate	into	the	intellectual	faculties.		Judgments	or	interpretations	are	generally	expressions	of	the	will	to	power	that	resolve	themselves	into	harmonies	and	bring	stability	or	order	to	the	preceding	conflict	and	tension.		In	summary,	what	makes	an	interpretation	better	or	worse	is	if	it	results	from	an	egosyntonic	or	egodystonic	constitution.		That	is,	an	interpretation	is	better	if	it	is	more	egosyntonic,	worse	if	it	is	more	egodystonic.		The	reason	why	is	that	an	egodystonic	constitution	entails	defensive	positions	that	hinder	incorporation,	whereas	an	egosyntonic	constitution	requires	incorporation	of	even	initially	conflicting	elements	into	a	harmonious	whole.	This	is	by	no	means	meant	to	endorse	a	realist	position	as	what	is	antagonistic	to	egodystonic	constitutions	that	often	result	in	delusions	or	fantasies																																																									503	Nietzsche,	Writings	form	the	Late	Notebooks,	34[55]	
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that	cover	over	or	exist	beside	reality,	often	supplanting	it.		Nietzsche,	I	argue,	can	be	regarded	as	an	ontological	relativist,	as	described	by	Christoph	Cox	as	well	as,	I	believe,	implied	by	Nehamas.		Furthermore,	and	in	relation	to	this,	I	believe	that	Nietzsche	entertains	both	a	coherence	and	pragmatic	theory	of	truth,	except	the	coherence	aspect	is	the	basis	of	veridical	claims.			I	maintain	that	truth,	as	such,	is	an	
aesthetic	phenomenon,	grounded	in	perspectives	(aesthetics	of	sense)	and	interpretations	(aesthetics	of	reflection),	and	by	which	existence	is	justified.		While	not	denying	the	existence	of	the	‘real’,	it	makes	little	or	no	sense	in	Nietzsche	to	speak	of	any	reality	outside	of	perspectives	and	interpretations.		For	Nietzsche,	interpretation	is	the	truth,	and	our	interpretations	and	perspectives	are	guided	by	the	will	to	power	according	to	what	interpretation	or	perspective	is	useful,	and	also	according	how	each	interpretation	and	perspective	coheres,	more	holistically,	with	the	constellation	of	all	our	other	interpretations	and	perspectives	since	they	too	were	formed	by	the	same	will	to	power.			Cox	observes,	“Nietzsche	constantly	returns	to	[the	topic	of	truth],”	throughout	his	work,	and	thus	“clearly	considers	the	issue	of	truth	to	be	of	central	philosophical	and	cultural	importance.”504		And	yet	in	the	Genealogy,	Nietzsche	claims,	“the	value	of	truth	…	[must]	for	once	be	called	into	question.”505		What	is	important	about	Cox’s	view,	with	which	I	am	in	agreement,	is	that	Nietzsche’s	consideration	of	truth	largely	pertains	to	the	value	accorded	to	it,	and	“how	truth	is	to	be	revalued	in	light	of	his	genealogy	of	European	thought.”506		In	The	Will	to																																																									504	Cox,	Naturalism	and	Interpretation,	pp.	27-28	505	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	III	§24	506	Cox,	Naturalism	and	Interpretation,	pg.	29	
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Power,	Nietzsche	writes,	“How	is	truth	proved?		By	the	feeling	of	enhanced	power	–	by	utility	–	by	indispensability	–	in	short,	by	advantages	(namely,	presuppositions	concerning	what	truth	ought	to	be	like	for	us	to	recognize	it).		But	that	is	a	prejudice:	a	sign	that	truth	is	not	involved	at	all.”507	What	he	means	by	this	is:	‘truth’,	in	the	sense	of	The	Truth,	outside	of	any	interpretation,	is	not	involved	at	all.		Furthermore,	he	also	points	out	that	we	conceive	truth	–	an	interpretation	–	according	to	the	‘feeling	of	power’	it	provides,	i.e.,	coherence;	and	according	to	its	‘utility’	and	‘indispensability’,	i.e.,	pragmatism.			The	least	troublesome	position	to	take	on	Nietzsche	concerning	the	nature	of	truth	or,	more	precisely,	what	we	take	to	be	the	truth,	is	something	of	a	‘hybrid’	interpretation	of	truth	that	Cox	observes	in	a	lengthy	footnote.508		It	is	true,	as	Nehamas	and	Gemes	both	assert,	that	Nietzsche	isn’t	particularly	interested	in	providing	a	wholly	rational	theory	of	truth.509		Yet,	the	ways	in	which	Nietzsche	uses	‘truth’	largely	oscillates	between	a	pragmatic	and	coherent	theory	of	truth,	whereby	truth	is,	respectively,	what	is	useful	or	harmonious	with	a	background	of	other	suppositions	or	perspectives.		This	is	an	affirmative	view	of	truth.		There	might	be	ways	in	which	truth	is	used	according	to	a	correspondence	theory	of	truth,	but	where	it	is	thus	used,	it	involves	correspondence	to	another	interpretation,	not	some	regulative	standard	like	‘reality’,	and	thus	actually	involves	coherence.		Nietzsche	asserts	that	even	the	‘truths’	of	science	are	also	interpretations	and	thus	matters	of	perspective.		Against	a	traditional	correspondence	view	of	truth,	Nietzsche	writes,																																																									507	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§455	508	Cox,	Naturalism	and	Interpretation,	pp.	28-29,	fn.	17	509	see	Gemes,	“Nietzsche’s	Critique	of	Truth,”	pg.	48	
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“physics	too	is	only	an	interpretation	and	arrangement	of	the	world	(according	to	ourselves!	If	I	may	say	so)	and	not	an	explanation	of	the	world.”510		This	clearly	illustrates	a	relativity	to	interpretations	and	truth,	and	one	that	is	generally	antagonistic	to	a	theory	of	correspondence.			How	can	one	conceptualize	truth	as	an	interpretation	in	Nietzsche’s	works,	where	both	a	pragmatic	and	coherent	theory	of	truth	exist	side	by	side?		Following	that	all	is	will	to	power,	and	will	to	power	is	essentially	creative,	one	can	appropriately	use	the	work	of	art	as	indicative	of	the	emergence	of	what	we	take	to	be	the	truth.		Indicative	of	the	ontological	relativism,	truth	–	or	what	we	take	to	be	the	truth	–	is	an	interpretation.		Every	interpretation	is	a	creative	phenomena	that	results	from	our	means	of	relating	aesthetically	with	the	world,	and	therefore	nothing	short	of	a	work	of	art.	Regarding	truth,	we	are	each	of	us	its	artists.		We	might	claim	that	something	is	true	when	it	is	useful,	like	a	specific	color	or	a	particular	medium	(paint,	stone,	mathematic	formula).		But	it	is	not	useful	outside	of	any	context;	that	is,	it	is	useful	precisely	because	of	its	coherence	with	the	rest	of	the	project.		So,	in	this	sense,	coherence	is	the	basis	of	truth	while	pragmatism	or	utility	might	also	allow	for	the	veridical	confirmation	or	indicate	the	coherence.		As	an	example,	I	could	claim	it	is	true	that	human	beings	are	perverse,	evil	creatures	in	need	of	salvation	if	such	a	claim	is	useful	to	me.		And	I	will	believe	it	insofar	as	it	is	useful	to	my	life	satisfaction	and/or	the	totality	of	my	beliefs.		Importantly,	what	makes	it	useful	to	me	is	the	background	upon	which	its	use	is	contingent;	namely,	it’s	coherence	with	the																																																									510	Nietzsche,	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§14	
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illusions,	wishful	thinking,	and/or	fantasies	I	might	attribute	to	life	and	existence,	desperate	to	find	meaning	in	suffering,	as	in	the	case	of	Nietzsche’s	‘ascetic’	in	the	
Genealogy.511	Nietzsche	further	claims	that	truth	represents	“Inertia;	that	hypothesis	which	gives	rise	to	contentment;	smallest	expenditure	of	spiritual	force,	etc.”512		Thus	‘truth’	for	Nietzsche	is	generated,	created,	imposed	or	bestowed	on	the	world	according	to	an	entropic	principle	whereby	‘truth’	indicates	the	attainment	of	a	homeostatic	aim,	a	harmony.		This	‘aim’	is	the	aesthetic	project.		As	human	beings,	what	creates	that	harmony	are	generally	the	means	by	which	we	relate	to	ourselves	and	the	world,	repudiating	or	incorporating,	as	no-sayers	or	yes-sayers.		We	relate	according	to	the	vicissitudes	of	our	instincts	and	drives,	and	therefore	egodystonically	or	egosyntonically.		Every	interpretation	and	every	valuation	–	everything	we	take	to	be	the	truth	–	is	the	product	of	a	creative	endeavor	towards	the	resolution	of	conflict	or	the	bestowal	of	order	and	harmony.		How	we	see	the	world,	through	the	structuring	capacities	of	our	vicissitudes,	is	a	work	of	art.		The	ascetic’s	‘truths’	are	egodystonic	in	that	they	are	contingent	on	the	vicissitude	of	repression	that	is	necessitated	by	its	relation	to	life	–	or	the	hinter-worldly	–	and	the	meaning	attributed	to	it.		The	vicissitudes	of	the	Übermensch,	on	the	other	hand,	necessarily	facilitate	incorporation	and	repudiate	nothing;	the	Übermensch	does	not	repress	or	disavow	any	aspect	of	his	nature	or	experience	and	there	for	is	an	archetype	of	egosyntonic	relating	–	of	sublimation.			
																																																									511	See,	for	example,	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	III	§20	512	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§537	
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III. AESTHETICS	AND	ETHICS:	
The	Symptoms	of	Vicissitudes		
	
The	Three	‘Senses’	of	Aesthetics	
In	any	discussion	of	Aesthetics,	the	grounds	are	not	always	clear.		The	term	‘Aesthetics’	is	used	to	describe	three	different	topics,	and	the	three	often	get	confused	and	conflated	or	comingled	with	each	other.		Kant	successfully	makes	a	distinction	between	these	three.513		Nietzsche	never	explicitly	addresses	the	distinction,	but	he	nonetheless	sufficiently	addresses	all	three	within	his	corpus,	each	of	which	carries	considerable	weight	in	his	project	for	re-valuations	and	self-cultivation.	These	three	distinct	topics	are:	first,	aesthetics	of	sense,	or	the	raw	sense	impressions	at	the	level	of	appearances;	second,	aesthetics	as	reflective	judgments,	and	thus	pertaining	to	feelings	of	the	beautiful	and	the	sublime	(and	respectively	to	the	ugly	and	the	horrific);	and	third,	aesthetics	as	it	pertains	to	art	and	artistic	endeavors	–	creativity.		And	perhaps	contributing	to	the	conflations,	each	of	these	three	topics	are	interrelated	in	such	a	way	that	‘reflection’	refers	to	‘sense’;	‘art	and	artistry’	to	both	reflection	and	sense,	and	each	in	either	the	paradigm	of	the	artist	or	of	the	spectator,	and	so	on.			Nietzsche,	unlike	Kant	and	Schopenhauer,	makes	a	further	distinction	in	the	third	category	of	aesthetics.		He	distinguishes	between	passive	art,	or	art	for	the	
																																																								513	In	Kant’s	work,	the	distinction	is	found	regarding	the	agreeable,	the	beautiful,	and	creativity	or	genius.	
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perceiver,	and	art	for	the	artist.		Following	from	what	was	addressed	above	concerning	artistry,	one	can	also	make	a	further	distinction	concerning	art	for	the	artist	in	Nietzsche’s	works,	whereas	a	reactive	artist	creates	in	order	to	console	and/or	conceal,	but	an	active	artist	exemplifies	something	like	Nietzsche’s	philosopher	or	artist	of	the	future,	incorporating	the	uncomfortable	and	‘ugly’	truths	of	nihilism	–	life’s	purposelessness	and	meaninglessness	–	by	making	it	beautiful,	creating	meaning	out	of	it.		This	will	ultimately	become	Nietzsche’s	ethical	imperative:	to	make	beautiful	and	give	style	to	one’s	self	and	the	world	via	sublimation.		
Aesthetics	of	Sense	and	Reflection	
Kant’s	project	in	the	Critique	of	Judgment,	diverges	somewhat	from	the	concerns	here,	but	Kant’s	descriptions	of	what	is	Beautiful	or	Sublime,	and	the	requirements	for	judging	things	as	such,	provides	a	ground	to	which	any	aesthetic	theory	should	refer	and	to	which	any	aesthetic	theory	after	him	is	indebted.		Of	particular	interest	is	the	germination	of	Kant’s	theory	in	the	works	of	Schopenhauer	and	the	works	Nietzsche	after	him.		In	his	three	critiques,	Kant	addresses	the	powers	of	the	capacities	of	mind:	the	cognitive	powers	responsible	for	theoretical	knowledge	as	delineated	in	the	
Critique	of	Pure	Reason;	the	power	of	desire,	as	delineated	in	the	Critique	of	Practical	
Reason;	and	the	power	of	judgment,	in	the	Critique	of	Judgment.		What	chiefly	concerns	us	here	is	the	reflective	judgment	termed	by	Kant	as	aesthetic	judgment,	pertaining	to	the	agreeable,	the	beautiful,	and	the	sublime.		I’d	like	to	add	that	this	
	 199	
also	concerns	judgments	of	what	are,	respectively,	disgusting,	ugly,	and	horrifying,	although	what	Kant	says	about	these	are	mostly	implied	if	present	at	all.		Aesthetic	judgment	pertains	to	the	judgment	of	a	thing	in	reference	to	a	pleasure	or	displeasure.		For	his	project,	Kant	wants	to	show	that	the	subjective	feeling	of	pleasure	(or	displeasure)	can,	in	relation	to	a	particular	object,	demonstrate	the	possibility	for	a	universal	liking	(or	disliking).		He,	however,	focuses	almost	exclusively	on	positive	aesthetic	judgments	for	largely	unconscious	reasons	unbeknownst	to	him	but	about	which	Freud	has	plenty	to	say	(which	will	be	addressed	in	the	section	on	das	Unheimlich).	Kant’s	3rd	Critique	is	intended	to	investigate	what	is	necessary	for	a	pure	and	universally	valid	judgment	about	what	is	otherwise	quite	subjective	and	therefore	admitting	of	peculiarities.		He	writes,	“If	we	wish	to	decide	whether	something	is	beautiful	or	not,	we	…	refer	the	presentation	[of	the	object]	to	the	subject	and	his	feeling	of	pleasure	or	displeasure.”		It	is	therefore	a	“judgment	whose	determining	basis	cannot	be	other	than	subjective.”514		The	mere	pleasure	(or	displeasure)	in	the	sensation	or	feeling	is	itself	the	basis	for	aesthetic	judging.		But	judging	a	thing	to	be	beautiful	or	otherwise	requires,	on	the	part	of	the	subject,	reflective	judgment	where	a	universal	is	found	(or	created)	for	it.	Pleasure	generally	emerges	from	the	attainment	of	an	aim.		Regarding	the	sensation	or	feeling	of	pleasure,	“The	attainment	of	an	aim	[Absicht]	is	always	connected	with	the	feeling	of	pleasure,”515	writes	Kant.		He	continues	writing	that																																																									514	Kant,	Critique	of	Judgment,	pg.	44	[204]	515	Kant,	2nd	Introduction,	Critique	of	Judgment,	VI,	pg.	27	[187]	I’d	like	to	point	out	the	distinction	between	‘aim’	as	it	appears	here	in	Kant,	and	‘aim’	as	it	appears	in	
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we	refer	to	“whatever	is	liked,	precisely	inasmuch	as	it	is	liked,”	as	being	agreeable,	and	“pleasure	would	be	the	agreeableness	[found]	in	the	sensation	of	one’s	state.”516		But	the	agreeable	is	not	to	be	equated	with	the	beautiful.		The	agreeable	involves	only	the	presentation	of	things	to	the	senses	and	the	corresponding	pleasure	in	that	engagement.		Significantly,	it	always	appears	to	be	interested,	according	to	Kant.		The	liking	of	the	beautiful,	on	the	other	hand,	involves	the	faculties	of	the	imagination	and	the	understanding	in	reflection	upon	what	is	experienced	as	pleasurable,	and	is	felt	as	such	with	disinterest.		Another	distinguishing	point	is	that	pleasure	in	the	agreeable	is	described	by	Kant	as	a	pleasurable	sensation,	indicating	the	embodiment.		Pleasure	in	the	beautiful,	on	the	other	hand,	is	a	pleasurable	feeling,	and	pertains	solely	to	the	cognitive	faculties.	I’d	like	to	digress	briefly	here	to	relate	this	to	previous	discussions	because	it	will	highlight	the	significance	of	Nietzsche’s	argument	against	disinterest	that	I’ll	make	later.		Tying	this	into	the	neuroscience	referenced	earlier,	I	think	it	isn’t	imprudent	to,	on	the	one	hand,	relate	this	to	the	dopaminergic	system,	popularly	regarded	as	the	brain	reward	system.		And	so,	this	rehashes	the	argument	mentioned	previously	concerning	pleasure	and	unpleasure	in	Freud	and	Nietzsche,	as	well	as	observations	made	by	Panksepp,	that	the	‘reward’	aspect	of	the	system	is	actually	secondary.		First	and	foremost	it	is	a	SEEKING	system,	indicating																																																																																																																																																																						Freud.		For	Freud,	aim	is	the	English	translation	of	Ziel,	which	might	be	translated	also	as	‘target’,	‘goal’,	‘objective’	or	a	kind	of	destination,	such	that	a	sex	drive	aims	at	a	sexual	object.		Absicht,	on	the	other	hand,	can	be	translated	also	as	‘intention’,	‘purpose’,	or	‘design’,	generally	denoting	a	kind	of	functionality.		Loosely,	I	think	the	two	can	be	used	interchangeably,	but	strictly,	it’s	a	diference	worth	considering	as	
Absicht	bears	a	relation	to	the	form	of	purposiveness	in	Kant	concerning	the	Beautiful.	516	Kant,	Critique	of	Judgment,	pg.	47	[206]	(my	emphases)	
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exploratory	behavior.		The	pleasure	(or	displeasure)	that	one	feels	should	be	regarded	as	1.	only	an	epiphenomenal	aspect	of	which	we	are	able	to	be	conscious,	and	2.	As	a	terminus	for	the	dispositions	that	would	nonetheless	exist	with	or	without	the	reward.		Following	Skinner’s	behavioral	psychology	concerning	the	“Brain	Reward	System,”	however,	the	epiphenomena	of	the	feeling	of	pleasure	would	serve	drive	cathexes;	viz.,	pleasure	would	increase	the	chances	of	an	action’s	repetition	(and	therefore	conditioning),	and	such	is	the	claim	made	by	Freud	on	the	derivation	of	drives	in	the	anaclitic	relation	with	the	instincts.			Through	the	instinct	of	feeding,	the	infant	feels	pleasure,	although	it	was	not	the	pleasure	that	motivated	the	act	of	feeding	but	only	emerged	from	it.		Pleasure	was	not	the	purpose	of	feeding.		However,	pleasure	in	the	sensuous	relation	with	the	breast	creates	the	sex	drives	(Eros),	and	the	drives	are	thus	formed	anaclitically	to	the	instinct.		Here,	pleasure	both	arises	from	action	not	compelled	towards	pleasure	–	as	functional	pleasure	of	the	instinct	–	and	sensual,	organ	pleasure	also	conditions	future	similar	actions	of	the	same	sort	in	the	anaclitic	formation	of	a	drive.		In	this	sense,	the	motivational	state	for	acting	might	be	originally	something	other	than	pleasure,	and	yet	pleasure,	which	is	epiphenomenal	to	it,	also	conditions	it	or	promotes	the	chances	of	its	repetition.		This	was	all	sufficiently	addressed	in	the	preceding	section	on	Bemächtigungstrieb.			Nietzsche	also	writes,	correspondingly,	“Pleasure	and	displeasure	can	only	be	means	in	the	course	of	events.”517	Nietzsche’s	point	is	that	the	will	to	power,	which	corresponds	to	Bemächtigungstrieb	in	Freud’s	corpus,	is	the	dispositional																																																									517	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§36	
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factor	involved	in	all	actions	or	reactions	–	the	motivational	state;	pleasure	and	displeasure	are	consequences	of	such	but	can	be	means	for	future	developments.		They	are	that	of	which	–	along	with	desire	–	we	are	able	to	be	conscious.		Again,	a	difference	might	be	drawn	between	motivational	states	and	propositional	attitudes	whereas	a	motivational	state	(an	instinct	or	drive)	is	not	driven	according	to	pleasure	or	unpleasure,	but	the	ensuing	propositional	attitude	might	very	well	be	in	the	form	of	desire.			It	might	be	that	our	propositional	attitudes	are	in	fact	compounds	of	our	motivational	states	conditioned	by	encounters	with	pleasures	and	unpleasures	and	the	ideas	formed	from	them.518	Returning	to	Kant’s	analysis,	beauty	produces	a	feeling	of	pleasure	in	the	subject,	and	thus	also	would	appear	to	be	produced	from	the	attainment	of	some	aim.		This	refers	to	the	quality	of	the	Beautiful	–	the	first	moment	in	the	critique.			He	further	elaborates	that	this	“designates	nothing	whatsoever	in	the	object,”	but	rather	how	the	subject	“is	affected	by	the	presentation.	…	namely,	to	his	feeling	of	life,	under	the	name	feeling	of	pleasure	or	displeasure,”	which	goes	on	to	form	“the	basis	of	a	very	special	power	of	discriminating	and	judging.”519	What	brings	about	this	pleasure	is	the	harmony	between	the	faculties	of	imagination	and	understanding	of	the	subject	in	the	presentation	of	the	object,	thus	a	pleasure	experienced	via	an	object	and	yet	independent	of	it.			
																																																								518	See,	for	example,	Harris, Sam et al. “Funcitonal Neuroimaging of Belief, Disbelief, 
and Uncertainty” and Turnball, Oliver, “The Pleasantness of False Beliefs” 519	Kant,	Critique	of	Judgment,	pg.	44	[204]	
	 203	
Kant	describes	the	liking	of	the	Beautiful	as	displaying	“purposiveness	without	a	purpose.”520	The	harmony	of	the	understanding	and	the	imagination	produces	the	feeling	of	the	Beautiful	where	one	can	“observe	a	purposiveness	as	to	form	and	take	note	of	it	in	objects	–	even	if	only	by	reflection	–	without	basing	it	on	a	purpose.”521		In	other	words,	the	subject	finds,	in	the	object	that	produces	the	feeling	of	beauty,	an	object	that	would	seem	to	have	brought	about	the	attainment	of	an	aim,	indicating	the	form	of	purposiveness,	without	actually	knowing	what	that	aim	is.		He	writes,	“The	very	consciousness	of	a	merely	formal	purposiveness	in	the	play	of	the	subject’s	cognitive	powers	…	is	that	pleasure”	that	is	“merely	contemplative”	and	disinterested.522		“Objective	purposiveness,”	however,	contrasted	to	the	subjective	purposiveness	in	the	feeling	of	beauty,	is	determined	according	to	a	concept.523		In	other	words,	a	judgment	of	the	beautiful	is	disinterested	because	it	is	purely	contemplative	and	involves	a	necessary	free	play	of	the	understanding	and	the	imagination.524		Kant	writes,	“A	judgment	of	taste	is	an	aesthetic	judgment,	i.e.,	a	judgment	that	rests	on	subjective	bases,	and	whose	determining	basis	cannot	be	a	concept	and	hence	also	cannot	be	the	concept	of	a	determinate	purpose.”525		Any	judgment	of	the	beautiful,	then,	entails	the	feeling	of	pleasure	in	the	subject	derived	from	the	form	of	purposiveness	that	the	free	play	of	the	understanding	and	the	imagination	can	cognize	in	the	presentation	of	an	object.																																																									520	Kant,	Critique	of	Judgment,	pg.	65	[220]	521	Kant,	Critique	of	Judgment,	pg.	65	[220]	522	Kant,	Critique	of	Judgment,	pg.	68	[222]	523	Kant,	Critique	of	Judgment,	pg.	73	[226]	524	This	is	the	important	aspect	that	I	will	later	address	discussing	Nietzsche’s	critique	of	Kant	and	Schopenhauer	525	Kant,	Critique	of	Judgment,	pg.	74	[228]	
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On	Aesthetic	Interest	
Kant	is	careful	to	distinguish	the	merely	agreeable	from	the	Beautiful,	and	likewise	the	Beautiful	from	the	good.	The	agreeable	and	the	good,	for	Kant,	are	both	interested	in	an	object’s	existence.		Concerning	the	agreeable,	such	a	judgment	“arouses	a	desire	for	objects	of	that	kind,”	so	that	“the	agreeable	produces	an	inclination.”526		The	judgment	of	the	agreeable	(or	disagreeable)	is	contingent	on	the	sensory	receptivity	of	an	object.		So,	Kant	also	distinguishes	between	the	sense	of	pleasure	in	the	case	of	the	agreeable,	and	the	feeling	of	pleasure	in	the	case	of	the	beautiful,	which	precludes	sensation	and	is	purely	cognitive;	that	is,	refers	only	to	the	cognitive	powers	of	the	imagination	and	the	understanding,	or	reason	in	the	case	of	the	sublime.			The	good	is	also	connected	with	interest,	whether	it	is	good	because	it	is	useful	toward	some	end	or	because	it	is	“intrinsically	good,”	as	when	it	is	liked	for	its	own	sake.		“All	interest	either	presupposes	a	need,”	as	in	the	case	for	the	good,	“or	gives	rise	to	one,”	as	in	the	case	for	the	merely	agreeable.527		The	good	“contains	a	concept	of	a	purpose,”	writes	Kant,	“consequently	a	relation	of	reason	to	a	volition…,	and	hence	a	liking	for	the	existence	of	an	object	or	action.”528		The	agreeable	and	the	good,	while	both	interested,	are	distinguishable	by	the	fact	that	the	agreeable	is	not	based	on	a	concept	but	on	sensation,	whereas	the	good	is	based	on	“principles	of	reason,	using	the	concept	of	a	purpose.”529		Kant	later	addresses	judgments	of	the	
																																																								526	Kant,	Critique	of	Judgment,	pg.	48		[207]	527	Kant,	Critique	of	Judgment,	pg.	52	[210]	528	Kant,	Critique	of	Judgment,	pg.	49	[207]	529	Kant,	Critique	of	Judgment,	pg.	49	[208]	
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good	in	his	critique	as	a	teleological	judgment.		Aesthetic	judgment	of	the	beautiful,	on	the	other	hand,	is	“merely	contemplative,”	because	it	is	“indifferent	to	the	existence	of	an	object.”530		But	how,	exactly,	can	a	judgment	of	taste,	which	produces	in	the	subject	a	feeling	of	pleasure,	be	referred	to	as	disinterested?	This	is	a	point	that	Nietzsche	specifically	attacks,	and	to	which	I’ll	address	further	on.	Schopenhauer	can	be	largely	seen	as	appropriating	and	psychologizing	Kant,	injecting	Kant’s	general	framework	with	a	psychology	and	subjectivity	that	Kant	intentionally	omitted	in	order	to	keep	his	project	as	‘rational’	and	non-convoluted	as	possible.		Schopenhauer	identifies	in	aesthetic	experience,	as	well	as	in	ethical	experience,	a	determinative	interest.		Dale	Jacquette	observes,	“Schopenhauer’s	claims	about	the	ability	of	aesthetic	experience	to	quiet	desire	and	wanting…	suggest	that	art	is	no	more	than	a	nonpharmaceutical	pain-killer.”531		This	kind	of	‘relief	from	suffering’	that	is	offered	in	aesthetic	experience	is	also	what	Freud	takes	up	and	further	elaborates	on,	asserting	that	it	is	one	of	many	various	palliative	measures	for	an	existence	that	is	otherwise	characterized	as	suffering.532		Schopenhauer,	with	sentiments	later	echoed	to	varying	degrees	by	Nietzsche	and	even	more	closely	by	Freud,	writes	that	all	of	life	is	conflict	and,	in	line	with	what	Freud	claims,533	Schopenhauer	writes,	“…	The	pain	essential	to	life	cannot	be	thrown	off.”534		Instead,	“The	ceaseless	efforts	to	banish	suffering	achieve	nothing	more	than	a	change	in	its	form.	…	If	…	we	have	succeeded	in	removing	pain	in	this																																																									530	Kant,	Critique	of	Judgment,	pg.	51	531	Jacquette,	Metaphysics,	pg.	27	532	see,	for	example,	Freud,	Civ.	&	Dis,	pp.	82-83	533	especially	in	Civilization	and	its	Discontents	534	Schopenhauer,	WWR	I	pg.	314	
	 206	
form,	it	at	once	appears	on	the	scene	in	a	thousand	others.”535		Thus	in	Schopenhauer	we	find	precursors	to	what	Freud	observes	in	the	formation	of	symptoms	through	utilizing	defense	mechanisms,	‘palliative	measures’,	whether	the	attempt	to	remove	the	pain,	and	the	consequent	‘symptom’,	is	neurotic	or	psychotic.			For	Schopenhauer,	pleasurable	aesthetic	experiences	have	the	affect	of	existential	consolations	or	ephemeral	atonements.		Daniel	Came	writes,	and	I	agree	with	him:	Schopenhauer’s	claims	regarding	aesthetic	experience	seem	phenomenologically	true,	or	nearly	true.		That	is,	at	the	level	of	phenomenology	he	seems	right	to	regard	as	the	hallmark	of	aesthetic	experience	a	diminished	sense	of	self	and	world	along	with	the	reciprocal	relations	of	space,	time,	and	causality	that	obtain	between	objects	in	ordinary	experiences.	…	One	might	object	that	…	we	never	lose	all	awareness	of	ourselves	…	But	something	approaching	this	kind	of	experience	does	seem	to	occur	in	aesthetic	experience.536			It	does	appear	that,	in	aesthetic	contemplation,	oneself	and	everything	else	other	than	the	object	of	contemplation,	seems	to	melt	away,	as	if	hypnotized	or	‘in	love’,537	and	all	the	rest	of	the	world	disappears.	Came	also	observes,	“In	Schopenhauer’s	hands,	this	axiology	of	selflessness	is	appropriated	in	the	service	of	his	wider	soteriological	end,	namely,	identifying	the	conditions	of	the	complete	and	permanent	abolition	of	self	and	the	‘blessed	peace	of	
																																																								535	Schopenhauer,	WWR	I	pg.	315.		See	also	Schopenhauer,	WWR	I,	pg.	147	on	Nature	as	conflict	substantialized.	536	Came,	Daniel,	“Schopenhauer	…	Art	and	Morality,”	pg.	242	537	Love	is	another	‘palliative	measure’	mentioned	by	Freud,	approximating	the	closest	to	‘happiness’.		See	Civ.	&	Dis.	pg.	82	
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nothingness’.”538	What	Schopenhauer	finds	valuable	in	aesthetic	contemplation	or	the	experience	of	the	beautiful	and	the	sublime	is	that	it	dissolves,	albeit	quite	ephemerally,	one’s	selfhood	into	the	a	hypercathexis	of	the	contemplated	object(s),	losing,	temporarily,	even	the	will-to-live.		One	dissolves	into	nothing,	but	as	no	thing	becomes	with	everything	…	that	is,	loses	individuation	and	becomes	everything	in	the	aesthetic	experience.			For	Schopenhauer,	“One’s	engagement	with	an	object	in	aesthetic	experience	is	disinterested	and	painless.”539		And	Nietzsche	observes,	“Ultimately	…	the	value	of	art	for	Schopenhauer	derives	from	its	status	as	a	kind	of	signpost	to	the	higher	condition	of	asceticism.”540		Observing	the	defense	mechanism	of	repression	or	reaction-formation	in	Schopenhauer’s	philosophy,	Nietzsche	writes,	“There	are	few	things	about	which	Schopenhauer	speaks	with	such	certainty	as	the	effect	of	aesthetic	contemplation:	according	to	him,	it	counteracts	sexual	‘interestedness’,	…	and	he	never	tires	of	singing	the	praises	of	this	escape	from	the	‘will’	as	the	great	advantage	and	use	of	the	aesthetic	condition.”541		In	other	words,	the	‘Will’,	which	Schopenhauer	loosely	identifies	with	willing	in	general,	is	affiliated	with	sexual	interestedness.		Aesthetic	contemplation,	the	recognition	of	‘ideas’	and	the	beautiful,	are	an	escape	from	that	interestedness	because	they	entail	disinterestedness	–	a	dissolution	of	the	self,	and	the	recognition	of	the	impersonal	will,	mediated	by	the	plastic	arts	or	nearly	unmediated	by	music.			
																																																								538	Came,	Daniel,	“Schopenhauer	…	Art	and	Morality,”	pg.	243	539	Came,	Daniel,	“Schopenhauer	…	Art	and	Morality,”	pg.	241	540	Came,	Daniel,	“Schopenhauer	…	Art	and	Morality,”	pg.	243	541	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	III	§6	
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Nietzsche	also	observes,	as	Freud	later	does	of	philosophers	in	general,	that	the	roots	of	Schopenhauer’s	philosophy	might	actually	be	grounded	in	Schopenhauer’s	sexuality	and	the	age	at	which	he	conceived	the	core	of	his	thought,	whereas,	“it	reflects	not	just	the	specific	characteristics	of	Schopenhauer	himself	but	also	the	specifics	of	that	season	of	life.”542	Nietzsche	claims,	“as	long	as	there	are	philosophers	on	earth	and	whenever	there	have	been	philosophers	…	there	exists	a	genuine	philosophers’	irritation	and	rancor	against	sensuality	–	Schopenhauer	is	just	the	most	eloquent	and	…	the	most	fascinating	and	delightful	eruption	among	them.”543		However,	Nietzsche	asserts,	“Sensuality	is	not	suspended	as	soon	as	we	enter	the	aesthetic	condition,	as	Schopenhauer	believed,	but	is	only	transfigured	and	no	longer	enters	the	consciousness	as	a	sexual	stimulus.”544		Thus,	some	vicissitude	or	defense	mechanism	like	repression	or	reaction-formation	is	clearly	identified.		 Furthermore,	if	we	examine	closely	what	is	at	stake	here,	Schopenhauer	sees	differentiation	as	a	source	of	suffering.		The	will	in	representations,	in	the	
principium	individuationis,	displays	illusions	of	difference,	and	that	differentiation	is	responsible	for	the	feeling	of	lack	that	arouses	desire.		Only	as	an	individual,	among	separate	things	to	be	desired,	does	one	suffer	through	desire.		Looking	again	at	primary	narcissism,	one	of	the	very	first	psychical	conflicts	that	arises	in	a	human	being	is	the	disillusionment	of	the	self/world	tautology.		Here,	Schopenhauer	flips	
																																																								542	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	III	§6	543	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	III	§7	544	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	III	§8	
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this	on	its	head	whereby	difference	is	regarded	as	illusion	rather	than	separation,545and	so	it	indicates	the	kind	of	disavowal	undergone	in	what	Freud	termed	the	psychoneuroses,	e.g.,	melancholia	(the	introjection	of	the	‘lost	object’).	In	his	book	on	Schopenhauer,	Raj	Singh	writes,	“It	has	been	claimed	that	no	other	human	field	of	inquiry	and	creativity	is	as	closely	allied	with	death	as	philosophy.		Indeed,	philosophy	was	conceived	as	wedded	to	death,”	and	in	Western	philosophy	it	would	appear	this	is	so,	ever	since	“Socrates	proclaimed	the	bond	between	death	and	philosophy,”	and	“the	theme	of	death	has	stayed	with	western	philosophy	as	an	essential	part	of	its	mandate.”546	He	observes	also	that	Socrates	defined	philosophy	as	a	rehearsal	for	death.		Schopenhauer	also	makes	this	reference	at	the	beginning	of	his	essay	on	Death.		We	also	find	at	this	point	in	time	a	simultaneous	rejection	of	corporeality.		Singh	observes,	“All	hindrance	to	the	will’s	striving,	or	obstacles	placed	between	the	will	and	its	temporary	goal,	is	called	‘suffering’	by	Schopenhauer.”547		This	echoes	also	the	“frustration”	observed	in	existence,	exemplifying	the	influence	of	Schopenhauer’s	philosophy	on	Otto	Rank’s	‘Birth	Trauma’.548				Jonathan	Lear	claims	“Plato	invents	philosophy	as	an	act	of	mourning.		Indeed,	the	very	name	‘philosophy’	characterizes	the	activity	as	a	distinctive	kind	of	longing	for	the	lost	object.”549		And	after	giving	an	account	of	the	irrational	forces	of	the	human	psyche	in	the	Republic,	the	rest	of	the	book	presents	“Plato’s	dream	of	a																																																									545	Or	perhaps	Freud	flips	Schopenhauer’s	assertion	on	its	head	546	Singh,	R.	Raj.		Death,	Contemplation,	pg.	ix	547	Singh,	R.	Raj.		Death,	Contemplation,	pg.	33	548	I	alluded	to	Rank	previously	in	discussing	the	vicissitude	of	disavowal.		549	Lear,	Happiness,	pg.	102	
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society	in	which	Socrates	could	come	back	and	rule.		The	‘beautiful	city’	(the	
kallipolis)	is	Plato’s	field	of	dreams:	a	place	where	philosophy	(=	Socrates)	will	rule	and	make	a	permanent	place	for	itself.”550		But	this	depicts	not	mourning	as	much	as	it	depicts	a	kind	of	melancholy	–	the	attempt	to	make	permanent	a	lost	love	object.		Schopenhauer	writes	that,	because	“there	is	no	ultimate	aim	of	striving	means	that	there	is	no	measure	or	end	of	suffering.”551		Schopenhauer,	like	Plato	in	his	death	contemplation,	exemplifies	melancholia	and	affirms	the	adage	of	Silenus:	“It	is	better	not	to	have	been	born,	but	having	been	born,	it	is	best	to	die	as	soon	as	possible.”		Nietzsche’s	criticism	of	Schopenhauer	is	that	what	he	values	in	aesthetics,	and	the	ethics	that	he	preaches,	amounts	to	a	philosophy	of	death.		“Schopenhauer	talks	about	beauty	with	a	melancholy	passion	…	because	he	sees	it	as	a	bridge	you	can	cross	to	something	further.		…	He	sees	it	as	a	momentary	redemption	from	the	‘will’	–	it	is	an	enticement	to	permanent	redemption	…	he	thinks	that	the	drive	to	procreate	is	negated	by	beauty.”552	And	furthermore,	Schopenhauer	“takes	art	as	a	bridge	to	the	negation	of	life.”553		But	even	Plato,	Nietzsche	asserts,	recognizes	that	“All	beauty	is	a	temptation	to	procreate.”554		Schopenhauer’s	idea	of	beauty	ends	up	amounting	to	the	repudiation	of	life,	or	what	is	fundamental	to	living,	which	is	to	say,	it	is	analogous	to	death	–	the	state	at	which	one	is	devoid	of	all	interest.		Taking	this	point	and	then	reapplying	it	to	Kant’s	formulation	as	a	comparison,	in	the	case																																																									550	Lear,	Happiness,	pg.	103	551	Schopenhauer,	WWR	I,	pg.	309	552	Nietzsche,	Twilight,	Skirmishes,	§22	553	Nietzsche,	KSA	13,	14[119]		“Die	unkünstlerischen	Zustände:	die	der	Objektivität	,	der	Spiegelung,	des	ausgehängten	Willens…	das	skandalöse	Mißverständniß	Schopenhauers	,	der	die	Kunst	als	Brücke	zur	Verneinung	des	Lebens	nimmt…”	(my	translation	from	German	is	quoted	above)	554	Nietzsche,	Twilight,	Skirmishes,	§22	
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of	Kant	a	condition	analogous	to	death	is	the	prerequisite	for	a	pure	judgment	of	beauty;	For	Schopenhauer,	a	condition	analogous	to	death	–	the	liberation	from	existential	suffering	and	willing	–	is	the	consequence	of	cognizing	beauty.	This	is,	of	course,	the	point	at	which	Nietzsche	is	most	in	contention	with	Schopenhauer.		Aside	from	Schopenhauer’s	metaphysics	(with	which	Nietzsche	is	also	very	critical),	the	issue	that	perhaps	separates	the	two	the	most	is	Schopenhauer’s	appeal	to	the	negation	of	the	will,	and	–	for	Nietzsche	at	least	–	ultimately	of	life.		For	Nietzsche,	this	represents	the	attitude	of	a	decadent	artist,	or	the	decadent	spectator	of	artists	and	culture.		Nietzsche,	in	opposition	to	Schopenhauer,	looks	to	affirm	life.		And	he	sees	a	positive,	healthy	role	for	art	in	precisely	that	task:	to	bring	order	to,	and	bestow	meaning	upon,	the	life	that	Schopenhauer	would	rather	repudiate.				
Nietzsche’s	Aesthetic	Judgment	
Nietzsche’s	critique	of	the	disinterestedness	of	aesthetic	judgment	essentially	kills	two	birds	with	one	stone.		He	argues,	with	Schopenhauer,	that	the	determining	ground	of	an	aesthetic	judgment	cannot	be	disinterested	and	regards	aesthetic	valuations	as	psychologically	grounded.		But	he	argues	against	Schopenhauer’s	valuation	of	beauty	that	is	symptomatic	of	a	melancholic,	reactive	nihilism	that	results	in	a	withdrawal	from	life.	
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	 Nietzsche	consistently	describes	disinterested	contemplation	as	a	“non-concept	and	an	absurdity.”555		This	is	because	all	contemplation	necessarily	entails	interest;	that	is,	all	objects	of	contemplation	are	objects	of	interest,	are	interpreted	according	to	interest,	and	the	mere	act	of	contemplation	itself	is	a	motivated	activity	so	that	without	interest	there	would	be	no	contemplation.		“To	eliminate	the	will	completely	and	turn	off	all	the	emotions	without	exception,	assuming	we	could	…	would	that	not	mean	to	castrate	the	intellect?”556		Nietzsche	writes	that	one	of	Kant’s	errors	lies	in	the	definition	he	gives	of	the	beautiful.		“Kant	said:	‘	Something	beautiful	is	beautiful	if	it	gives	pleasure	without	
interest’.		Without	interest!		Compare	this	definition	with	another	made	by	a	genuine	‘spectator’	and	artist	–	Stendhal,	who	once	called	the	beautiful	une	promesse	de	
bonheur.”557		Nietzsche	thus	pits	Stendhal	against	Kant.		Schopenhauer	on	the	other	hand,	Nietzsche	claims,	“stood	much	closer	to	the	arts	than	Kant	and	still	could	not	break	free	of	the	spell	of	Kant’s	definition	…	he	interpreted	the	phrase	‘without	interest’	in	the	most	personal	way	possible.”558		Nietzsche	observes,	then,	that	Schopenhauer	does	not	mean	the	same	by	‘disinterested’	as	Kant	–	that	Schopenhauer	makes	what	Kant	intends	to	be	impersonal	and	purely	rational	(thus	lacking	all	sentiment,	such	as	in	intellectualization)	as	personal	and	injected	with	psychical	interest.			For	Kant,	the	agreeable	concerns	only	judgments	of	sense,	in	the	mere	pleasure	or	liking	in	the	object,	which	is	interested	in	the	object’s	existence,	such																																																									555	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	III	§12	556	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	III	§12	557	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	III	§6	558	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	III	§6	
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that	a	man	in	the	desert	will	find	water	to	be	agreeable,	and	insofar	as	he	is	interested	in	the	objects	existence,	then	his	judgment	of	taste	pertaining	to	quality	of	the	water	cannot	be	taken	seriously.		A	man	who	is	not	dying	of	thirst	in	the	desert,	however,	and	therefore	not	interested	in	the	existence	of	the	water,	can	judge	it	without	interest.		However,	Kant	also	writes,	“It	does	not	follow	…	that	…	an	interest	cannot	be	connected	with	[the	beautiful],”	but	only	that	the	“beautiful	must	not	have	an	interest	as	its	determinative	basis.”559		In	other	words,	we	can	judge	an	object	in	which	we	are	interested	as	beautiful,	but	such	a	judgment	is	only	a	pure	aesthetic	judgment	if	it	is	disconnected	from	that	interest	as	a	determining	factor.		In	the	aesthetic	judgment	of	the	beautiful,	it	requires	the	feeling	of	pleasure	that	is	produced	only	by	the	harmonious	free	play	of	the	understanding	and	the	imagination	in	reflection	upon	the	object,	absent	of	all	desire	and	volition	on	the	part	of	the	perceiver	which	would	otherwise	make	the	‘play’	determined	and	thus	unfree.		To	support	this,	Kant	intriguingly	claims	that	the	pleasure	in	a	pure	judgment	of	taste	must	follow	from	rather	than	precede	the	judgment,	so	as	to	ensure	its	disinterestedness.		For	Kant,	the	power	of	judging	and	the	activity	of	the	cognitive	faculties	responsible	for	judgment	are	disinterested	only	insofar	as	they	are	entirely	separated	off	from	the	influence	of	the	inclinations.		Nietzsche’s	point	is	that	it	is	impossible	for	anything	to	be	judged	and	interpreted,	or	even	perceived	at	all,	without	the	influence	of	motivational	states	–	our	instincts	or	drives	(referred	to	as	‘inclinations’	by	Kant)	–	i.e.,	will	to	power.560																																																									559	Kant,	Critique	of	Judgment,	pg.	163,	[296]	560	What	Schopenhauer	provides	with	the	Will	is	a	possibility	for	a	universal	substratum	that	determines	the	liking	and	therefore	also,	to	varying	degrees,	
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While	in	Kant	there	are	reflective	judgments	(aesthetic	and	teleological),	Nietzsche	refers	to	instinctive	judgments.		When	Nietzsche	introduces	the	notion	of	
instinctive	judgments,	he	implicitly	criticizes	Kant’s	a	priori	‘reflective	judgment’,	and	is	explicitly	criticizing	the	role	of	the	understanding	(and	the	imagination	and	reason	as	well)	in	a	‘disinterested	and	pure	aesthetic	judgment’.	In	§804	in	The	Will	
to	Power,	titled,	“Origin	of	the	beautiful	and	the	ugly,”	Nietzsche	writes	that	aesthetics	involves	a	biological	valuation.		“That	which	is	instinctively	repugnant	to	us,	aesthetically,	is	proved	by	mankind’s	longest	experience	to	be	harmful,	dangerous,	worthy	of	suspicion:	the	suddenly	vocal	aesthetic	instinct	(e.g.,	in	disgust)	contains	a	judgment.		To	this	extent	the	beautiful	stands	within	the	general	category	of	biological	values	of	what	is	useful,	beneficent,	life-enhancing,”	even	by	a	distant	association,	whether	they	are	“the	sensations	that	accompany	such	things,	or	symbols	of	them.”561		Of	course,	there	is	already	some	science	to	back	up	his	claims.		Biologically,	all	organic	life	has	been	evolutionarily	programed	to	respond	to	various	stimuli	in	particular	ways	and	according	to	any	of	the	various	senses	found	throughout	nature.		Color	psychology	is	one	example,	where	certain	colors	naturally	(for	biological	reasons)	have	stimulating	or	relaxing	affects	on	the	psyche	(whether	
																																																																																																																																																																					provides	a	basis	for	universal	assent	by	virtue	of	the	substratum’s	universality.		The	same	can	be	said,	also,	of	Freud’s	drive	theory,	although	he	never	explicitly	asserts	as	much;	and	the	same	can	be	said	of	the	will	to	power	in	the	works	of	Nietzsche.		What	Schopenhauer	has	done,	and	what	Nietzsche	and	Freud	both	do	in	following	him,	is	provide	a	psychological	and	irrational	substratum	to	account	for	valuations,	regardless	of	if	it	pertains	to	what	Kant	relegates	to	the	agreeable,	the	beautiful,	or	the	sublime.	561	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§804,	pg.	423	
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human	or	animal;	just	think	of	all	the	sublime,	stimulating	plumage	on	male	birds,	or	the	coloration	of	other	species,	and	the	affect	of	the	color	red,	for	example).562			The	understanding,	for	Nietzsche,	“retards”	and	“considers,”	putting	a	brake	on	“immediate	reactions.”		“All	instinctive	judgments	are	shortsighted,”	he	continues,	and	“judgments	concerning	beauty	and	ugliness	are	shortsighted	…	but	persuasive	in	the	highest	degree;	they	appeal	to	our	instincts	where	they	decide	most	quickly	and	pronounce	their	Yes	and	No	before	the	understanding	can	speak.”563		He	is	clearly	making	a	distinction	between	motivational	states	(which	pronounce	their	judgment)	and	propositional	attitudes.		Because	reflective	judgment,	in	Kant,	depends	upon	the	understanding	in	its	relation	with	the	imagination	(in	the	case	of	the	beautiful,	reason	in	the	case	of	the	sublime),	then	instinctive	judgments	are	kinds	of	judgments	that	precede	and	influence	reflective	judgments.		If	true,	this	would	make	Kant’s	aesthetic	judgment	concerning	the	Beautiful	impure	and	interested	–	even	in	the	sense	in	which	Kant	speaks	of	interest,564	because	they	would	be	interested	in	some	particular	aim	concerning	an	object,	directly	or	indirectly,	and	thus	would	resemble	more	closely	teleological,	and																																																									562	Schopenhauer	refers	to	this	as	well,	I	think	implicitly	acknowledging	Goethe’s	work	on	color	psychology	that	still	has	some	influence	today.		He	writes,	“Colors	directly	excite	a	keen	delight,”	and	the	“absence	of	light	immediately	makes	us	sad”	(WWR	I	pg.	199).		While	not	entirely	accurate	scientifically,	research	has	shown	that	specific	hues	do	elicit	specific	responses.		See	below	fn.		I	mean	to	show	that	disinterest	is	impossible.			563	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§804	564	Heidegger	claims	that	Schopenhauer	misunderstands	Kant’s	‘disinterestedness’.		I	hope	I	have	shown	it	is	possible	this	is	not	the	case,	for	by	psychologizing	Kant,	Schopenhauer	makes	Kant’s	disinterestedness	impossible,	thus	it	is	a	
reinterpretation	more	than	a	misinterpretation.		Heidegger	claims	that	Nietzsche	also	misunderstands	Kant	because	he	understands	Kant	through	Schopenhauer.		I	hope	to	show	that	this	is	even	further	from	the	truth	and	that	Nietzsche	actually	provides	a	substantial	criticism	of	Kant’s	perspective.	
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empirical	(agreeable),	rather	than	reflective	judgments	according	to	Kant’s	topology	of	judgment.			For	Kant,	the	faculties	are	not	passive;	they	are	actively	engaged	in	a	free	play	in	the	contemplation	of	the	beautiful.		But	the	play	of	the	understanding	and	imagination	do	entail,	in	Kant,	a	kind	of	autonomy	where	each	faculty	plays	according	to	its	function,	and	only	according	to	its	function,	by	virtue	of	which	they	cannot	be	regarded	as	influenced	by	other	factors	such	as	drives	or	instincts	(or	inclinations).		This	is	what	Nietzsche	criticizes.		Instead,	Nietzsche	claims,	the	Kantian	faculties	are	at	a	play	that	is	not	free	from	instinctual	influence.		For	Kant,	the	understanding	(let	it	be	x)	is	defined	by	its	function	–	the	faculty	that	unifies	intuitions	according	to	concepts.		x	=	f(x).		The	same	is	true	of	the	other	faculties:	the	imagination	(let	it	be	y)	insofar	as	it	combines	intuitions.		In	a	pure	judgment	of	the	beautiful,	the	understanding	and	the	imagination	are	at	harmony	in	their	‘free	play’.		Let	t	stand	for	drives	or	instincts	(our	motivational	states).	
• ‘Free	Play’	in	the	contemplation	of	the	beautiful	entails	x	and	y	fulfilling	their	function	autonomously,	whereby	x	plays	according	to	only	the	function	of	x,	and	y	according	to	only	the	function	of	y.			
• If	x	or	y	are	said	to	be	influenced	by	any	other	factor	alien	to	their	respective	functions,	such	as	t,	then	their	activity	involves	also	at	least	some	portion	of	the	function	of	t	and	are	at	least	loosely	determined	by	it.		
• Insofar	as	x	or	y	entail	at	least	some	function	of	t	or	anything	else,	the	play	between	them	cannot	be	regarded	as	free,	for…	
o x	=	x	IFF	x	=	f(x),	y	=	y	IFF	y	=	f(y),	and	so	on.		Each	is	purely	itself	only	insofar	as	its	activity	entails	only	the	function	according	to	which	each	is	defined	to	be	what	it	is.			
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o Insofar	as	x	or	y	are	not	purely	themselves	–	playing	according	to	the	influence	of	anything	else,	such	as	t,	and	thereby	importing	at	least	some	of	the	function	of	that	alien	faculty/force,	then	their	play	cannot	be	regarded	as	free,	but	instead	determined	in	proportion	to	the	amount	of	the	alien	function	imported	into	its	activity.	
• A	pure	judgment	of	beauty,	for	Kant,	requires	disinterested	contemplation.	
• And	such	disinterest	requires	a	harmony	in	a	free	play	of	the	understanding	and	the	imagination,	meaning	that	the	activity	of	each	must	be	purely	its	own	with	respect	to	its	function	only.	
• Therefore,	if	t	bears	any	influence	on	x	or	y,	then	neither	is	purely	itself,	and	any	resulting	harmony	cannot	be	attributed	to	a	free	play.	
• Furthermore,	if	the	harmony	is	not	attributable	to	a	free	play,	then	the	contemplation	cannot	be	said	to	be	disinterested,	for	the	play	is	not	free	but	to	some	degree	determined.	Nietzsche	thus	raises	a	compelling	argument	against	the	‘disinterestedness’	of	beauty	as	it	appears	in	Kant’s	critique.		I	have	only	unpacked	in	considerably	more	detail	what	his	objection	entails.		It	depends,	however,	on	the	assumption	that	biological	and	psychical	factors	outside	the	domain	of	the	function	of	the	understanding	or	the	imagination	do	influence	them.		Without	evidence,	proposing	the	influence	begs	the	question.		 Fortunately	for	Nietzsche,	there	is	considerable	evidence	in	the	psychological	sciences.565		The	problem	for	Kant’s	approach	was	that	it	attempted	a	strictly	rationalist	analysis	of	aesthetic	judgment,	intentionally	absent	of	psychology.566		Schopenhauer	had	appropriated	Kant’s	analysis,	but	intentionally	injected	it	with	
																																																								565	See	below	on	Disgust	or	above	on	color	psychology	566	…	contrary	to	Paul	Guyer’s	reading	of	the	3rd	Critique	
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psychology.567		For	this	reason,	in	Schopenhauer,	Beauty	maintains	the	character	of	disinterestedness,	but	disinterestedness	becomes	the	‘telos’	of	aesthetic	judgments,	whereas	the	perceiving	subject	is	now	interested	in	becoming	disinterested	–	the	subject	is	interested	in	losing	its	interest	in	the	contemplation	of	an	object	it	finds	beautiful.		Schopenhauer’s	move,	in	this	regard,	is	quite	respectable.		What	it	indicates,	actually,	is	later	echoed	by	Freud’s	conception	of	the	death	drive,	whereas	the	death	drive	is	precisely	the	interest	in	becoming	disinterested	because	interest	presupposes	tension	and	disinterest	is	the	absence	of	all	tension.568			The	interest	that	Nietzsche	attempts	to	demonstrate	in	reflective	judgment,	quite	distinct	from	Kant’s	postulation,	is	indicative	of	what	Schopenhauer	also	saw	in	his	reference	to	the	Will	–	it	is	the	substratum	common	to	all	humans	in	Kant’s	antinomy	of	taste	that	allows	for	agreement	in	aesthetic	judgments	between	perceivers.		Only	here,	Nietzsche	would	amend	this	to	the	will	to	power	–	that	towards	which	all	drives	are	aimed.		Nietzsche	actually	explicitly	argues	that	
purposiveness	(the	form	of	which,	without	conceptual	understanding,	is	the	determining	factor	in	judging	the	beautiful	according	to	Kant)	is	attributable	to	the	will	to	power.		He	writes,	for	example,	“What	appears	to	be	‘purposiveness’	(‘the	
purposiveness	infinitely	superior	to	all	human	art’)	is	merely	the	consequence	of	the	
will	to	power	played	out	in	everything	that	happens,”	so	that	“becoming	stronger	brings	with	it	orderings	which	resemble	outlines	of	purposiveness.	…																																																									567	Schopenhauer	did	not	misunderstand	Kant	concerning	disinterestedness,	as	Heidegger	and	others	adamantly	claim,	but	rather	injected	Kant’s	analysis	with	something	foreign,	something	that	was	lacking.;	Schopenhauer	reinterpreted	Kant’s	work	by	importing	psychological	concerns.	568	This	is	significant,	as	the	title	of	my	thesis	is:	Living	as	Sublimated	Dying	
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[purposiveness	is]	only	an	expression	of	an	ordering	of	spheres	of	power	and	their	interplay.”569		In	other	words,	Nietzsche	claims	‘purposiveness’	is	an	illusion	that	emerges	from	the	appearance	–	or	rather	imposition	or	projection	–	of	order	that	allows	for	a	feeling	of	mastery.		It	is	an	illusion	from	myopic	retrospection.570		However,	one	is	entitled,	perhaps,	to	speak	of	a	purposiveness	as	exemplifying	this	pseudo-telos	of	will	to	power	(namely,	the	homeostatic	‘trend’	towards	‘power’	or	‘mastery’).		
A	Bifurcation	of	Interest	
One	key	difference	between	Kant	and	Schopenhauer’s	discussions	of	Beauty	concerns	disinterestedness.		This	is	also	a	point	at	which	Nietzsche	diverges	from	Schopenhauer	as	well	as	from	Kant.	Julian	Young	makes	the	important	observation	that	disinterestedness	functions	differently	for	Kant	and	Schopenhauer	in	aesthetic	judgment.		For	Kant,	disinterestedness	is	a	required	condition	for	the	judgment	of	the	beautiful;	but	for	Schopenhauer,	disinterestedness	is	the	consequence	of	cognizing	the	beautiful.		Young	writes,	for	Schopenhauer,	“the	object	of	pleasure	is	one’s	own	state	of	disinterestedness.”571		Schopenhauer	regards	the	willing	subject																																																									569	Nietzsche,	Writings	from	the	Late	Notebooks,	9[91]	autumn	1887	570	I	have	explained	this	fallacy	in	the	introduction.	571	Young,	Nietzsche	Art,	pp.	118-119	And	contrary	to	Heidegger,	it	can	be	asserted	that	Schopenhauer	does	not	misunderstand	Kant,	but	rather	adds	is	own	twist	to	Kant’s	critique	of	aesthetic	judgment,	where	disinterestedness	is	still	a	condition	of	the	cognition	of	the	beautiful,	but	where	one	is	interested	in	cognizing	beauty	–	one	is	interested	in	becoming	disinterested	–	thus	not	misunderstanding	Kant	but	instead	psychologizing	him	and	disagreeing	with	the	point	that	one	can	cognize	beauty,	or	entertain	the	pleasure	of	the	feeling	of	the	beautiful,	from	a	disinterested	ground.	
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as	interested,	and	yet	speaks	of	the	disinterestedness	in	the	contemplation	of,	or	reflection	upon,	beauty	as	the	subject’s	becoming	a	“pure,	will-less	subject	of	
knowledge.”572		In	other	words,	Schopenhauer’s	subject	is	interested	in	being	
disinterested.573			A	significant	difference	between	Schopenhauer	and	Nietzsche,	one	that	essentially	motivates	their	distinct	pessimisms,	concerns	desire.		Nietzsche	regards	desire	qua	deprivation	as	indicative	of	a	slave	spirit,	one	who	desires	because	one	
lacks.			Desire	in	this	sense	is	relentless,	as	Schopenhauer	points	out,	and	fosters	an	endless	cycle	of	trying	to	attain	the	unattainable:	complete	satisfaction.		Schopenhauer	writes:	All	willing	springs	from	lack,	from	deficiency,	and	thus	from	suffering.		Fulfillment	brings	this	to	an	end;	yet	for	one	wish	that	is	fulfilled	there	remain	at	least	ten	that	are	denied.	…	Therefore,	…	so	long	as	we	are	given	up	to	the	throng	of	desires	with	its	constant	hopes	and	fears,	so	long	as	we	are	the	subject	of	willing,	we	never	obtain	lasting	happiness	or	peace.574		For	Schopenhauer,	it	appears	that	what	one	should	want	more	than	anything,	the	impetus	of	all	desire	is	a	cessation	of	all	desire,	such	that	one	can	only	“rest	in	peace.”575	Nietzsche,	however,	regards	strong	spirits	as	those	who	do	not	lack	anything,	but	instead	are	overflowing	with	energy.		In	fact,	in	line	with	entropy	in	an	open																																																									572	Schopenhauer,	WWR	I	pg.	195	573	Some	have	asserted	that	this	is	a	contradiction.		Rather,	I	think	it	isn’t,	but	is	instead	an	assertion	much	like	that	of	the	‘death	drive’	as	it	is	at	times	(erroneously)	regarded	as	a	desire	to	die.	574	Schopenhauer,	WWR	I,	pg.	196	575	I’m	purposefully	alluding	to	death	
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system,	Nietzsche	regards	nature	in	general	as	exemplifying	a	surplus	of	energy.		I	think	a	good	way	to	describe	this	is	by	referencing	drive	theory,	where	drives	are	said	to	press	towards	discharge.		In	consciousness,	this	might	express	itself	as	a	desire	for	that	with	which	the	drive	has	cathected,	and	implies	the	deprivation	of	that.		But	in	actuality,	underneath	this	conscious	experience,	one	is	driven	to	
discharge	an	excess,	and	one	does	so	through	objects	in	the	world.		The	slave	spirit	mistakenly	endeavors	to	appropriate	things	of	the	world	to	quiet	the	unrelenting	pressure,	or	ascetically	renounces	desire	altogether,	while	Nietzsche	observes	another	possibility	for	those	of	an	opposite	orientation:	to	incorporate	objects	of	experience	as	vehicles	through	which	one	can	discharge	that	energy,	an	operation	that	is	more	aligned	with	nature	because	it	isn’t	warped	by	conscious	reflection	on	deprivations.576		Cox	observes	“On	the	face	of	it,	will	to	power	would	seem	to	be	the	drive	to	acquire	power;	yet	…	it	essentially	concerns	the	expenditure	(‘discharge’,	‘sacrifice’,	‘overflow	and	squandering’)	of	power,	‘even	to	the	point	of	absurdity’.”577		And	if	the	will	to	power	were	actually	a	desire	for	power,	Cox	observes	that	Nietzsche	would	be	merely	substituting	“one	superfluous	teleological	principle”	for	another.		And	another	interesting	point	made	by	Cox	that	cannot	be	emphasized	enough	is:	a	“desire	(for	power)	would	seem	to	signify	a	fundamental	lack	(of	power),”	felt	as	distress	or	impotence,	“which,	however,	…	Nietzsche	repeatedly	denies	is	the	basic	condition	of	nature.”578		And	in	this	sense,	Nietzsche’s	notion	of	
																																																								576	I	owe	Miguel	de	Beistegui	for	highlighting	this	nuance	of	desire	when	taking	one	of	his	courses	on	Bioethics	577	Cox,	Nietzsche	Naturalism	and	Interpretation,	pg.	230	578	Cox,	Nietzsche	Naturalism	and	Interpretation,	pg.	230	
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‘will	to	power’	is	more	fundamental	than	Freud’s	notion	of	Bemächtigungstrieb	which	does	imply	a	will	to	dominate	and	a	lack	of	power.	Schopenhauer,	Nietzsche	observes,	equates	the	disinterestedness	of	aesthetic	contemplation	with	the	Epicurean	notion	of	ataraxia	(the	Hellenistic	equivalent	of	
Nirvana).		“’This	is	the	painless	condition	which	Epicurus	praises	as	the	greatest	good	and	as	the	condition	of	the	gods;	we	are,	for	that	moment,	relieved	of	the	base	craving	of	the	will,	we	celebrate	the	Sabbath	from	the	penal	servitude	of	volition,	the	wheel	of	Ixion	stands	still’.”579		Nietzsche	continues,	“Schopenhauer	described	one	effect	of	beauty,	that	of	calming	the	will.”580		And	then	juxtaposing	Schopenhauer	and	Stendhal,	as	well	as	Schopenhauer	and	Kant	(implicitly),	Nietzsche	asserts:	“Stendhal,	no	less	a	sensualist	than	Schopenhauer,	…	emphasizes	another	effect	of	beauty:	‘beauty	promises	happiness’,”	so	that	it	is:	…	precisely	the	excitement	of	the	will	(‘of	interest’)	through	beauty.		And	could	we	not,	finally,	accuse	Schopenhauer	himself	of	thinking	quite	erroneously,	that	in	this	he	was	following	Kant,	and	object	that	he	did	not	understand	the	Kantian	definition	of	beauty	in	a	Kantian	way	at	all	–	that	beauty	pleased	him,	too,	out	of	‘interest’,	in	fact,	out	of	the	strongest,	most	personal	interest	possible:	that	of	the	tortured	person	who	frees	himself	from	his	torture?581		What	Nietzsche	observes	are	two	different	beauties:	one	that	‘quiets	the	will’	(as	in	the	case	of	Schopenhauer);	and	one	that	stimulates	it	(as	in	the	case	of	Stendhal).		I	believe	this	should	also	be	studied	along	with	where	Nietzsche	contrasts	two	kinds																																																									579	Schopenhauer,	WWR	I	pg.	231,	qtd.	by	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	III	§6	580	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	III	§6	581	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	III	§6	
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of	pleasures	and	two	kinds	of	displeasures.		He	writes,	“There	exists	(a)	displeasure	as	a	means	of	stimulating	the	increase	of	power,	and	(b)	displeasure	following	an	over-expenditure	of	power,”	the	latter	leaving	one	exhausted	and	in	need	of	sleep.582		And	where	pleasure	is	a	conscious	feeling	of	an	increase	of	power,	Nietzsche	has	thus	articulated	a	bifurcation	in	the	capacity	to	feel	pleasure	or	displeasure	according	to	one’s	psychical	constitution,	health,	or	strength.		He	writes	further:	The	great	confusion	on	the	part	of	psychologists	consisted	in	not	distinguishing	between	these	two	kinds	of	pleasure	–	that	of	falling	asleep	and	that	of	victory.		The	exhausted	want	rest,	relaxation,	peace,	calm	–	the	happiness	of	the	nihilistic	religions	and	philosophies;	and	living	want	victory,	opponents	overcome,	the	overflow	of	the	feeling	of	power	across	wider	domains	than	hitherto.		All	healthy	functions	of	the	organism	have	this	need	–	and	the	whole	organism	is	such	a	complex	of	systems	struggling	for	an	increase	of	the	feeling	of	power.583		Indeed,	Freud	mostly	regarded	pleasure	in	a	Schopenhauerian	sense,	an	analgesic	for	existence	associated	with	a	quantitative	diminution	of	energy	(although,	especially	in	the	Economic	Problem	of	Masochism,	and	thus	after	the	introduction	of	the	death	drive,	he	came	to	recognize	an	important	qualitative	aspect	to	pleasure	that	is	sometimes	in	contradistinction	to	the	quantitative	aspect).			Looking	back	at	Kant’s	definition	of	pleasure	then,	as	the	attainment	of	an	aim	[Absicht],	beauty	is	presented	to	a	weak	spirit	as	the	attainment	of	quietness	–	restfulness;	to	a	strong	
																																																								582	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§703	583	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§703	
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spirit	as	the	increase	of	power.584		Schopenhauer	see’s	the	cognition	of	the	beautiful	as	finding	satisfaction	in	disinterestedness	–	as	being	interested	in	disinterestedness;	“He	wants	to	free	himself	from	torture,”585	Nietzsche	writes.		It	is	a	mere	negative	liberation.			Furthermore,	Nietzsche	writes	in	The	Genealogy,	“One	is	tempted	to	ask	if	[Schopenhauer’s]	fundamental	conception	of	Will	and	Idea,	the	thought	that	there	can	only	exist	freedom	from	the	‘will’	by	means	of	‘idea,’	did	not	originate	in	a	generalization	from	his	sexual	experience.”586		In	fact,	and	also	quite	in	line	with	Freud’s	own	account	of	reaction-formation	and	the	potency	of	sexual	desire,	Nietzsche	writes	that	Schopenhauer’s	aesthetic	contemplation	“simply	counteracts	sexual	interest…	he	never	gets	tired	of	glorifying	this	escape	from	the	‘Life-Will’	as	the	great	advantage	and	utility	of	the	aesthetic	state.”587		Schopenhauer,	it	appears,	sought	to	‘escape’	his	sexuality.		He	did	so	by	repudiating	it	–	by	repressing	it	through	reaction-formations	–	reacting	against	it	with	the	help	of	the	formations	of	ontotheological	ideas.		This	is	how	one	should	regard	aesthetic	interest	and	disinterest	in	Schopenhauer.		He	advocates	the	secondary	interest	of	disinterestedness	after	first	repudiating	the	primary	interest	of	his	sexuality.		
																																																								584	These	are	not	entirely	exclusive,	however,	for	the	weak	spirits	‘quietness’	is	also	a	feeling	of	‘mastery’	–	an	ascetic	mastery	of	the	will;	and	the	strong	spirit’s	stimulation	is,	in	the	grand	style	(as	will	be	observed	below)	indicative	of	‘calm’.		The	importance,	I	believe,	is	in	the	constitution	and	orientation	that	determines	the	valuations.	585	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	III	§6	586	Nietzsche,	Genealogy,	pg.132	587	Nietzsche,	Genealogy,	pg.	132	
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The	Unheimlich	Aesthetics	of	Psychoanalysis	
	 In	what	follows,	I	want	to	discuss	Freud’s	most	profound	contribution	to	aesthetics,	which	concerns	‘The	Uncanny’.		My	aim	here	is	to	show	in	what	way	Freud	regarded	aesthetic	valuations	as	deeply	interested,	but	also	as	results	of	defensive	operations	that	I	have	been	demonstrating	were	at	play	in	Kant	and	Schopenhauer’s	philosophy.		But	a	few	words	must	first	be	said	on	what	is	ugly	and	horrific.			What	is	judged	as	Beautiful,	for	Kant,	entails	the	form	of	purposiveness	in	the	free	play	of	the	understanding	and	the	imagination.		Nietzsche	has	sufficiently	criticized	the	‘free	play’	and	disinterestedness	involved	in	the	judgment,	but	has	shown	that	the	‘form	of	purposiveness’	can	be	thought	of	as	an	illusion	generated	by	the	will	to	power,	in	the	same	sense	that	biologists	might	refer	to	a	characteristic	of	a	species	as	being	for	something	and	thus	selected	in	evolution.		But	it	isn’t	for	anything,	not	originally;	however,	the	description	of	that	kind	of	purposiveness	is	at	times	unavoidable	when	retroductively	explaining	the	acquisition	of	traits.		In	that	same	sense,	one	can	speak	of	the	‘purposiveness’	of	the	will	to	power	and	therefore	of	the	valuation	of	the	beautiful	in	relation	to	the	will	to	power.		The	ugly	should	be	regarded	as	what	is	presented	as	counter-purposive,	and	yet	unarousing.		When	Nietzsche	writes,	“The	only	thing	ugly	is	a	degenerating	person,”	so	that,	“physiologically,	everything	weakens	and	depresses	people,”588	he	is	speaking	from	the	perspective	of	a	stronger	spirit,	one	to	whom	the	psychical	constitution	of	the	herd	appears	ugly	because	it	is	counter-purposive	to	a	healthy	spirit.																																																									588	Nietzsche,	TI	“Skirmishes”	§20	
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Kant	writes,	“Not	every	object	that	arouses	fear	is	found	sublime	when	we	judge	it	aesthetically.”589		Objects	that	arouse	fear	but	are	unable	to	be	incorporated	harmoniously	by	reason	and	the	imagination	into	the	subject’s	experience	are	to	be	regarded	as	horrific	only;	that	is,	we	are	afraid	of	it,	or	reason	does	not	provide	an	idea	that	can	render	what	is	unpleasant	pleasurable.		Psychologically,	horrific	is	that	
which	threatens	the	ego	and	has	not	been	repressed	or	disavowed	and	also	has	not	
been	rendered	amenable	to	the	ego	(ideal).	Where	the	subject	is	unable	to	harmoniously	incorporate	a	threatening	aesthetic	experience,	the	subject	feels	horror	and	terror.		The	horrific	arouses	a	‘fight	or	flight’	response.		It	terrifies	us.		The	horrifying	is	that	in	relation	to	which	one	is	impotent	to	defend	one’s	self	or	to	otherwise	make	it	amenable	(thus	rendering	it	pleasurable)	whilst	feeling	threatened	by	it.			By	contrast,	the	ugly	is	what	one	cannot	make	amenable	to	the	ego	but	lacks	that	threatening	character.		To	make	the	ugly	or	the	horrific	amenable,	one	must	relate	with	it,	must	obtain	a	perspective,	that	finds	in	the	ugly	or	the	horrific	the	possibility	of	some	satisfaction	of	the	will	to	power	or	at	the	least	what	is	not	antagonistic	to	that	satisfaction.		A	means	of	incorporating	such	might	be	giving	it	a	place,	seeing	in	it	something	“purposive,”	in	one’s	existence.		How	one	relates	to	what	is	initially	perceived	as	ugly	and	horrific	is,	ultimately,	the	deciding	factor	for	Nietzsche,	and	far	more	indicative	of	one’s	strength	or	weakness	and	degeneracy	than	feelings	of	aesthetic	pleasure.		But	there	are	several	means	of	doing	so,	most	of	which	are	egodystonic.		For	Nietzsche,	the	imperative	is	to	be	strong	enough	to																																																									589	Kant,	Critique	of	Judgment,	pg.	119		
	 227	
incorporate	and	render	aesthetically	pleasing	all	that	is	ugly	or	horrific	by	means	that	are	egosyntonic.			Freud	opens	his	1919	essay	“The	‘Uncanny’”	–	translated	from	the	German	
unheimlich	–	literally	‘unhomely’	–	writing,	“Only	rarely	[does]	a	psychoanalyst	feel	impelled	to	investigate	the	subject	of	aesthetics,	even	when	aesthetics	is	understood	to	mean	not	merely	the	theory	of	beauty,	but	the	theory	of	the	qualities	of	feeling.”590		He	further	observes	that	the	majority	of	‘treatises	on	aesthetics’	of	his	time	do	not	deal	with	the	subject	of	the	uncanny,	and	instead	“concern	themselves	with	what	is	beautiful,	attractive	and	sublime	–	that	is,	with	feelings	of	a	positive	nature.”591		But	these	concerns	do	not,	at	least	not	directly,	interest	the	psychoanalyst.		The	psychoanalyst,	he	writes,	“works	in	other	strata	of	mental	life	and	has	little	to	do	with	subdued	emotional	impulses,	which,	inhibited	in	their	aims	…	usually	furnish	the	material	for	the	study	of	aesthetics.”592		In	other	words,	the	psychoanalyst	concerns	himself	with	the	chthonic	psychical	impulses,	vicissitudes,	and	content	that	give	rise,	indirectly,	to	the	positive	aesthetic	feelings.		Psychoanalysis	aims	at	uncovering	what	a	subject	experiences	as	horrific	or	disgusting.		According	to	Freud,	what	is	felt	to	be	beautiful	is	very	much	in	a	causal	relation	to	a	mechanism	of	defense	such	as	reaction-formation.593																																																									590	Freud,	Uncanny,	pg.	219	591	Freud,	Uncanny,	pg.	219	592	Freud,	Uncanny,	pg.	219	(italics	mine).		I	mean	to	emphasize	that	Freud	is	implying	that	what	is	studied	in	aesthetics	are	‘subdued’	drives	and	desires	–	impulses	that	have	undergone	transformation	and	been	weakened,	simplified,	or	subtracted	from	in	order	to	produce	what	is	studied	in	aesthetics.		The	same	will	be	said	by	Nietzsche,	later	in	this	paper,	regarding	the	‘covering	over’	by	the	Apollonian	over	the	Dionysian	in	the	Birth	of	Tragedy.	593	See,	for	example,	the	discussion	above	of	“cleanliness”	and	reaction-formation.	
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In	the	opening	pages	of	The	Birth	of	Tragedy,	Nietzsche	is	quick	to	describe	the	Apolline	and	the	Dionysiac	–	“those	artistic	drives	of	nature”594	–	as	a	“duality”	that,	just	as	“reproduction	depends	on	there	being	two	sexes,	…	exist	side	by	side,	mostly	in	open	conflict,	stimulating	and	provoking	one	another	to	give	birth	to	ever-new,	more	vigorous	offspring	in	whom	they	perpetuate	the	conflict	inherent	in	the	opposition	between	them.”595		Nietzsche	here	claims	that	there	is	an	inherent	conflict	between	two	separate	drives.		The	characteristics	between	the	Dionysiac	and	Apolline	drives	with	Freud’s	primary	and	secondary	process,	the	death	drive	and	Eros,	respectively,	are	comparable.		As	previously	mentioned,	Freud	himself	states	in	Beyond	that	the	views	of	psychoanalytic	theory	“Have	from	the	very	first	been	dualistic,	and	today	they	are	even	more	definitely	dualistic	than	before	–	now	that	we	describe	the	opposition	as	being	not	between	ego	instincts	and	sex	instincts	but	between	life	instincts	and	death	instincts.”596		Freud	has	intended,	from	the	very	beginning	of	psychoanalytic	theory,	to	recognize	an	inherent,	psychical	conflict	that	is	generated	by	a	duality	of	drives,	one	in	opposition	to	the	other.		Even	when	his	duality	appears	to	collapse,	he	stubbornly	maintains	a	duality	of	drives	underneath	all	psychical	conflict,	an	opposition	that	is	responsible	for	the	productions	of	not	only	neuroses	and	psychoses	but	also	the	products	of	culture	and	civilization.		A	significant	difference	between	the	death	drive	and	the	Dionysiac,	however,	is	that	Nietzsche	describes	the	Dionysiac	as	entailing	a	“lust	for	life,”597	which	would	stand																																																									594	Nietzsche,	The	Birth	of	Tragedy,	§	2,	pg.	19	595	Nietzsche,	The	Birth	of	Tragedy,	§	1,	pg.	14	596	Freud,	Beyond	the	Pleasure	Principle,	edt.	Strachey,	pg.	53	I	am	not	here	claiming	that	the	primary	and	secondary	process	is	a	duality.	597	Nietzsche,	The	Birth	of	Tragedy,	§	1.	Pg.	17	
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directly	opposed	to	how	Freud	presents	the	death	drive.		Instead,	the	Dionysiac	would	appear	to	take	on	the	qualities	of	the	sex	drives	–	to	be	distinguished	from	the	
ego	instincts	–	which	would	risk	the	individual	for	the	acquisition	of	their	aim	but	are	nonetheless	characterized	by	a	lust	for	living.		The	Dionysian,	rather,	is	already	those	bits	of	the	death	drive	worked	over	by	Eros	appearing	in	Freud	as	
Bemächtigungstrieb.		Apollo,	for	Freud,	would	instead	be	a	reaction-formation	against	the	Dionysian;	it	isn’t	really	a	drive	but	a	vicissitude.	The	characteristics	of	Nietzsche’s	two	drives	presents	the	Apolline	as:	“an	image-maker	or	sculptor”,598	an	“image	of	the	principium	individuationis”599	–	a	description	that	Nietzsche	acquires	from	Schopenhauer	–	and	also	as	possessing	the	“Beauty	of	‘semblance’.”600		In	other	words,	the	Apolline	is	presented	as	a	drive	to	establish	order	and	difference	or	individuality	and	is	accredited	with	images	and	the	semblance	of	beauty.		This	is	quite	characteristic	of	Freud’s	homeostatic	drive	Eros	that	similarly	creates	order	and	is	associated	with	the	differentiating-	and	symbolizing-	secondary	(or	tertiary)	processes.		The	Dionysiac	drive,	on	the	other	hand,	is	characterized	by	Nietzsche	as	entailing	an	“enormous	horror	which	seizes	people”	when	they	lose	faith	in	the	phenomenal	world	of	appearances	–	appearances	being	the	constructions	of	Apollo	(Nietzsche)	and	Eros	(Freud).		In	addition	to	this,	Nietzsche	writes,	“These	Dionysiac	stirrings,	…	as	they	grow	in	intensity,	cause	subjectivity	to	vanish	to	the	point	of	complete	self-forgetting.”601		Nietzsche	writes	further	that	the	“breakdown	of	the	principium	individuationis”																																																									598	Nietzsche,	The	Birth	of	Tragedy,	§	1,	pg.	14	599	Nietzsche,	The	Birth	of	Tragedy,	§	1,	pg.	17	600	Nietzsche,	The	Birth	of	Tragedy,	§	1,	pg.	17	601	Nietzsche,	The	Birth	of	Tragedy,	§	1.	Pg.	17	
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characteristic	of	the	Apolline	adds	“to	this	horror	the	blissful	ecstasy	which	arises	from	the	innermost	ground	of	man,	indeed	nature	itself.”602		Freud	does	speak	of	the	psychical	conflict	as	begetting	neuroses	or	“madness”,	and	that	psychical	breakdown	can	entail	feelings	of	“intoxication,	self-absorption	and	ecstasy.”603	In	fact,	this	is	related	to	the	hysterical	symptoms	that	present	themselves	when	repressions	fail,	such	as	how	Nietzsche	characterizes	the	religious	sublime	and	Wagnerian	(or	nationalist)	art.		A	proper	synthesis	of	the	theory	would	render	the	Dionysian	the	expression	of	the	primary	process	and	the	Apollonian	the	expression	of	the	
vicissitudes,	rather	than	the	drives,	that	occur	under	the	‘object’	relations	of	Eros.		And	where	Apollo	opposes	the	Dionysian,	and	is	associated	with	beauty,	it	is	clearly	a	reaction-formation	against	the	Dionysian.	What	is	the	relation	between	beauty	and	drives	or	desires?		In	a	sense,	the	beautiful	functions	much	like	the	censorship	of	the	preconscious	such	that	the	real	
aim	of	a	wish	will	be	symbolized	by	some	refraction	of	itself	in	association	–	like	a	cigar	for	a	penis	–	in	which	case,	the	beautiful	manifests	itself	as	something	that	both	reveals	and	conceals	a	drive	or	desire.			Freud	describes	the	enjoyment	of	art	as	“compensation	for	human	wishes,”604	or	again	as	“an	activity	intended	to	allay	ungratified	wishes	–	in	the	first	place	in	the	creative	artist	himself	and	subsequently	in	his	audience	or	spectators.		The	motive	forces	of	artists	are	the	same	conflicts	which	drive	other	people	into	neurosis	and	have	encouraged	society	to	construct	its	
																																																								602	Nietzsche,	The	Birth	of	Tragedy,	§	1.	Pg.	17	603	Freud,	Humour,	pg.	163	604	Freud,	“The	Claims	of	Psychoanalysis	to	Scientific	Interest,”	pg.	188	
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institutions.”605		He	thus	situates	what	is	aesthetically	pleasing	on	the	plane	of	egodystonic	vicissitudes,	which	repudiate	stimuli	and	obtain	a	compromise	satisfaction	through	disavowals	or	repressions.	Recalling	the	previous	discussions	of	Leonardo	and	the	vicissitudes,	it	appears	that	Freud	has	in	mind	reaction-formations,	or	at	the	least	‘sublimations	through	reaction-formations’.		“Art	constitutes	a	region	half-way	between	a	reality	which	frustrates	wishes	and	the	wish-fulfilling	world	of	the	imagination	–	a	region	in	which,	as	it	were,	primitive	man’s	strivings	for	omnipotence	are	still	in	full	force.”606	Art	thus	seems	to	be	involved	in	reestablishing	a	‘lost	unity’	of	sorts	relinquished	as	the	ego607	formed	through	the	disillusionments	from	primary	narcissism.	The	artist	“represents	his	most	personal	wishful	fantasies	as	fulfilled,”	but	what	is	most	characteristic	of	a	work	of	art	is	that	it	has	“undergone	a	transformation	which	softens	what	is	offensive	in	them.”608	Art,	for	Freud,	satisfies	the	artists’	fantasies,	apparently	towards	the	reacquisition	of	that	lost	feeling	of	omnipotence	and	a	kind	of	regression	to	primary	narcissism,	and	it	achieves	this	aim	through	disavowals	or	
reaction-formations	against	those	aspects	that	are	‘offensive’	or	threatening	to	the	subject.			Many	of	the	romantics	were	discussing	the	uncanny,	and	often	likened	it	to	the	Sublime	as	depicted	by	Burke	and	Kant,	or	even	saw	the	Uncanny	as	being	an	integral	ingredient	to	the	Sublime.		Despite	claiming	that	it	is	a	topic	little																																																									605	Freud,	“The	Claims	of	Psychoanalysis	to	Scientific	Interest,”	pg.	187	606	Freud,	“The	Claims	of	Psychoanalysis	to	Scientific	Interest,”	pg.	188	607	Although	I	use	the	term	“ego,”	I’d	like	to	remind	the	reader	that	there	is	no	ego,	but	only	an	ego	ideal,	as	I	briefly	articulated	at	the	end	of	the	chapter	on	the	terminology	“egodystonic”	and	“egosyntonic.”	608	Freud,	“The	Claims	of	Psychoanalysis	to	Scientific	Interest,”	pg.	187	
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addressed,609	Freud’s	main	argument	hinges	upon	a	definition	of	the	Uncanny	given	by	Schelling.		He	writes,	“We	notice	that	Schelling	says	something	which	throws	quite	a	new	light	on	the	concept	of	the	Unheimlich.	…	According	to	him,	everything	is	
unheimlich	that	ought	to	have	remained	secret	and	hidden	but	has	come	to	light.”610		What	strikes	Freud	about	this	definition	is	the	“uncanny”	resemblance	this	definition	has	to	Freud’s	own	recognition	of	the	mechanism	of	repression.			Freud	goes	on	to	explicitly	state	the	‘rule’	of	what	is	felt	to	be	uncanny.		He	writes,	“The	uncanny	is	something	which	is	secretly	familiar,	which	has	undergone	repression	and	then	returned	from	it,	and	…	everything	that	is	uncanny	fulfills	this	condition.”611		On	the	other	hand,	Freud	observes,	“Not	everything	that	recalls	repressed	desires	and	surmounted	modes	of	thinking	…	is	on	that	account	uncanny.”612		In	other	words,	everything	uncanny	involves	the	return	of	the	repressed,	but	not	every	return	of	the	repressed	is	experienced	as	uncanny.			Freud	further	on	notes,	“What	is	‘heimlich’	…	comes	to	be	‘unheimlich’.”613		In	other	words,	what	was	once	familiar	has	become	unfamiliar	and	is	thereafter,	in	its	presentation,	felt	to	be	‘uncanny’.			Freud	writes,	“The	feeling	of	something	uncanny	is	directly	attached	to	the	figure	of	the	Sand-Man,”614with	which	Freud	relates	to	a	destructive	drive.		Freud	also	find’s	the	uncanny	in	Shakespearean	tragedy,	such	as	Hamlet	and	Macbeth,	among	others,	where	there	is	at	times	almost	an	explicitly	mentioned	desire	to	die,	a																																																									609	Freud,	The	Uncanny,	pg.	219	610	Freud,	The	Uncanny,	pg.	225	611	Freud,	The	Uncanny,	pg.	245	612	Freud,	The	Uncanny,	pg.	245	613	Freud,	The	Uncanny,	pg.	224	614	Freud,	The	Uncanny,	pg.	230	
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desire	that	is	at	least	implicit	in	the	question	of	why	one	should	go	on	living.		The	uncanny	immediately	becomes	associated	with	a	desire	to	die.		This	is	remarkable	because	the	publication	of	this	work	preceded	the	publication	of	Beyond	where	he	explicitly	introduces	the	death	drive.		Freud	also	begins	to	introduce	the	repetition	compulsion	in	The	Uncanny	as	well,	although	he	does	not	deal	with	the	subject	directly	here.		Freud	writes,	“This	phenomenon	[of	repetition]	does	undoubtedly	…	arouse	an	uncanny	feeling,	which,	furthermore,	recalls	the	sense	of	helplessness	experienced	in	some	dream-states.”615		And	again,	Freud	observes:	It	is	possible	to	recognize	the	dominance	in	the	unconscious	mind	of	a	‘compulsion	to	repeat’	proceeding	from	the	instinctual	impulses	and	probably	inherent	in	the	very	nature	of	the	instincts	–	a	compulsion	powerful	enough	to	overrule	the	pleasure	principle,	lending	to	certain	aspects	of	the	mind	their	daemonic	character	…	which	is	responsible	for	a	part	of	the	course	taken	by	the	analyses	of	neurotic	patients.		…	Whatever	reminds	us	of	this	inner	‘compulsion	to	repeat’	is	perceived	as	uncanny.616		Of	significance	to	the	previous	discussion	of	the	repetition	compulsion	as	it	appears	in	Beyond,	Freud	remarks	here	that	the	uncanny	is	experienced	as	a	return	of	repressed	content,	and	it	involves	a	repetition	that	is	perceived	as	uncanny.		He	writes,	“If	psychoanalytic	theory	is	correct	in	maintaining	that	every	affect	belonging	to	an	emotional	impulse	…	is	transformed,	if	it	is	repressed,	…	then	among	instances	of	frightening	things	there	must	be	one	class	in	which	the	frightening	element	can	be	shown	to	be	something	repressed	which	recurs.”617		Recognizing	that																																																									615	Freud,	The	Uncanny,	pg.	237	616	Freud,	The	Uncanny,	pg.	238	617	Freud,	The	Uncanny,	pg.	241	
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there	is	something	familiar	with	much	that	is	experienced	as	unfamiliar	–	something	
heimlich	in	much	that	is	experienced	as	unheimlich	–	Freud	continues:	this	uncanny	is	in	reality	nothing	new	or	alien,	but	something	which	is	familiar	and	old-established	in	the	mind	and	which	has	become	alienated	from	it	only	through	the	process	of	repression.		This	…	enables	us,	furthermore,	to	understand	Schelling’s	definition	of	the	uncanny	as	something	which	ought	to	have	remained	hidden	but	has	come	to	light.618				It	is,	one	might	say	in	Nietzschean	terms,	the	Dionysian	motivational	states	breaking	through	the	reaction-formations	of	Apollo,	or	neurotic	symptoms	permeating	the	Apollonian	defenses.	Freud	also	recognizes	the	uncanny	in	what	he	refers	to	as	the	“omnipotence	of	thought”	and	“magical	thinking,”	which	can	be	regarded	in	relation	to	the	original	narcissistic	position.		He	writes	of	the	“Over-accentuation	of	psychical	reality	in	comparison	with	material	reality	–	a	feature	closely	allied	to	the	belief	in	the	omnipotence	of	thoughts.”619		In	other	words,	it	is	very	much	in	line	with	magical	thinking,	also	referred	to	by	analysts	and	theoreticians620	as	primary	process	thinking	–	or	paleological	thinking.	Freud	elaborates	on	this	point,	“An	uncanny	effect	is	often	and	easily	produced	when	the	distinction	between	imagination	and	reality	is	effaced,	as	when	something	that	we	have	hitherto	regarded	as	imaginary	appears	before	us	in	reality,	or	when	a	symbol	takes	over	the	full	functions	of	the	thing	it	symbolizes,	and	so	on.”621		The	conflation	of	the	symbol	with	the	symbolized,																																																									618	Freud,	The	Uncanny,	pg.	241	619	Freud,	Uncanny,	pg.	244	620	See,	for	example,	Arieti	and	Loewald.	621	Freud,	Uncanny,	pg.	244	
	 235	
magical	thinking	and	omnipotence	of	thought,	and	a	psychotic	position	of	living	in	psychical	reality	over	and	beyond	a	material	reality,	all	are	manifestations	of	what	is	uncanny.		Freud	writes,	“We	–	or	our	primitive	forefathers	–	once	believed	that	these	possibilities	were	realities,	and	were	convinced	that	they	actually	happened.		Nowadays	we	no	longer	believe	in	them,	we	have	surmounted	these	modes	of	thought;	but	…	the	old	ones	still	exist	within	us	ready	to	seize	upon	any	confirmation.”622		In	the	same	sense,	the	Apollonian	has	surmounted	the	Dionysian	in	civilization	and	cultural	products.			 The	“Oceanic	feeling”	analyzed	by	Freud	in	Civilization	and	its	Discontents	years	later	is	an	uncanny	return	–	a	glimmering	possibility	of	confirmation	–	of	that	original	narcissistic	position.		The	“omnipotence	of	thought”	is	directly	related	to	the	drive	for	mastery,	Bemächtigungstrieb,	whereas	magical	thinking	entertains	the	illusion	that	one	indeed	has	complete	mastery	over	the	world.		“What	is	involved,”	Freud	writes,	“is	an	actual	repression	of	some	content	of	thought	and	a	return	of	this	repressed	content,	not	a	cessation	of	belief	in	the	reality	of	such	content.”623		In	other	words,	the	feeling	of	the	Uncanny	emerges	from	the	encounter	with	content	that	had	at	one	time	been	repressed	in	the	effort	to	maintain	a	particular	(or	generalized)	illusion	of	mastery.		It	should	be	noted,	however,	that	this	distinction	might	not	describe	what	is	necessary	for	the	feeling	of	the	uncanny	for	the	presentation	in	reality624	of	what	one	had	since	rejected	entering	into	the	secondary	process	could																																																									622	Freud,	Uncanny,	pg.	247	623	Freud,	Uncanny,	pg.	249	624	To	an	extent,	what	is	regarded	as	physical	reality	is,	in	a	Kantian	sense,	always	actually	psychical	reality,	where	the	mind	creates	–	or	allows	for	–	a	presentation	of	the	manifold.	
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still	be	felt	as	uncanny.		But	where	the	Uncanny	does	present	itself,	there	is	yet	a	place	that	was	kept	for	its	inclusion,	a	potential	re-emergence,	and	therefore	Freud	remarks	that	it	was	more	repressed	than	it	was	removed	from	the	mind	as	a	possibility.			The	Uncanny,	to	distinguish	it	from	the	horrific	and	the	ugly,	should	be	regarded	as	what	is	simultaneously	purposive	and	counter-purposive.		This	is	perhaps	why	it	has	been	associated	with	the	sublime.		It	might	entail	either	the	ugly	or	the	horrific,	or	entail	neither	but	instead	a	kind	of	‘je	ne	sais	quoi’.		Central	to	the	‘uncanny’	is	the	return	of	the	repressed,	so	that	it	is	purposive	in	that	it	is	very	much	
at	home	as	a	part	of	one’s	nature,	but	is	counter-purposive,	however,	because	it	has	been	repudiated	via	‘Apollonian’	constructs,	counter-cathexes	of	reaction-formations,	or	so	on.		 To	understand	beauty	from	this	discussion,	and	in	accordance	with	the	thinking	of	Kant,	Schopenhauer,	Nietzsche,	and	Freud,	we	can	characterize	aesthetic	feelings	thus:	Beauty	is	that	which	is	felt	to	be	heimlich,	and	all	that	is	not	heimlich	is	felt	to	be	unheimlich	in	some	fashion,	but	unlike	the	uncanny	lacks	the	history	of	
heimlichkeit.		The	horrific	is	felt	as	something	that	threatens	heimlichkeit,	the	ugly	as	something	disagreeable	but	mostly	unarousing	by	contrast	to	the	horrific.		It	is	merely	incompatible	with	what	is	heimlich,	but	doesn’t	threaten	it.		I	think	the	sublime	can	be	best	characterized	as	homesickness.		Where	beauty	involves	a	feeling	of	being	at	home,	the	sublime	involves	an	implicit	recognition	that	one	is	
heimatlos625	while	yearning	for	a	home,	and	importantly	correlated	with	a	hope,																																																									625	homeless	
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fantasy,	or	promise	of	a	home.		Indeed,	it	is	for	those	who	call	themselves	“homeless”	that	Nietzsche	“commend[s	his]	secret	wisdom	and	gaya	scienza.”626		Looking	at	the	above	discussion	of	purposiveness	and	counter-purposiveness,	a	simultaneous	feeling	common	to	both	the	uncanny	and	to	sublimity,	the	one	seems	to	be	opposite	the	other.		For	the	Uncanny,	what	was	purposive	has	become	counter-purposive.		For	the	sublime,	one	tries	to	make	what	is	counter-purposive	purposive.		But	this	does	leave	the	possibility	as	well	of	rendering	the	uncanny	sublime	if	there	is	inspiration	to	make	what	is	counter-purposive	in	the	uncanny	purposive	once	more.				
Sublimity	&	Hysteria	
The	feeling	of	the	sublime	is	most	closely	associated	with	Panksepp’s	observations	concerning	the	SEEKING	system	described	previously.		But	as	also	observed	previously,	people	will	‘seek’	along	various	vicissitudes,	such	that	there	is	a	bifurcation	of	paths	by	which	one	might	discover	–	or	even	more	appropriately,	create	–	home.		The	bifurcation	occurs	through	either	egodystonic	or	egosyntonic	paths,	so	that	what	is	envisioned	as	home,	and	the	path	one	takes	there,	is	different	according	to	one’s	psychical	constitution.			In	what	follows,	I	discuss	how	sublimity	features	in	Nietzsche’s	work,	as	it	is	an	integral	aspect	of	the	Dionysian	and	thus	of	his	entire	philosophy.		Specifically,	I	examine	the	bifurcation	of	aesthetic	values	between	strong	and	weak	spirits.		In	my	opinion,	Keith	Ansell-Pearson	demonstrates	considerable	insight	in	focusing	on	the																																																									626	Nietzsche,	The	Gay	Science,	V	§377	
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sublime	in	the	middle	period,	for	this	was	in	fact	the	period	in	which	Nietzsche’s	views	towards	the	sublime	–	reasons	for	its	condemnation	in	some	contexts,	and	valorizations	in	others	–	are	generally	formed.627		Ansell-Pearson	observes,	“[Daybreak]	is	an	unduly	neglected	text	in	Nietzsche’s	corpus,”628	and	he	endeavors	to	show	that	“Nietzsche	here	commits	himself	to	fashioning	new	sublimities	of	philosophy,	including	our	appreciation	of	the	beautiful.”629		Daybreak	is	a	book	largely	focused	on	the	overcoming	of,	or	elimination	of,	religious	and	metaphysical	beliefs	in	addition	to	moralities	and	customs	that	influenced	such	beliefs	or	resulted	from	them.	It	is	a	book	opposed	to	the	‘prejudices’	of	civilization.		Ansell-Pearson	writes,	“Here,	Nietzsche’s	concern	is	with	a	transitional	humanity	that	is	moving	from	a	heritage	of	religions	and	moralities	to	something	new,	in	fact,	to	uncharted	conditions	of	existence.”630	Ansell-Pearson	illustrates	convincingly	that,	around	the	time	of	Daybreak,	“Nietzsche	is	in	search	of	new	possibilities	for	the	sublime	as	a	concept	and	an	experience.”631		This	is	congruent	with	what	will	consequently	be	
																																																								627	Any	reader	who	looks	to	understand	the	sublime	as	it	functions	in	the	works	of	Nietzsche	cannot	overlook	Keith	Ansell-Pearson’s	paper	“Nietzsche,	the	Sublime,	and	the	Sublimities	of	Philosophy.”		In	it,	Ansell-Pearson	masterfully	focuses	his	attention	on	a	period	of	Nietzsche’s	career	in	which	Nietzsche’s	views	of	the	sublime	are	undergoing	a	significant	change	that	will	remain	roughly	consistent	until	the	end	of	his	career.		In	addition,	Ansell-Pearson	also	draws	attention	to	the	relationship	of	what	is	being	worked	out	in	the	middle	period	concerning	the	sublime	with	what	had	preceded	it	and	what	will	follow	it.		628	Thanks	to	work	by	Ansell-Pearson,	it	is	becoming	significantly	less	neglected.	629	Ansell-Pearson,	Nietzsche,	the	Sublime,	pg.	203	630	Ansell-Pearson,	“Nietzsche,	the	Sublime,	…”	pg.	205	631	Ansell-Pearson,	“Nietzsche,	the	Sublime,	…”	pg.	202	
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argued,	concerning	a	bifurcation	of	the	aesthetics	of	reflection.		The	bifurcation	will	serve	to	undo	the	superficial	impression	of	a	contradiction.632			Ansell-Pearson	observes,	“what	troubles	Nietzsche	about	the	sublime	is	made	explicit	in	his	late	text,	The	Case	of	Wagner,”	where	he	criticizes	the	construction	of	the	hinter-worldly	and	transcendence	exemplified	in	Wagner’s	operas.633		This	was,	however,	also	evident	in	Human.		Ansell-Pearson	argues	that	Nietzsche	“sets	himself	in	opposition	to	this	dependence	on	the	sublime	…	in	the	name	of	a	certain	rationalism.		It	is	‘rationalism’	that	defines	Nietzsche’s	philosophical	position	in	both	his	middle	and	late	periods.		The	appeal	to	reason	and	principles	of	rationality	is	strong	in	[Daybreak]	and	informs	his	criticism	of	Wagner.”634		I	think	Ansell-Pearson	is	correct	insofar	as	Nietzsche	venerates	the																																																									632	Ansell-Pearson	claims	that	there	are	three	different	phases	in	Nietzsche’s	‘intellectual	development’	pertaining	to	the	sublime.		The	first,	which	we	can	associate	with	The	Birth	of	Tragedy,	“…	he	writes	as	an	advocate	of	the	sublime	as	that	which	we	need	to	hold	onto;	in	his	middle	period	…	he	adopts	a	more	sober	attitude	toward	the	sublime;	and	in	his	late	writings	he	is	highly	critical	of	our	attraction	to	the	sublime	and	warns	against	it	(for	example,	the	case	of	Wagner’s	music”.	(Nietzsche,	the	Sublime,	pp.	203-204).	I	think	Ansell-Pearson	is	on	the	right	track	regarding	the	evolution	of	Nietzsche’s	thought	concerning	the	sublime,	but	I	also	think	it’s	not	quite	as	simple	as	this.		In	the	middle	period,	Nietzsche	is	originally	quite	critical	of	the	Sublime,	asserting	a	need	for	people	to	‘cool	down’.		This	is	not	merely	a	sober	view,	but	is	a	warning	against	the	attraction	of	the	sublime	which	is	how	Ansell-Pearson	characterizes	Nietzsche’s	later	works.		Furthermore,	Ansell-Pearson	is	correct	that	Nietzsche	continues	to	warn	against	the	sublime	that	he	sees	apparent	in	religions	or	in	arts,	of	which	Wagner	is	a	consistent	example.		However,	in	the	later	period,	Nietzsche	also	valorizes	Dionysian	Rausch,	which	can	only	be	interpreted	as	the	sublime.		For	Nietzsche,	Ansell-Pearson	observes,	the	sublime	becomes	“a	matter	of	purifying	ourselves	of	the	origins	and	sources	of	our	feelings	and	desire	for	the	sublime	because	the	higher	feelings	associated	with	it	are	bound	up	with	humanity’s	investment	in	an	imaginary	world:	an	‘exhalted	humanity’	is	full	of	self-loathing	and	this	needs	to	be	conquered”	(Nietzsche,	the	Sublime,	pg.	202).	633	Ansell-Pearson,	“Nietzsche,	the	Sublime…”	pg.	231	634	Ansell-Pearson,	“Nietzsche,	the	Sublime…”	pg.	231	
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release	from	unhealthy	illusions	that	honest,	scientific	and	rational	research,	for	example,	provides.		But	I	must	also	emphasize	that	one	should	not	place	too	much	emphasis	on	rationality	in	Nietzsche	as	a	distinguishing	factor,	for	rationality	can	also	deceive,	as	with	rationalization,	or	be	too	removed	from	life,	as	with	intellectualization.635			Ansell-Pearson	writes	that,	for	Nietzsche,	“The	new	sublime”	and	“including	the	sublimities	of	philosophy,	is	bound	up	with	a	new	comportment	toward	existence	as	it	now	concerns	us	as	searches	of	knowledge,	and	a	new	fearlessness	is	required	as	we	embark	on	this	search	free	of	‘the	prejudices	of	morality.”636		Ansell-Pearson	is	emphasizing	the	rational,	scientific	aspect	of	der	Freigeist,	and	this	is	appropriate	as	it	is	science	and	rational	thought	that	allow	for	that	freedom	by	instigating	disillusionment.		However,	one	cannot	move	into	the	future	as	merely	a	scientist	or	seeker	of	knowledge	(which,	for	Nietzsche,	can	only	be	negative);	one	must	be	an	artist	too	in	creating	the	knowledge	one	seeks.		It	is	as	a	creative	being	that	one	can	move	on	to	new	horizons,	and	it	is	the	creativity	coupled	with	rationality	that	provides	the	possibilities	of	health	at	these	horizons.			Matthew	Rampley	observes,	“While	Nietzsche	criticizes	systematic	thinking	for	its	dishonesty,	the	constant	focus	of	his	relentless	tirades	against	Wagner	is	the																																																									635	Unfortunately,	there	isn’t	the	space	to	address	this	issue	here,	but	I	believe	Nietzsche	is	as	much	of	an	‘irrationalist’	as	Schopenhauer	or	Freud.		And	common	approaches,	such	as	Kaufmann’s,	that	suppose	reason	is	responsible	for	over-comings	“smells	offensively	Hegelian”	(to	use	Nietzsche’s	phrase	from	EH).	‘Reason’,	or	rationality,	does	not	operate	independently	of	the	irrational	will	to	power,	but	is	an	expression	of	such	an	irrational	principle.		What	makes	it	valuable	is	instead,	as	with	everything	else,	the	psychical,	constitutional	underpinning	of	reason	that	would	increase	or	decrease	the	strength	necessary	for	the	honesty	that	is	essential	for	disillusionment	and	over-comings.	636	Ansell-Pearson,	“Nietzsche,	the	Sublime…”	pg.	206.			
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disorganization	caused	by	his	reduction	of	music	to	the	micrological.”637	For	this	reason,	Nietzsche	diagnoses	Wagner	the	person,	and	especially	Wagner	the	musician,	as	an	hysteric.		But	this	lack	of	organization	isn’t	necessarily	an	issue	of	rationality,	but	can	be	said	to	be	an	aesthetic	concern.		In	this	sense,	Wagner	characterizes	precisely	the	sublime	that	Nietzsche	criticizes	consistently,	and	most	acutely,	in	Human	and	later	works.		“Nietzsche	regards	‘joy	in	uncertainty	and	polysemy’	as	the	sign	of	a	strong	spirit,”	Rampley	observes.		But	“Dissonance,	contradiction	and	ambiguity	are	not	ends	in	themselves,	but	rather	strategic	moves	in	the	project	of	undermining	the	amnesiac	illusions	of	metaphysics.”638		In	other	words,	Nietzsche	favors	the	sublime	insofar	as	it	serves	to	expand	the	possibilities	of	becoming,	and	importantly	insofar	as	it	is	not	merely	enjoyment	in	the	destruction	of	order.		This	would	never	overcome	nihilism;	it	would	neither	succeed	in	positing	new	values	nor	motivate	one	to	fly	out	to	new	horizons.		Nietzsche	wants	one	to	cease	feeling	at	home	among	the	rabble	in	the	city	and	fly	out	to	new	horizons	–	not	towards	nothing,	but	towards	new	possibilities	of	home.	A	bifurcation	of	sublime	feelings	might	be	conceptualized	as	follows:		The	religious	(or	‘Wagnerian’),	for	example,	seek	out	the	Rausch	of	the	sublime.		The	free	spirit,	on	the	other	hand,	more	nobly	is	open	to	Rausch	merely	in	being	open	to	the	ugliness	or	horrifying	aspects	of	life.		The	task	of	the	convalescent	is	not	only	to	become	open	again	to	one’s	nature,	to	allow	the	expression	again	of	one’s	drives,	but	to	give	style	as	well.		In	this	sense,	the	convalescent	is	open	to	the	sublime	so	as	to	make	beautiful.		By	contrast,	those	of	religious,	or	‘Wagnerian’	or	postmodernist																																																									637	Rampley,	Nietzsche	Aesthetics	and	Modernity,	pg.	238	638	Rampley,	Nietzsche	Aesthetics	and	Modernity,	pg.	238	
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seductions,	may	give	a	place	for	the	beautiful,	but	generally	for	the	task	of	producing	sublime	feelings	of	intoxication	that	serve	as	either	analgesics	(as	in	the	case	of	Schopenhauer)	or	as	stimulants	where	one	lacks	power	and	is	exhausted	(as	in	Nietzsche’s	frequent	characterization	of	Wagner).			The	‘Wagnerian’	‘beauty’	–	their	‘home’	–	is	necessarily	something	hinter-worldly,	a	schizoid	fantasy,	or	something	of	an	imagined	past	about	which	they	feel	nostalgic.639	I	think	Ansell-Pearson	is	correct	with	his	assertion	that	here	“Nietzsche	is	inviting	us	to	replace	the	sublime	dream	of	immortality”	–	which	we	can	take	to	signify	the	sublime	of	the	hinter-worldly	and	Wagnerian	intoxications	–	“with	a	new	sobriety	toward	existence.”640		This	sobriety	was	first	suggested	in	Human	when	Nietzsche	writes	of	a	need	to	‘cool	down’,	which	science	provides.641		The	same	sentiment	in	Human	is	again	echoed	in	Daybreak,	where	Nietzsche	writes,	“It	is	a	sad	fact,	but	for	the	moment	the	man	of	science	has	to	be	suspicious	of	all	higher	
feelings,	so	greatly	are	they	nourished	by	delusion	and	nonsense.		It	is	not	that	they	are	thus	in	themselves,	or	must	always	remain	thus:	but	of	all	the	gradual	
purifications	awaiting	mankind,	the	purification	of	the	higher	feelings	will	certainly	be	one	of	the	most	gradual.”642		And	in	Human,	Nietzsche	writes:	A	church	trembling	with	deep	sounds;	dull,	regular,	repressed	calls	from	a	company	of	priests	who	involuntarily	transmit	their	tension	to	the	congregation	and	excite	them	to	listen	almost	in	fear,	as	though	a	miracle	were	about	to	occur;	the	breath	of	the	architecture,	which,	as	the	abode	of	a																																																									639	See	also	Gemes,	Ken,	“Postmodernisms	Use	and	Abuse	of	Nietzsche,”	on	this	point,	which	I	address	further	on	in	discussions	of	beauty.	640	Ansell-Pearson,	“Nietzsche,	the	Sublime…,”	pg.	218	641	See,	for	example,	Nietzsche,	Human,	All	too	Human,	1.38,	1.81,	&	1.38		642	Nietzsche,	Daybreak	§33	
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divinity,	reaches	up	into	obscurity,	in	the	dark	spaces	of	which	the	divinity	may	at	any	moment	make	evident	his	dreaded	presence.643		The	religious	sublime	is	such	that	weak	or	fettered	spirits	feel.		And	Nietzsche	invites	the	speculation	that	it	is	in	fact	strength	that	is	required	for	the	giving	of	form	and	style,	for	incorporating	reality,	whereas	the	weak	spirits	subsist	on	the	illusion	of	power	that	sublimity	provides.			Nietzsche	writes,	for	example,	“There	is	a	unique	consolation	in	affirming	through	one’s	suffering	a	‘profounder	world	of	truth’	than	any	other	world	is,	and	one	would	much	rather	suffer	and	thereby	feel	oneself	exalted	above	reality	…	than	be	without	suffering	but	also	without	this	feeling	that	one	is	exalted.”644		This	passage	in	Daybreak	is	the	same	sentiment	echoed	in	the	Genealogy	that	one	is	not	opposed	to	suffering	so	long	as	there	is	a	supposed	meaning	or	purpose	to	that	suffering,	in	which	case	one	will	even	desire	suffering.645	Nietzsche	writes	that	the	decadent	spirits	no	longer	recognize	pleasure	as	anything	but	intoxication:	“The	only	pleasure	they	could	still	recognize	was	in	the	form	of	ecstasy	and	other	precursors	of	madness.”646		This	‘pure	spirituality’	“has	destroyed	nervous	energy	with	its	excesses,”	and	“has	produced	gloomy,	tense	and	oppressed	souls.”647	This	is	what	I	refer	to	as	the	‘religious	sublime’.		Nietzsche	writes,	alluding	to	the	same	heated,	ecstatic	feelings	in	Human,	“How	repulsive	enjoyment	is	to	us	now…	The	theatrical	cry	of	passion	now	hurts	our	ears;	that	who																																																									643	Nietzsche,	Human,	All	too	Human,	I,	§	130	644	Nietzsche,	Daybreak,	§32	645	See,	for	example,	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	III	§28	646	Nietzsche,	Daybreak,	§39	647	Nietzsche,	Daybreak	§39	
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romantic	uproar	and	tumult	of	the	senses	that	is	loved	by	educated	mob	together	with	its	aspirations	towards	the	sublime,	the	elevated,	the	distorted,	how	foreign	it	has	become	to	our	taste!”648		Nietzsche	thus	criticizes	the	haughty,	romantic,	and	hinter-worldly	feelings	that	he	sees	epitomized	by	Wagner,	religious	fervor,	and	the	growing	political	and	revolutionary	projects	of	Europe	that	are	to	become	aligned	with	Nationalism	and	Socialism.		These	things	cannot	be	enjoyed	by	free	spirits,	Nietzsche	claims,	because	it	is	only	through	illness	that	the	enjoyment	of	such	things	are	possible.		Free	spirits	have	liberated	themselves	from	the	illness,	and	thus	find	such	‘arts’	repulsive.		Society	can	no	longer	benefit	from	such	art.			Indicative	of	the	religious	sublime	–	what	Rampley	refers	to	as	reactive	sublime	–	are	feelings	of	intoxication	and	ecstasy	reinforced,	or	caused	by,	delusions	and	repudiations	of	one’s	own	nature.		Nietzsche	writes:	
Faith	in	Intoxication.	–	Men	who	enjoy	moments	of	exaltation	and	ecstasy	and	who	…	are	ordinarily	in	a	wretched	and	miserable	condition,	regard	these	moments	as	their	real	‘self’	and	their	wretchedness	and	misery	as	the	effect	of	
what	is	‘outside	the	self’;	…	Mankind	owes	much	that	is	bad	to	these	inebriates:	for	they	are	insatiable	sowers	of	the	weeds	of	dissatisfaction	with	oneself	and	one’s	neighbor,	of	contempt	for	the	age	and	the	world,	and	especially	of	world-weariness.	…	so	mankind	as	a	whole	has	been	slowly	and	thoroughly	ruined	through	the	feelings	made	drunk	by	spiritual	fire-waters	and	by	those	who	have	kept	alive	the	desire	for	them:	perhaps	will	go	on	to	perish	by	them.649		
																																																								648	Nietzsche,	The	Gay	Science,	preface	to	second	edition,	§	4	649	Nietzsche,	Daybreak	I	§	50	
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The	sublime,	for	such	beings,	would	correspond	with	a	weakness	in	one’s	constitution,	whereby	it	is	owing	to	the	weakness(es)	that	one	finds	such	fantasies	or	delusional	beliefs	intoxicating.		 Furthermore,	the	intoxicating	feelings	are	supposed	to	be	cures	for	the	ills	of	the	world,	instead	of	corresponding	to	what	is	unhealthy	in	man’s	relation	to	himself	or	the	world.		Nietzsche	writes	further:		“The	means	which	worked	immediately,	anaesthetizing	and	intoxicating,	the	so-called	consolations,	were	ignorantly	supposed	to	be	actual	cures;	the	fact	was	not	even	noticed,	indeed,	that	these	instantaneous	alleviations	often	had	to	be	paid	for	with	a	general	and	profound	worsening	of	the	complaint.”650		It	is	for	this	reason	that	Nietzsche	proposes	the	therapeutic	task	of	“calming	the	imagination	of	the	invalid,”651	because	it	is	the	imagination	of	the	weak	and	ill	spirits	that	are	attached	to	the	delusions	and	schizoid	fantasies	that	spread	their	illness	throughout	the	world.652	In	“Hysteria	and	Histrionics,”	Gregory	Moore	observes	a	persistent	concern	of	the	modern	era	with	the		“degeneracy	and	hysteria”	that	people	“saw	plaguing	the	
fin	de	siècle,”	of	the	nineteenth	century.		Creativity	was	often	viewed	as	exemplifying																																																									650	Nietzsche,	Daybreak	I	§52	651	Nietzsche,	Daybreak	I	§54	652	This,	of	course,	foreshadows	what	Nietzsche	writes	of	the	ascetic	priest	as	well.	The	ascetic	priest	merely	offers	an	anaesthetic,	treating	the	symptoms	of	the	sick	herd	rather	than	curing	them	of	their	illnesses.		The	ascetic	priest	“Brings	ointments	and	balms	with	him,	of	course;	but	first	he	has	to	wound	so	that	he	can	be	the	doctor;	and	whilst	he	soothes	the	pain	caused	by	the	wound,	he	poisons	the	wound	at	
the	same	time	–	for	that	is	what	he	is	best	trained	to	do,	this	magician	and	tamer	of	beasts	of	prey,	whose	mere	presence	necessarily	makes	everything	healthy	sick,	and	everything	sick,	tame”	(Genealogy	of	Morality,	III	§15).652		And	further…		“The	
alleviation	of	suffering,	‘consolation’	of	every	kind,	--	that	is	where	his	genius	lies:	how	imaginatively	he	has	understood	his	task	as	consoler”	(Genealogy	of	Morality,	III	§17).652		In	a	since,	Nietzsche	is	picturing	Wagner	as	something	like	an	Ascetic	priest,	the	sick	who	make	sick	and	provide	an	anaesthetic	for	the	complaint.	
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such	a	“pathological	origin,”	and	that	this	was	repeating	the	same	theme	observed	in	Plato’s	perspective	of	the	“’divine	madness’	that	is	the	well-spring	of	philosophical	inspiration.”653		But,	he	writes,	it	was	“Not	until	the	Romantic	reaction	against	the	Enlightenment	ideal	of	the	artist	as	the	embodiment	of	reason,	judgment	and	taste	that	widespread	medical	interest	in	the	pathology	of	genius	awakened	in	earnest.”654			Moore	observes	that	Charcot	had	used	“hypnotic	suggestion	to	induce	or	halt	seizures,	like	the	director	of	some	macabre	ballet”	in	front	of	large	audiences.		Furthermore,	there	appeared	to	be	a	similitude	between	the	displays	of	‘hysteria’	and	“the	stylized	movements	and	gestures	of	the	French	Classical	acting.”655		This,	Moore	observes,	was	one	reason	why	hysteria	and	histrionics	had	so	captured	the	imagination	in	relation	to	art	and	theatrics	in	the	modern	era.656	In	Twilight,	Nietzsche	makes	a	contrast	between	‘Dionysian	histrionics’	and	hysteria.		Moore	observes	that	Nietzsche	suggests,	“The	difference	between	the	hysterical	and	the	Dionysian	artist	lies	predominantly	in	their	respective	states	of	health,”	rather	than	“in	the	superficially	similar	forms	of	aesthetic	intoxication	which	they	experience.”657		Both	the	hysteric	and	the	histrionic	Dionysian	exemplify,	for	Nietzsche,	a	kind	of	ecstatic	Rauch.		Sublimity,	we	might	infer	according	to	Nietzsche’s	analysis,	can	result	from	either	an	egosyntonic	or	egodystonic	psychical	constitution.		The	Sublime	that	he	criticizes	in	Human,	when	he	speaks	of	a	need	to	‘cool	down’,	is	a	sublimity	felt	in	religious	fervor,	a	symptom	of	egodystonic																																																									653	Moore,	“Hysteria	and	Histrionics,”	pp.	246-247	654	Moore,	“Hysteria	and	Histrionics,”	pg.	247	655	Moore,	“Hysteria	and	Histrionics,”	pg.	253	656	Moore,	“Hysteria	and	Histrionics,”	pg.	253	657	Moore,	“Hysteria	and	Histrionics,”	pg.	265	
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vicissitudes	that	result	from	the	release	(or	failures)	of	repressions	or	the	delusions	that	result	from	disavowing	a	troubling	reality.		The	sublime	that	reappears	positively	on	the	other	hand,	notably	around	the	time	of	Daybreak,	exemplifies	the	feelings	of	sublimity	that	Nietzsche	enthusiastically	praises	as	inspirations	and	incentives	for	free	spirits	to	move	beyond	the	sickness	of	the	cities	into	future	becomings.658		Moore	references	a	passage	from	Twilight:659	…	In	the	Dionysian	state,	…	the	entire	system	of	affects	is	excited	and	intensified:	so	that	it	discharges	all	its	modes	of	expression	at	once,	releasing	the	force	of	presentation,	imitation,	transfiguration,	transformation,	and	all	types	of	mimicry	and	play	acting,	all	at	the	same	time.		The	essential	thing	is	the	ease	of	metamorphosis,	the	inability	not	to	react	(--	similar	to	certain	hysterics	who	can	take	on	any	role	at	the	drop	of	a	hat).		…	Music	as	we	understand	it	today	is	also	a	total	stimulation	and	discharge	of	the	affects,	just	a	residuum	of	Dionysian	histrionics…660			An	important	aspect	of	the	passage	is	the	parenthetical	note	that	it	is	similar	to	what	hysterics	exemplify;	but,	in	saying	it	is	similar,	Nietzsche	also	observes	a	difference.		He	further	speaks	of	the	Dionysian	as	exemplifying	histrionics.		Moore	asks,	“what	is	the	relation	between	hysteria	and	histrionics	here?”	and	observes,	“A	recurrent	theme	in	Nietzsche’s	late	writings	is	that	there	is	a	thin	line	separating	health	and	sickness;	that	one	state	is	frequently	mistaken	for	the	other.”661		Moore	further	
																																																								658	see,	for	example,	Nietzsche,	Daybreak,	§423	659	The	reference	itself	isn’t	entirely	sufficient	because	of	its	allusion	the	The	Birth	of	
Tragedy	in	its	discussion	of	the	Apollonian	and	Dionysian	660	Nietzsche,	TI	Skirmishes,	§10.		Moore	only	references	the	first	half	what	the	portion	I’ve	cited.		I	have	included	the	rest	because	of	the	important	elements	Moore	omitted.			661	Moore,	“Hysteria	and	Histrionics,”	pg.	260	
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observes	that	this	is	similar	to	the	sense	in	which	religious	fervor	might	be	confused	with	“potency	experienced	by	strong,	creative	natures.”662		The	observance	of	this	‘thin	line’	is	also	applicable	in	distinguishing	kinds	of	self-mastery,	where	Nietzsche	admires	the	mastery	of	which	the	convalescent	is	capable,	but	relentlessly	criticizes	the	mastery	of	the	ascetics	for	egodystonically	repudiating	their	nature	by	repressing	it.		Nietzsche	also	claims	that	Modern	music,	implying	the	Wagnerian	sort,	is	“a	total	stimulation	and	discharge	of	the	affects,	but	it	is	only	the	remnant	of	a	much	fuller	world	of	expressive	affects,	just	a	residuum	of	Dionysian	histrionics.”663		What	makes	it	a	mere	‘residuum’,	I	suggest,	is	the	difference	between	unrepressed	behavior	–	the	Dionysian	–	and	behavior	resulting	from	the	failures	of	repressions	–	hysteria.		Hysteria	is	in	a	sense	Dionysian,	both	entailing	the	‘discharge	of	affect’,	but	is	discharged	in	a	way	that	is	not	only	uncontrolled	but	quite	uncontrollable,	and	it	is	always	followed,	after	the	discharge,	by	a	return	to	the	same	repression	from	which	it	had	emerged.		In	hysteria,	there	is	a	‘return	of	the	repressed’,	as	it	were,	and	hence	a	residuum	of	what	was	repressed.		Thus,	hysteria	is	quite	appropriately	associated	with	das	unheimlich	as	indicated	above.		 If	we	look	at	what	psychoanalysis	has	brought	to	the	table,	and	in	conjunction	with	the	preceding	discussion	of	aesthetic	feelings,	we	can	differentiate	hysteria	and	histrionics	as	being	both	feelings	of	sublimity	–	excitation	and	discharge	in	euphoric	passion.		Except,	in	the	case	of	hysteria,	the	sublime	feeling	results	from	the	discharge	of	a	quota	of	affect	that	had	been	repressed,	like	a	dog																																																									662	Moore,	“Hysteria	and	Histrionics,”	pp.	260-261,	he	here	references	Nietzsche’s	notes	KSA	13[68]	663	Nietzsche,	TI	“Skirmishes,”	§10	
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being	let	off	a	leash.		For	the	Dionysian,	on	the	other	hand,	repression	was	not	a	prerequisite,	and	therefore	its	expression	can	only	be	a	natural	discharge	unobstructed	by	egodystonic	(inhibitory)	vicissitudes.		Or	to	formulate	it	differently,	hysteria	is	cathartic	and	always	returns	in	the	end	to	exhaustion	or	the	same	repressions	from	which	it	emerged.		The	Dionysian,	on	the	other	hand,	has	the	
potential	to	be	sublimated.		In	other	words,	as	Moore	writes,	“The	Dionysian	artist	only	appears	to	exhibit	the	same	symptoms	as	the	hysteric.”664	Moore	quotes	Nietzsche:	“Wie	man	heute	‘Genie’	als	eine	Form	der	Neurose	beurtheilen	dürfte,	so	vielleicht	auch	die	künstlerische	Suggestion-Kraft,	–	und	unsere	Artisten	sind	in	der	That	den	hysterischen	Weiblein	nur	zu	verwandt!!!	Das	aber	spricht	gegen	‘heute’,	und	nicht	gegen	die	‘Künstler’.”665		Nietzsche	claims	that	Artists	of	his	day	were	largely	hysterical,	but	this	is	because	of	the	Zeitgeist	and	not	of	the	constitution	of	artists	in	general.		Moore	writes,	“Hysterical	and	Dionysian	frenzy	represent	different	points	on	a	continuum	of	human	aesthetic	experiences.		The	experience	of	intoxication,	a	heightened	sensory	awareness	and	extreme	irritability	are	just	as	much	the	necessary	preconditions	for	the	production	of	art	as	they	are	symptoms	of	organic	dysfunction.”666		The	hysteric	artist,	exemplified	by	Wagner	according	to	Nietzsche,	is	in	this	way	differentiated	from	the	Rauch	of	the	Dionysian.	
																																																								664	Moore,	“Hysteria	and	Histrionics,”	pg.	261	665	Moore,	“Hysteria	and	Histrionics,”	pg.	261,	quoting	Nietzsche,	KSA	13,	14[119].		The	German	might	read:	“One	might	regard	the	‘genius’	of	today,	as	well	as	the	artistic	power	of	suggestion,	as	a	form	of	neurosis	–	and	such	artists	are	in	fact	only	related	to	hysterical	little	women!!!		But	this	is	an	argument	against	‘today’,	not	against	the	‘artist’.”	(my	translation).	666	Moore,	“Hysteria	and	Histrionics,”	pg.	261	
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If	my	reading	is	correct,	what	was	Apollonian	in	The	Birth	is,	afterwards,	largely	indicative	of	egodystonic	vicissitudes	such	as	of	reaction-formations,	schizoid	fantasies	that	compensate	for	reality,	or	even	psychotic	delusions	that	paint	over,	and	disavow,	disturbing	aspects	of	reality.		But	there	are	those	convalescents	who	experience	the	Dionysian	with	a	more	egosyntonic	constitution,	however.		This	bifurcation	is	evident	in	the	Case	of	Wagner,	where	Nietzsche	writes	of	“Love,	love	that	has	been	translated	back	into	nature!		Not	the	love	of	a	‘higher	virgin’!	No	Senta-Sentimentality!	But	instead,	love	as	fate,	as	fatality,	cynical,	innocent,	cruel	–	and	that	is	precisely	what	makes	it	nature!”667	There	is	a	love	that	has	been	‘translated	back	into	nature’	–	a	Dionysian	love;	and	also	a	love	that	is	unnatural,	‘Christian’,	decadent,	ascetic,	and	in	opposition	to	nature.		This	is	the	bifurcation.		Dionysian	
Rausch	is	a	feeling	of	intoxication	–	of	sublimity	–	that	results	from	an	egosyntonic	orientation	with	the	world.		Hysteria	and	the	‘religious’	sublime,	on	the	other	hand,	result	from	egodystonic	orientations	with	the	world.		
A	Bifurcation	of	Beauty	
Just	as	there	is	a	bifurcation	of	sublimity,	so	too	is	there	a	bifurcation	concerning	beauty	–	a	bifurcation	that	is	itself	responsible	for	a	lot	of	the	apparent	inconsistencies	in	Nietzsche’s	work,	as	will	here	be	addressed.		The	reasons	for	these	inconsistencies,	which	at	times	appear	as	strict	contradictions,	are	two	fold:	First,	they	are	the	product	of	honesty.		Just	as	the	American	president	Thomas	Jefferson	once	declared	that	it	is	in	his	inconsistencies	that	we	know	he	is	being																																																									667	Nietzsche,	The	Case	of	Wagner,	§3	
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genuine,	so	it	is	with	Nietzsche;	he	is	inconsistent	because	he	is	being	honest	with	his	observations,	thoughts,	and	feelings,	rather	than	trying,	at	the	expense	of	honesty,	to	force	everything	into	an	unnatural	unity.668		Secondly,	and	generally	coupled	with	the	first	reason	in	the	middle	period,	Nietzsche	is	experimenting	with	perspectives.		Nietzsche	feels	that	one	of	his	strongest	talents	is	the	capacity	to	entertain	varying,	and	at	times	conflicting,	perspectives.		The	enthusiasm	for	discovering	new	perspectives	and	his	disciplined	honesty	both	result	in	apparent	inconsistencies.	While	some	of	the	inconsistencies	might	be	irreconcilable,	the	honesty	in	the	experimentation	allows	for	the	possibility	of	retroductive	reasoning	that	can	render	the	inconsistencies	consistent	whilst	nonetheless	maintaining	their	perspectival	integrity.		This	is	quite	apparent	with	respect	to	Nietzsche’s	engagement	with	aesthetic	and	ethical	valuations,	where	what	is	important	isn’t	so	much	the	valuation	or	what	is	being	valued,	but	instead	the	reason	for	the	valuation,	or	rather,	its	motivation.	Above,	I	articulated	the	sublime	as	exemplifying	a	feeling	of	heimatlos,	and	the	beautiful	as	exemplifying	a	feeling	of	heimlichkeit.		So,	I	will	begin	with	the	sublime	and	some	popular	misunderstandings	of	Nietzsche	in	order	to	segue	into	a	discussion	of	the	beautiful.		The	sublime,	Rampley	observes,	is	“founded	on	the	experience	of	internal	dissonance.”669		This	was	true	in	Kant	and	Schopenhauer	in	the	‘special	effort’	that	is	needed	to	render	pleasurable	what	is	at	first	felt	as																																																									668	That’s	not	to	say	he	doesn’t	want	to	construct	a	coherent	whole;	he	does.		But	he	will	not	sacrifice	honesty	for	that	coherence.		Instead,	he	looks	to	create	a	coherence	that	is	made	possible	through	the	disillusionment	that	such	honesty	provides.	669	Rampley,	Nietzsche,	Aesthetics,	and	Modernity	pg.	235	
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unpleasure.		And	this	was	a	point	emphasized	by	Lyotard,	and	is	further	observable	in	Nietzsche.		Something	that	is	commonly	misunderstood	is	the	idea	of	Rauch	–	intoxication	–	as	it	figures	in	Nietzsche’s	aesthetics.		Herbert	Dreyfus,	in	his	book	All	
Things	Shinning,	supposes	that	Nietzsche	privileged	the	ecstasy	and	sublime	feelings	of	Rausch	over	that	of	the	Beautiful.			This	is	probably	due	to	the	attention	that	Nietzsche	pays	to	notions	of	will	to	power	and	the	Dionysian;	the	qualities	of	both	of	these	would	appear	to	be	what	draws	one	out	of	one’s	self	and	fosters	growth	and	expansion	and	strength,	indeed	feelings	of	power.			However,	as	Ken	Gemes	correctly	points	out,	this	is	a	popular	post-modern	interpretation	of	Nietzsche	that	doesn’t	really	fit	Nietzsche’s	position.		Nietzsche	actually	always	values	a	kind	of	order,	and	only	values	Rausch	insofar	as	it	can	be	generative	of	that	order.		He	never	values	intoxication	or	sublimity	for	its	own	sake.	Observing	this	post-modernist	misunderstanding	of	the	sublime	in	Nietzsche,	Rampley	writes,	“For	Lyotard	the	sublime	is	central	to	an	understanding	of	both	modern	and	post-modern	culture;	it	underpins	both,	thus	confirming	their	intrinsic	affinity	as	well	as	underlying	their	difference.”670			Rampley	writes	that	one	could	include	Nietzsche	among	various	modernists	identified	by	Lyotard,671	and	yet	observes	that	the	sublime	of	modernism	“is	founded	on	nostalgia;	the	unpresentable	remains	as	a	palpable	absence,	a	‘missing	contents’.”672		Nietzsche’s	philosophy,	however,	was	not	a	nostalgic	or	melancholic	philosophy	as	can	be	said	of	Schopenhauer’s.		Gemes	observes,	“Nietzsche’s	invocation	of	the	notion	of	a	unity																																																									670	Rampley,	Nietzsche,	Aesthetics,	and	Modernity,	pg.	235	671	See	Rampley,	Nietzsche,	Aesthetics,	and	Modernity,	pg.	236	672	Rampley,	Nietzsche,	Aesthetics,	and	Modernity	pp.	236-237	
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never	indulges	in	the	nostalgic	moment,	the	invocation	of	a	lost	purity.”673		And	this	is	true	despite	Nietzsche’s	frequent	and	persistent	gaze	towards	Ancient	Greece.		The	health	of	human	spirit	that	he	claims	was	lost	in	the	juxtaposition	of	humankind	and	nature	–	even	man’s	own	nature	–	is	not	something	to	which	we	can,	or	should,	return.		Nietzsche	writes	in	the	Gay	Science,	“We	conserve	nothing	neither	do	we	want	to	return	to	any	past	periods.”674		Nietzsche	is	rather,	as	Gemes	accurately	points	out,	a	philosopher	of	the	Future.675			In	contrast	to	the	nostalgia	of	the	modern	sublime,	Rampley	also	writes,	“The	post-modern	sublime	is	stripped	of	any	such	nostalgia	and	denies	the	imaginary	solace	of	final	reconciliation.”676		In	this	sense,	it	would	appear	Nietzsche	would	fit	more	the	post-modern,	as	it	is	consistent	with	both	his	lack	of	nostalgia	as	well	as	with	the	notion	of	becoming,	of	never	reaching	some	completion.		Against	this,	however,	“the	dissonance	of	the	modernist	sublime	is	sustained	by	the	promise	of	ultimate	solace,”	but	for	the	post-modernist	there	is	a	lack	of	resolution	which	is	further	“celebrated	and	figures	as	part	of	a	much	larger	political	aim	of	resisting	the	impulse	towards	totality,”	where	“the	work	of	art”	is	“an	irruptive	event.”677		For	the	post-modernist	and	contrary	to	the	modernist,	the	sublime	is	identified	as	Rauch	–	as	irruptive	and	intoxicating	–	and	resists	territorializing.		It	is	essentially	resistant	
																																																								673	Gemes,	“Postmodernism’s	Use,”	pg.	355	674	Nietzsche,	The	Gay	Science,	§377,	quoted	by	Gemes,	“Postmodernism’s	Use,”	pg.	355	675	See	Gemes,	Ken.		“Post-Modernism’s	Use	and	Abuse	of	Nietzsche”	in	which	he	successful	disentangles	Nietzsche	from	a	Nazi	aesthetics.	676	Rampley,	Nietzsche,	Aesthetics,	and	Modernity,	pg.	237	677	Rampley,	Nietzsche,	Aesthetics,	and	Modernity,	pg.	237	
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to	beauty.678		Gemes	observes,	however,	that	postmodernists	have	overlooked	the	positive	aspect	of	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	in	relation	to	the	Übermensch	and	self-cultivation	–	the	“positive	construction	of	a	new	unified	self.”679		Nietzsche’s	philosophy	is	quite	affirmative,	and	Nietzsche	is	adamant	about	the	need	to	give	form,	style,	and	order.		Regarding	aesthetic	feelings,	Beauty	is	that	order	that	is	given	to	the	disordered	sublime,	by	‘taming	opposites’	and	cultivating	conflict	into	a	harmonious	whole.		To	prolong	the	above	metaphor,	beauty	is	a	home	bestowed	on	the	homeless	–	we	who	are	homeless	are	always	creating	our	home.		And	the	more	conflict	there	is,	the	more	there	is	to	tame	and	the	grander	will	be	the	product	because	more	will	have	been	incorporated	into	it.		Nietzsche	privileges	beauty,	but	he	privileges	beauty	of	this	world,	and	nothing	in	this	world	can	be	static.		Gemes	observes,	“Nietzsche	is	not	content	with	mere	chaos	and	unmastered	discharges	of	affect.		Nietzsche	does	not	only	negate	all	meaning	in-itself,	like	the	post-modernists,	but	is	also	affirmative,	is	a	philosopher	of	the	future	who	speaks	of	a	need	to	give	shape,	and	form,	and	meaning	to	existence.”680		Nietzsche	speaks	of	a	need	to	‘give	style’.		Nietzsche	distinguishes	two	instances	of	the	feelings	of	sublimity	not	according	to	some	aim	but	instead	according	to	one’s	psychical	constitution.		Beauty	functions,	rather	than	some	distinct	sublimity,	as	that	which	then	unifies	the	Dionysian	Rausch	of	sublimity.		Beauty,	for	Nietzsche,	is	the	‘taming	of	opposites’,	or	the	‘taming’	or	ordering	of																																																									678	I	am	reminded	of	a	paper	by	Deleuze	in	which	he	discusses	beauty	as	an	ephemeral	territory,	a	house,	which	is	consistent	with	my	metaphor	of	heimlichkeit	above.	679	Gemes,	“Postmodernism’s	Use,”	pg.	354	680	Gemes,	“Postmodernism’s	Use,”	pg.	354	
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dissonance	and	disorder.		Gemes	writes,	“The	emphasis	on	Nietzsche’s	picture	of	the	sublimated	self	as	a	coherent	structure	of	sublimated	drives	under	the	dominance	of	the	sublimating	master	drive	may	easily	suggest	a	static	notion	of	the	self”	–	a	“permanent	harmony”	of	sorts	between	the	drives.681		But	this	is	not	the	case.		He	observes,	“Nietzsche	rejected	all	such	static	notions	on	both	descriptive	and	normative	grounds.		All	life,	or	at	least	all	healthy	life,	for	Nietzsche	involves	overcoming	and	indeed	self-overcoming.”682		Gemes	suggests	that	the	picture	of	sublimation	in	Nietzsche	thus	need	not	“transgress	this	Nietzsche	dictum.”		And,	as	I	hope	to	have	shown	already,	the	idea	of	a	static	harmony,	or	equilibrium,	is	actually	
antithetical	to	the	notion	of	sublimation,	and	all	static	‘being’	and	notions	of	things	are	indicative	of	neurotic	(egodystonic)	orientations	instead;	that	is,	the	very	activity	of	sublimation	necessarily	entails	constant	disillusionment,	mourning,	grief	(to	be	contrasted	with	melancholy),	the	undoing	of	repressions,	and	libidinal	redistributions.		Reaction-formation	is	actually	responsible	for	the	formation	of	‘stasis’,	or	the	attempts	to	make	permanent.		Even	the	Übermensch,	an	archetype	of	pure	sublimation,	can	never	acquire	stasis;	and,	more	importantly,	would	be	repulsed	by	a	static	equilibrium.		This	is	why,	I	suggest,	Nietzsche	has	transformed	the	traditional	view	of	beauty	from	something	static,	eternal,	and	formal	into	something	dynamic.	Following	the	point	about	aesthetic	interest	made	above,	beauty	can	no	longer	be	regarded	as	disinterested.		Nietzsche	regards	beauty	as	Stendhal	had	defined	it	in	his	book,	Love.		Countering	‘disinterestedness’	with	the	aid	of	Stendhal,																																																									681	Gemes,	“Sublimation…,”	pp.	51-52	682	Gemes,	“Sublimation…,”	pg.	52	
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Nietzsche	asserts	that,	on	the	contrary,	Beauty	is	laden	with	interest:	“Beauty	is	nothing	but	the	promise	of	happiness.”683		Nietzsche’s	allusion	to	Stendhal	here	may	also	be	very	telling.		Stendhal	defines	beauty	in	this	way	in	a	footnote	to	a	passage	where	he	describes	how	one	is	able	to	transform	what	is	ugly	into	something	beautiful	through	one’s	apperception	of	it	–	the	perception	through	a	mode	of	relating	that	is	often	historically	influenced.		Stendhal	describes	a	man	who	once	loved	a	woman	who	had	pockmarks.		After	the	woman	died,	the	man	found	more	beautiful	those	women	who	also	had	pockmarks.		So,	Stendhal	writes,	“Ugliness	even	begins	to	be	loved	and	given	preference,	because	in	this	case	it	has	become	beauty.”684		Stendhal	thus	expresses	that	beauty	is	a	matter	of	perspective,	constituted	by	one’s	historical	and	possible	socio-cultural	paradigm,	explaining	in	the	footnote,	“Beauty	is	only	the	promise	of	happiness.		The	happiness	of	a	Greek	differed	from	the	happiness	of	a	Frenchman	in	1822,”	continuing	to	justify	the	distinction	with	a	comparison	of	the	different	appearances	of	women	in	art	at	those	times.685		And	since	their	idea	of	happiness	was	different,	so	too	was	their	valuation	of	beauty.	Stendhal	also	noted	in	a	preceding	footnote,	“Beauty	…	means	the	promise	of	a	quality	useful	to	my	soul,	and	transcends	physical	attraction;	the	latter	is	only	one	particular	kind.”686		Beauty	is	more	psychically	than	physically	determined,	hence	why	it	‘transcends’	physical	attraction.		But	what	is	meant	in	‘beauty’	here	is	not	a	
promise	of	happiness,	but	as	the	intimation	of	that	happiness	–	the	result	of	engaging																																																									683	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	III	§6	and	repeated	in	Ecce	Homo	684	Stendhal,	Love,	pg.	66	685	Stendhal,	Love,	pg.	66	fn.	1	686	Stendhal,	Love,	pg.	59	fn.	1	
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the	promise.		Stendhal	observes	that	it	is	improbable	that	men	will	agree	on	what	is	meant	by	‘love’,	and	correspondingly,	it	is	“improbable	that	they	will	agree	about	the	meaning	of	the	word	‘beauty’,”	for,	“The	beauty	a	man	discovers	is	a	new	capacity	for	arousing	his	pleasure,	and	since	pleasures	vary	with	the	individual,	each	man’s	crystallization	will	be	tinged	with	the	color	of	his	pleasures.		…	[the]	beauty	[of	the	loved	object]	is	nothing	but	the	sum	of	the	fulfillment	of	all	the	desires	you	have	been	able	to	formulate	about	her.”687		Interestingly,	here,	Beauty	appears	associated	with	the	happiness	–	the	fulfillment	–	rather	than	the	promise	of	it.		“Each	new	beauty,”	writes	Stendhal,	“gives	us	the	complete	fulfillment	of	a	desire.”688	And	again,	“In	passionate	love,	intimacy	is	not	so	much	the	perfect	happiness,	but	the	last	step	on	the	way	to	it.”689		Perhaps,	where	‘beauty	is	the	promise	of	happiness’,	the	sight	of	what	is	beautiful	is	the	thing	promised,	but	it	awakens,	in	love,	sublime,	intoxicating	feelings	inspiring	one	towards	what	is	promised.	As	with	the	sublime,	there	is	a	bifurcation	of	beauty	concerning	one’s	psychical	constitution	and,	as	a	result,	a	bifurcation	of	the	aim	the	attainment	of	which	is	felt	as	pleasurable,	or	anticipated	as	pleasurable,	and	hence	regarded	as	beautiful.		I	suggest	that	a	proper	way	of	viewing	this	bifurcation	is	with	regard	to	interest,	so	that	Kant	and	Schopenhauer’s	views	should	be	regarded	in	their	distinctive	ways	as	egodystonic,	as	either	supposing	an	intellectualized	state	of	disinterest	(in	the	case	of	Kant),	or	in	seeking	to	acquire	through	aesthetic	contemplation	a	state	of	disinterestedness,	a	schizoid	escape	from	willing	(in	the																																																									687	Stendhal,	Love	pg.	59	688	Stendhal,	Love,	pg.	59	689	Stendhal,	Love,	pg.	104	
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case	of	Schopenhauer),	both	of	which	would,	in	Nietzsche’s	terms,	be	regarded	as	repudiations	of	one’s	nature.		Nietzsche,	I	argue,	instead	regards	the	beauty	of	healthy	spirits	to	be	dynamic	and	fluctuating	(albeit	enduring	to	a	point	in	the	‘grand	style’)	and,	importantly,	incorporative.	Nietzsche	writes,	“Beauty	is	certainly	the	goal	of	human	sensual	knowledge,	it	transfigures	the	world.		Why	do	we	chase	after	anything	else?		Why	do	we	want	to	transcend	our	senses?”690		Why,	in	other	words,	is	sensual	knowledge	devalued,	from	Plato	on	through	Kant?		Why	does	Kant	look	to	the	supersensuous?		Rather,	Kant	was	probably	fighting	a	war	against	his	perspective	of	ugliness	that	required	him	to	neglect	the	senses	and	repudiate	his	inclinations.		Kant	could	see	“sensual	knowledge”	as	beautiful	only	by	subverting	it	to	reasoning	that	is	dissociated	from	the	affective	via	the	defense	mechanism	of	intellectualization.		In	a	section	of	The	Will	to	Power	already	mentioned	regarding	interest,691	Nietzsche	observes	explicitly	a	bifurcation	of	Beauty	as	he	writes	on	“the	genesis	of	the	beautiful	and	the	ugly.”	I’ll	be	referring	to	the	Nachlass	fragment	subtitled	“Aesthetika.”	He	writes:	What	is	instinctively	repugnant	to	us,	aesthetically,	is	what	the	very	longest	experience	has	demonstrated	to	be	harmful,	dangerous,	suspect	to	man:	the	aesthetic	instinct	which	suddenly	raises	its	voice	(e.g.,	when	we	feel	disgust)	contains	a	judgment.		To	this	extent,	the	beautiful	belongs	within	the	general	category	of	the	biological	values	of	the	useful,	beneficent,	life-intensifying:	but	in	such	a	way	that	many	stimuli	which	very	distantly	remind	us	of	and	are	associated	with	useful	things	and	states	arouse	in	us	the	feeling	of	the																																																									690	Nietzsche,	Unpublished	Writings,	vol	11.		Summer	1872-Early1873	19[146]	691	I	will	be	referring	to	the	passage	in	the	late	note-books,	for	the	one	in	Will	to	
Power	appears	edited	significantly.	
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beautiful,	i.e.,	of	growth	in	the	feeling	of	power	(--	thus	not	just	things,	but	also	the	feelings	that	accompany	such	things,	or	their	symbols).	…	The	beautiful	and	the	ugly	are	conditional;	conditioned	by	our	fundamental	values	of	preservation.		It’s	pointless	to	want	to	posit	a	beautiful	and	an	ugly	aside	from	that.		The	beautiful	exists	as	little	as	does	the	good,	the	true.		Each	separate	case	is	again	a	matter	of	the	conditions	of	preservation	for	a	particular	kind	of	man:	thus,	the	value	feeling	of	the	beautiful	will	be	aroused	
by	different	things	for	the	man	of	the	herd	and	for	the	exceptional	and	[Übermensch].	It	is	the	perspective	of	the	foreground,	considering	only	the	most	
immediate	consequences,	which	gives	rise	to	the	value	of	the	beautiful	(also	of	the	good,	also	of	the	true).692		Nietzsche	notably	addresses	not	only	the	beautiful,	but	ugliness	and	disgust	as	well,	which	is	significant.		Freud	observes	most	philosophers	tend	only	to	focus	on	what	is	aesthetically	pleasing	(indicating	an	egodystonic	constitution).		The	role	of	disgust	also	features	significantly	in	ethics	as	will	be	discussed	below.		 Nietzsche	claims	that	there	is	a	beauty	peculiar	to	the	herd,	and	a	beauty	peculiar	to	the	Übermensch.		What	is	regarded	as	beautiful	or	ugly	(or	disgusting)	is	a	matter	of	perspective.		And	that	perspective	is	contingent,	ultimately,	on	one’s	constitution.		Weaker	spirits	of	the	herd	will	see	and	enjoy	a	beauty	that	the	
Übermensch	would	likely	find	ugly,	and	vice	versa.		For	example,	Nietzsche	writes,	“Christianity	is	based	on	the	rancor	of	the	sick,	the	instinct	against	the	healthy,	
against	health.		Everything	well-constituted,	proud,	high-spirited,	beauty	above	all,	
																																																								692	Nietzsche,	Writings	from	the	Late	Notebooks,	10[167]	autumn	1887		
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hurts	their	ears	and	eyes.”693		Thus	Nietzsche	also	speaks	of	a	beauty	that,	in	its	health	and	vitality,	offends	the	senses	of	the	sick,	Christian	spirit	and	would	be	regarded	by	them	as	possibly	repulsive.		Beauty	is	psychological,	pertaining	to	one’s	constitution,	to	the	vicissitudes	of	one’s	drives.	Recalling	what	I	mentioned	previously	concerning	the	understanding’s	role	‘retarding’	the	instinctive	judgments,	Nietzsche	goes	on	to	summarize:	1. the	judgment	of	beauty	is	short-sighted,	it	only	sees	the	most	immediate	consequences	2. it	heaps	upon	the	object	stimulating	it	a	magic	conditioned	by	the	association	of	many	different	judgments	of	beauty	–	but	which	is	
quite	alien	to	the	nature	of	that	object	To	experience	a	thing	as	beautiful	necessarily	means	experiencing	it	wrongly…694		What	Nietzsche	means,	I	believe,	is	that	beauty	is	an	illusion	(just	as	is	‘the	good’	and	‘truth’).		That	is	to	say,	beauty	(as	‘the	good’	and	‘truth’)	is	an	interpretation.		Nothing	is	in-itself	beautiful,	and	isn’t	conditioned	by	the	object	as	much	as	by	the	subject,	so	claiming	an	object	is	beautiful	is	to	claim	something	‘false’	about	the	object.		But	what	is	subjective	about	the	valuation	is	not,	rational	and	pertaining	to	a	
priori	cognitive	faculties,	but	is	irrational	and	determined	largely	by	motivational	states	–	our	instincts	and	drives.		The	key	difference	between	what	the	weaker	spirits	regard	as	beautiful	and	what	the	Übermensch	interprets	thus	is	the	reason	for	the	judgment	or	interpretation:	the	psychical	constitution	of	each	‘subject’	allows	for	
																																																								693	Nietzsche	The	Anti-Christ,	§51	694	Nietzsche,	Writings	from	the	Late	Notebooks,	10[167]	autumn	1887		
	 261	
a	particular	perspective	or	interpretation	owing	to	the	constellations	of	past	and	present	associations.	There	is	also	an	inescapable	conflict	concerning	art	as	a	cultural	artifact.		The	conflict	concerns	the	way	in	which	humankind	will	look	upon	great	works.		Although	the	production	itself	might	have	been	egosyntonic,	and	although	it	might	in	its	greatness	have	succeeded	in	making	precisely	the	ugly	aspects	of	life	beautiful,	it's	greatness	can	seduce	one	away	from	life	and	live	in	it	nostalgically	as	delusion	or	fantasy.		This	is	one	form	of	velleity.		There	is	furthermore	a	tendency	for	the	herd,	or	the	rabble,	to	conservatively	seek	to	preserve	what	is	beautiful,	to	resist	change,	to	insist	on	'being'.		This	is	another	form	of	velleity.		Here,	what	is	regarded	as	beautiful	might	have	once	been	life-affirming	but,	because	nothing	is,	it	too	must	die.		To	seek	to	preserve	what	is	beautiful,	to	make	it	permanent,	is	to	disavow	life,	becoming,	and	appearance.		For	Freud,	it	opposes	the	very	nature	of	beauty	itself.695		This	is	the	kind	of	velleity,	perhaps,	that	Nietzsche	recognizes	in	Antiquarian	orientations	that	romanticize	the	past	or	indicate	nostalgia	for	it.696	Nietzsche	writes	that	the	weak	spirits	might	“take	refuge	in	the	beauty	of	
form,”	as	do	the	‘artists	of	decadence.’697	Exemplifying	velleity	of	a	spectator,	“Love	of	beauty,”	Nietzsche	writes,	“can	…	be	something	other	than	the	ability	to	see	the	beautiful,	create	the	beautiful;	it	can	be	an	expression	of	the	very	inability	to	do	so.”698		In	other	words,	to	love	what	is	beautiful	is	possibly	a	symptom	of	an	inability	to	discover	or	create	what	is	beautiful;	it	is	a	symptom	of	weakness,	and	a	desire	to																																																									695	See	Freud	on	Transience	696	See,	for	example,	Nietzsche,	Untimely	Meditations,	“history”	697	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§852	698	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§852	
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see	what	is	given	to	one	as	beautiful.		In	Daybreak,	Nietzsche	writes,	“When	someone	subjects	himself	to	[custom]	completely,	…	his	organs	of	attack	and	defense	–	both	bodily	and	spiritual	–	degenerate:	that	is	to	say,	he	grows	increasingly	beautiful!		For	it	is	the	exercise	of	organs	…	which	keeps	one	ugly	and	makes	one	uglier.”699		Here,	Nietzsche	is	describing	what	is	‘beautiful’	from	a	decadent	perspective,	as,	for	example,	what	the	Christian	might	regard	as	beautiful,	rather	than	from	the	perspective	of	a	‘higher	type’.		And	the	ascetic	can	only	become	‘beautiful’	by	making	the	tumultuous	waves	of	passion	and	drives	recede	into	faint	murmurs,	thus	inviting	no	real	effort	in	approaching	homeostasis.		The	Übermensch,	on	the	other	hand,	is	invigorated	by	vehement	drives,	acquires	his	power	from	such,	and	would	never	seek	to	hold	them	back;	the	Übermensch	is	strong	enough	to	be	able	to	manipulate	these	multifarious	forces	into	a	dynamic	homeostasis	by	contrast	to	the	conservative,	static,	psycho-neurotic	fixations	of	weak	spirits.		Nietzsche’s	general	‘principle’	of	beauty	might	be	this:	“‘Beauty’	is	for	the	artist	something	outside	all	orders	of	rank,	because	in	beauty	opposites	are	tamed;	the	highest	sign	of	power,	namely	power	over	opposites;	moreover,	without	tension:	--	that	violence	is	no	longer	needed;	that	everything	flows,	obeys,	so	easily	and	pleasantly	–	that	is	what	delights	the	artist’s	will	to	power.”700		Of	course,	an	egodystonically	constituted	spirit	would	‘tame	opposites’	and	acquire	feelings	of	power	by	not	allowing	their	drives	expression	or	by	disavowing	conflicting	aspects	of	reality.		But	an	egosyntonically	constituted	spirit	would	do	so	through	sublimation.		Nietzsche	writes,	“This	…	self-violation,	this	artists’	cruelty,	this	desire																																																									699	Nietzsche,	Daybreak,	§25	700	Heidegger,	Nietzsche,	pg.	803	
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to	give	form	to	oneself	as	a	piece	of	difficult,	resisting,	suffering	matter	…	which	makes	itself	suffer	for	of	the	pleasure	of	making	suffer,	this	whole	active	‘bad	conscience’	has	finally,	…	as	a	true	womb	of	ideal	and	imaginative	events,	brought	a	wealth	of	novel,	disconcerting	beauty	and	affirmation	to	light,	and	perhaps	for	the	first	time	beauty	itself.”701	What,	here,	should	be	regarded	as	beautiful?		I	think	one	should	distinguish	the	mere	‘giving	form	to	one’s	self’	and	the	giving	of	form	through	a	‘bad	conscience’.			The	giving	of	form	through	a	bad	conscience	is	responsible	for	a	perception	of	beauty,	but	a	beauty	that	is	ultimately	degenerate,	a	symptom	of	sickness.		Nietzsche	speculates	as	to	whether	or	not	this	is	the	origin	of	beauty	itself	because	it	is	perhaps	the	‘giving	form	to	one’s	self’	as	well	as	the	world	that,	historically	occurred	in	ascetic	practices,	allowed	one	to	be	more	cognizant	of	one’s	self,	and	further	to	require	the	comfort	and	release	of	one’s	bad	conscience	into	‘beauty’,	the	promise	of	happiness.		Furthermore,	the	weak	sprits,	and	ascetic	spirits,	are	those	who	learned	–	albeit	egodystonically	–	self-mastery.			A	noble	spirit	wouldn’t	have	needed	a	promise	of	happiness	as	would	the	suffering,	masochistic,	ascetic	spirit.		The	‘beauty’	that	Nietzsche	describes	here	is,	ultimately,	egodystonic.		However,	there	is	also	beauty	that	is	egosyntonic	and,	although	it	too	might	require	an	‘artist’s	cruelty’	in	giving	form,	destroying	in	an	act	of	creation,	this	beauty	does	not	emerge	from	a	‘bad	conscience’.		As	Nietzsche	writes,	“…	to	master	the	passions,	not	to	weaken	or	exterminate	them!		The	greater	the	mastering	force	of	the	will,	the	more	freedom	may	be	given	to	the	passions.		The	‘great	man’	is	great	through	the	free	play																																																									701	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	II	§18	
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he	gives	his	desires	and	the	even	greater	power	that	is	capable	of	taking	these	magnificent	monsters	into	his	service.”702	What	Nietzsche	means,	therefore,	is	that	nothing	Übermenschlich	arises	from	a	bad	conscience.		The	Beauty	peculiar	to	the	
Übermensch	is	necessarily	non-repressive	and	therefore	of	a	‘good	conscience’,	and	is	able	to	be	of	a	good	conscience	because	of	the	non-repressive	mastery.	In	some	respects,	there	are	points	at	which	Schopenhauer	and	Nietzsche	agree	on	the	beautiful.		For	example,	they	both	assert,	according	to	their	respective	philosophies,	that	everything	can,	in	theory,	be	experienced	as	beautiful.		Schopenhauer	writes,	“Every	existing	thing	can	be	observed	purely	objectively	and	outside	all	relation,	and	…	the	will	appears	in	everything	at	some	grade	of	its	objectivity.”	For	this	reason,	and	because	everything	is	“the	expression	of	an	Idea,	everything	is	also	beautiful.”703		In	other	words,	Ideas	are	always	beautiful	for	Schopenhauer,	and	Ideas	can	be	discovered	in	all	existing	things,	therefore	beauty	is	also	always	waiting	to	be	discovered.		Nietzsche	also	asserts,	in	Human	that	everything	that	is	not	experienced	as	beautiful,	everything	that	is	ugly,	entails	the	possibility	of	discovering	beauty	in	it.		He,	however,	rejects	Schopenhauer’s	idealism.	Furthermore,	Rampley	observes	that	Schopenhauer	regarded	the	body	–	its	instincts	and	drives	–	as	a	problem	to	be	overcome.		Nietzsche	also	acknowledges	the	potency	of	the	body’s	influence	in	life.		But	instead	of	seeking	to	overcome	it,	Nietzsche	seeks	to	incorporate	it.		Rampley	writes,	“While	Schopenhauer	acknowledges	the	body’s	potency,	he	is	still	concerned	to	free	the	mind	from	its																																																									702	Nietzsche,	Writing	form	the	Late	Notebooks,	9[139],	autumn	1887	703	Schopenhauer,	WWR	I,	pg.	210	
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effects,	regarding	it	as	a	hindrance	to	true	thought.”704		Notice	the	implication	of	a	Kantian	notion	of	‘disinterestedness’	as	necessary	for	objectivity.		“In	contrast,”	Rampley	continues,	“Nietzsche	sees	the	body	as	one	of	the	principle	determinants	of	thinking;	the	two	are	inseparable,	and	as	such	the	body	gives	thought	its	form,	indeed,	facilitates	it.”705		For	this	reason,	the	means	of	discovering	beauty,	for	Nietzsche,	are	entirely	different	from	that	of	Schopenhauer;	for	Schopenhauer,	it	still	involves	repudiation	and	disinterested	contemplation,	whilst	for	Nietzsche	it	involves	not	a	repudiation	of	interest	but	necessarily	an	incorporation	of	it	in	order	to	render	it	pleasurable	and	therefore	beautiful.			Beauty	for	weak	and	fettered	or	ascetic	spirits	is	symptomatic	of	egodystonic	vicissitudes,	requiring	repudiations	of	one’s	instincts	and	drives	or	even	of	reality.		It	is	conditioned	by	a	failure	or	unwillingness	to	incorporate	various	elements.		Beauty	conceived	by	the	Übermensch	requires	the	incorporation	of	everything	hitherto	regarded	as	ugly,	disgusting,	or	threatening	through	a	mastery	and	creativity	that	renders	the	ugly	and	repugnant	beautiful.			
On	Ethical	Values	
Ethics,	especially	since	the	time	of	Socrates,	has	been	a	weighty	concern	in	Western	philosophy.		Jonathan	Lear	observes,	“The	birth	of	ethics	as	a	serious	reflective	inquiry	simply	is	the	introduction	of	the	concept	of	the	good	as	the																																																									704	Rampley,	Nietzsche,	Aesthetics,	and	Modernity,	pg.	169	705	Rampley,	Nietzsche,	Aesthetics,	and	Modernity,	pg.	169	
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concept	in	terms	of	which	one	should	reflectively	evaluate	one’s	life.”706		However,	instead	of	the	birth	of	ethics	being	simply	the	introduction	of	the	good,	‘the	good’	and	more	importantly	‘happiness’,	were	introduced	as	answers	to	the	question	surrounding	the	birth	of	ethics:	the	question	of	how	to	live	well.		As	Lear	himself	writes,	“Socrates’	fundamental	question	–	how	shall	I	live?	–	looks	innocent	but	is	in	fact	traumatic.		Socrates	rips	open	the	fabric	of	Athenian	life	and	creates	a	gap	which	no	one	can	fill,”707	and	in	this	sense	Socrates	“is	a	traumatizing	seducer.”708		Ethics,	as	a	serious	reflective	inquiry,	is	then	born	from	the	question	of	how	to	live,	for	which	‘happiness’	and	‘the	good’	are	themselves	enigmatic	signifiers	that	signify	nothing	particular,	stable,	and	effable.			In	BGE,	Nietzsche	writes	that,	after	reflecting	on	the	various	‘subtle	and	crude	moralities’	that	have	had	some	influence	throughout	history,	he	“found	certain	traits	regularly	recurring	together	and	linked	to	each	other.		In	the	end,	two	basic	types	became	apparent	…:	There	is	a	master	morality	and	a	slave	morality.”	And	he	further	adds	that,	in	more	‘mixed’	cultures,	there	are	moralities	that	appear	to	be	a	mediation	between	these	two.709		For	the	noble	spirits,	the	contrast	between	‘good’	and	‘bad’	amounted	to	the	contrast	between	‘noble’	and	‘despicable’.710	“The	noble	and	brave	types	of	people	who	think	this	way,”	Nietzsche	continues,	“are	the	furthest	removed	form	a	morality	that	see	precisely	pity,	actions	for	others,	and	
																																																								706	Lear,	Happiness,	pp.	11-12	707	Lear,	Happiness,	pg.	101	708	Lear,	Happiness,	pg.	102	709	Nietzsche,	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§260	710	Nietzsche,	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§260	
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désintéressement	as	emblematic	of	morality.”711		Slave	morality,	on	the	other	hand,	Nietzsche	describes	as	expressing	a	“pessimistic	suspicion	of	the	whole	condition	of	humanity”	and	“perhaps	a	condemnation	of	humanity	along	with	its	condition.		The	slave’s	gaze	resents	the	virtues	of	the	powerful.”712		Everything	noble	becomes	thought	of	as	evil,	inciting	fear	because	of	its	strength	and	awesomeness.		One	might	say	the	slave	spirit	experiences	the	noble	spirit	as	‘horrific’.		Furthermore,	“qualities	that	serve	to	alleviate	existence	for	suffering	people	are	pulled	out	and	flooded	with	light	…	Slave	morality	is	essentially	a	morality	of	utility.”713		Essentially,	everything	that	is	useful	and	comforting	to	the	slave,	to	those	weak	and	poor	in	spirit,	become	regarded	as	‘good’.		It	is	exemplified	by	“the	desire	for	freedom,	the	instinct	for	happiness,”714	for	it	is	only	those	who	are	unfree	and	unhappy	who	would	desire	freedom	and	happiness	as	their	chief	aims.		Notice	that	the	free	spirit,	who	is	neither	fettered	nor	‘noble’	(in	the	original	sense,	though	perhaps	ennobled	in	a	new	sense)	does	not	have	a	morality.		The	free	spirit	is	an	immoralist.		It	is	not	a	‘mediation’	between	the	two	but	is	free	of	both.			Maudemarie	Clark	observes	in	Nietzsche	a	discussion	of	morality	that	is	meant	in	both	a	narrow	and	a	broad	sense.		She	cites	the	work	of	Bernard	Williams	on	this	matter,	where	Williams	refers	to	morality	in	the	broad	sense	as	‘ethics’.715		I	am	partial	to	this	view	as	well,	as	it	is	impossible	to	escape	the	notion	of	some	ethical	valuations	or	proposals	in	Nietzsche’s	philosophy,	such	as	amor	fati	–	the																																																									711	Nietzsche,	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§260	712	Nietzsche,	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§260	713	Nietzsche,	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§260	714	Nietzsche,	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§260	715	see	Clark,	Nietzsche	on	Ethics,	pp.	42-43	
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‘formula	for	human	greatness’.		But	such	a	formula	is	quite	broad	and	vague.			This	interpretation	also	remains	faithful	to	Nietzsche’s	proclamation	that	he,	and	other	free	spirits	like	him,	are	immoralists.		Clark	also	observes,	however,	that	Nietzsche	writes	of	‘noble	morality’	and	‘higher	moralities’.		I’d	like	to	suggest	that	Nietzsche’s	perspective	is	that	there	are	moralities	that	are	symptomatic	of	healthier,	more	egosyntonic	constitutions,	and	are	thus	more	‘noble’	and	‘higher’	because	they	do	not	repudiate	nature	as	in	the	case	of	fettered	or	ascetic	spirits.		But	this	does	not	mean	that	he	personally	values	these	higher	moralities	as	what	should	supplant	the	more	decadent	moralities.		Just	because	Nietzsche	regards	a	particular	morality	as	higher	than	another	in	no	way	means	he	advocates	for	such	a	morality,	especially	when	his	concern	is	chiefly	genealogical	or	comparative.		He	is	still	an	immoralist	–	in	the	company	of	other	hypothetical	free	spirits	–	where	‘morality’,	in	the	narrow	sense	is	something	all	too	human	and	from	which	Nietzsche	believes	it	is	necessary	for	one	to	free	oneself.		Immoralism	thus	becomes	the	way	of	the	Übermensch.	Nietzsche	writes	that	he	is	particularly	concerned	with	“what	origin	our	terms	good	and	evil	actually	have.”716	More	specifically,	Nietzsche	inquires,	“Under	what	conditions	did	man	invent	the	value	judgments	good	and	evil?		And	what	value	
do	they	themselves	have?		Have	they	up	to	now	obstructed	or	promoted	human	flourishing?”717		Nietzsche	obviously	thinks	they	have	obstructed	human	flourishing.		Berkowitz	correctly	observes	that	Nietzsche’s	Genealogy	is	a	“prelude	to	the	urgent	task	of	establishing	a	new	rank	order	of	values.”718		As	a	prelude,	it	does	not	itself																																																									716	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	preface	§3	717	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	preface	§3	718	Berkowitz,	Nietzsche:	the	Ethics,	pg.	123	
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establish	that	rank	order	of	revaluations.		Its	purpose	is	an	historical	critique,	a	genealogy,	of	the	origins	of	values,	which	is	a	necessary	philosophical	prerequisite	for	the	project	of	creating	newer,	healthier	valuations.		In	order	to	‘cure’	the	disease,	one	must	discover	its	underlying	causes	so	that	one	does	not,	like	the	ascetic	priest,	merely	treat	the	symptoms.		“Morality,”	writes	Nietzsche,	is	“essentially	a	shield,	a	means	of	defense;	to	this	extent	a	sign	of	the	immature	(armored,	stoical).”719		Nietzsche	thus	states	explicitly	what	I	am	asserting:	morality	is	defensive,	it	is	symptomatic	of	an	egodystonic	constitution.		The	ascetic,	the	stoic,	all	those	who	repress	their	nature	–	their	instincts	and	drives	–	are	egodystonically	constituted.		Morality	is	a	reaction-formation.		“The	mature	man,”	by	contrast,	is	not	defensive.		Nietzsche	says	“he	attacks,”	by	which	he	means	to	express	that	the	mature	man	is	
active	rather	than	reactive.		And	also	tellingly,	with	the	mature	spirit	one	observes	“Instruments	of	war	transformed	into	instruments	of	peace.”720		I	think	this	demonstrates:	1.	by	‘he	attacks’	Nietzsche	merely	emphasizes	action;	and	2.	
Aggression	is	not	mature,	but	the	propensity	of	aggression	turned	towards	other	ends	is	mature,	for	it	does	not	repudiate	the	potential	but	masters	it	into	something	useful.			Below,	I	argue	that	the	bifurcation	of	egodystonic	or	egosyntonic	vicissitudes	involves	what	one	does	with	motivational	states,	i.e.,	one’s	most	intimate	“interest.”	For	example,	I	argue	that	values	can	be	cognized	according	to	a	repudiation	of	interest	or	a	repudiation	of	reality.		This	was	already	demonstrated	with	aesthetics,	where	Nietzsche	imagines	a	beauty	that	is	cognized	without	such	repudiations.																																																									719	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§727	720	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§727	
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Ethics	echo	aesthetic	valuations	in	precisely	the	same	way	concerning	interest.		For	Kant,	disinterest	is	necessary	in	order	to	judge	the	beautiful.		Similarly,	the	moral	law	is	recognized	only	disinterestedly;	i.e.,	purely	rationally	without	admitting	of	any	influence	of	one’s	inclinations.		And	for	Schopenhauer	too,	the	morally	good	action	is	the	one	that	relieves	suffering,	just	as	aesthetic	contemplation	had	done.		For	Schopenhauer,	the	ethical	even	seems	preconditioned	by	the	aesthetic,	or	that	the	aesthetic	entices	one	towards	the	ethical.		The	ethical,	for	Schopenhauer,	is	in	the	end	an	eradication	of	interest	–	the	acquisition	of	disinterestedness	by	repudiating	the	will	–	and	thus,	like	in	aesthetic	valuations,	there	is	an	interest	in	being	disinterested.			In	what	follows,	I	seek	to	demonstrate	how	ethical	valuations	are	symptom	formations	that	are	reducible,	retroductively,	to	the	vicissitudes	of	our	drives	and	the	employment	of	defense	mechanisms.		Morality,	I	argue,	is	always	the	result	of	an	egodystonic	orientation	with	our	instincts	and	drives.		But	an	egosyntonic	ethics	is	possible.		This	should	all	be	regarded	as	a	corollary	to	the	discussion	of	aesthetics,	such	that	there	is	a	bifurcation	according	to	one’s	orientation	and	corresponding	psychical	constitution.		Just	as	slave	beauty	is	indicative	of	an	unhealthy	disposition	towards	life,	so	too	is	morality.		This	is	why	Nietzsche	infamously	proclaims	that	he	is	an	immoralist.		But	there	is	also	a	beauty	peculiar	to	the	Übermensch,	and	for	this	reason	an	ethics	for	the	Übermensch	as	well.		After	showing	in	what	way	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	is	to	be	distinguished	from	other	philosophies,	I	try	to	elucidate	what	an	egosyntonic	ethics	might	be.	
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The	difference	between	Kant	and	Schopenhauer	amounts	to	age-old	conflict	between	rationalism	and	irrationalism.		Is	the	ground	of	ethical	valuations	or	moral	judgments	a	rational	or	irrational	ground?		Ultimately,	Nietzsche	and	Freud	as	well	as	contemporary	psychology	side	with	Schopenhauer	concerning	the	ground	for	judgments	and	valuations.					
Moral	Masochism	and	Ethical	Disinterest	
Jonathan	Lear	claims	that	psychoanalysis	is	not,	or	cannot	provide,	an	ethical	theory,	natural	or	otherwise.		However,	even	here,	psychoanalysis	is	useful,	as	I	hope	to	show,	for	understanding	why	this	or	that	is	regarded	as	moral	or	immoral.		In	fact,	I	believe	that	psychology	is	the	only	discipline	that	can	provide	a	sufficient	ethical	theory	as	well	as	aesthetic	theory.		While	ethics	and	morality	might	not	have	been	the	concern	for	psychoanalysis	as	it	was	for	Nietzsche,	we	nonetheless	can	find	that	psychoanalysis	has	something	to	say	about	the	life	and	character	of	an	individual,	an	individual’s	development	and	relational	vicissitudes,	or	even	the	functioning	of	a	society.		Psychoanalysis	has	a	lot	to	say	about	how	an	individual	can	
live	well.		In	this	sense,	nothing	is	more	appropriate	for	a	description	or	explanation	of	the	ethical	than	the	fields	of	psychology	of	which	psychoanalysis	is	possibly	the	most	relevant,	as	it,	especially	in	conjunction	with	neuro-science,	can	describe	the	origin	of	our	valuations	and	the	generation	of	the	motivations	for	our	expressions	or	behaviors.		Our	values,	as	Nietzsche	observes,	are	symptoms.		Of	what	are	they	
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symptoms?	The	means	by	which	one	relates	to	one’s	self	and	the	world;	which	is	to	say,	the	vicissitudes	of	our	drives.	Psychoanalysis	as	a	practice	–	as	an	attempt	at	a	‘cure’	–	by	contrast	to	the	theory,	generally	will	tend	more	towards	“restoring	a	normative	balance	with	the	world.”721		That	is	to	say,	clinically,	psychoanalysis	as	a	practice	aims	towards	enabling	analysands	to	function	normally	in	the	world,	with	minimal	disturbance	and	discontent,	rather	than	actually	making	analysands	more	‘ethical’.		But	Freud	nonetheless	engages	with	ethical	theories	in	his	theoretical	work.		He	uses	Immanuel	Kant’s	deontology,	specifically,	as	an	exemplar	of	what	he	refers	to	as	‘moral	masochism’.	Kant’s	perspective,	I	must	point	out,	is	contrary	to	what	is	articulated	in	this	thesis:	for	Kant,	the	sublime	appears	to	have	a	moral	foundation;	I	am	arguing	the	opposite:	morality	and	ethics	have	an	aesthetic	foundation.		Kant	claims	we	“…	presuppose	moral	feeling	in	man.		And	so	we	attribute	necessity	to	this	[kind	of]	aesthetic	judgment	as	well.”722		In	other	words,	for	Kant,	the	morally	good	is	judged	according	to	a	subjective	feeling,	but	it	is	independent	of	the	empirical	and	is	instead	purely	rational.		Furthermore,	Kant	also	claims,	“The	beautiful	is	symbolic	of	the	morally	good.”723		Here	again,	there	is	a	moral	foundation	of	which	beauty	is	symbolic.		But	also	in	contrast	to	Kant,	and	aligned	with	Nietzsche,	I	am	not	claiming	
																																																								721	Lacan,	Ethics,	pg.	109	722	Kant,	Critique	of	Judgment,	pg.	125	(G	266)	723	Kant,	Critique	of	Judgment,	pg.		I	should	point	out	that,	contrary	to	Kant,	I	am	presenting	an	ethical	theory	implicit	in	Nietzsche	that	makes	ethics	(or	morals)	
schematic	of	aesthetic	valuations,	in	a	loosely	Kantian	sense,	rather	than	seeing	aesthetic	valuations	as	symbolic	of	the	ethical.	
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in	this	thesis	that	the	‘morally	good’	is	symbolic	of	beauty,	but	rather	schematic	of	it,	if	not	even	structurally	and	etiologically	indistinguishable	from	it.	Freud	asserted	early	on	in	the	Three	Essays	that	all	our	moral	feelings	(as	well	as	aesthetic	valuations	and	feelings	of	disgust	and	shame)	arise	through	the	vicissitude	of	reaction-formation.724		Furthermore,	Kant	has,	unbeknownst	to	him,	described	the	very	process	of	reaction-formation	and	the	vehemence	of	the	super-ego	on	the	self	in	conformity	with	the	moral	law	that,	in	the	Oedipal	situation,	is	derived	from	the	identification	and	internalization	of	the	father.		In	The	Economic	Problem	of	Masochism,	Freud	discusses	various	kinds	of	masochisms:	a	primary	‘erotogenic’	masochism	(loosely	corresponding	with	primary	narcissism	and	the	death	drive);	a	‘feminine’	masochism	(what	we	can	think	of	as	secondary	masochism…	where	one	is	the	‘recipient’	of	attention);	and	
moral	masochism.		The	third,	he	writes,	has	“loosened	its	connection	with	what	we	recognize	as	sexuality.”725	Freud	associates	moral	masochism	with	the	sense	of	feeling	of	guilt	at	one’s	sexual	urges,	particularly	in	the	desire	for	the	mother.				Notice,	already,	it	is	attributable	to	reaction-formation.		Reaction-formation,	noted	previously,	is	responsible	for	our	feelings	of	disgust,	shame,	as	well	as	the	generation	of	conscience	and	the	super-ego.		This	is	association	with	disgust	is	paramount,	and	I	ask	the	reader	to	bear	this	in	mind	throughout.		Freud	then	writes,	“The	superego	–	the	conscience	at	work	in	the	ego	–	may	…	become	harsh,	cruel,	and	inexorable	against	the	ego	which	is	in	its	charge.		Kant’s	categorical	imperative	is																																																									724	I	ask	the	reader	to	bear	in	mind	this	claim	concerning	disgust,	as	it	will	feature	heavily	in	discussions	of	moral	judgment	below.	725	Freud,	The	Economic	Problem,	pg.		165		
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thus	the	direct	heir	of	the	Oedipus	Complex.”726	The	repressions	enacted	in	Kant’s	deontology,	the	repudiation	of	inclinations,	etc.,	are	repetitions	of	the	repudiation	of	the	desire	for	the	mother	in	the	name	of	the	father.			Kant	claims	that	the	derivation	of	the	moral	law	cannot	be	found	in	happiness	(as	it	will	be	for	Utilitarians	and	Schopenhauer)	because	it	is	an	empirical	notion,	and	therefore	admits	of	peculiarities	between	people.727	Happiness,	therefore,	“can	never	yield	a	practical	law”	since	“in	the	desire	for	happiness,	what	counts	is	not	the	form	of	lawfulness	but	solely	the	matter,	viz.,	whether	in	complying	with	the	law	I	am	to	expect	gratification,	and	how	much.”728		So	when	Kant	states	the	universal	moral	law,	“So	act	that	the	maxim	of	your	will	could	always	hold	at	the	same	time	as	a	principle	of	a	universal	legislation,”729	he	is	claiming	to	have	found	what	allows	for	individual	gratification,	accommodating	desire,	but	also	provides	a	wholly	rational	universalizable	maxim	that	is	good	for	the	general	welfare	of	a	community	and	each	member’s	’satisfaction	with	his/her	existence’.	An	essential	requirement	to	following	the	moral	law,	for	Kant,	is	that	it	be	gratifying	so	as	to	provide	an	incentive.		“To	be	happy	is	necessarily	the	longing730	of	every	rational	but	finite	being,731	and	hence	is	an	unavoidable	determining	basis	of	its	power	of	desire.”732	This	is	articulated	by	Kant	as	a	being’s	‘satisfaction	with	its	
																																																								726	Freud,	The	Economic	Problem,	pg.	167	727	Kant,	Critique	of	Practical	Reason,	pg.	38	[25]	728	Kant,	Critique	of	Practical	Reason,	pg.	38	[25]	729	Kant,	Critique	of	Practical	Reason,	pg.	45	§7	[30]	730	this	has	been	translated	from	‘Verlangen’	which	Pluhar	observes	can	also	mean	‘demand’.		See	Kant,	Critique	of	Practical	Reason,	pg.	38,	fn.	47	731	That	is	to	say,	every	‘human	being’	732	Kant,	Critique	of	Practical	Reason,	pg.	38	[25]	
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own	existence’,733	and	Kant	writes,	“This	satisfaction	is	a	problem	thrust	upon	the	being	by	its	finite	nature	itself;	for	the	being	is	needy,	and	this	need	pertains	to	the	matter	of	its	power	of	desire,	i.e.,	to	something	that	refers	to	a	subjectively	underlying	feeling	of	pleasure	or	displeasure.”734		The	incentive	is	self-love,	which	should	be	understood	as	primary	narcissism	–	‘all	inclinations	together’	according	to	Kant	–	as	it	unfolds	in	an	infant’s	relationships.	In	order	to	find	agreement	with	the	moral	law,	the	love	for	oneself	must	be	a	“rational	self-love.”	But	for	Kant,	the	moral	law	must	determine	one’s	practical	incentives.		And	yet,	“The	presentation	of	the	moral	law	deprives	self-love	of	its	influence	and	self-conceit	of	its	delusion,”	writes	Kant.735		He	thus	observes:	The	effect	of	the	moral	law	as	an	incentive	is	only	negative,	and	as	such	this	incentive	can	only	be	cognized	a	priori.		For	all	inclination	and	every	sensible	impulse	is	based	on	feeling,	and	the	negative	effect	on	feeling	is	itself	a	feeling.		Consequently,	we	can	see	a	priori	that	the	moral	law	as	determining	basis	of	the	will,	by	infringing	all	our	inclinations,	must	bring	about	a	feeling	
that	can	be	called	pain.736		The	incentive	to	follow	the	moral	law	is	thus	negatively	related	to	pain.		It	appears,	at	first,	that	this	incentive	is	purely	negative.737	In	other	words,	the	initial	incentive	for	the	moral	law	originates	with	pain.		The	moral	law	is	impotent	without	pain.		
																																																								733	Kant,	Critique	of	Practical	Reason,	pg.	38	[25]	734	Kant,	Critique	of	Practical	Reason,	pg.	38	[25]	735	Kant,	Critique	of	Practical	Reason,	pg.	99	[75]	concerning	what	Katn	refers	to	as	‘delusion’	here,	I	am	reminded	of	the	biblical	reference	of	St.	Anselm,	“The	fool	hath	said	there	is	no	God,”	so	that	the	delusional	will	accuse	those	who	are	not	delusional	of	being	so	as	a	means	of	argument.	736	Kant,	Critique	of	Practical	Reason,	pg.	95-96	[73]	my	emphasis	737	I	ask	that	the	reader	compare	this	to	Kant’s	account	of	the	sublime	as	well.	
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And	this	is	what	leads	Nietzsche	to	write,	“The	categorical	imperative	smells	of	cruelty.”738		This	same	characterization	is	echoed	by	Freud	who	characterizes	Kant’s	deontological	ethics	as	exemplifying	“moral	masochism.”		However	the	humbling	effect	of	the	moral	law	on	the	subject	produces	the	feeling	of	respect,	which	Kant	claims	is	a	positive	feeling.		There	is	then	a	primary	unpleasure	and	a	subsequent,	secondary	pleasure	in	respect.		Indicating	the	repression	of	instincts	or	drives	where	they	run	contrary	to	the	moral	law,	Kant	writes,	“What	is	essential	in	all	determination	of	the	will	by	the	moral	law	is	that,	as	a	free	will,	and	hence	not	merely	without	the	cooperation	of	sensible	impulses	but	even	with	the	rejection	of	all	of	them	and	with	impairment	of	all	
inclinations	insofar	as	they	could	be	contrary	to	that	law,	it	be	determined	by	that	law.”739		Furthermore	“Respect	for	the	law,”	writes	Kant,	is	“the	consciousness	of	a	
free	submission	of	the	will	to	the	law,”	and	is	“linked	with	an	unavoidable	constraint	inflicted	…	on	all	inclinations.”740		This	is	the	genesis	of	duty,	which	Kant	writes	is	“an	action	that	is	objectively	practical	according	to	the	law,”	necessarily	excluding	the	inclinations	from	providing	any	determining	basis.741		This	would	preclude	any	sublimation,	which	requires	the	inclusion	of	the	inclinations	as	a	determining	basis.		Instead,	Kant’s	deontology	requires	as	its	basis	any	of	the	neurotic	defenses.		It	requires	repression	and	the	refusal	to	allow	the	instincts	and	drives	a	determining	role.		Duty,	for	Kant,	requires	above	all	reaction-formation.	
																																																								738	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	II	§6	739	Kant,	Critique	of	Practical	Reason,	pg.	95	[72]	my	emphasis	740	Kant,	Critique	of	Practical	Reason,	pg.	104	[80]	741	Kant,	Critique	of	Practical	Reason,	pg.	104	[80]		
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Kant’s	deontological	ethics,	the	categorical	imperative	specifically,	is	a	product	of	reaction-formation.		The	formation	that	reinforces	the	repression	is	the	‘moral	law’,	the	ethical	valuation.		Freud	observes	that	it	is	directly	generated	by	the	oedipal	complex	in	relation	to	the	superego,	where	moral	feelings	arise	in	response	to	guilt	or	shame,	one’s	sex	drives	are	repressed	and	one	acts	in	opposition	to	the	demand	of	the	original	sex	drives.		That	is,	one	acts	according	to	duty,	which	is	juxtaposed	to	one’s	natural	inclinations,	as	respect	for	the	‘father’	and	the	‘father’s	law’.742		Freud	and	Nietzsche	are	correct	in	asserting	that	Kant’s	deontology	indeed	involves	the	warping	of	one’s	nature	to	conform	to	ideals	rather	than	the	construction	of	ideals	in	conformity	to	one’s	nature,	which,	it	will	be	shown	in	the	final	chapters,	is	what	Nietzsche	instead	advocates.						
																																																								742	Nietzschean	scholars	are	often	criticized	for	asserting	that	Kant’s	ethics	involves	a	‘top-down’	morality.		On	the	face	of	it,	the	criticism	appears	correct;	for,	Kant’s	categorical	imperative	is	not	imposed	from	outside	oneself	as	the	Ten	Commandments	–	the	‘will	of	God’	–	or	monarchical	legislation	had	been;	it	is	a	rational	principle	that	begins	within	oneself	as	the	center	of	reason.		In	this	sense	it	is	distinguishable	from	the	‘top-down’	morality	of	religions	in	that,	instead	of	involving	the	imposition	of	an	external	moral	law	or	code,	one	instead	imposes	on	oneself	a	moral	law	or	code.		However,	it	nonetheless	displays	the	same	characteristic	of	top-down	morality.		There	is,	in	the	application	of	it,	an	unavoidable	reaction-formation	in	two	senses:	1. It	entails	the	moral	masochism	of	the	super-ego,	which	is	a	top-down	morality	of	sorts	in	that	a	‘moral	good’	is	held	over	the	ego	and	the	id.			2. The	judgment	of	the	‘moral’	agent	in	virtue	of	the	super-ego	is	often	conditioned	beforehand	to	by	societal	standards	and	structures,	or	in	relation	to	the	father	(in	Freudian	psychoanalytic	theory).		
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A	Bifurcation	of	Interest	
Criticizing	Kant’s	deontological	ethics,	Schopenhauer	writes,	“Kant	…	ridiculed	all	empirical	stimuli	of	the	will,	and	began	by	removing	everything,	whether	subjective	or	objective,	on	which	a	law	determining	the	will’s	action	could	be	empirically	based.		The	consequence	is,	that	he	had	nothing	left	for	the	substance	of	his	law	but	simply	its	Form.”743		And	while	paying	tribute	to	Kant	for	his	‘rational	gymnastics’,744	he	goes	on	to	argue	that	practical	reason	devoid	of	the	empirical	ends	up	virtually	indistinguishable	from	theoretical	reason.745		In	other	words,	when	extracting	what	is	empirical	from	the	formulation	of	the	categorical	imperative,	then	it	has	no	justified	practical	application.		“Ethics,”	writes	Schopenhauer,	“has	to	do	with	actual	human	conduct,	and	not	with	the	a	priori	building	of	card	houses.”746		And	further,	“Because	for	men	the	only	thing	which	has	reality	is	the	empirical,	or	else	that	which	is	supposed	to	have	a	possibly	empirical	existence,	therefore	it	follows	that	the	moral	stimulus	cannot	but	be	empirical.”747		Thus	Schopenhauer,	as	was	the	case	in	aesthetic	valuations,	returns	us	to	an	initially	embodied	and	psychological	interestedness.			To	distinguish	Kant	and	Schopenhauer,	Kant	rejects	the	empirical,	and	therefore	compassion,	from	being	a	determining	ground	for	ethics.		Schopenhauer,	by	contrast,	argues	it	can	be	nothing	but	compassion,	the	empirical.		The	selflessness	
																																																								743	Schopenhauer,	Basis	of	Morality,	pg.	30	744	Schopenhauer,	Basis	of	Morality,	pg.	30.		He	writes,	“I	pay	Kant	a	tribute	of	sincere	admiration	for	the	great	acumen	he	displayed	in	carrying	out	this	dexterous	feat.”	745	Schopenhauer,	Basis	of	Morality,	pg.	30	746	Schopenhauer,	Basis	of	Morality,	pp.	31-32	747	Schopenhauer,	Basis	of	Morality,	pg.	31	
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in	Kant	is	intellectualized.		For	Schopenhauer,	it	is	altruistic.		To	be	disinterested	is	the	same	as	being	‘selfless’	because	the	self	is	essentially	motivated	(by	drives	and	instincts),	is	structured	according	to	those	drives	and	instincts,	and	disinterest	precludes	those	motivational	states.			For	Kant,	the	derivation	of	the	moral	law	must	be	wholly	rational,	which	is	to	say,	objective	and	absent	of	subjective	inclinations.		Furthermore,	acting	in	accordance	with	the	‘moral	law’	requires	the	initial	repudiation	of	one’s	inclinations.		Following	the	moral	law	is	a	matter	of	desire,	and	in	this	instance	the	desire	is	for	a	secondary	aim	that	succeeds	repression	or	suppression	when	the	moral	law	prohibits	the	primary	interest.		For	Schopenhauer,	selflessness	is	the	desired	outcome,	and	the	suffering	with	others	that	occurs	when	one	‘pierces	the	veil	of	Maya’	induces	one	to	act	‘selflessly’	to	relieve	others’	suffering	in	order	to	also	relieve	one’s	own	in	order	to	become	disinterested.	A	key	aspect	of	altruism	in	particular	is	the	selflessness	of	an	action,	that	is	to	say,	the	compromise	or	sacrifice	of	one’s	own	interests	for	the	sake	of	another’s,	to	act	selflessly	is	to	act	without	regard	for	one’s	own	interests	or	in	direct	opposition	to	them.		Significantly,	for	Schopenhauer	and	the	Utilitarians,	the	aim	of	acting	for	others	is	to	relieve	suffering.		But	for	Schopenhauer,	there	is	no	‘highest	good’	as	there	is	for	the	Utilitarians	(and	Deontologists).		Schopenhauer	claims	that	there	is	no	such	thing	as	an	absolute	good,	or	highest	good,	which	he	claims	“signifies	the	same	thing,	namely	in	reality	a	final	satisfaction	of	the	will,	after	which	no	fresh	willing	would	occur;	a	last	motive,	the	attainment	of	which	would	give	the	will	an	imperishable	
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satisfaction.”748	But	Schopenhauer	nonetheless	believes	in	an	ethics	that	entails	the	same	motive	as	aesthetic	contemplation:	to	relieve	suffering.		For	Schopenhauer,	compassion	occurs	when	one	has	‘pierced	the	veil	of	Maya’	and	recognizes	the	illusion	of	separateness	among	beings.		Recognizing	the	illusion,	one	then	suffers	
with	others,	and	one	seeks	to	alleviate	that	suffering	by	coming	to	the	aid	of	others.		Schopenhauer,	ironically,	also	allowed	into	his	philosophy	the	altruism	of	the	‘nihilistic’	faiths	whilst	criticizing	Kant	on	this	very	point.	But	as	with	aesthetics,	Nietzsche	wants	to	point	out	that,	ethically,	selflessness	or	disinterestedness	is	impossible,	as	in	the	case	of	Kant;	and	it	is	
undesirable	or	indicative	of	decadence	in	the	case	of	Schopenhauer.		Nietzsche	writes	that	at	some	point	it	will	be	realized	that	“altruistic	actions	are	only	a	species	of	egoistic	actions.”749	He	thus	criticizes	altruism	for:	1. Being	dishonest750		One	might	say	that,	in	the	case	of	Kant	where	the	empirical	is	rejected	as	a	determining	ground,	the	postulation	of	the	moral	law	is	not	straightforwardly	rational	but	is	unavoidably	determined	by	our	self-interest;	i.e.,	our	motivational	states.		Regarding	altruism,	Nietzsche	writes,	“The	motives	of	this	morality	stand	opposed	to	its	principle.”751		In	other	words,	there	is	no	such	thing	as	altruism	–	as	selfless	action	–	for	behind	every	action	are	self-interested	motivations.	Only	the																																																									748	Schopenhauer,	WWR	I	pg.	362	Perhaps	Schopenhauer	is	aware	that	his	philosophy,	were	there	a	higher	good,	would	imply	a	state	that	corresponds	with	death	as	a	state	of	absolute	disinterestedness,	which	would	be	an	impossibility	for	a	sentient	being	(which	just	ceases	to	exist).			749	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§786	750	Jonny	Anamoly	states	‘inconsistent’.		See	Anamoly	on	“Nietzsche’s	Critique	of	Utilitarianism”	751	Nietzsche,	The	Gay	Science,	§21	
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noble	spirit	is	honest	about	his	motivation	and	acts	on	it	with	good	conscience.		Nietzsche	even	praises	noble	spirits	for	acting	generously.752		His	criticism	of	acting	for	others	in	the	case	of	slave	morality	is	that	it	is	dishonest.		It	accomplishes	its	‘egoist’	orientation	–	in	the	words	of	Schopenhauer	–	indirectly,	which	we	can	understand	as	being	through	reaction-formations.			Nietzsche	writes,	“The	psychological	error	out	of	which	the	antithetical	concepts	…	arose	is:	‘selfless’,	‘unegoistic’,	‘self-denying’	–	all	unreal,	imaginary”;	and	“…	The	psychology	of	the	saint,	the	priest,	the	‘good	man’	naturally	had	to	be	purely	phantasmagorical.		One	had	declared	real	motives	of	action	bad.”753	These	real	motives	are	the	free	expressions	of	the	will	to	power.		The	outcome	resulted	in	“Rage	against	the	instincts	of	life,”	which	became	regarded	as	“’holy’,	as	venerable.		Absolute	chastity,	absolute	obedience,	absolute	poverty:	the	priestly	ideal.		Alms,	pity,	sacrifice,	denial	of	beauty,	of	reason,	of	sensuality,	a	morose	eye	cast	on	all	strong	qualities	one	possessed:	the	lay	ideal.”754		Furthermore:	Where	[an	instinct]	weakens	–	the	individual	seeks	a	value	for	himself	only	in	the	service	of	others,	one	can	be	certain	that	exhaustion	and	degeneration	are	present.		An	altruistic	disposition,	genuine	and	without	tartuffery,	is	an	instinct	for	creating	at	least	a	secondary	value	for	oneself	in	the	service	of	other	egoisms.		Usually,	however,	altruism	is	only	apparent;	a	detour	to	the	preservation	of	one’s	own	feeling	of	vitality	and	value.”755		
																																																								752	Nietzsche,	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§229	753	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§786	754	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§786	755	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§785	
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Nietzsche	thus	consistently	criticizes	altruism	for	its	dishonesty,	but	also	criticizes	it	for	being	a	detour	towards	its	unconscious	interest	that	is	contingent,	firstly,	on	repression/suppression	of	one’s	own	nature.		So,	another	criticism	of	altruism	is	that	it	involves…	2. The	repudiation	of	one’s	own	nature	and	an	impoverishment	of	it,	making	one	incapable	of	doing	what	is	better	and	healthier.	3. It	is	a	detour	–	a	vicissitude	–	to	a	feeling	of	power	and	a	corresponding	valuation,	but	a	vicissitude	that	is	egodystonic.		Nietzsche	discovers	in	it	the	same	things	as	Freud:	reaction-formation.		So,	there	is	no	such	thing	as	‘selfless’	action.		But	that	to	which	we	can	refer	to	as	selfless	or	‘altruistic’	is	symptomatic	of	a	particular	psychical	constitution	that	achieves	a	kind	of	compensatory	or	secondary	interest.	To	act	out	of	compassion	and	to	act	altruistically	involve	acting	for	another.	And	this	leads	us	to	a	distinction	between	deontology	and	compassion:		in	deontology,	one	compromises	or	sacrifices	one’s	‘inclinations’	–	self-interest	–	for	the	sake	of	the	moral	law,	although	this	is	perhaps	egoistically	grounded;	for	an	ethics	of	compassion	or	care,	one	compromises	or	sacrifices,	one’s	self-interest	for	the	sake	of	someone,	for	an	other.		One	is	regarded	the	more	moral	on	Kantian	terms	the	more	one	is	able	to	oppose	one’s	inclinations	for	the	sake	of	the	moral	law.		On	the	other	hand,	one	is	regarded	as	more	moral	on	Schopenhauerian	terms	the	more	one	is	able	to	oppose	one’s	inclinations	for	the	sake	of	alleviating	suffering.		His	‘compassion’	is	equally	egoistic,	however,	as	it	is	one’s	suffering	with	another	that	induces	one	to	act	for	another.		As	observed	regarding	aesthetic	valuations,	in	
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Schopenhauer’s	philosophy	one	is	interested	in	becoming	disinterested.		And	this	is	no	less	true	pertaining	to	his	ethical	theory	as	well.	In	my	view,	the	difference	between	Kant’s	ethics	and	Schopenhauer’s	is	echoed	precisely	by	the	difference,	and	conflict,	between	that	of	Lawrence	Kohlberg	and	Carol	Gilligan.756			In	her	groundbreaking	work,	In	a	Different	Voice,	Gilligan	writes	that	she	had	become	aware	of	“two	ways	of	speaking	about	moral	problems,	two	modes	of	describing	the	relationship	between	other	and	self.”757		And	I	agree	with	her	when	she	writes	that	this	‘different	voice’	should	be	“characterized	not	by	gender	but	by	theme,”	despite	the	fact	that,	empirically,	it	is	often	generally	attributed	to	the	perspective	of	women.758	I	am	here	arguing	that	Schopenhauer	himself	embraced	this	“different	voice”	to	which	Gilligan	alludes,	and	that	the	principle	of	utilitarianism	might	indeed	embrace	the	same,	despite	the	rational	and	‘disinterested’	application	of	its	principle	because	it’s	“highest	good”	is	empirically	derived.759		Discussing	how	children	might	learn	ethics	in	play,	Gilligan	writes,	“Lever	extends	and	corroborates	the	observations	of	Piaget	in	his	studies	of	the	rules	of	the																																																									756	Gilligan also criticizes Freud for thinking that women are morally inferior to men, but 
most of her criticism is reserved for Kohlberg’s rationalist approach.	757	Gilligan,	Different	Voice,	pg.	1	758	Gilligan,	Different	Voice,	pg.	2	Schopenhauer,	obviously,	was	not	a	woman,	and	was	indeed	sexist	and	a	product	of	his	time.		759	Mill	writes	of	the	importance	of	being	disinterested	in	moral	judgments.		He	writes	“The	happiness	which	forms	the	utilitarian	standard	of	what	is	right	in	conduct	is	not	the	agent’s	own	happiness	but	that	of	all	concerned.		Utilitarianism	requires	him	to	be	as	strictly	impartial	as	a	disinterested	and	benevolent	spectator”	(Utilitarianism,	pg.	17).		This	referral	to	‘disinterest’	should	not	be	conflated	with	Kant’s,	however.		The	ground	of	Kant’s	ethical	theory	requires	the	disinterested	derivation	of	the	moral	law	from	pure	reason	as	its	ground.		In	the	case	of	utilitarianism,	however,	the	‘principle’	or	‘standard’	is	derived	empirically;	that	is,	according	to	the	sensible.		It	is	then	applied	with	disinterest	after	its	derivation.			
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game,	where	he	finds	boys	becoming	through	childhood	increasingly	fascinated	with	the	legal	elaboration	of	rules	and	the	development	of	fair	procedures	for	adjudicating	conflicts.”760		Girls,	on	the	other	hand,	“are	more	tolerant	in	their	attitudes	toward	rules,	more	willing	to	make	exceptions,	and	more	easily	reconciled	to	innovations.”761		As	for	Kohlberg,	he	expands	on	this	observing	that	“the	moral	lessons	inherent	in	girls’	play	appear	to	be	fewer	than	in	boys’.”762	In	addition	to	this,	Gilligan	observes	that	Kohlberg	mostly	excluded	women	from	his	studies,	where	his	stages	of	moral	development	“…	describe	the	development	of	moral	judgment	from	childhood	to	adulthood	[that]	are	based	empirically	on	a	study	of	eighty-four	boys.”763		It	isn’t	then	surprising	that	populations	not	included	in	the	study	might	not	reach	the	higher	stages	of	his	moral	theory	since	the	theory	was	derived	looking	only	at	one	of	the	sexes.		Kohlberg	thus	excluded	from	moral	analyses	a	voice	of	a	significant	portion	of	the	population.	What	is	the	‘different	voice’	to	which	patriarchal	society	has	been	deaf?		Gilligan	suggests	it	is	an	‘Ethics	of	Care’.		Kohlberg’s	moral	development	theory	is	based	on	a	paradigm	of	males	who	were	raised	in	a	patriarchal	society	in	which	women	were	also	denied	their	voice.		His	theory	concerns	what	Gilligan	refers	to	as	an	‘ethics	of	justice’;	and	the	‘different	voice’	is	an	ethics	of	care.764		Gilligan	writes,	“To	admit	the	truth	of	the	women’s	perspective	to	the	conception	of	moral	development	is	to	recognize	for	both	sexes	the	importance	throughout	life	of	the																																																									760	Gilligan,	Different	Voice,	pg.	10	761	Gilligan,	Different	Voice,	pg.	10	762	Gilligan,	Different	Voice,	pg.	10	763	Gilligan,	Different	Voice,	pg.	18	764	see,	for	example,	Gilligan,	Different	Voice,	pg.	63	
	 285	
connection	between	self	and	other.”765		She	further	observes	that	the	moral	imperative	that	emerges	in	interviews	with	women	is	an	injunction	to	care,	a	responsibility	to	discern	and	alleviate	the	‘real	and	recognizable	trouble’	of	this	world.”766		Introducing	the	“different	voice,”	she	notes	that	one	of	her	students,	when	explaining	why	she	felt	one	individual	was	particularly	moral,	answered	that	it	was	because	he	had	“given	his	life	to	help	others.”767	The	‘ethics	of	care’	is	an	ethics	of	compassion;	its	orientation	is	towards	alleviating	the	suffering	of	others	wherever	that	suffering	is	discerned	and	felt.		In	involves	a	feeling	of	responsibility	for	others.		Astutely,	she	also	observes	that	moral	dilemmas	such	as	what	were	developed	by	Kohlberg	“recast	moral	judgments	from	a	consideration	of	the	good	to	a	choice	between	evils.”768		In	other	words,	moral	dilemmas	as	cast	and	scored	by	Kohlberg	and	others	involve	choosing	a	lesser	of	two	evils,	although	the	lesser	evil	will	be	judged,	deontologically	or	consequentially,	to	be	good,	i.e.,	the	right	decision.		For	an	ethics	of	care	or	compassion,	however,	the	emphasis	is	on	the	imperative	to	
help,	to	bring	about	a	good	consequence	in	the	alleviation	of	suffering,	not	on	what	is	theoretically	right	or	just,	but	practically	beneficial	to	those	concerned.	Nietzsche	is	often	very	critical	of	compassion	and	pity.		I’d	like	to	argue,	however,	that	it	is	not	so	much	compassion	itself	that	he	opposes,	but	that	he	opposes	it	as	a	determining	factor	in	our	lives.		For	example,	in	the	Untimely	
Meditations,	Nietzsche	writes	that	the	ideal	philosopher	“destroys	his	earthly	happiness	through	his	courage;	he	must	be	hostile	even	to	the	human	beings	whom																																																									765	Gilligan,	Different	Voice,	pg.	98	766	Gilligan,	Different	Voice,	pg.	100	767	Gilligan,	Different	Voice,	pg.	65	768	Gilligan,	Different	Voice,	pg.	101	
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he	loves	and	to	the	institutions	from	whose	womb	he	issued;	he	may	spare	neither	human	beings	nor	things,	though	he	himself	suffers	in	hurting	them.”769	His	point	is	that	the	‘philosopher	of	the	future’,	as	he	later	describes	such,	must	create	into	the	future,	and	this	creating	will	require	the	destruction	of	all	the	creature	comforts	of	the	present.		Furthermore,	this	creating	should	not	let	itself	be	determined	by	the	happiness	or	suffering	of	oneself	or	others,	lest	such	concern	degenerate	the	projects.		This	might	seem	very	cold,	and,	in	part,	it	is.		But	for	Nietzsche,	his	point	is	that	one	needs	to	be	cold	in	liberating	one’s	self	from	the	fetters	that	bind	one	to	the	present	and	the	present’s	plethora	of	degenerate	and	decadent	relations	and	consequent	values.	As	for	the	more	contemporary	‘ethics	of	care’,	what	I	am	comfortable	claiming	is	that	an	ethics	of	care	does	in	fact	risk	the	same	danger	that	Nietzsche	identifies	in	Schopenhauer:	an	opposition	to	primary	self-interest.		And	I’d	like	to	suggest	that,	in	the	interests	of	feminism,	this	danger	should	be	taken	seriously,	for	altruism	demands	precisely	that	one	act	for	another’s	interests	at	the	expense	of	
one’s	own.		In	such	an	instance,	an	‘ethics	of	care’	might	serve	to	perpetuate	the	notion	of	servitude	that	Nietzsche	critiques	as	slave	morality	and	therefore	ironically	operate	in	opposition	to	feminist	ideals	whilst	seeking	to	listen	to	a	different	“voice.”	Altruism	involves	a	reaction-formation.		Schopenhauer’s	ethics	is	underpinned	by	compassion	–	suffering	with	others	–	and	for	Schopenhauer	induces	the	same	effect	that	was	needed	in	aesthetic	relations:	a	comportment	towards																																																									769	Nietzsche,	UT	SE.4	
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relieving	suffering.		Nietzsche	is	adamantly	opposed	to	such	a	relationship	to	suffering,	also	indicated	by	his	attacks	upon	the	notion	of	Mitleiden	–	to	suffer	with,	often	translated	into	English	as	pity	or	compassion.		Although	it	might	not	be	similar	in	content	or	incentive,	owing	to	the	important	weight	of	sentiment	that	is	involved	here	in	contrast	to	Kant’s	deontology,	it	nevertheless	follows	from	a	similar	structure.		One	might	say	that	Consequentialism	is	a	middle	road	between	an	ethics	of	compassion	and	deontology,	for	it	takes	into	account	a	feeling	for	others	inherent	in	an	ethics	of	compassion,	but	it	approaches	ethical	issues	rationality,	through	reason;	it’s	principle	is	derived	empirically,	but	it	is	applied	disinterestedly.					Compassion	shouldn’t	be	conflated	with	altruism,	but	an	ethics	of	care,	and	utilitarianism,	generally	regard	compassion	and	a	feeling	for	others	as	a	ground	for	altruist	action.		As	I	have	so	far	argued,	Nietzsche	opposes	altruism	for	advocating	action	that	sacrifices	primary	self-interest	for	a	compromise	in	a	secondary	interest.		In	addition	to	this,	Nietzsche	is	opposed	to	an	ethics	that	would	eradicate	suffering.	Nietzsche	criticizes	the	need	to	relieve	suffering	above	all	else	rather	than	pursue	a	greater	end	that	necessarily	entails	suffering.		This	is	why	Nietzsche	also	writes	in	
Daybreak:	Is	the	nature	of	the	truly	moral	to	lie	in	our	keeping	in	view	the	most	immediate	and	most	direct	consequences	to	others	of	our	actions	and	deciding	in	accordance	with	these	consequences?		But	this,	though	it	may	be	a	morality,	is	a	narrow	and	petty	bourgeois	one:	a	higher	and	freer	viewpoint	…	is	to	look	beyond	these	immediate	consequences	to	others	and	under	certain	circumstances	to	pursue	more	distant	goals	even	at	the	cost	of	the	
suffering	of	others	–	for	example,	to	pursue	knowledge	even	though	one	
	 288	
realizes	that	our	free-spiritedness	will	at	first	and	as	an	immediate	consequence	plunge	others	into	doubt,	grief	and	even	worse	things.770				Interestingly,	it	seems	to	propound	a	kind	of	consequentialism,	only	one	that	does	not	take,	as	utilitarians	or	Schopenhauerians	(an	ethics	of	care),	the	alleviation	of	suffering	to	be	the	desired	consequence,	but	instead	perhaps	a	distant	Eudaimonia	or	flourishing	for	which	much	suffering	is	needed.	Criticizing	democrats	and	socialists,	as	well	as	perhaps	utilitarians	and	other	moral	theorists	such	as	Schopenhauer	–	all	of	whom	generally	inform	such	political	ideologies	–	Nietzsche	writes	that	these	spirits	are	‘un-free’	and	‘superficial’,		…	particularly	given	their	basic	tendency	to	think	that	all	human	misery	and	wrongdoing	is	caused	by	traditional	social	structures.	…	What	they	want	to	strive	for	with	all	their	might	is	the	universal,	green	pasture	happiness	of	the	herd,	with	security,	safety,	contentment,	and	an	easier	life	for	all.		Their	two	most	well-sung	songs	and	doctrines	are	called:	‘equal	rights’	and	‘sympathy	for	all	that	suffers’	–	and	they	view	suffering	itself	as	something	that	needs	to	be	abolished.771				Nietzsche	criticizes	the	tendency	to	eradicate	suffering	from	life,	or	to	find	some	eternally	green	pasture	of	happiness,	a	‘promise	land’,	or	‘heaven’,	or	‘perpetual	peace’.		He	also	writes:	A	condemnation	of	life	on	the	part	of	the	living	is,	in	the	end,	only	the	symptom	of	a	certain	type	of	life,	and	has	no	bearing	on	the	question	of	whether	or	not	the	condemnation	is	justified.	…	When	we	talk	about	values	we	are	under	the	inspiration,	under	the	optic,	of	life:	life	itself	forces	us	to																																																									770	Nietzsche,	Daybreak	§146	771	Nietzsche,	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§44	
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posit	values,	life	itself	evaluates	through	us,	when	we	posit	values.		It	follows	from	this	that	even	the	anti-natural	morality	…	the	condemnation	of	life,	is	only	a	value	judgment	made	by	life	–	but	which	life?		…	it	is	the	judgment	of	a	declining,	weakened,	exhausted,	condemned	life.772		Nietzsche	thus	expresses	a	bifurcation	of	moral	values	that	echoes	what	is	established	aesthetically,	between	decadent,	sick	spirits	and	life-affirming	convalescents,	not	to	mention	the	Übermensch	who	is	the	archetype	of	affirmation	(and	egosyntonic	relating).		He	condemns	the	acquisition	of	a	state	of	being	that	is	free	of	suffering	and	therefore	condemns	that	utilitarian	and	Schopenhauerian	notion	of	happiness	and	‘the	good’.		For	Schopenhauer,	that	happiness	is	the	result	of	ridding	oneself	of	all	willing,	and	thus	all	interest:	it	is	becoming	disinterested.		Schopenhauer’s	notion	of	happiness	is	obviously	a	schizoid	fantasy.	Central	to	Nietzsche’s	criticisms	of	morality	in	general,	regardless	of	the	ethical	theory	involved	or	any	moral	system,	is	the	egodystonic	orientation	upon	which	morality	is,	and	can	only	be	grounded.		First,	morality	is	generally	grounded	on	the	notion	altruism	–	the	notion	of	selflessness	–	or	disinterestedness,	which	is	itself	‘selfless’	in	an	intellectualized	sense.		But	disinterestedness	or	altruism	are	themselves	consequences	of	self-interest	that	have	been	turned	against	one’s	self,	requiring	the	vicissitude	of	repression	(and	generally	reaction-formation),	and	essentially	compromise	or	substitute	the	original	interest	with	a	second	one	in	opposition	to	the	first.		If	values	are	symptoms,	as	Nietzsche	suggests,	then	ethical	
																																																								772	Nietzsche,	TI	“morality,”	§5	
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values	are	neurotic	symptoms	or	symptoms	of	spiritual	degeneration	if	they	repudiate	one’s	primary	interest.			Nietzsche	writes,	“Egoism	belongs	to	the	essence	of	the	noble	soul.”773	The	noble	spirit	acts	out	of	self-interest,	or	with	self-interested	motivations.		This	is	a	quality	that	Nietzsche	values	in	noble	spirits	to	which	free	spirits	return	after	breaking	their	fetters:	a	recentering	of	every	should	or	ought	on	oneself,	one’s	body,	one’s	own	natural	becoming.		The	slave,	or	herd,	by	contrast,	emphasizes	the	other	(or	a	disembodied	ideal,	in	the	case	of	Kant)	in	action	and	motivation.		But	when	a	noble	spirit	takes	to	relating	with	others,		…	the	noble	soul	honors	itself	in	them	and	in	the	rights	that	it	gives	them.;	it	has	no	doubt	that	the	exchange	of	rights	and	honors	belongs	to	the	natural	state	of	things,	too,	as	the	essence	of	all	interaction.		The	noble	soul	gives	as	it	takes,	out	of	the	passionate	and	sensitive	instinct	of	retribution	that	is	fundamental	to	it.		The	concept	of	‘mercy’	is	senseless	and	noisome	inter	
pares;	there	might	be	a	sublime	way	of	letting	gifts	fall	down	on	you	from	above	…	but	the	noble	soul	has	no	talent	for	this	art	and	conduct.		Its	egoism	gets	in	the	way:	it	does	not	generally	like	looking	‘upwards’,	–	but	rather	
ahead,	horizontally	and	slowly,	or	downwards:	–	it	knows	that	it	is	high	up.774		The	act	of	allowing	‘gifts’	to	sublimely	‘fall	on	one	from	above’	might	be	characterized	as	velleity	of	ascetic	spirits	and	as	a	herd	mentality,	which	was	discussed	previously	concerning	aesthetics.		Such	reception	of	gifts	can,	as	an	example,	be	seen	in	the	creations	of	the	ascetic	priest,	and	which	the	weak	spirits	are	easily	seduced	into	receiving.		It	is	an	“art”	for	which	the	noble	lacks	talent	–																																																									773	Nietzsche,	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§265	774	Nietzsche,	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§265	
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both	in	the	reception	and	in	the	giving	–	because	it	hinders	or	impairs	the	self-interested	bestowals	indicative	of	noble	spirits.			To	relate	with	others	horizontally,	as	equals,	can	also	be	self-interested,	and	acting	with	self-interest	is	the	natural	state	of	things.		All	this	would,	quite	possibly,	offend	many	peoples’	sensibilities	because	society	is	so	accustomed	to	praising	selflessness	and	altruism.		But	what	is	meaningful	in	selfless	actions?		This,	I	believe,	is	what	Nietzsche	questions.		What	is	done	selflessly	is	not	as	meaningful	as	what	is	done	out	of	self-interest,	and	the	meaning	can	only	be	decadent.			Nehamas	observes,	“Nietzsche	certainly	glorifies	selfishness,	but	he	is,	once	again,	equally	serious	in	denying	a	sharp	distinction	between	egoism	and	altruism.”		And	furthermore,	imagines	a	future	when	“love	and	respect	for	others	will	just	be	love	and	respect	for	oneself.”775		I	think	Nehamas	is	correct	on	both	fronts;	technically,	there	is	no	such	a	thing	as	‘altruism’,	an	action	done	without	self-interest	or	entirely	in	opposition	too	one’s	own	interests.		Also,	Nietzsche	does	glorify,	and	advocate,	what	Nehamas	calls	“selfishness.”		However,	I’d	like	to	modify	that	terminology	to	self-interestedness.		The	reason	for	the	modification	is	to	separate	it	off	from	the	egoism	and	selfishness	of	secondary	narcissism	whereby	there	is	a	repudiation	of,	or	ignorance	concerning,	otherness	that	resembles	disavowal.		Secondly,	it	makes	the	important	connection	to	aesthetics,	highlighting	the	parallel	of	ethical	and	aesthetic	valuations.		Nietzsche’s	point	is	essentially	that	all	action	is	self-interested	action,	by	which	what	is	meant	is	that	all	action	is	done	according	to	an	individual’s	configuration	of	the	will	to	power.																																																											775	Nehamas,	Nietzsche,	pp.	191-192	
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Nietzsche	writes,	“For	too	long,	man	has	viewed	his	natural	inclinations	with	an	‘evil	eye’,	so	that	they	finally	came	to	be	intertwined	with	‘bad	conscience’	in	him.”776	And	he	wonders	what	kind	of	spirit	would	be	better.	He	writes	that	these	qualities	belong	“to	another,	younger	man,	one	‘with	more	future’,	one	stronger	than	me	–	something	to	which	Zarathustra	alone	is	entitled,	Zarathustra	the	Godless.”777		We	see	here	the	self-interest,	strength	and	vitality	of	a	noble	spirit	combined	with	the	self-mastery	and	clearer	mountain	air	of	free	spirits.	What	does	it	look	like	for	one	to	act	ethically	with	self-interest	rather	than	selflessly	in	altruism?		An	example	might	suit.		Imagine	that	there	are	two	conflicting	groups.		One	might	think	of	immigrants	with	their	own	values	and	interests,	and	also	the	“native”	society	to	which	they	immigrate.		This	is	unfortunately	an	increasingly	pertinent	example.		Altruism,	or	selfless	action,	of	one	group	would	require	the	sacrifices	of	their	interests	for	the	sake	of	the	other	group	or	society.		It	would	likely,	also,	entail	a	kind	of	backlash	exemplified	in	failures	of	repressions	such	as	violence	by	oppressed	(and	therefore	repressive),	disenfranchised	populations.		And	the	flip	side	of	the	coin	is	that,	instead	of	the	one	being	altruistically	accommodating,	the	one	demands	the	altruistic	self-sacrifice	of	the	other.		There	is,	then,	the	same	echo	of	Hegel’s	master/slave	dichotomy	in	altruism.		One	submits	when	one	acts	altruistically,	or	one	demands	that	the	other	submits	to	one’s	own	interests.			But	this	is	a	false	dilemma.		Instead,	one	can	find	a	third	option:	creatively	aligning	one’s	own	interests	with	others’	interests	into	a	whole	that	is	dynamically	harmonious.				
																																																								776	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	II	§24	777	Nietzsche,	Genealogy	of	Morality,	II	§25	
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Echoing	a	differentiation	between	free	and	fettered	(or	herd)	spirits	in	Nietzsche’s	works,	Donald	Winnicott	writes:	It	is	creative	apperception	more	than	anything	else	that	makes	the	individual	feel	that	life	is	worth	living.		Contrasted	with	this	is	a	relationship	to	external	reality	which	is	one	of	compliance,	the	world	and	its	details	being	recognized	but	only	as	something	to	be	fitted	in	with	or	demanding	adaptation.		Compliance	carries	with	it	a	sense	of	futility	…	and	is	associated	with	the	idea	that	nothing	matters	and	that	life	is	not	worth	living.778		Notice	the	rather	nihilistic	tone	where	creativity	is	lacking	–	a	passive	nihilism.779	A	“link	can	be	made,	and	usefully	made,	between	creative	living,”	as	in	the	case	of	artists,	“and	living	itself,	and	the	reasons	can	be	studied	why	it	is	that	creative	living	can	be	lost	and	why	individual’s	feeling	that	life	is	real	or	meaningful	can	disappear.”780		To	be	altruistic	or	demand	altruism	of	another	would	appear	to	be	a	failure	of	creative	living,	an	inability	to	resolve	difference	in	creating	a	harmonious	whole.			But	such	creativity	also	requires	conditions	that	facilitate	it.		Regarding	Winnicott’s	discussion	of	play,	and	with	a	very	Anna-Freudian	tone,	Lois	Oppenheim	observes,	“Favorable	conditions	are	required	for	this	kind	of	play,	for	the	free	and	imaginative	use	of	internal	representations	that	is	based	neither	wholly	in	the	psyche	nor	in	the	reality	of	the	external	world.		Deprived	of	these	conditions,	the	child	has	an	impoverished	capacity	to	play	and	will,	eventually,	make	a	limited,	if	
																																																								778	Winnicott,	Playing	and	Reality,	pg.	87	779	I	refer	the	reader	to	the	discussion	of	Rampley’s	differentiation	between	passive	and	(re)active	nihilism.			780	Winnicott,	Playing	and	Reality,	pg.	93	
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any,	contribution	in	the	cultural	domain.”781		But	In	Daybreak	§449,	Nietzsche	gives	us	an	example	of	this	third	possibility.		Here,	one	is	‘like	a	little	inn’	and	imposes	nothing	on	others,	but	does	this	out	of	self-interest	and	discovers	that	the	paths	to	
the	sublime	are	always	nearby	in	virtue	of	that	openness.		Against	Stoicism	and	asceticism,	perhaps	as	well	Kant	and	Schopenhauer,	Nietzsche	writes,	“Fear	of	the	senses,	of	the	desires,	of	the	passions,	when	it	goes	so	far	as	to	counsel	us	against	them,	is	already	a	symptom	of	weakness.		…	and	almost	all	the	passions	have	been	brought	into	ill	repute	on	account	of	those	who	were	not	sufficiently	strong	enough	to	employ	them.”782		In	other	words,	this	‘free	spirit’	is	powerful	and	creative	enough	to	be	able	to	incorporate,	to	employ	one’s	passions	in	such	a	way	that	demands	neither	one’s	own	selflessness	nor	another’s.		There’s	neither	repression	nor	disavowal	(nor	aggression)	on	the	part	of	such	spirits.		Such	spirits	are	able	to	incorporate	not	only	external	reality	(including	another’s	interests)	but	also	one’s	own	instincts	and	drives	(self-interest)	into	a	harmonious	and	joyful	whole.		Whereas	Kant	asserts,	“The	presentation	of	the	moral	law	deprives	self-love	of	its	influence,”783	Nietzsche	intends	to	reunite	us	with	its	influence.		For	this	reason,	Nietzsche	is	an	immoralist.		And	through	our	self-love,	it	might	be	possible	to	create	into	the	future	in	ways	that	neither	disavow	reality	(including	the	interests	of	others)	nor	repudiate	our	own	nature	(our	own	interest).																																																											781	Oppenheim,	Curious	Intimacy,	pg.	18	782	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§778	783	Kant,	Critique	of	Practical	Reason,	pg.	99	[75]	concerning	what	Katn	refers	to	as	‘delusion’	here,	I	am	reminded	of	the	biblical	reference	of	St.	Anselm,	“The	fool	hath	said	there	is	no	God,”	so	that	the	delusional	will	accuse	those	who	are	not	delusional	of	being	so	as	a	means	of	argument.	
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Rational	vs.	Irrational	Grounds	
Kant	and	Schopenhauer	exemplify,	respectively,	rational	and	irrational	grounds	of	valuations.	And	according	to	Lawrence	Kohlberg,	one’s	moral	aptitude	is	proportional	to	one’s	reasoning	capacity,	so	that	the	more	rational	solution	to	a	moral	dilemma	the	more	morally	developed	is	the	person	making	the	judgment.		However,	“The	roots	of	human	intelligence,	rationality,	and	ethical	sophistication,”	observes	the	psychologist	Jonathan	Haidt,	“should	not	be	sought	in	our	ability	to	search	for	and	evaluate	evidence	in	an	open	and	unbiased	way.		Rather	than	…	worshipping	reason,	we	should	instead	look	for	the	roots	of	human	intelligence,	rationality,	and	virtue	in	what	the	mind	does	best:	perception,	intuition,	and	other	mental	operations	that	are	quick,	effortless,	and	generally	quite	accurate.”784		Contemporary	research	in	the	psychology	of	morality	largely	sides	with	Schopenhauer,	Nietzsche,	and	Freud	on	the	irrational	grounds	of	moral	valuations.			Haidt,	a	substantial	contributor	to	emerging	findings	in	moral	psychology,	argues	against	the	rationalist	approaches	to	morality.		Instead,	he	puts	forward	an	
intuitionist	account	of	morality.		The	dominant	rationalist	approaches	that	he	identifies	are	deontology	and	consequentialism,	each	of	which	entails	reasoning	to	ascertain	their	respective	moral	judgments.		On	the	other	hand,	“Moral	intuition	is	a	kind	of	cognition,	but	it	is	not	a	kind	of	reasoning.”785		There	is	also	a	social	aspect	for	a	moral	intuitionist,	writes	Haidt,	but	in	such	an	instance,	“moral	reasoning	is	usually	an	ex	post	facto	process	used	to	influence	the	intuitions	(and	hence	
																																																								784	Haidt,	The	Emotional	Dog,	pg.	821	785	Haidt,	The	Emotional	Dog,	pg.	814	
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judgments)	of	other	people.”786		Moral	intuitions	appear	to	be	‘self-evident’	and	these	‘moral	truths’	are	cognized	“not	by	a	process	of	ratiocination	and	reflection	but	rather	by	a	process	more	akin	to	perception.”787		Haidt,	thus,	identifies	the	derivation	of	‘moral	intuitions’	with	what	has	been	described	previously	as	aesthetics	of	sense,	and	which	further	finds	coherence	with	Nietzsche’s	assertion	concerning	instinctive	judgments	that	procure	perspectives	and	interpretations.	Haidt	identifies	four	reasons	for	“doubting	the	causality	of	reasoning	in	moral	judgment.”		These	are:	1. Of	the	two	cognitive	processes	at	work	in	moral	judgments	–	reasoning	and	intuition	–	“reasoning	has	been	over	emphasized”	2. “Reasoning	is	often	motivated”	3. Although	we	illusorily	experience	reasoning	to	be	prior	to	a	judgment,	reasoning	often	“constructs	post	hoc	justifications”	4. “Moral	action	covaries	with	moral	emotion	more	than	with	moral	reasoning”788		The	first	point	is	moot	if	the	others	are	true.		The	second	point	should,	as	I	have	argued,	be	regarded	very	much	in	the	same	sense	as	the	argument	Nietzsche	made	against	Kant	regarding	aesthetic	judgment:	i.e.,	all	judging	is	irrational	and	
motivated;	that	is,	there	is	no	such	thing	as	a	judgment	that	is	disinterested.		The	fourth	point	follows	closely	from	this,	and	the	third	point	follows	from	what	was	laid	forth	in	the	chapter	on	the	Will	to	Power	as	interpretation:	the	ways	we	think	about	
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the	world	are	constructions	imposed	upon	it,	only	some	more	or	less	incorporative	of	various	elements.	Psychologists	such	as	Kohlberg	who	are	influenced	by	a	rationalist	approach	(either	deontological	or	consequentialist)	tend	to	presuppose	the	reverse	etiology.		Exemplifying	his	rationalist	orientation,	Kohlberg	writes,	“The	moral	force	in	personality	is	cognitive.		Affective	forces	are	involved	in	moral	decisions,	but	affect	is	neither	moral	nor	immoral.		When	the	affective	arousal	is	channeled	into	moral	directions,	it	is	moral;	when	it	is	not	so	channeled,	it	is	not.		The	moral	channeling	mechanisms	themselves	are	cognitive.”789		That	is	to	say,	moral	judgment	is	rational,	and	‘affect’	is	‘moral’	only	when	feeling	the	channel	carved	by	moral	reasoning.		Haidt	writes,	“Psychologists	have	generally	assumed	that	morality	is	learned	in	childhood,	and	they	have	set	out	to	discover	how	morality	gets	from	outside	the	child	to	inside.		The	social	intuitionist	model,”	on	the	other	hand,	“proposes	that	morality,	like	language,	is	a	major	evolutionary	adaptation	for	an	intensely	social	species,	built	into	multiple	regions	of	the	brain	and	body,	that	is	better	described	as	emergent	than	as	learned	yet	that	requires	input	and	shaping	form	a	particular	culture.		Moral	intuitions	are	therefore	both	innate	and	enculturated.”790		This	is	remarkably	inline	with	Nietzsche’s	assertion	concerning	“instinctive	judgments.”	Haidt	writes,	“Our	moral	life	is	plagued	by	two	illusions.		The	first	illusion	can	be	called	the	wag-the-dog	illusion:	We	believe	that	our	own	moral	judgment	(the	dog)	is	driven	by	our	own	moral	reasoning	(the	tail).		The	second	illusion	can	be																																																									789	Kohlberg,	“from	is	to	ought”,	pp.	230-231,	qtd.	by	Haidt,	The	Emotional	Dog,	pg.	816	790	Haidt,	The	Emotional	Dog,	pg.	826	
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called	the	wag-the-other-dog’s-tail	illusion,”	where	we	assume	that	our	reasoning	
qua	rationality	might	convince	another	of	our	own	judgment,	as	when	judging	a	thing	as	beautiful	or	good,	and	proceeding	to	argue	for	the	case.791		Furthermore,	a	rationalist’s	approach	to	ethics	can	“create	an	unusual	and	nonrepresentative	kind	of	moral	judgment.	…	moral	reasoning	is	not	left	free	to	search	for	truth	but	is	likely	to	be	hired	out	like	a	lawyer	by	various	motives,	employed	only	to	seek	confirmation	of	preordained	conclusions.”792		Significantly,	moral	reasoning	can	often	be	engaged	in	rationalizations	of	affectively	determined	orientations.		Reasoning,	although	not	thus	described	by	Haidt,	can	actually	entail	defense	mechanisms.		It	can	be	either	a	rationalization,	in	which	case	it	is	underpinned	by	disavowal;	or	it	can	be	an	intellectualization,	in	which	case	it	is	underpinned	by	repression;	or	it	can	utilize	any	number	of	other	defenses.		In	both	cases,	the	‘reasoner’	attempts	to	dissociate	the	reasoning	from	the	motivational	states	for	the	reasoning,	which	is	an	impossible	task.		 What	all	this	implies	is	that	affective	states	matter	far	more	greatly	in	moral	judgments	than	reasoning.		Further	evidence	of	this,	Haidt	writes,	“comes	form	the	study	of	psychopaths.”		Psychopaths	generally	have	“good	intelligence	and	a	lack	of	delusions	or	irrational	thinking.		[They]	know	the	rules	of	social	behavior	and	they	understand	the	harmful	consequences	of	their	actions	for	others.		They	simply	do	not	care	about	those	consequences.		…	[they]	show	a	general	poverty	of	major	affective	reactions,	particularly	those	that	would	be	triggered	by	the	suffering	of	
																																																								791	Haidt,	The	Emotional	Dog,	pg.	826	792	Haidt,	The	Emotional	Dog,	pg.	822	
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others.”793		The	psychopath,	claims	Haidt,	“illustrates	Hume’s	statement,	‘…	‘tis	not	contrary	to	reason	to	prefer	the	destruction	of	the	world	to	the	scratching	of	my	little	finger’.”794		The	preference	entails	what	it	is	that	most	offends	the	senses,	such	as	a	sense	of	disgust,	as	well	be	articulated	in	the	following	chapter.	In	the	diagrams	below,	Haidt	illustrates	a	comparison	of	the	rational	model	of	judging	(figure	1)	and	the	non-rational,	what	he	calls	the	intuitionist,	model	(figure	2).		Although	not	indicated	by	Haidt’s	diagram	concerning	the	rationalist	approach	to	judgments	in	Figure	1,	there	is	also	a	social	element	to	the	rationalist	approach,	which	Haidt	means	to	illustrate	with	links	5	&	6	in	Figure	2.		All	of	Figure	2.,	however,	illustrates	the	intuitionist	model,	where	reasoning	is	regarded	as	having	a	contributing	factor	at	times,	but	where	the	most	weight	of	the	judgment	still	falls	on	intuition.795		This	is	called	the	social	interactionist	model.		Social	interaction	pertains	to	social	aspects	of	behavior	such	as	“taking	turns,	sharing,	harming,	and	responding	to	harm.”	Haidt	observes,	“In	the	social	interactionist	model,	people	are	said	to	think	about	the	consequences	of	an	action	before	determining	whether	the	action	is	a	moral	violation.”796		In	other	words,	we	think	that	our	moral	judgments	are	caused	by	our	reasoning.		And	we	use	reasoning	to	try	to	argue	against,	or	for,	other	peoples’	judgments	(whether	aesthetic	or	moral),	but	in	reality,	the	only	power	reasoning	seems	to	have	across	the	board	in	effecting	other	peoples’	judgments	has	nothing	to	do	with	reason	at	all;	instead,	it	would	appear	to	concern	rhetoric	or	something	aesthetic	–	an	appeal	to	affective	elements.																																																											793	Haidt,	The	Emotional	Dog,	pg.	824	794	Hume,	Treatise,	pg.	461.		qtd.	by	Haidt,	The	Emotional	Dog,	pg.	824	795	Haidt,	The	Emotional	Dog,	pg.	819	796	Haidt,	The	Emotional	Dog,	pg.	816	
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Figure	1.	The	rationalist	model	of	moral	judgment.		Moral	affects	such	as	sympathy	may	sometimes	be	inputs	to	moral	reasoning	(Haidt,	Emotional	Dog,	pg.	815)		
		
Figure	2.	The	social	intuitionist	model	of	moral	judgment.		The	numbered	links,	drawn	for	person	A	only,	are	(1)	the	intuitive	judgment	link,	(2)	the	post	hoc	reasoning	link,	(3)	the	reasoned	persuasion	link,	and	(4)	the	social	persuasion	link.		Two	additional	links	are	hypothesized	to	occur	less	frequently:	(5)	the	reasoned	judgment	link	and	(6)	the	private	reflection	link.	(Haidt,	Emotional	Dog,	pg.	815)						
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The	Aesthetic	Influence	on	Ethical	Valuations	
I	believe	Haidt	is	wrong	to	attribute	moral	valuations	to	intuition.		Moral	intuitionism	runs	the	risk	of	implying	that	people	have	evolutionarily	acquired	certain	intuitions	that	are	inherently	of	a	quality	that	can	be	judged	as	moral	or	immoral.		It	runs	the	risk	of	postulating	the	existence	of	a	thing	called	an	‘intuition’	that	is	elicited	by	various	situations	or	perspectives.797		This	is	a	danger	with	an	account	of	intuitionism,	observable	in	Haidt’s	work,	despite	the	fact	that,	in	subsequent	research,	Haidt	observes	the	causal	link	of	the	affect	disgust	–	an	
aesthetic	response	–	on	moral	reasoning.798		If	feelings	of	disgust	are	the	stuff	of	intuitions,	for	example,	then	there	are	no	evolutionarily	inherited	moral	intuitions,	but	evolutionarily	inherited	aesthetic	capacities,	qua	aesthetics	of	sense	and	feeling,	that	serve	as	a	ground	of	the	‘moral	intuitions’.		In	other	words,	the	intuition	of	a	‘moral	intution’	is	nothing	more	than	an	aesthetic	response,	an	embodied	sensation	or	feeling	that	might	be	universal	or	particular,	and	which	guides	moral	reasoning.		This	is	the	claim	I’m	making	in	the	present	work.		It	is	therefore	doubtful	that	there	exist	intuitions	inherited	as	such,	but	the	existence	of	affects	is	unquestionable.799		
																																																								797	This becomes clearer where Haidt asserts that moral intuitionism is comparable to 
phonemes in the development of language, where children are born with the phonetic 
capacity for every language, but that they lose the ability to make certain sounds, or to 
contrast certain sounds, after sufficient exposure to specific languages that do not use 
such sounds.  There is evidence that Haidt himself might be making the mistake where he 
makes assertions like “cultural knowledge is far more than a set of inherited beliefs about 
the right and wrong ways of doing things.” See Haidt,	The	Emotional	Dog,	pg.	827		798	see,	for	example,	Schnall,	Simone	“Disgust”	&	Wheatley,	Thalia	“Hypnotic	Disgust”	799	However,	the	existence	of	an	affect	as	inherited	from	an	ancestor’s	life,	as	Freud	postulates	in	Moses	and	Monotheism,	is	clearly	false.		But	that	we	have	acquired,	through	evolution,	the	capacity	for	such	affects	is	without	doubt.	
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That	which	Haidt	regards	as	intuition	is	actually	an	aesthetic	valuation.		This	makes	even	more	sense	regarding	the	below	research	on	the	influence	of	disgust	on	moral	judgments.		And	it’s	not	that	Haidt’s	research	can’t	allow	for	this	possibility;	rather,	it	is	quite	consistent	with	it.		He	just	doesn’t	acknowledge	that	the	aesthetic	aspect	has	priority.		Haidt	inappropriately	regards	what	appears	empirically	as	exemplifying	an	‘intuition’;	but	really	the	‘intuition’	is	nothing	more	than	an	aesthetic	feeling.		What	I	aim	to	show	in	what	follows	is:	moral	judgments	are	valuations	that	have	an	aesthetic	foundation	and	are	causally	correlated	to	aesthetic	valuations.		In	other	words,	what	is	valued	as	‘beautiful’	is	likewise	regarded	as	‘good’	and	believed	to	be	‘true’.	In	philosophy,	Kant	claimed	that	Beauty	is	symbolic	of	the	morally	good.		Schopenhauer	also	appears	to	affiliate	‘piercing	the	veil	of	Maya’	with	the	experience	not	only	of	compassion,	but	also	with	the	experience	of	the	contemplation	of	the	beautiful.		In	each	case,	one	gets	beyond	the	principium	
individuationis.		Nietzsche,	usually	implicitly,	recognizes	a	connection	between	what	is	judged	as	ugly	or	beautiful	with	ethical	valuations.			Nietzsche,	as	noted	previously	in	the	discussion	of	Aesthetics,	appeals	to	“instinctive	judgments,”800	where	judgments	are	made	before	reflection	takes	place.		And	as	mentioned	previously,	Freud	asserts	explicitly	that	Kant’s	categorical	imperative	is	the	product	of	reaction-formation,801	the	vicissitude	by	which	Freud	asserts	we	acquire	our	feelings	of	
																																																								800	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§804	801	Freud,	The	Ego	and	the	Id,	pg.	167.		This	is	an	inference.		Explicitly,	he	refers	to	it	as	the	product	of	an	Oedipal	complex	in	relation	to	the	super-ego,	but	the	explanation	itself	parallels	everything	he	has	said	about	reaction	formation.	
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disgust,	moral	sentiments,	and	aesthetic	valuations.802			Until	recently,	there	has	been	little,	if	any,	empirical	research	done	on	the	relationship	between	feelings	of	disgust	and	moral	judgments,	but	psychologists	are	beginning	to	examine	the	connection	that	Freud	observed	explicitly	in	1905	with	the	publication	of	the	Three	
Essays.	In	an	experiment	done	by	Thalia	Wheatley	and	Haidt,	participants	were	hypnotized	to	“feel	disgust	in	response	to	one	of	two	arbitrary	words.”803		These	words	were	then	used	in	vignettes	of	situations	where	some	action	traditionally	valued	as	immoral	was	taking	place	(such	as	bribery).		They	found	that	“moral	transgressions”	were	experienced	by	the	participants	in	the	study	as	“more	disgusting	when	their	hypnotic	disgust	word	was	embedded	within	the	vignettes	than	when	this	word	was	absent,”804	by	triggering	a	‘sickening	feeling’.		For	a	second	experiment,	participants	were	asked	to	rate	a	list	of	activities	according	to	preference,	where	some	of	the	activities	were	described	using	the	words	affiliated	with	the	hypnotically	implanted	feeling	of	disgust.		The	results	show	that	“Participants	judged	actions	to	be	more	disgusting	when	their	hypnotic	word	was	present	than	when	it	was	absent.”805		Furthermore,	it	was	observed,		“participants	sometimes	experienced	puzzlement	as	they	watched	themselves	make	severe	judgments,”	and	when	asked	to	explain	the	evaluations,	it	was	clear	that	post	hoc	moral	reasoning,	as	described	by	Haidt,	was	taking	place.806		“Rather	than	over-rule																																																									802	Freud,	Three	Essays	on	Sexuality	803	Wheatley,	Hypnotic	Disgust,	pg.	780	804	Wheatley,	Hypnotic	Disgust,	pg.	781	805	Wheatley,	Hypnotic	Disgust,	pg.	782	806	Wheatley,	Hypnotic	Disgust,	pg.	783	
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their	feelings…,	some	participants	launched	an	even	more	desperate	search	for	external	justification.”807		Wheatley	thus	concludes,	“augmenting	feelings	of	disgust	through	hypnosis	can	increase	the	severity	of	moral	judgments	…”	and	provides	evidence	for	Hume’s	assertion	that	reason	can	only	serve	and	obey	the	passions.808	In	another	study	by	Simone	Schnall	and	Haidt,809	published	in	an	article	titled	“Disgust	as	Embodied	Moral	Judgment,”	Schnall	writes,	“Affective	feelings	have	been	shown	to	influence	ratings	of	life	satisfaction,	estimates	of	risk,	and	other	evaluative	judgments.”810		Schnall	writes	that,	evolutionarily,	“Disgust	evolved	to	help	our	omnivorous	species	decide	what	to	eat	in	a	world	full	of	parasites	and	microbes	that	spread	by	physical	contact.	…	Disgust	indicates	that	a	substance	either	should	be	avoided	or,	if	ingestion	has	already	occurred,	should	be	expelled.”811		But	although	disgust	appears	to	be	food-related,	it	was	also	“well–suited	for	use	as	an	emotion	of	social	rejection.”812		And	furthermore,	indicating	the	process	of	reaction-formation	as	articulated	by	Freud,	“as	with	other	emotions,	feelings	of	disgust	can	be	transferred	to	objects	for	which	they	are	irrelevant.”813		And	“Disgust,”	notes	Schnall,	appears	to	have	a	privileged	place	among	affective	states	concerning	evaluative	judgments	owing	to	the	fact	that	it	“may	be	the	most	effective	…	at	triggering	the	gastroenteric	nervous	system.”814		Ethical	judgments,	then,	would	appear	to	be	as	embodied	as	anything	else,	quite	literally.		At	this	point,	it	might	be	pertinent	to																																																									807	Wheatley,	Hypnotic	Disgust,	pg.	783	808	Wheatley,	Hypnotic	Disgust,	pg.	783	809	Schnall,	et	al.	“Disgust	and	Moral	Judgment”	810	Schnall,	et	al.	“Disgust	and	Moral	Judgment”	pg.	1097	811	Schnall,	et	al.	“Disgust	and	Moral	Judgment”	pg.	1097	812	Schnall,	et	al.	“Disgust	and	Moral	Judgment”	pg.	1097	813	Schnall,	et	al.	“Disgust	and	Moral	Judgment”	pg.	1097	814	Schnall,	et	al.	“Disgust	and	Moral	Judgment”	pg.	1097	
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remind	the	reader	as	well	of	Nietzsche’s	assertions	concerning	‘instinctive	judgments’	that,	whilst	psychically	bifurcated	according	to	a	person’s	psychical	constitution,	largely	act	for	biological	reasons	concerning	what	is	‘self-preserving’	or	‘life-enhancing’.	Schnall	et	al.	conducted	a	series	of	experiments,	the	first	of	which	sought	to	replicate	the	findings	of	Wheatley	and	Haidt	in	their	experiment	of	hypnotically	induced	feelings	of	disgust,	only	here	by	inducing	the	affect	by	means	of	repugnant	smells.		In	a	series	of	other	experiments,	they	also	found	that	where	a	feeling	of	disgust	was	induced	in	participants,	“Disgust	influenced	moral	judgment	similarly	for	both	disgust	and	non-disgust	vignettes,”815	but	interestingly	correlated	with	a	susceptibility	to	visceral	reactions.816		After	showing	the	influence	of	disgust	on	moral	judgments,	another	experiment	was	done	to	determine	if	disgust	has	a	privileged	position	as	an	influential	factor	in	judgments	of	moral	worth,	or	if	other	negative	affects	such	as	sadness	can	play	a	similar	role.				For	this	experiment,	three	conditions	were	examined:	one	of	disgust,	one	of	sadness,	and	a	neutral	condition.		It	was	found	that	“participants	in	the	disgust	condition	gave	more	severe	moral	judgments	than	did	participants	in	the	two	comparison	conditions,”	and	where	those	in	the	“disgust	condition	gave	significantly	higher	ratings	than	did	those	in	the	sadness	condition.”817		Sadness,	contrary	to	expectations,	“showed	a	trend	in	the	opposite	direction	of	influence	on	moral	judgments,”	which	“suggests	that	the	effects	of	disgust	on	moral	judgment	are	not																																																									815	Schnall,	et	al.	“Disgust	and	Moral	Judgment”	pg.	1102	816	Schnall,	et	al.	“Disgust	and	Moral	Judgment”	pg.	1103	817	Schnall,	et	al.	“Disgust	and	Moral	Judgment”	pg.	1103	
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merely	a	manifestation	of	a	general	tendency	for	negative	affect	to	amplify	moral	judgments.		It	thus	appears	that	the	more	clearly	participants	are	experiencing	disgust,	the	more	directly	this	feeling	is	taken	as	input	to	moral	judgments.”818		What	I’d	like	to	highlight	is	that	“sadness”	is	an	emotion,	not	an	aesthetic	feeling,	whereas	disgust	is	deeply	aesthetic.	Schnall	further	makes	four	important	observations	regarding	the	experiments	on	the	effects	of	disgust	on	moral	judgments.	First,	…	the	effect	of	disgust	applies	regardless	of	whether	the	action	to	be	judged	is	itself	disgusting.		Second,	…	disgust	influenced	moral,	but	not	additional	non-moral	judgments.		Third,	…	the	results	appear	to	concern	feelings	of	disgust	rather	than	merely	the	primed	concept	of	disgust.		Fourth,	that	there	is	something	special	about	the	connection	between	disgust	and	morality	was	indicated	by	the	fact	that	induced	sadness	did	not	have	similar	effects.819		“Disgust	is	often	experienced	as	a	particularly	visceral	feeling,”	owing	perhaps	to	the	various	physical	responses	it	can	trigger.820		This	suggests	that	moral	judgments,	rather	than	being	rational	especially	in	the	extreme	sense	of	being	able	to	operate	independently	of,	or	even	in	opposition	to,	bodily	affective	states,	are	instead	very	much	embodied	valuations	or	reactions	against	the	visceral	feelings	of	disgust	in	particular.		In	other	words,	what	is	rational	in	a	moral	judgment	appears	to	be	
aesthetically	grounded,	meant	broadly	to	encompass	aesthetics	of	sense	(agreeable/disagreeable)	or	aesthetics	of	reflection	(beauty,	ugliness,	etc.).																																																											818	Schnall,	et	al.	“Disgust	and	Moral	Judgment”	pg.	1105	819	Schnall,	et	al.	“Disgust	and	Moral	Judgment”	pp.	1105-1006	820	Schnall,	et	al.	“Disgust	and	Moral	Judgment”	pg.	1106	
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	 We	see	the	same	in	Nietzsche’s	works	as	well,	and	it	is	precisely	this	relation	to	disgust	that	informs	reactive	nihilism.		Nietzsche	often	refers	to	Ekel	throughout	his	works,	and	significantly	in	Zarathustra.		Ekel	can	be	translated	into	English	as	
disgust	or	as	nausea.		Most	English	translations	of	Nietzsche’s	work	use	‘nausea’,	perhaps	because	it	highlights	existential	concerns.		But	disgust	is	equally	appropriate,	more	so	when	acknowledging	the	visceral	response	it	indicates.			In	the	final	section	of	Zarathustra,	Zarathustra	speaks	to	the	motley	crew	gathered	in	his	cave	of	the	‘higher	types’	for	whom	he	has	been	waiting	and	laboring.		“Not	for	you	do	I	wait	here	in	these	mountains,	not	with	you	shall	I	go	down	for	the	last	time,”	the	motley	crew	were	omens	of	the	Übermenschlich.		Such	‘higher	ones’	are	“not	the	people	of	great	longing,	of	great	nausea,	of	great	surfeit	and	what	which	you	called	the	remnant	of	God.”821		These	‘higher	types’	Zarathustra	refers	to	also	has	his	children	and	as	his	“beautiful	new	species,”822	indicating	the	
Übermensch.		This	should	also	be	understood	in	relation	to	Nietzsche’s	description	in	“On	the	Sublime	ones,”	where	sublimity	appears	to	indicate	a	longing	and	beauty	a	realization	of	what	is	longed	for,	and	a	kind	of	harmony	impossible	for	post-modernism.			One	of	the	motley	crew	in	the	final	part	of	Zarathustra,	the	magician,	identifies	himself	and	others	as	those	“who	suffer	from	the	great	nausea.”823		Each	of	the	motley	crew	enters	as	one	feeling	disgust	or	nausea.824		Such	nausea	is	also	affiliated	by	Nietzsche	with	the	spirit	of	gravity.		In	“The	Awakening,”	he	writes	of	his																																																									821	Nietzsche,	Zarathustra,	“The	Welcome,”	pg.	229	822	Nietzsche,	Zarathustra,	“The	Welcome,”	pg.	229	823	Nietzsche,	Zarathustra,	“The	Song	of	Melancholy,”	pg.	241	824	See	also	the	Kings,	Nietzsche,	Zarathustra,	“Conversation	with	Kings,”	pg.	197	
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motley	crew	convalescing	and,	in	convalescing,	“the	spirit	of	gravity”	is	“already	retreating.”		And	furthermore,	“Nausea	retreats	form	these	higher	men	…	they’re	becoming	grateful.		/	That	I	take	as	the	best	sign;	they’re	becoming	grateful.		…	They	are	convalescing!”		In	On	the	Spirit	of	Gravity,	Zarathustra	states,	“Only	the	human	being	is	a	heavy	burden	to	himself!”	and	“This	is	because	he	lugs	too	much	that	is	foreign	to	him,”	not	least	of	which	are	foreign	values,	which	makes	life	itself	seem	like	a	desert,825	and	thus	implicitly	would	lead	one	to	the	hinter	worldly	for	recompense.		But,	in	addition	to	this,	“much	that	is	one’s	own	is	also	a	heavy	burden!	And	much	of	what	people	are	on	the	inside	is	like	an	oyster,	namely	disgusting	and	slimy	and	hard	to	grasp.”826		What	is	“one’s	own”	are	the	instincts	and	drives	–	one’s	nature;	and	what	people	are	“on	the	inside”	are	the	instincts	and	drives	–	that	beyond	which	one	can’t	get	up	or	down	to	any	other	inference,	as	Nietzsche	describes	in	BGE	§36.		And	here,	Nietzsche	writes,	“A	noble	shell	with	a	noble	ornamentation	must	intercede	for	it.		But	one	must	also	learn	this	art:	to	have	a	shell	and	seemly	sigh	and	clever	blindness.	…	[but]	many	a	shell	is	meager	and	sad	and	too	much	shell.”		The	art	is	to	have	‘Choosy	tongues	and	stomachs,”	for	“chewing	and	digesting	everything	–	that	is	truly	the	swine’s	style.”827		Thus,	while	Nietzsche	advocates	making	the	disgusting	into	pearls	or	mother	of	pearl	shells,	we	must	have	a	‘shell’	–	we	must	have	a	discerning	taste	and	we	must	learn	the	art	of	cultivating	what	we	know	of	our	selves	into	pearls,	into	works	of	art,	but	must	do	so	with	refined	tastes	and	without	saying	yes	to	everything,	as	might	a	postmodernist.		But																																																									825	Nietzsche,	Zarathustra,	“On	the	Spirit	of	Gravity”	826	Nietzsche,	Zarathustra,	“On	the	Spirit	of	Gravity”	827	Nietzsche,	Zarathustra,	“On	the	Spirit	of	Gravity”	
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the	art	itself	is	not	something	that	can	be	taught,	as	Kant	also	writes	of	genius.		But	unlike	Kant,	It	concerns	each	person’s	own	unique	taste.		This	is	what	Zarathustra	answers	those	who	ask	‘The	way’.		“The	way	after	all	–	it	does	not	exist!”828	What	becomes	clear	from	this	exposition	is	the	guidance	one	receives	from	disgust,	and	even	more	importantly,	it	is	not	that	one	feels	disgust	that	is	important	but	the	means	by	which	one	responds	to	such	disgust.		Previously,	in	“On	Old	and	New	Tablets,”	Zarathustra	speaks,	“There	is	much	filth	in	the	world:	that	much	is	true!		But	the	world	itself	is	not	therefore	a	filthy	monster!	/	There	is	wisdom	in	the	fact	that	much	in	the	world	smells	foul:	nausea	itself	creates	wings	and	water-divining	powers!		Even	in	the	best	there	is	something	that	nauseates;	and	the	best	is	still	something	that	must	be	overcome!”829		In	On	the	Sublime	Ones,	Zarathustra	criticizes	one	who	is	sublime,	and	contrasted	with	himself,	“There	is	still	contempt	in	his	eyes,	and	[disgust]	lingers	on	his	lips.”830		This	sublime	one	is	referred	to	as	an	‘ascetic	of	the	spirit’	who	Zarathustra	regards	as	ugly.831		The	ugliness	prompts	Zarathustra	to	assert,	“His	happiness	should	smell	of	earth	and	not	of	contempt	for	the	earth.		I	want	to	see	him	as	a	white	bull,	snorting	and	bellowing	ahead	of	the	plow	–	and	his	bellowing	should	praise	everything	earthly.”832		In	other	words,	Zarathustra	is	again	criticizing	the	influence	of	the	hinter	worldly,	and	states	that	what	makes	this	being	ugly	is	the	inability	to	reconcile	himself	with	the	earth,	with	nature,	and	all	that	is	of	this	world,	such	as	the	body	and	the	senses.		The	sublime	one	is	a	‘hero’,	but																																																									828	Nietzsche,	Zarathustra,	“On	the	Spirit	of	Gravity”	829	Nietzsche,	Zarathustra,	“On	Old	and	New	Tablets,”	pg.	164	830	Nietzsche,	Zarathustra,	“On	the	Sublime	Ones”	831	ugly	is,	for	reflection,	what	is	disagreeable	or	disgusting	for	sense	832	Nietzsche,	Zarathustra,	“On	the	Sublime	Ones”	
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“Precisely	for	the	hero	beauty	is	the	most	difficult	of	things.		Beauty	is	not	to	be	wrested	by	any	violent	willing.		…	To	stand	with	muscles	relaxed	and	with	an	unharnessed	will:	this	is	the	most	difficult	for	all	of	you	sublime	ones!		When	power	becomes	gracious	and	descends	into	view:	beauty	I	call	such	descending.”833		The	point	is	that	there	is	no	order	or	harmony	for	sublime	ones,	for	the	heroic	will,	driven	only	by	passion.		But	importantly,	Nietzsche	also	asserts	that,	were	‘form’	and	‘style’	to	be	achieved,	it	would	need	to	be	achieved	without	force.		In	other	words,	and	regarding	Nietzsche’s	foray	into	drive	psychology,	it	would	require	a	harmonious	arrangement	of	the	drives,	but	no	forceful	efforts	–	no	repression	–	in	order	to	acquire	such	harmony.		This	Zarathustra	would	find	beautiful.			This	is	also	coherent	with	what	Nietzsche	writes	in	Daybreak,834	where	he	writes	that	one	should	be	as	a	gardener	with	one’s	drives.		One	can	garden	by	imposing	a	strict	order	(in	the	English	or	Chinese	style),	one	could	let	the	‘plants’	grow	wild	as	direct	expressions	of	nature,	or	one	could	give	embellishments	here	or	there,	implicitly	allowing	their	expression	but	also	giving	style	to	it,	not	repressing	it	in	the	English	or	Chinese	fashion.		Nietzsche	seems	to	opt	for	the	third	possibility	–	order,	form	and	style	that	isn’t	forced.		To	let	the	plants	grow	wild	would	be	noble,	to	impose	and	force	order	–		slavish,	involving	a	reaction-formation;	but	to	give	style	–	detours	–	to	their	growth	without	forcing	the	order	would	be	like	sublimating	one’s	drives,	precluding	repressions	and	disavowals.	In	addition,	the	above	speech	of	Zarathustra’s	also	indicates	what	Gemes	argues	in	his	essay	on	Nietzsche	and	post-modernism:	namely,	that	the																																																									833	Nietzsche,	Zarathustra,	“On	the	Sublime	Ones”	834	See,	for	example,	Daybreak	§560	
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postmodernist	celebrates	sublimity	and	exemplifies	an	ugliness	that	results	from	an	unordered	chaos.		Beauty	requires	the	giving	of	style	and	order.		Disgust	figures	in	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	as	a	necessary	component	in	overcoming	and	also	of	giving	style	and	order.		The	rabble	are	unable	to	recognize	it.		In	a	sense,	they	repudiate	it,	react	against	it,	disavowing	or	repressing	it.		But	Nietzsche	makes	the	point	that	it	is	something	that	must	be	encountered,	that	must	be	experienced	as	that	which	can	give	one	the	comportment	to	overcome	it	by	first	acknowledging	it.		And	it	is	only	thus	that	one	can	beautify	existence.		Otherwise,	beauty	remains	only	something	hinter	worldly,	and	it	is	precisely	the	hinter	worldly	that	must	be	rejected.	Importantly,	for	Nietzsche	there	is	a	bifurcation	according	to	how	one	responds	to	disgust.		A	noble	spirit	might,	aggressively,	simply	try	to	annihilate	what’s	disgusting	in	order	to	make	its	world	beautiful.		A	weak	or	fettered	spirit	will	repudiate,	through	disavowals	or	repressions,	what	is	regarded	as	disgusting	and	thereby	‘beautify’	the	world	by	refusing	what	is	disagreeable	a	place	in	it,	at	times	passive-aggressively	and	cruelly	using	others	as	scapegoats	for	the	disagreeableness	that	such	spirits	are	unable	to	avoid	facing.			Only	the	Übermensch	is	capable	of	facing	and	beautifying	what	is	disgusting,	the	free	spirits	to	a	lesser	extent	whilst	providing	the	possibility	for	the	Übermensch.		And	again,	the	means	of	such	beautifying	must	be,	for	an	egosyntonically	oriented	spirit,	sublimation.					
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Sublimation	and	Morality	
Walter	Kaufmann	explicitly	associates	sublimation	with	morality	where	‘self-overcoming’	in	general	is	regarded	as	sublimation,	and	‘morality’	as	the	ethos	of	that	overcoming.		This,	however,	should	by	now	clearly	be	regarded	as	a	mistake,	whereas	morality	is	peculiar	to	reaction-formation	or	other	egodystonic	vicissitudes.		Sublimation	is	actually,	as	I	hope	to	make	clear,	antagonistic	to	specificially	moral	valuations.		Kaufman	states	that	Nietzsche	identifies	the	common	thread	of	morality	as	will	to	power.		He	correctly	observes	that	Nietzsche	advances	a	kind	of	moral	relativism,	whereby	every	moral	code	will	differ	in	proportion	to	the	difference	in	perspective	and	interpretation	of	a	society.		Thus,	against	utilitarians	and,	loosely,	deontologists,	one	“cannot	a	priori	assert	the	superiority	of	the	values	of	[one’s]	own	society;	nor	can	[one]	judge,	or	even	compare,	the	values	of	different	societies	unless	they	have	something	in	common,”835	but	in	that	case	all	that	can	be	compared	would	be	that	in	reference	to	which	there	is	common	ground.		However,	Nietzsche	also	is	not	absolutely	relative.		Kaufmann	observes,	“Against	the	relativists”	Nietzsche	claims	“there	is	a	common	element	that	makes	possible	comparative	judgments	of	value,”	and	that	is	the	will	to	power.		For	Nietzsche,	then,	what	determines	the	valuations	is	the	will	to	power,	and	this	everyone	has	in	common;	here	there	is	not	relativity	but	a	universal	substratum	of	sorts.		But	the	valuations	that	are	the	symptoms	of	the	various	expressions	and	manifestations	of	will	to	power	are	quite	contingent	on	various	aspects	in	the	environment.			
																																																								835	Kaufmann,	Nietzsche,	pg.	200	
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What	should	be	emphasized	here,	as	elsewhere,	is	the	establishment	of	harmony,	i.e.,	the	acquisition	of	the	feeling	of	homeostasis.	Contrary	to	Kaufmann,	even	slave	morality	results	in	a	kind	of	‘harmony’,836	since	the	purpose	of	every	vicissitude	upon	which	morality	is	grounded	is	the	procurement	of	harmony	and	a	resolution	of	conflict	–	of	homeostasis.		But	a	slave	morality,	or	even	a	‘higher’	morality,	are	harmonies	that	result	from	the	exclusion	of	various	elements.		For	the	slave,	it	involves	either	the	repression	of	drives	or	the	disavowal	of	external	elements;	for	the	noble,	it	often	results	in	a	lack	of	freedom	with	respect	to	the	expression	of	his	or	her	drives,	as	they	need	to	be	expressed	directly.		In	instances	of	frustration,	this	can	mean	a	violent	annihilation	of	conflicting	external	elements	rather	than	an	incorporation	of	them.837		A	harmony	of	sorts	is	procured	in	both	instances,	but	it	is	contingent	on	secondary	satisfactions	provided	through	egodystonic	orientations	with	the	world.		The	slave,	for	example,	harmonizes	its	existence	with	the	world	by	repudiating	troubling	aspects.		This	might	be	accomplished	by	repressing	troubling	drives	and	erecting	schizoid	fantasies	as	substitute	satisfactions	due	to	the	lack	of	satisfaction	with	reality.		This	is	what	Freud	termed	a	compromise	formation.		The	basis	of	this	secondary	satisfaction	is	that	it	counteracts	the	dissonance	and	conflict	with	the	primary	satisfaction	(which,	for	Nietzsche,	is	the	slave’s	own	impotence).		The	noble,	on	the	other	hand,	might	harmonize	its	existence	by	annihilating	the	conflicting	elements,	analogously	to	disavowal	but	through	physical	rather	than	psychical	action.		In	Civilization	and	its																																																									836	see	above,		Kaufmann,	Nietzsche,	pg.	227,	Kaufmann	asserts	that	harmony	is	only	possible	through	sublimation.	837	I	refer	the	reader	to	the	above	discussions	concerning	the	‘vicissitudes’.	
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Discontents,	Freud	spoke	of	a	hermitic	existence	as	one	akin	to	disavowal.		It	is	a	means	of	feeling	harmonious	with	the	world	by	removing	oneself	from	aspects	of	it.		Egodystonic	constitutions	achieve	a	kind	harmony	psychically,	but	generally	at	the	expense	of	real	relations	(with	one’s	drives	or	external	reality)	and	usually	result	in	the	formations	of	compensatory	neurotic	or	psychotic	symptoms.			 ‘Harmony’	is	an	essentially	aesthetic	concept	(indicated	‘homeostasis’	for	sentient	beings).		All	the	preceding	discussions	should	be	sufficient	in	demonstrating	that	this	conceptualization	is	appropriate	because	the	task	at	hand	is,	basically,	an	aesthetic	task.		Every	ethical	valuation,	as	well	as	every	aesthetic	valuation,	refers	in	every	case	to	a	ground	of	feeling	or	sensibility,	and	the	only	way	of	altering	a	feeling	or	sense	with	regard	to	content	is	again	aesthetic:	it	involves	the	reorganization	of	content	and	a	perspectival	alteration	that	can	establish	a	new	harmony.		Self-overcoming	is	a	transfiguration	and	transformation	in	which	harmonies	are	created	that	are	either	only	psychical	harmonies	(at	the	expense	of	drives	or	external	nature)	or	both	psychically	and	externally	incorporative	(although	all	external	reality	is	also	only	an	interpretation,	it	coheres	with	empirical	verifications	and	a	background	of	consistent	interpretations).			Kaufmann	claims	the	“differences	between	particular	moralities	may	be	due	to	divergent	conceptions	not	only	of	the	aim	and	sanction,	but	also	of	the	manner	of	self-overcoming.”838		I	think	he	couldn’t	be	more	correct,	taken	both	as	a	general	interpretation	of	morality	as	well	as	an	accurate	reading	of	Nietzsche’s	ideas.		‘Self-overcoming’,	and	the	valuations	that	stem	from	it,	emerge	from	one’s	psychical																																																									838	Kaufmann,	Nietzsche,	pg.	214	
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constitution	regarding	the	ways	drives	are	or	are	not	allowed	expression.		He	further	observes,	“The	classical	ideal	was	that	reason	should	control	the	inclinations,	while	Kant	insisted	…	that	inclination	must	be	overcome	to	such	an	extent	that	it	may	not	even	be	a	co-motive	of	action.”839		This	is	certainly	the	case	with	what	has	been	argued	up	to	now.		Arguably,	the	Kantian	position	was	inherited	from	the	Stoic	position	as	well,	as	Kant	himself	appears	to	indicate;840		Kant	inherited	a	stoicism	that	spawned	from	the	encountered	of	Alexander’s	conquests	with	Buddhism,	and	later	was	the	germ	influencing	the	Christian	renunciation	of	instincts,	a	renunciation	that	itself	was	purified	increasingly	through	the	centuries																																																									839	Kaufmann,	Nietzsche,	pg.	214	840	This	is	also	a	point	on	which	Kant	elaborated	in	describing	the	difference	between	Epicureans	and	Stoics.	Kant	characterizes	the	Epicureans	and	Stoics	thus,	“The	Epicurean	said,	to	be	conscious	of	one’s	maxim	leading	to	happiness	–	that	is	virtue;	the	Stoic,	to	be	conscious	of	one’s	virtue	is	happiness.		To	the	former,	
prudence	was	tantamount	to	morality;	to	the	latter,	who	selected	a	higher	designation	for	virtue,	morality	alone	was	true	wisdom”	(Practical	Reason,	pg.	142	[111]).	Furthermore,	he	writes,	the	Epicurean	“posited	the	principle	thereof	on	the	aesthetic	side”	and	the	Stoic	“on	the	logical	side.”		Further	clarifying	the	relation:	The	[Epicurean]	in	the	consciousness	of	sensible	need,	the	[Stoic]	in	the	independence	of	practical	reason	from	all	sensible	determining	bases.	…	According	to	the	Epicurean,	the	concept	of	virtue	already	resided	in	the	maxim	…	to	further	one’s	own	happiness;	according	to	the	Stoic,	…	the	feeling	of	happiness	was	already	contained	in	the	consciousness	of	one’s	virtue	(Practical	Reason,	pg.	142	[112]).	Kant,	it	is	easy	to	see,	aligns	himself	more	with	the	philosophy	of	the	Stoic.		And	one	could	argue	that	the	Epicruean	can	be	used	to	denote	the	empirical	or	utilitarian	position,	which	hold	‘happiness’	as	the	greatest	good	so	that	actions	are	done	to	procure	happiness	as	the	consequence.		Mill	himself	seems	to	align	Utilitarianism	with	the	Epicurean	school	of	thought.		Addressing	criticisms	concerning	the	relationship	between	utility	and	pleasure,	Mill	writes:	Those	who	know	anything	about	the	matter	are	aware	that	every	writer,	from	Epicurus	to	Bentham,	who	maintained	a	theory	of	utility	meant	by	it,	not	something	to	be	contradistinguished	form	pleasure,	but	pleasure	itself,	together	with	the	exemption	form	pain;	and	instead	of	opposing	the	useful	to	the	agreeable	or	the	ornamental,	have	always	declared	that	the	useful	means	these,	among	other	things	(Utilitarianism,	pg.	6).	
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and	became	particularly	responsible,	although	not	solely,841	for	the	weakness	and	psychical	impairment	that	Nietzsche	came	to	identify	with	Europe.				
Amor	Fati	–	an	Imperative	to	Dance	
Nietzsche	advocates	willing	one’s	fate	rather	than	repudiating,	avoiding,	or	even	merely	tolerating	it.		This	is	expressed	by	amor	fati.		It	is	a	synthesis	of	the	strengths	of	stoic	and	Epicurean	orientations	in	life.		It	embraces	a	stoical	fatalism	and	simultaneously	an	epicurean	sensitivity,	gratitude,	and	attunement	with	oneself.		It	further	removes	those	detrimental	aspects:	the	ascetic	repudiation	of	the	instincts	and	passions	and	the	desensitization	of	Stoics,	and	the	hermitic	weakness	of	Epicureanism	–	repressions	on	the	one	hand	and	disavowals	on	the	other.		Nietzsche’s	synthesis	ultimately	promotes	incorporation.			In	The	Gay	Science,	Nietzsche	writes,	“I	want	to	learn	more	and	more	how	to	see	what	is	necessary	in	things	as	what	is	beautiful	in	them	–	thus	I	will	be	one	of	those	who	makes	things	beautiful.		Amor	fati:	let	that	be	my	love	from	now	on!”842		And	again	in	Ecce	Homo	he	writes,	“My	formula	for	human	greatness	is	amor	fati:	that	you	do	not	want	anything	to	be	different,	not	forwards,	not	backwards,	not	for	all	eternity.		Not	just	to	tolerate	necessity	…	but	to	love	it.”843	Amor	fati	is,	while	sparsely	referred	to	explicitly,	an	imperative	characteristic	of	strong	spirits.		In	Thus																																																									841	Nietzsche	also	identifies	elements	of	Epicureanism	and	Skepticism,	and	significantly	Platonism,	with	the	weakness	and	psychical	impairments.		But	Plato	and	Aristotle	had	been	largely	forgotten	until	the	Renaissance.		Elements	of	Stoicism	and	Epicureanism,	however,	were	preserved	and	enhanced	within	the	Judeo-Christian	Faiths.			842	Nietzsche,	The	Gay	Science,	§276,		843	Nietzsche,	Ecce	Homo,	Why	I	am	so	Clever,	§10	
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Spoke	Zarathustra,	Zarathustra	asks	us	to	think	of	the	possibility	that	all	that	will	happen	has	already	happened,	the	same	events	occur	time	and	again.844		This	is	presented	as	both	inevitable	and	unavoidable,	and	Nietzsche	sees	that	only	a	strong	character	can	will	this	to	be	the	case.		In	order	to	will	eternal	recurrence,	amor	fati	is	necessary.		Nehamas	writes,	“The	self-creation	that	Nietzsche	has	in	mind	involves	accepting	everything	that	we	have	done	and,	in	the	ideal	case,	blending	it	into	a	perfectly	coherent	whole.”845		Significantly,	Nietzsche	discusses	amor	fati	as	a	process	of	beautification.	According	to	my	interpretation,	this	emphasizes	the	importance	of	incorporation.		And	incorporation	precludes	egodystonic	vicissitudes.		The	vicissitudes	of	repression,	disavowal,	and	aggression,	e.g.,	all	exemplify	failures	of	incorporation.		Furthermore,	only	egodystonic	vicissitudes	exemplify	rigidity	and	stubbornness.		As	Nehamas	observes,	“The	creation	of	the	self	is	not	a	static	episode,	a	final	goal	which,	once	attained,	forecloses	the	possibility	of	continuing	to	change	and	to	develop.”846		As	mentioned	above,	this	is	one	aspect	of	the	traditional	view	of	happiness	that	Nietzsche	rejects.		This	is	observed	in	the	neurotic	compulsion	to	make	permanent,	to	postulate	fixed,	eternal	‘truths’,	and	so	on.		Egodystonic	vicissitudes,	particularly	of	the	neurotic	sort,	are	configured	in	opposition	to	becoming.		They	want	constancy	and	operate	against	the	flux	of	life,	seeking	the	unchangeable.		They	are	essentially	a	hindrance	to	incorporation.	Nehamas	observes,	“Zarathustra’s	mistrust	of	unity	–	his	desire	to	avoid	goals	of	stability	–	is																																																									844	See	also	Nietzsche,	The	Gay	Science,	§341	for	his	first	mention	of	eternal	recurrence	845	Nehamas,	Nietzsche,	pp.	187-188	846	Nehamas,	Nietzsche,	pg.	189	
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his	aversion	to	the	permanence	of	specific	character	traits,	parallel	to	Nietzsche’s	praise	of	‘brief	habits’	in	section	295	of	The	Gay	Science.”847		In	the	Gay	Science,	Nietzsche	also	writes	that	one	should	not	be	as	snakes	who	lie	too	long	in	the	same	sun.		Likewise,	Zarathustra	is	much	like	a	nomad.		He	begins	in	solitude,	but	cannot	remain	too	long	in	that	solitude,	that	‘sun’	as	it	were,	and	requires	social	interaction,	a	‘different	sun’,	so	to	speak.		He	descends	the	mountain.		But	Zarathustra	never	reaches	a	point	of	stably	existing	here	nor	there,	for	as	soon	as	he	feels	content	among	his	friends	or	disciples,	he	feels	an	imperative	to	climb	a	mountain	and	breathe	the	clear	air	of	solitude	once	more.		Every	book	of	Zarathustra	is	enveloped	by	the	perpetual	ascending	and	descending	of	Zarathustra,	from	solitude	to	community,	from	community	to	solitude.		And	one	can	infer	that,	for	Zarathustra,	this	would	go	on	ad	infinitum,	never	relinquishing	his	opposition	to	a	static,	flat-line	of	existence,	such	as	he	encounters	on	the	Epicurean	blessed	isles.		It	is	inherently	antagonistic	to	incorporation	in	virtue	of	the	rigidity;	it	repudiates	change	and	thus,	in	a	sense,	disavows	‘reality’.			Only	egosyntonic	vicissitudes	allow	for	the	openness	needed	for	the	incorporation	implied	by	the	great	health.		Indeed,	this	was	noticed	above	in	the	distinction	between	reaction-formation	and	sublimation,	the	former	being	rigid	and	inflexible,	the	latter	more	adaptive	and	flexible.				 A	central	determining	factor	of	valuations,	whether	aesthetic	or	ethical,	is	relational.		Everything	that	is	judged	is	so	judged	on	account	of	the	way	by	which	one	relates	to	the	thing	judged,	for	the	relation	determines	the	perspective	and	the	interpretation,	and	therefore	the	way	one	might	choose	to	relate	further,	contingent																																																									847	Nehamas,	Nietzsche,	pg.	190	
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on	such	perspectives.		Thus	Nietzsche	writes,	“There	is	no	‘essence-in-itself’;	(the	
relations	…	constitute	the	essence)…”848	The	relations	constitute	the	essence.		And	what	determines	one’s	relation	–	in	other	words,	one’s	orientation	–	is	one’s	psychical	constitution	or	configuration	of	drives.		One	relates	to	a	thing	in	a	particular	way	owing	to	a	particular	constitution	that	opens	up	particular	perspectives	and	interpretations	of	that	thing,	or	possibilities	of	such.		If	one’s	psychical	constitution	is	egodystonic,	then	one	will	be	oriented	towards	things	in	the	world	in	such	a	fashion	that	is	egodystonic;	that	is,	one	will	disavow	things	or	value	and	relate	to	things	with	a	filter	of	repression,	both	of	which	hinder	incorporation.			The	great	health	that	Nietzsche	imagines,	however,	entails	a	harmony	that	is	constructed	out	of	conflicting	drives.		It	can	involve	neither	repression	nor	disavowal	(nor	aggression),	but	only	sublimation	(wherever	direct	expressions	aren’t	appropriate).			In	Ecce	Homo,	Nietzsche	writes,	“The	word	‘Übermensch’,	is	a	designation	for	a	type	that	has	the	highest	constitutional	excellence,	in	contrast	to	‘modern’	people,	to	‘good’	people,	to	Christians	and	other	nihilists	–	a	word	that	really	makes	you	think	when	it	comes	from	the	mouth	of	Zarathustra,	a	destroyer	of	morals.”849	Thus,	beauty	from	the	perspective	of	the	Übermensch	is	of	the	highest	
constitutional	excellence;	and,	correspondingly,	the	perspective	of	the	Übermensch	is	beyond	the	moralizing	of	good	and	evil.		The	values	of	good	and	evil	are	generated	by	weakly	constituted	spirits;	that	is,	they	result	from	egodystonic	orientations	with	the	world.		“The	strength	of	a	spirit	would	be	proportionate	to	how	much	of	the																																																									848	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§625	849	Nietzsche,	Ecce	Homo,	“Good	Books,”	§1	
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truth	he	could	withstand.”850		What	Nietzsche	means	here	is	not	the	‘truth’	that	is	made	beautiful	by	interpretation	(what	we	take	to	be	the	truth),	but	the	Nihilistic	
Truth	that	is	ugly	and	uncomfortable.851		A	strong	spirit	is	able	to	incorporate	more	ugliness	and	more	suffering	than	a	weaker	spirit,	and	incorporates	it	by	beautifying	it.		The	Übermensch,	supposedly,	is	such	a	spirit	capable	of	that	incorporation.	Decadent	and	degenerate	spirits	are	often	described	as	those	spirits	least	capable	of	incorporating	and	putting	to	use	various	aspect	of	their	world,	be	it	environmental	or	‘internal’,	i.e.,	concerning	one’s	own	nature,	one’s	own	instincts	and	drives.		Both	weak	and	strong	spirits	appear	to	be	oriented	towards	establishing	a	kind	of	psychical	harmony	or	unity,	but	the	means	they	have	of	doing	so	are	very	different.		The	weak	or	the	ascetic	spirits	generally	obtain	this	mastery	by	repressing	antagonistic	drives	or	by	disavowing	antagonistic	aspects	of	external	‘reality’.		Nehamas	recognizes,	“Unity	can	always	be	achieved	by	refusing	to	acknowledge	an	existing	multiplicity.”		And	goes	on	to	point	out,	“it	would	be	more	accurate	to	say,	however,	that	only	the	feeling	of	unity,	and	not	unity	itself,	can	be	secured	in	this	way.”852		What	Nehamas	points	out	is	the	possibility	of	establishing	a	
feeling	of	unity,	an	interpretation	of	unity,	that	is	procured	by	vicissitudes	of	repression	or	disavowal.		While	Nehamas	focuses	on	the	aspect	of	disavowal,	it	is	equally	plausible	that	a	semblance	–	or	illusion	–	of	the	feeling	of	unity	can	be	acquired	by	repression	as	well,	the	repudiation	of	the	disrupting	influences	of	the	drives.		Stronger	and	healthier	spirits,	by	contrast,	are	able	to	discern	and	practice																																																									850	Nietzsche,	Beyond	Good	and	Evil,	§39	851	…	that	there	is	no	‘Truth’,	no	meaning	or	purpose	in	things,	etc.	852	Nehamas,	Nietzsche,	pg.	186	
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means	of	incorporating	these	diverse	and	often	antagonistic	elements	into	a	harmonious	configuration.		Nietzsche	observes	this,	Nehamas	points	out,	by	referring	to	two	types	of	spirits	who	have	faith	in	themselves;	those	who	“have	faith	because	they	refuse	to	look	at	all,”	and	those	who	“must	acquire	it	slowly	and	are	faced	with	it	as	a	problem	themselves.”853	And	importantly,	For	Nietzsche,	psychical	harmony,	or	unity,	does	
not	imply	a	fait	accompli.		Nehamas	observes:	Nietzsche	does	not	think	of	unity	as	a	state	of	being	that	follows	and	replaces	an	earlier	process	of	becoming.		Rather,	he	seems	to	think	of	it	as	a	continual	process	of	integrating	one’s	character	traits,	habits,	and	patterns	of	action	with	one	another.		This	process	can	also,	in	a	sense,	reach	backward	and	integrate	even	a	discarded	characteristic	into	the	personality	by	showing	that	it	was	necessary	for	one’s	subsequent	development.854		This,	according	to	my	reading,	is	what	is	behind	the	imperative	of	amor	fati,	it	embraces	the	moment,	incorporates	even	those	aspects	of	one’s	existence	that	are	unpleasurable,	and	redeems,	as	it	were,	even	those	aspects	of	the	past	that	one	has	overcome	by	viewing	them	as	necessities	to	be	where	one	is	now.			Amor	fati	is	a	formula	for	greatness	because	it	is	a	formula	for	gratitude,	for	love,	for	possibilities	of	enjoyment	–	above	all,	for	incorporation.	I’d	now	like	to	turn	to	what	is	Nietzsche’s	metaphor	for	this	incorporation:	
dancing.		In	Nietzsche’s	book	Thus	Spoke	Zarathustra,	Zarathustra	Encounters	a	Saint,	and	the	saint	recognizes	Zarathustra	because	“No	disgust	is	visible	around	his	
																																																								853	Nehamas,	Nietzsche,	pg.	186	854	Nehamas,	Nietzsche,	pg.	185	
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mouth.		Does	he	not	stride	like	a	dancer?”855		Why	is	no	disgust	visible	on	his	mouth?		What	does	the	absence	of	an	appearance	of	disgust	have	to	do	with	being	a	dancer?		Recalling	the	discussion	above	about	how	we	relate	aesthetically	with	the	world,	and	the	influence	that	the	visceral	feeling	of	disgust	has	on	ethical	orientations	specifically,	Nietzsche’s	association	of	‘dancing	well’	with	‘no	disgust	being	visible’	is	significant.		Below,	I	seek	to	illustrate	that	‘dance’	is	Nietzsche’s	chosen	metaphor	for	egosyntonic	relating.		In	other	words,	it	is	through	dancing	(figuratively)	that	we	incorporate	external	reality	and	our	visceral,	internal	life	of	drives	into	a	unified	work	of	art,	and	this	metaphor	expresses	the	positive	ethics	one	can	observe	in	Nietzsche’s	philosophy.	The	metaphor	of	Dance	coheres	with	the	symbol	of	the	child	at	play	that	is	so	essential	to	Nietzsche’s	concept	of	the	innocence	of	becoming,	a	symbol	he	acquires	form	Heraclitus.		But	I	think	an	often	over-looked	significance	of	this	metaphor	is	that	it	illustrates	beautifully	the	connection,	even	the	identity,	of	aesthetics	and	ethics.		Dance,	for	Nietzsche,	is	always	discussed	in	terms	of	self-overcoming,	relating,	and	all	things	of	ethical	consideration.		But	dance	is,	first	and	foremost,	an	art.		I	suggest	that	dancing	is	actually	Nietzsche’s	metaphor	for	his	ethical	imperative,	an	imperative	that	he	cannot	otherwise	put	into	words	but	which	coheres	with	the	formulas	he	does	articulate,	such	as	amor	fati	and	naturalism.856	In	Human,	Nietzsche	asserts	that	if	the	scientific	“pressure	is	not	relaxed,”	then	“there	arises	the	other	danger	of	a	feeble	vacillation	back	and	forth	between	
																																																								855	Nietzsche,	Zarathustra,	preface	§2	856	See	above	on	Amor	Fati	
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different	drives,”857	implicitly	between	those	of	science	and	those	of	art.		But	to	return	to	a	world	without	science	–	to	refuse	the	disillusionment	that	opens	up	the	horizon	to	healthier	ways	of	being/becoming	–	is	unthinkable	for	Nietzsche.		In	order	to	prevent	oneself	(or	one’s	culture)	from	taking	a	step	back	each	time	one	takes	a	step	forward,	Nietzsche	asserts	that	the	different,	often	conflicting	drives,	need	to	incorporate	each	other	into	a	harmonious	whole,	which	he	refers	to	as	the	
parable	of	the	dance.		He	writes,	“The	dance	is	not	the	same	as	a	languid	reeling	back	and	forth	between	different	drives.		High	culture	will	resemble	an	audacious	dance:	which	is	…	why	one	needs	a	great	deal	of	strength	and	suppleness.”858	Claudia	Crawford	talks	about	dance	in	Nietzsche’s	works	referencing	Hinduism.		While	I	find	the	comparison	problematic	in	some	ways,	in	other	ways	I’m	partial	to	this	view.	Nietzsche	often	affiliates	Schopenhauer	with	‘Buddhism’.		Buddhism	was	largely	a	reaction	against	the	sensuality	in	Hinduism,	and	so	affiliating	one’s	self	with	Hinduism	is	a	rejection	of	the	“nihilistic”	path	–	the	vicissitudes	–	that	Schopenhauer	took.		Nietzsche	writes,	“The	spiritualization	of	sensuality	is	called	love:	it	represents	a	great	triumph	over	Christianity.”859		This	is	good	for	Nietzsche	precisely	because	of	the	return	to	sensuality,	to	embodiment,	and	the	rejection	of	the	‘beyond’	whether	metaphysical,	religious,	or	otherwise	supersensuous.		And	this	recentering	on	oneself	opens	up	a	horizon	of	natural	possibilities	of	giving	style.			
																																																								857	Nietzsche,	Human,	All	too	Human,	1.278	858	Nietzsche,	Human,	All	too	Human,	1.278	859	Nietzsche,	Twilight	of	the	Idols,	“morality,”	§3	
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In	addition	to	this,	the	imagery	Nietzsche	uses	often	obtains	with	Hindu	myths.		Crawford	appropriately	acknowledges	the	Hindu	god	Shiva	explicitly.860		Crawford	writes,	“The	similarities	between	the	mystical	dances	of	[Shiva]	and	Zarathustra	are	so	striking	that	it	is	not	at	all	unreasonable	to	suggest	that	Nietzsche	consciously	made	use	of	Indian	sources.”861	Crawford	also	observes	a	spiritual	experience	in	dancing862	where	“all	things	are	dancing	together	in	harmony	with	the	will	to	power.”863		This,	she	appears	to	claim,	is	the	epitome	of	dance	as	it	figures	in	Nietzsche’s	‘Dionysian	arts’,	particularly	in	Zarathustra.		This	experience,	“for	Nietzsche,	is	of	the	body,	an	awakened	relationship	of	the	senses	to	all	the	complexity	of	forces	and	movements	with	which	we	move	in	harmony.”864		Harmony,	I	agree,	appears	to	be	the	central	significance	to	dance:	a	harmony	of	everything	sensual	and	embodied	with	all	the	forces	of	nature	and	all	the	various	becomings	of	will	to	power.			Importantly,	it	also	indicates	celebration,	lust,	and	implies	a	strength,	suppleness,	and	vitality	of	strong	spirits	essential	for	overcomings.	What	I’d	like	to	suggest	is	that	dance,	more	than	anything	else	in	Nietzsche’s	writings,	is	indicative	of	his	ethical	propositions.		It	exemplifies	an	attunement	to																																																									860	For	example,	in	Zarathustra	“On	the	Vision	and	the	Riddle,”	Zarathustra	is	climbing	a	mountain	but	weighted	down	by	a	‘dwarf’	described	as	the	‘spirit	of	gravity’.		Zarathustra	is	also	the	union	of	two	forces:	creation	and	destruction.		Similarly,	in	Hindu	myth,	the	God	Shiva	represents	both	creation	and	destruction,	and	dances	the	tandava,	the	dance	that	destroys	the	world	and	brings	forth	a	new	beginning	–	a	very	‘Dionysian’	dance	–	and	does	the	dance	on	top	of	a	dwarf,	the	dwarf	signifying	ignorance.			861	Crawford,	“Nietzsche’s	Dionysian	Arts,”	pg.	318	862	she	uses	the	word	‘mystical’,	the	use	of	which	I	find	problematic	863	Crawford,	“Nietzsche’s	Dionysian	Arts,”	pg.	318	864	Crawford,	“Nietzsche’s	Dionysian	Arts,”	pg.	318	
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one’s	body,	to	the	senses,	and	to	the	environment.		It	also	indicates	a	substantial	openness	and	receptiveness	to	the	universe,	including	one’s	own	nature.		And,	I’d	like	to	argue,	it	expresses	metaphorically	what	I	have	been	arguing	throughout	my	paper:		a	constitution	and	an	orientation	with	oneself	and	the	world	that	is	egosyntonic.		Those	who	dance	well,	one	might	say,	are	egosyntonically	constituted;	those	who	dance	poorly	–	in	opposition	to	their	body	or	to	the	‘music	of	the	spheres’	–	are	egodystonically	constituted.		Dancing	requires	the	incorporation	of	diverse	internal	and	external	elements,	and	one	who	is	egosyntonic	facilitates	such	incorporation.		One	who	is	egodystonically	constituted,	on	the	other	hand,	hinders	or	directly	opposes	such	incorporation.			The	weakness	of	Crawford’s	account	is	her	sole	focus	on	the	Dionysian	as	if	a	free	expression	of	the	Dionysian	was	enough.		But	rather,	a	key	aspect	of	dancing	is	the	giving	of	form	and	the	giving	of	style.		It	is	not	‘free	expression’.		In	her	book	on	neuropsychology,	Lois	Oppenheim	notices	that	Martha	Graham,	whom	she	adorns	with	praise	for	being	one	of	the	geniuses	of	the	last	century,	once	said,	“You	should	
be	the	beat,	not	follow	the	beat.”865		To	be	the	beat,	to	live	the	music,	would	mean	to	allow	the	expression	of	the	Dionysian.		In	this	sense,	dance	involves	investing	one’s	nature	in	each	action	in	such	a	way	that	what	is	being	done	is	self-referential.		But	it	also	requires	style	and	form.		Dance	requires	the	imposition	of	form	on	what	is	formless.		Following	from	what	was	previously	articulated	in	the	chapter	on	beauty,	it	is	the	rendering	of	what	is	sublime	–	the	Dionysian	Rausch	–	beautiful.			Dance	is	
																																																								865	Martha	Graham,	quoted	by	Oppenheim,	Curious	Intimacy,	pg.	124	
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infused	with	self-interest	and	is	a	very	poor	art	if	one	moves	in	opposition	to	either	the	music	or	to	one’s	own	body.	If	we	regard	our	nature	–	our	instincts	and	drives	and	the	experiences	of	external	reality	in	relation	to	them	–	as	a	musical	score,	then	the	weak	and	fettered	spirits	move	juxtaposed	to	the	score,	in	a	way	that	might	appear	clumsy	and	awkward,	and	which	healthier	witnesses	would	regard	as	ugly	and	repugnant	whilst	a	fettered	spirit	would	experience	it	as	beautiful.		The	ascetic	dance	is	a	reaction	against	nature	that	is	decadent	and	indicative	of	a	degenerate	spirit.		But	were	the	dancer	strong	and	healthy,	and	the	witness	degenerate,	the	witness	may	yet	still	regard	the	dance	as	ugly	–	perhaps	horrific	–	for	it	would	appear	to	affirm	everything	the	degenerate	spirit	denies	about	the	world.		If	we	regard	music	not	as	our	nature	but	as	custom	or	as	the	socio-cultural	valuations	to	which	we	must	as	social	beings	respond	for	better	or	worse,	a	free	spirit	and	a	noble	spirit	might	also	dance	in	such	a	way	that	they	would	also	appear	to	the	theoretically	objective	witness	as	ugly	–	dancing	juxtaposed	to	a	score	emanating	from	society.		But	this	dance	is	peculiarly	Dionysian,	in	that	it	allows	the	expression	of	one’s	nature.		This	is	perhaps	exponentially	the	case	were	the	Übermensch	to	dance	the	Tandava	or	even	the	Lasya.866		Regardless	of	the	vicissitudes,	dance	is	an	expression	of	the	will	to	power,	and	according	to	both	bifurcations	it	will	often	be	juxtaposed	and	seen	by	others	as	ugly.		In	the	case	of	weak	or	fettered	spirits,	the	ugliness	comes	from	the	aversion	to,																																																									866	‘Tandava”	is	the	name	of	the	dance	performed	by	Shiva	to	bring	about	the	destruction	of	the	world	and	its	regeneration.		The	Lasya	is	performed	in	response	to	it	by	Parvati,	and	is	said	to	be	an	erotic	dance	exemplifying	beauty	and	grace,	and	thus	one	should	say,	a	‘giving	form’	or	a	‘transformation’		
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and	reaction	against,	nature.		In	the	case	of	the	Übermensch,	the	aversion	comes	from	the	offense	that	decadence	causes	upon	the	senses.		But	what	is	important	to	Nietzsche	is	that	the	dance	of	convalescent	spirits	has	the	capacity	to	produce	from	it	a	future	music	of	societal	valuations.		The	dance	of	free,	Dionysian	spirits	is	pregnant	with	the	music	of	the	future,	and	allows	the	possibility	for	a	becoming	beautiful	where	coherence	is	established	with	the	musical	score	that	is	coming	to	be.		The	only	beauty	in	an	ascetic	dance	is	fantastical	–	or	even	delusional	–	in	virtue	of	the	fact	that	it	can	weaken	but	cannot	change	one’s	nature,	and	therefore	cannot	alter	the	music	that	their	dance	reacts	against.		The	disharmony	in	the	dance	of	the	weak,	sick,	and	fettered	spirits	is	symptomatic	of	degeneration.		Dance	always	involves	a	‘self-overcoming’	and	the	feeling	of	the	sublime	that	motivates	it	and	also	results	from	it.		But	the	self-overcoming	entails	something	different	for	both	decadent	and	convalescent	spirits.		Oppenheim	writes	that	the	medium	of	dance	“may	relate	to	homeodynamic	stability	in	ways	that	literature	and	painting	do	not.”867		She	also	observes	that,	unlike	words…	Musical	notes	…	have	no	innate	meanings.		Their	significance	derives	purely	from	the	relationship	between	them.		Though	in	a	sense	grammatical	and	syntactical,	they	do	not	signify	by	sign	and	symbol,	as	language	does.		The	same	is	true	of	the	movements	choreographed	into	a	ballet	or	modern	dance.		The	only	reality	is	that	of	the	dancer’s	body,	which	cannot	designate	any	other	reality	existing	a	priori	outside	it.868																																																												867	Oppenheim,	Curious	Intimacy,	pg.	121	868	Oppenheim,	Curious	Intimacy,	pg.	123	
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This	echoes	the	same	sentiment	Nietzsche	argues	that,	as	Cox	observes,	there	is	no	reality	outside	of	one’s	interpretation	of	it.		Every	interpretation	is	itself	an	embodied	work	of	art.	Dance,	more	than	anything	else	in	Nietzsche’s	writings,	exemplifies	an	attunement	to	one’s	body,	to	the	senses,	and	to	the	environment.		It	indicates	a	substantial	openness	and	receptiveness	to	one’s	own	natural	inclinations.		And,	I’d	like	to	argue,	it	expresses	metaphorically	a	constitution	and	an	orientation	with	oneself	and	the	world	that	is	incorporative	and	requires	both	free	expression	as	well	as	strength	and	discipline.		That	is	to	say,	dance	expresses	for	Nietzsche	the	strength,	creativity,	and	self-mastery	necessary	for	philosophers	of	the	future;	it	involves	neither	repression	nor	disavowal,	but	instead	a	discipline	peculiar	to	the	vicissitude	of	sublimation.		It	epitomizes	the	activity	and	ethos	of	the	Übermensch.												
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V.	Concluding	Remarks	
For	sentient	beings,	living	involves	our	vicissitudes	of	drives	and	instincts	–	our	motivational	states	–	that	structure	how	we	relate	to	ourselves	and	to	the	world.		As	Nietzsche	writes,	“…	relations	…	constitute	the	essence”	of	things.869	These	vicissitudes	seek	to	preserve	what	is	agreeable	by	mastering	or	repudiating	what	is	disagreeable.		They	are	therefore	influenced	aesthetically	as	the	means	by	which	sentient	beings	procure	homeostases	in	life,	a	feeling	of	harmony,	according	to	one’s	strength	or	weakness.		And	this	also	occurs	through	any	number	of	vicissitudes	(e.g.,	repression,	disavowal,	aggression,	or	sublimation).		But	the	vicissitudes	also	determine	our	orientation	in	the	world.		In	this	way,	the	vicissitudes	structure	our	aesthetic	interpretations	of	the	world,	such	that	repressions	or	disavowals	will	determine	what	is	beautiful	for	egodystonically	constituted	spirits,	or	sublimations	determine	what	is	beautiful	for	egosyntonically	constituted	spirits.		Beauty	is	indicative	of	homeostasis	for	each.		Ethical	values	are	schematic	of	these	aesthetic	values.		When	we	speak	of	ethics,	we	refer	to	our	means	of	relating.		What	is	‘ethically’	or	‘morally’	good	is	that	which	was	determined,	aesthetically,	to	procure	homeostasis.	Homeostasis	is,	in	life,	a	detour	of	entropic	trends	that	Freud	refers	to	as	the	death	drive.		Living	well,	according	to	Nietzsche,	necessarily	involves	sublimation	as	only	that	vicissitude	allows	for	the	incorporation	of	diverse,	often	conflicting	elements,	including	self-interest	(the	will	to	power	and	our	motivational	states).		
																																																								869	Nietzsche,	The	Will	to	Power,	§625	
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Sublimation	is	an	egosyntonic	means	of	the	will	to	power	expressing	itself	for	sentient	beings.		If	at	bottom	every	vicissitude	is	a	particular	means	of	expressing	an	entropic	trend	in	psychical	life	–	the	death	drive,	as	I	have	argued	–	then	to	live	well	entails	living	by	sublimating	the	death	drive.		To	live	well	requires	egosyntonic,	homeodynamic	processes.		The	Übermensch	is	Nietzsche’s	archetypal	representative	of	that	kind	of	living,	and	this	is	expressed,	metaphorically,	by	living	as	sublimated	dying.		 																
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